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Thesis Abstract
This thesis examines the occurrence, convergence and divergence of tropes of 
cultural pessimism in British and French letters over the two decades following 
the Second World War. Like other forms of pessimism, cultural pessimism is a 
consistently negative approach to the future; here it refers to the prospects of 
culture as a whole, seeing it as being in decline. The specific cultural context 
surveyed here has received little critical attention in the already limited declinism 
scholarship; as a time of sweeping change, it is a particularly revealing juncture 
that also suggests new tropes for the cultural pessimism range. Although Britain 
and France had arrived at the end of the war in rather different circumstances, in 
the following twenty years they underwent similar social, economic and cultural 
processes: cultural massification, decolonisation, modernisation,
Americanisation, postwar reconstruction and Cold War positioning. These 
processes are taken as the basis for this ad hoc thematic comparison. The first 
section discusses cultural pessimism with reference to class and social structure; 
it surveys discourses on Culture and popular culture and expands on two 
illustrative works: Jean Genet’s Le Balcon and Alan Sillitoe’s Saturday Night 
and Sunday Morning. In the second section, conceptions of national identity and 
collective memory come to the fore: similar reattachments to heritage, real or 
imagined, are explored through Angus Wilson’s Anglo-Saxon Attitudes and 
Marguerite Duras’s Hiroshima mon amour. The third section unpacks the 
morally ambivalent concept of youth along with the advent of youth culture and 
its greater adaptability to modernisation and Americanisation, and develops this 
alongside discussions of Boris Vian’s L \Ecume des jours and Colin Maclnnes’s 
Absolute Beginners.
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Introduction
Rationale
This thesis will argue for the pertinence of the theme of cultural pessimism as a 
basis for the interpretation of cultural phenomena in the postwar period. Several 
concepts and tropes of this theme will be used to recontextualise certain British 
and French literary works of the two decades following the Second World War. 
These texts will be considered in their broader cultural context, taking into 
account associated contemporary cultural discourses and a range of literary and 
theoretical works. The French and British sides will be discussed separately, each 
in its own terms; however, frequent links will be drawn to point out comparisons, 
correspondences and influences across the Channel. This end will be served by a 
structure of themed chapters, exploring social structure and class, national 
identity, and youth culture respectively. As a whole, this thesis will provide a 
window onto the workings of an intellectual, culturally pessimistic attitude in 
Britain and France, post-war but pre-‘Sixties’.1
The thematics of cultural pessimism are pregnant with meaning. Put 
simply, cultural pessimism is a particular subset of pessimism that concerns the 
prospects of culture and consistently sees them as negative or doomed. Culture in 
this context has been understood variously as national culture, ‘high’ culture, or 
that of humanity as a whole. The original scope of this project included only 
ideas of cultural decline (e.g. decadence or degeneration), but these form only 
part of the picture. Another major subset of cultural pessimism includes images 
of the actual end of culture, be it in states of ‘civilisation’ or ‘barbarism’ or in a 
total apocalypse. Cultural pessimisms also vary regarding the root cause of 
culture’s corruption: some regard cultural decline as a creeping, intensifying 
trend that becomes increasingly apparent throughout history (which leads some 
to call this approach ‘historical pessimism’); others see culture as essentially
1 That is, before the cultural phenomenon of ‘the Sixties’, as distinct from the decade itself. See 
the discussion of periodisation below.
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corrupt, considering (like Walter Benjamin) each document of culture also a 
document of barbarity.2
Tropes of cultural pessimism may be apparently disparate, but their 
epistemic merit is in their interconnectedness. To understand the many tropes and 
outlooks of ‘cultural pessimism’ requires understanding them as one system, 
however diverse, in which all parts are connected and therefore indicative of one 
another. Such a study would be first and foremost a study of content, of 
thematics and their interpretations, as it is the pessimistic themes that define this 
system.
This thesis is intended as a new outlook onto familiar phenomena, 
offering the application of the thematics of cultural pessimism to postwar British 
and French cultures. This intended import is strengthened by relative lacks in the 
relevant fields. Firstly, studies of cultural pessimism are few and far between and 
are relatively recent. Among these studies, rare are the ones that approach 
cultural pessimism synthetically: the majority deal with particular subsets of it, 
such as degeneration or millenialism. Secondly, in cultural pessimism 
scholarship there is little to account for the particular period discussed in this 
thesis, stretching roughly from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s. In this respect 
the study offered below ploughs its own furrow. Thirdly, this thesis joins a small 
group of comparative French-British cultural studies. While these studies are not 
numerous, over the past decade interest in comparative perspectives has been 
growing, as has their legitimacy, not least under the regionalist mantle of 
European Studies. Lastly, a study of cultural pessimism falls within the scope of 
history of ideas, itself a type of cultural history. Cultural histories are written by 
historians as well as by non-historians, often being modem language scholars, 
who seek to fill the broadening, culturalist remits of modem language studies.
2 Both allusions will be discussed below.
3 A good primer on degeneration is Degeneration: The Dark Side o f  Progress, ed. by Edward J.
Chamberlin and Sander L. Gilman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); on the 
millennium in modem secular perceptions see Krishan Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in 
Modem Times (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); on decadence, see Charles Bemheimer, Decadent 
Subjects: the Idea o f  Decadence in Art, Literature, Philosophy, and Culture o f  the Fin de 
Siecle in Europe, ed. by T. Jefferson Kline and Naomi Schor (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). See also the literature survey below.
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This study is of the latter variety and as such offers a different perspective to 
those of historians who might study the same objects. In sum, the particular 
thematic and methodological slant of this thesis should distinguish it from related 
works.
These are the basic intentions of this thesis; but it is equally important to 
clarify what it does not intend. Because of its limited length and scope, this thesis 
cannot be an exhaustive survey of postwar British and French literatures or 
cultures. Therefore, the works and topics were chosen for discussion because 
they were consequential and representative in articulating the central concerns of 
their period. The thematic interpretation through cultural pessimism is not 
intended to be a definitive one, but only plausible, valid and contributing to the 
greater understanding of its objects. Furthermore, this is not merely a conceptual 
study of cultural pessimism: it also aims to elaborate on the theme’s relatively 
new definitions, to make several internal links and suggestions, and to then apply 
the theme as interpretive tool. Overall, this study is closely circumscribed by 
proposing an interpretive connection between two national cultures in postwar 
transition and pessimistic attitudes that may have influenced them.
This introductory chapter will now go on to present the objects and terms 
of engagement of this study. Its first part will expand on the concept of cultural 
pessimism, the definitions and development of cultural pessimism in history, as 
well as some notable terms recurring in cultural pessimism scholarship. Four 
main tropes of cultural pessimism will be introduced, followed by a suggestion 
of their relevance to various discourses and fields of inquiry. The second part of 
this introduction will introduce the historical context of this study, starting with 
an explanation of the period chosen (ca. 1944-1964), and of the problems of 
comparative periodisation. This will be followed by an elaboration of the 
similarities between postwar France and Britain that make up the basis for their 
comparison, also taking into account their respective peculiarities. The third part 
of this introduction will survey the available scholarship on the topics of this 
thesis, and will note several tendencies and problems this literature presents. This 
will lead us to the fourth part of the chapter, where the methodology of this thesis 
will be explained, together with its structure of three thematically defined 
sections.
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Cultural Pessimism
A composite discourse
Individual pessimism, as an object of psychology, is usually taken as an 
inclination consistently to view the world and future prospects negatively. 
Cultural pessimism differs from individual pessimism in two main respects: it 
limits the scope of pessimism to questions of culture; and it expands the 
character of pessimism beyond individual interest and to the realm of culture as 
collective identity. In a recent and wide-ranging study, Oliver Bennett asserts 
that “cultural pessimism arises with the conviction that the culture of a nation, a 
civilization or of humanity itself is in an irreversible process of decline”; and 
also, “in its severest form, it goes beyond the idea of culture as a set of 
intellectual and artistic practices, or even culture as a ‘signifying system’, and 
attaches itself to culture as a whole way of life,” therefore cultural pessimism is 
grounded in such common and hazy forms as fears for the continuation of ‘life as 
we know it’.4 This is an important effort to circumscribe a wide-ranging generic 
attitude or outlook, across the many ideologies, poetics and stylistics into which 
it translates. Bennett is primarily interested in ‘the postmodern world’; this 
thesis, on the other hand, will look at the period just before it, at what one might 
call the ‘prehistory’ of the postmodern.
Fundamental to the attitude of cultural pessimism is the idea of 
impending collective human degradation, the idea of a seemingly determined 
(and debatably reversible) cultural fmitude. It concerns mental attitudes rather 
than the ontological actuality of decline. Arthur Herman intimates that he is often 
asked, since he works ‘on decline’, whether culture is in fact declining or not -  
an experience recurrently shared by the author of this thesis.5 This is a common 
elision that must be avoided: cultural pessimism is a kind of pessimism, that is, a 
mental disposition rather than a real state of affairs. Whether it has much to rely 
on in real history is a moot point; nevertheless, this highlights two aspects of 
cultural pessimism, as cognitive disposition and as historical outlook.6
4 Oliver Bennett, Cultural Pessimism: Narratives o f  Decline in the Postmodern World
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 1.
5 Arthur Herman, The Idea o f Decline in Western History (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 1.
6 Bennett, 15.
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A contested distinction exists between cultural pessimism and historical 
pessimism: as Herman, who makes the distinction, puts it, “the historical 
pessimist sees civilization’s virtues under attack from malign and destructive 
forces that it cannot overcome; cultural pessimism claims that those forces form 
the civilizing process from the start.” However, adopting Bennett’s definition 
renders Herman’s distinction secondary, regarding a classification of cultural- 
pessimist positions: some strains are bom of bad experience, others rely on a 
priori judgments; some see decline as reversible, others consider it ultimate.8
If cultural pessimism has a history, it is important to recognise its agents. 
J.H. Buckley suggests a starting point in his study of Victorian Decadents when 
he distinguishes between ‘writers of decadence’ and ‘decadent writers’.9 The 
distinction is between those who hold Decadent opinions (or in our case, cultural 
pessimists) and those who merely document or convey Decadent attitudes or 
mindsets, without necessarily embracing those attitudes themselves. This 
distinction is relevant to a broadly defined culture as the question of authorial 
intention is only important when a writer also conveys it by non-fictional or non- 
literary means, in their capacity as a public figure rather than as a ‘hidden’ 
author. For this thesis, only one side of Buckley’s distinction -  the ideas, images 
and tropes of cultural pessimism -  is relevant. ‘Decadent style’ (see below) has 
no parallel in a looser, broader grouping of ideas like cultural pessimism. There 
is no ‘pessimist stylistics’, only some culture-specific pessimistic tropes: 
narratives, themes, images.
Expanding the question of agency to include traditions of thought, Ilan 
Gur-Ze’ev suggests a three-way differentiation between self-proclaimed 
pessimists, who have allied themselves with the Western pessimistic tradition of 
philosophical thought; ‘appropriated’ pessimists, themselves not belonging to the 
pessimist tradition; and, finally, thinkers not belonging or appropriated to the 
pessimistic tradition, whose work still prominently features pessimistic
7 Herman, 444.
8 See Bennett’s fifth question in Bennett, 12.
9 Jerome Hamilton Buckley, Triumph o f  Time: A Study o f  the Victorian Concepts o f  Time,
History, Progress, and Decadence (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1966), 88-93.
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elements.10 This differentiation illuminates cognitive and volitional aspects of 
pessimistic expression as public action: the consideration of a pessimistic work 
independently of its author and his allegiances, and the importance of pessimist 
traditions to the validation of pessimist standpoints. The present thesis contends 
that in the postwar period several overlapping traditions of culturally pessimistic 
thought persist, some older and some more general than others, generally sharing 
common wellsprings. The mutual influences of these traditions produce newer 
expressions and varieties of cultural pessimism, products of their times no less 
than of the traditions that have informed them.
History of decline
Any historical account of ideas of cultural decline is bound to be partial, and this 
short survey is no exception. That notwithstanding, it will nevertheless attempt to 
include several central themes relevant to this study, the full details of which are 
in the bibliography.
The Jewish and the Christian paradigms, both based on monotheistic 
religions of revelation, share a fundamental faith in two symbolic and narrative 
elements: the start of humanity’s life in the world with the Fall and banishment 
from Eden; and its end in redemption by transcendence.11 Four major prophecies 
of the Old Testament (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel) and several of the 
Apocrypha and Pseudoepigrapha are visions of apocalypse and salvation of the 
righteous. The New Testament ends with a more detailed account of a similar 
terminus in the Book of Revelation. Additionally, Pentateuch guidelines for the 
eventuality of a whole community becoming ‘fallen’ either by heresy or by lax 
morality (the issue of Ir HaNidaxat, the corrupted town) preceded Old Testament 
canonisation and further elaboration in the Mishna and Talmud. This, too, attests 
to the special attention and violent reaction to the possibility of collective (as 
distinct from personal) degeneration accorded by the religious establishment.
10 Ilan Gur-Ze’ev, The Frankfurt School and the History o f  Pessimism [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem:
The Hebrew University Magnes Press, 1996), 13.
11 In that, they were preceded by the Sumerians (ca. 4000BC) and Zoroaster (ca. 1400BC). 
Bennett, 11.
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Frank Kermode suggests coupling the Christian concept of decadence 
with the concept of empire, as part of a host of symbolic terms from the 
revelation and apocalypse at the end of the New Testament, relating the myths of 
the end of history and of redemption. In this context, decadence is the process of 
the waning power of empire -  a specific empire or the empire of man, i.e. 
civilisation. Its occurrence signifies the imminent End, of empire and of history. 
Thus Kermode’s future-directed “myth of decadence” serves to depict and 
explain an “end-dominated age of transition,” around which various phenomena 
in nature and society cohere, affecting perception of the present through ordering 
time and Man’s place in it, replacing endless transition with a clear “sense of an 
ending.” 12 To Kermode, the need for (at least possible) closure was not unique to 
Christianity or other religious traditions. He sees cultural-pessimistic patterns as 
relevant to literary studies: secular tragedy reinterprets apocalyptic patterns, and 
its tragic undoing replaces religious decadence.
Modernity, greatly overlapping with secularisation in Western Europe, 
offers the first opportunity to examine decline (and cultural pessimism) in 
relation to the concept of progress. Belief in human perfectibility had preceded 
modernity, but progress (and its critics, like Erasmus and Machiavelli) first 
appears in public discourse as integral to Renaissance humanism, then in 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century New Science writings (by, for example, Vico, 
Bacon).13 Progress was central to the late-eighteenth century Enlightenment 
project. By then, studies of classical forms and their disappearance had produced 
historical analyses with interesting conclusions. Edward Gibbon’s The Decline 
and Fall o f  the Roman Empire (1776-1788) asserted that Rome’s moral and 
cultural decline was the cause of its political and social disintegration and ruin, a 
fate shared by all civilisations as a natural law of deterministic history. Count de 
Volney expressed similar thoughts in Les Ruines, ou meditations sur les 
revolutions des empires (1791). Thomas Malthus, in his Essay on the Principle o f  
Population (1798) raised concerns about the sustainability of economic progress, 
which might turn into retrogression should it exceed society’s capacities to feed
12 Frank Kermode, The Sense o f  an Ending: Studies in the Theory o f  Fiction with a New 
Epilogue, rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 [1966]), 12-17.
13 See Bennett, 9.
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itself: history and humanity’s progress might move with ‘accelerated velocity’ 
and adversely affect the human psyche. Jean-Jacques Rousseau saw modernity 
and progress as grounds to wish for their own undoing {Emile, or On Education, 
1762) or for a reformed civil society {The Social Contract, 1762).14
The nineteenth century is replete with examples of cultural pessimism, 
not least because of disillusionment with the ‘project of modernity’. Romantics 
like Blake, Shelley, Schiller, and Thomas Carlyle (in ‘Signs of the Times’, 
1829), disapproved of the detrimental effects of technological progress on 
culture, influencing later observers like Matthew Arnold {Culture and Anarchy, 
1868-9). Desire Nisard’s invocation of decadent Rome to critique 1830s France 
was then adopted and elaborated by Baudelaire, Verlaine, and Mallarme. The 
pessimistic meditations of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche became touchstones for 
future philosophies of strife and irrationality.15 With steadily accelerating 
industrialisation and urbanisation, and a growing (and increasingly visible) 
working class, Marx’s condemnation (in Capital, 1867) of the bourgeois way of 
life for essentially exceeding its capacities was resonant as both an analytical 
diagnosis and a moral repudiation. Darwin’s evolutionary conjecture in The 
Origin o f Species (1859) and The Descent o f  Man (1871) was similarly 
influential through its many usurpations as allegedly corroborating physiognomy, 
eugenics, ‘social Darwinism’, and racial supremacist theories. Marx’s (and 
Tocqueville’s) view of social and cultural massification compounded with 
pseudo-Darwinian elements, in other widely read works such as Gustave 
LeBon’s La Psychologie des Foules (1895) and Max Nordau’s Degeneration 
(1895).
The end of the First World War saw the appearance of the most 
influential culturally pessimistic historical analysis in the twentieth century, 
Oswald Spengler’s The Decline o f the West (1918-1922). Spengler derived from 
the natural sciences his understanding of historical ‘high cultures’ as organic 
(collective) bodies with single life-spans, and his model for a deterministic 
‘historical morphology’ of cultural life-cycles. Like Herder, Kant and Humboldt
14 These were preceded by his critical ‘Discourse on the Arts and Sciences’ (1750) and 
‘Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men’ (1754); Bennett, 8.
15 See Bennett, 5-6.
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before him, Spengler distinguished between Kultur, the organic phase of culture 
most concerned with the idea of morality, and Zivilisation, its state of irreversible 
decline, when it becomes artificial and superficial. Latest in the succession of 
world ‘high cultures’ comprising history was the restless, haunted, ‘Faustian’ 
West, that Spengler believed had been declining since Napoleon. He saw this in 
its alienation from the strong local bonds of organic culture; the state epitomised 
by the cosmopolis, showing cultural disintegration in the rule of money, 
democracy and the press; and the rise of science, rationalism, socialism, and 
internationalism. This led Spengler to anticipate a new ascendant ‘high culture’, 
which for a while he identified in regenerationist ideas of German national- 
socialism. Spengler’s historical application of the culture/civilisation distinction 
and its deterministic vigour were resonant, shaping a widespread form of 
interwar (and postwar) cultural pessimism and inspiring similar studies, such as 
Arnold Toynbee’s A Study o f  History (1934-1961).
Several o f Spengler’s contemporaries were similarly influential in their 
cultural pessimism. Freud’s Civilisation and Its Discontents (1929) criticised the 
destructive contradictions and tensions of the modem West. In the wake of Freud 
and Marx, the work of Benjamin (‘Theses on the Concept of History’, 1940) and 
Adomo and Horkheimer {Dialectics o f  Enlightenment, 1944) reflected on the 
inherently flawed nature of ‘Enlightened’ civilisation, showing its barbarism in 
mass repression and a ‘culture industry’ driven by an overarching ‘instrumental 
rationality’. More recently, Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard’s term ‘the postmodern 
condition’ {La Condition posmodeme, 1979) denotes a sense of displacement 
and loss in the late twentieth-century West, where the eroded authority of ‘grand 
narratives* left a lack of an overarching structure of meaning to contemporary 
human experience. One lost ‘grand narrative’ is universal humanism, the 
foundational belief in the individual as the autonomous elementary agent of 
ethics, society and history. This kind of bourgeois ‘ideological thought’ was 
opposed by Althusser, who suggested instead that social relations and masses are 
ethically and historically more important than individuals and their wills. 
Althusser’s radical ‘anti-humanism’ was matched by similarly evocative and 
controversial assertions such as the ‘death of man’ (or ‘death of the subject’) in 
Foucault’s Les Mots et les choses (1966), or Barthes’s 1968 proclamation of the 
liberating ‘death of the author’ (as monolithic authoritative function). Foucault
14
thought the human as subject was formed by social and cultural practices and 
was therefore bereft of any (self-)constitutive role. To the contemporary 
westerner, the chagrin and resentment of the postmodern condition are more than 
a philosophical attitude: they shape the experience of life as categorically 
lacking, prompting either concern or indifference.
Terms of cultural pessimism
An adequate history of any idea or set of ideas should include a survey of the 
terminology related to it -  a challenging task with cultural pessimism. The 
relative novelty of a general discourse on cultural pessimism is due in part to the 
fact that existing discourses regarding its constituent parts, chiefly ‘decadence’ 
and ‘degeneration’, are usually confined to considerations of the fm-de-siecle. 
Decline is also elusive: scholarship accepts that the term ‘decadence’ does not 
have a fixed historical referent, meaning quite different things throughout history 
and in religious or secular contexts.16 However related, a plurality of terms 
indicates a plurality of significances and contexts of usage, all of them relevant to 
understanding cultural pessimism. Here again, discussions of each term are 
intentionally elementary, as each term could easily occupy an entire thesis on its 
own.
Decadence
The word ‘decadence’, derived from the early Medieval Latin decadentia for 
‘falling away from’, denotes several things. Its English lexical meaning is 
defined by the OED as a material phenomenon, “the process, period, or 
manifestation of moral or cultural decline.” 17 It is also a metaphor for a process 
o f deterioration that gives decline a suggestive visual or spatial interpretation of
16 Cf. Richard Gilman, Decadence: The Strange Life o f  an Epithet (London: Seeker & Warburg, 
1979). Gilman thinks this lack o f fixity is wrong and dangerous, wishing the term ‘decadence’ 
be abandoned in scholarship altogether.
17 “Decadence,” in Concise Oxford English Dictionary, rev. 10th edn, ed. by Judy Pearsall 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 370.
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‘falling away’, and with that a stronger, figurative negative connotation.18 This 
metaphor also functions as a mytheme, an elementary functional unit in the 
structural analysis of myths, and specifically religious fabulae mundi of 
antiquity. In those myths decadence helps explain the degradation of experience 
as we know it toward finitude as the way of the world. Decadence is therefore 
closely linked with eschatology, and this association has shaped its common 
meanings to this day, even in modem secular incarnations of culture as ideology 
that superseded religion.19
Decadence also appears in the history of European ideas as the proper 
name o f a short-lived post-romantic artistic movement, active mainly in London 
and Paris o f the 1880s and early 1890s. The Decadents were not a clearly defined 
group and shared several characteristics and members with the Symbolists, who 
similarly sought to disturb the otherwise straightforward referential function of 
literary language. Talk of Decadence in cultural-historical contexts usually refers 
to this specific movement and its times. The Decadents and their work inform 
arguments over modernism and over progress versus degeneration. As such they 
were not alone: confusingly, “it was this sense o f decline that inspired many of 
the revivals of the nineteenth century: the Nazarenes, the pre-Raphaelite 
Brotherhood, Pugin’s Gothic Revival, the Arts and Crafts movement and Art 
Nouveau.”20
Decadent Style and Thematics
Gayatri Spivak suggests that the Decadent formulation of the literary task of 
reference be understood through its background in the revolt of ‘modernism’ 
against its ‘traditional’ antecedents. Decadent style refers to the ‘natural’ world 
not as it ‘really is’ but at one remove, as a modem world already made into 
artifice. Its challenge is then self-consciously to display a discontinuity between 
icon and significance, and to create the readers’ knowledge of that gap and its
18 For a discussion of decadence as a spatial metaphor see Matei Calinescu, Five Faces o f  
Modernity, rev. edn (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1987), 152-154.
19 On decadence in Christian eschatology see Kermode, 3-31.
20 Partick Bade, “Art and Degeneration: Visual Icons o f Corruption,” in Degeneration: The Dark 
Side o f  Progress, ed. by Edward J. Chamberlin and Sander L. Gilman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985), 221.
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meanings, so as to undermine the otherwise “comfortable faith in words’ 
reference to things” (what Russian Formalists later called the ‘estrangement 
effect’).21 Alienated from their present, Decadents sought the bizarre, the sublime 
and fantastic, to be captured only by the finest filaments of the aesthetic 
connoisseur’s senses. The ordinary objects surrounding characters in Naturalist 
nineteenth-century novels were replaced in Decadent works by an eclectic 
assemblage o f obscure curiosities. Awareness was drawn to the ironic gap 
between the seemingly ‘beautiful* language and what is otherwise commonly 
understood as ‘beautiful’, language itself has to be transformed into a strangely 
artificial encoding. The intentionally unnatural and disturbed text was 
constructed through rare and obscure words; arcane allusions to extinct 
traditions, semantic contexts and linguistic registers; and neologisms created 
especially by the Decadent author.22
Spivak’s treatment of Decadence as literary style is telling: as she herself 
claims, most o f the discussions of Decadent style are grounded in ‘literary 
historical research’, reducing literature to a reflection of the social history of its 
time by the use of suggestive slogans like ‘the pursuit of artificiality* and ‘art for 
art's sake’ (the name of a different, albeit related, artistic grouping). Decadent 
style is characterised by an aestheticist attitude to both experience (in content) 
and literature (in form); an overabundance of detail and description that 
seemingly disintegrates the surface cohesion of the text; the theme of highly 
individualistic, self-sufficient experience devoid of a sense of environment; and 
suffering rejection and mourning loss as life- and identity-affirming. Other topoi 
proper to fin-de-siecle Decadent literature are the insatiable desire of the sadistic 
woman (the femme fatale); the rampant sexuality of nature; the vital energy
21 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Decadent Style,” Language and Style VII, 4 (Fall, 1974), 227-
234; see also Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four 
Essays, ed. and trans. by Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1965).
22 See Rachel Leket, “Inside Jean des Esseintes’ Inner Sanctum” (in Hebrew), in Joris-Karl 
Huysmans, A Rebours, trans. by Benny Ziffer (Jerusalem: Carmel, 1998), 204-207.
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generated from organic decomposition; and, more generally, elements of 
misogyny, perversion, and orientalism.23
Generally, then, the Decadent attitude in literature is characteristically 
nihilist, individualistic and hedonistic; it is at once both immoralist and 
amoralist, both fascinated with the beauty of evil and seeking to sever altogether 
the linkage between the ‘artistic’, the ‘beautiful’, the ‘pure of form’ -  and the 
moral, the good, the emotional/affective. Significantly, it has been claimed that 
the Decadent attitude is symptomatic of moments of cultural transition, in which 
it sees the catastrophic exhaustion of a dying culture while looking ‘around the 
comer’ for its replacement.24 In principle, this pessimistic reaction of the 
Decadents to cultural transition resembles that of their harsh critic Spengler. This 
ironic affinity is indicative of the interconnectedness of cultural pessimistic 
tropes, and will inform the literary discussion in the third section below.
Degeneration
The term ‘degeneration’ appears in Western culture much later than the term 
‘decadence’. In fifteenth-century Latin the verb degenerare had meant 
debasement and so the adjective degeneratis ‘no longer of its kind’, or ‘fallen 
from its state at birth’. It appeared originally as a pessimistic assumption about 
the nature of history, akin to decadence in assuming that culture is ultimately 
irredeemable. The advent of degeneration as a biological term -  with its 
invocation of nature and natural species and hence its scientific appeal -only 
occurred in the eighteenth century, and that was the context in which it was
* OSemployed until the early twentieth century. The pseudo-scientific discourse of 
degeneration assimilated into it other developments in the natural sciences.
23 Charles Bemheimer, Decadent Subjects: The Idea o f  Decadence in Art, Literature, Philosophy,
and Culture o f  the Fin de Siecle in Europe, ed. by T. Jefferson Kline and Naomi Schor 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 102.
24 Nicholas Zurbrugg, “Beyond Decadence: Huysmans, Wilde, Baudrillard and Postmodern 
Culture,” in Michael St. John (ed.), Romancing Decay: Ideas o f Decadence in European 
Culture (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 210-212; Zurbrugg relies on Renato Poggioli, The Poets 
o f  Russia 1890-1930 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 80-88 passim.
25 For the orthodox interpretations of biological degeneration see: Daniel Pick, Faces o f  
Degeneration: A European Disorder, c. 1848-c. 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989).
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Darwinian evolution theory was suggestively usurped to ‘justify’ the managed 
‘survival of the fittest’ within human society to ensure human development. 
Likewise, entropy in the second law of thermodynamics was misinterpreted as 
affirming the doomed fate of the earth in ‘heat death’; as a metaphor entropy was 
further misinterpreted as the wasting away of order and energy, a general 
‘degeneration’ of existence.
Until the 1940s the Nazis also used the term ‘degeneration’. Informing 
the malign political modernism of Nazism, race theory (accounting for biological 
degeneration) and cultural degeneration were two complementary elements, akin 
in their degenerationist outlook. The centrality of culture as ideology, which 
Terry Eagleton called the ‘Ideology of the Aesthetic’, was a similar and specific 
German characteristic. This is evident as far back as Winckelmann’s neo- 
classicism and Friedrich Schlegel’s romanticism and their respective uses of the 
term ‘degeneration’, and most prominently in Max Nordau’s indictment of his 
contemporary culture in Entartung (1895, translated into English as 
Degeneration, 1896).
Cultural degeneration is a prime example of the fallacy of indistinctness 
between individual and social degeneration, essentially the metaphorical blow-up 
of the personal to the scale of the universal, making the token an entire type. This 
was attributed to the suggestive functions of degeneration as ‘generative 
metaphor’ (according to Stuart C. Gilman) and ‘explanatory myth’ (according to 
William Greenslade).27 Discussing Nordau's Entartung, Alison Hennegan 
suggests that degeneration “is a way of thinking tailored for those who seek 
scapegoats, who require always to be allowed to believe that danger can be kept 
out,” and so Entartung was timely in offering “one man’s passionately expressed
• 9 0prejudices and a popularizing digest of currently fashionable theories.” 
Nordau’s vitriol was directed at his contemporaries, ‘Decadents and aesthetes’
26 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
27 Stuart C. Gilman, “Political Theory and Degeneration: From Left to Right, from Up to Down,”
in Chamberlin and Gilman (eds.), 167; William Greenslade, Degeneration, Culture and the 
Novel 1880-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 15.
28 Alison Hennegan, “Personalities and Principles: Aspects of Literature and Life in fin-de-siecle
England,” in Fin de Siecle and Its Legacy, ed. by Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 189.
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such as Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Ibsen and particularly Wilde, seen as a charismatic 
corruptor who had betrayed his artistic calling for the role of seducer, turning his 
seduced acolytes into corrupting agents spreading the contagious disease of 
‘degeneration’.
In short, degeneration is a biological interpretation of the concept of 
decadence, pinning the blame for social or cultural degradation, that is, of human 
behaviour, on a form of biological essentialism. The credibility which 
degenerationist theories enjoyed for several decades in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was the result of an adoption of terminology from the 
natural sciences to apply to all social problems. It was also the expression of a 
progressivist confidence in the industrial revolution as a beneficial effect of the 
growth of science and technology, while explaining away its adverse social 
effects in urbanisation, pauperisation and criminality. Losing all serious 
credibility by the end of the Second World War, degenerationism will not be of 
much use to this study. It is nevertheless important to distinguish it from 
decadence as such, as another variety of cultural pessimism.
Declinism
The impression or consciousness of living in a declining culture, inasmuch as it 
affects behaviour, has been described as declinism. In effect, declinism is cultural 
pessimism in its broadest sense, as an outlook, a worldview or a mentalite that 
shapes one’s very perception of the world. As mentalite, declinism reveals 
another side of cultural pessimism, that of a Zeitgeist, a generational spirit 
grounded in a shared, collective experience. Cultural pessimism is therefore 
historicised: it becomes a historical fact rather than merely a philosophical or 
psychological term. Moreover, as mentalite, declinism has a synthetic quality: it 
is not just a cognitive ‘filter’ of experience but also a principle by which it is 
understood.
Declinism is, then, clearly distinct from the more traditional terms of 
‘decadence’ and ‘degeneration’, but many of its contemporary forms are 
informed by the metaphorical understanding of those terms or by their 
intellectual legacies. It is this broadest term that will be of most use to this thesis,
29 Cf. Peter Hennessy, Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 28.
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binding together tropes of cultural pessimism into historically and socially 
specific narratives, and helping identify the values implicit in them.
Tropes of cultural pessimism
To clarify the ways in which cultural pessimism manifests itself in modes of 
thought and expression, it is useful to expand on several main tropes of cultural 
pessimism that recur independently but in connection with the terms just 
discussed. There is no existing compendium of tropes of cultural pessimism and 
the four main tropes presented below have been collected in and through the 
preparation of this thesis.
A first trope of cultural pessimism to be considered is that of belatedness, 
being the feeling of living ‘late in history’, in an old world in which all has been 
seen and done before. Indeed, it is through the efforts of past generations that we 
have arrived to be and act in our own time -  a feeling of indebtedness 
encapsulated in the suggestion (by the twelfth-centuiy monk Joachim of Fiore) 
that we are ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’, and if we do see further it is 
thanks to this fact. The Joachite dictum is therefore ambivalent: on the one hand, 
the impression of command and abundance is significant, but on the other hand 
belatedness can be coloured by a feeling of destitution, of living past the end of a 
great age. Martin L. Davies suggests that the sense of indebtedness to the past is 
the basis for reactionary politics (indeed, that is its most common manifestation) 
and also for the cult of heritage, a fetish of origins interpreted as an attempt to 
compensate with conservation for belatedness itself, taken to be lacking and 
guilty.30
A second prevalent trope of cultural pessimism has its roots in imperial 
Rome and the term panem et circenses, or ‘bread and circuses' , originally the 
populist devices employed by Augustus Caesar to pacify Rome’s citizens and 
fortify his rule. A seminal work of scholarship elaborating on the modem turns of 
the ‘bread and circuses’ metaphor is Patrick Brantlinger’s eponymous book. In 
his study, Brantlinger takes ‘bread and circuses’ as the metaphor it has become.
30 Martin L. Davies, “The Lateness of the World, or How to Leave the Twentieth Century,” in St. 
John (ed.), 251-252.
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Therefore, the critical understanding of a democratised or ‘mass’ culture and its 
agents as a form of social decay is at the heart of the book, taking the form of 
what he dubs ‘negative classicism’: the notion that the past is not only the 
positive model for modernity but also in the decadence of imperial Rome its 
negative template.31 Thus, for example, commercial mass media such as 
television have become the contemporary emblems of the fragmentation, 
privatisation, and moral and intellectual degradation of their audiences.
The trope of belatedness is distinct from our third trope of cultural 
pessimism, which regards not simply junctures late in history, but precisely the 
event o f the end of history, of apocalypse, and of theologies of the end, that is, 
eschatologies. This gives voice to more than just what Frank Kermode had called 
‘the sense of an ending’. If the present’s belatedness charges it from the past, 
apocalyptic narratives -  be they religious (the opening of the seven seals), 
secularised (nuclear catastrophe) or somewhere in between (millennialism) -  
indict it from the future, in fact from beyond the future, from beyond history. As 
such, apocalyptic narratives are not just formidable in themselves, as a horrible 
end envisioned, but also as a last judgment of all that is, or starts, today. The 
figure o f apocalypse is, for example, part of what endows the contemporary 
literary dystopias of Wells, Kafka, Huxley or Orwell with their evocative force.
A fourth, and rarer, trope of cultural pessimism, which seems by its logic 
to be the most recent, is that o f retrogression, or the undoing of progress,
experienced as disillusionment with progress itself. Sometimes this takes the 
form o f what Herman called ‘historical pessimism’: disappointment with human 
(or national, or classical) record that leads the observer to consistently anticipate
' X ' Jfailure and dysfunction, indeed to fatalism. This disenchantment can also be 
brought about through the removal of a sense of continuity of identity, a 
severance of ties to the past and to past ways of life.33 This breach can be a 
catastrophic event, as with France’s ‘strange defeat’ of 1940, but it can also be a
31 Patrick Brantlinger, Bread and Circuses: Theories o f  Mass Culture as Social Decay (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 17.
32 Inasmuch as this dysfunction is lateness itself, Davies sees it as a form of belatedness. In
general, however, the fatalism of disillusionment has broader foundations, and this goes to 
demonstrate the interconnectedness of tropes of cultural pessimism, Davies, 253.
33 Bennett, 9.
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process of dissipation, like the erosion of authority of grand narratives in 
Lyotard’s ‘postmodern condition’. The loss of faith in progress can also inspire a 
search for compensations in fantasy and nostalgia, or to embittered cynicism 
regarding progress.34 Temperamentally such disappointment is not merely 
lamented but also experienced with the rage and self-recrimination of the 
undeceived.
Talk of continuity and breach, transformation and novelty in tropes of 
cultural pessimism, that is, a historical survey of them, is meaningless outside of 
historically situated narratives that employ them, usually in combination. 
Postwar declinist narratives relating to the unprecedented circumstances of the 
nuclear age can, for example, seem wholly novel. In fact, the tropes of 
belatedness, disillusionment and apocalypticism that recur in such narratives 
situate them within wider European and Western traditions of thought. These 
tropes also link declinist narratives to other discourses through which they, and 
cultural pessimism as a whole, can also be explored.
Relevance of cultural pessimism
Introducing a psychological study of optimism and pessimism, Edward C. Chang 
suggests that “it is the power of possibility that represents an important
35determination of who and what we are and how we exist in the world.” The 
question of general pessimism, and thus of cultural pessimism, is therefore
36  * «largely a question of perceived possibilities. The idea of decline, which 
underlies the attitude of cultural pessimism, is often introduced as a lack, as ‘the 
reverse o f Progress’ or the absence of cultural optimism. It is the logical 
consequence of the construction (or assumption) of the ideal reality of Progress, 
as central to the Enlightenment project, to secular humanism, to modernity, and 
therefore to Western identity at large. Just as the added meanings attached to the
34 Joe Bailey, Pessimism (London: Routledge, 1988), 42-43.
35 Chang links this to the influence of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) on postwar philosophy,
theology and psychology. Edward C. Chang (ed.), Optimism & Pessimism: Implications for  
Theory, Research, and Practice (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 
2001), 4.
36 Bailey’s Pessimism is an illuminating source on general pessimism.
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idea of Progress can be the source of positive motivation, so the possibility of 
decline, or of any non-progression, becomes a menacing eventuality, a source for
• • • T 7discontent and a negative motivation. Thus, in a culture premised on Progress 
as a descriptive and normative state of affairs, the very possibility of decline 
becomes almost taboo, that which is beyond the pale.
Progress gives rise to its own discontents, in particular to ‘technological 
pessimism’. The mystification of the old ‘mechanical arts’ as modem 
‘technology’, invested with Enlightenment social hopes made it an idealised 
entity, an agent of the faith in human improvement through objective, certain 
knowledge. The souring of technological optimism can understandably be the 
source o f great despair: for their very success and pervasiveness, science and 
technology have had adverse effects that become particularly alarming in the 
awareness of our dependence on them and relative ignorance of them. Thus, 
technological pessimism tends toward fatalism, acquiescing with the historical 
determinism of technology, as the ideal that replaced the just republican 
society.39 To some, this technological pessimism blurs earlier distinctions 
between private and public spheres, and a symptom of the frustrated hope of 
escaping the exercise of fallible, contingent human judgment in politics through 
depersonalised determination of ‘the public interest’.40
The bulk of what is considered the pessimist tradition in social 
philosophy is reflected in conservative (Burke, Tocqueville) and neo­
conservative (Leo Strauss, Fukuyama) thought. Yet other pessimist 
interpretations, while embedded in traditionalist or conservative viewpoints, also 
have a revolutionary side to them, as exemplified by Spengler’s flirt with 
German national socialism. The Nazis had a new utopia to offer, albeit one 
imbued with traditional imagery, and like other utopias it appealed to a public
37 See introduction to Robert Nisbet, The History o f  the Idea o f  Progress (New York: Basic
Books, 1980).
38 Bennett, 113-122.
39 Leo Marx, “The Idea o f ‘Technology’ and Postmodern Pessimism,” in Yaron Ezrahi, Everett
Mendelsohn and Howard Segal (eds.), Technology, Pessimism, and Postmodernism 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 11-28.
40 Yaron Ezrahi, “Technology and the Illusion of the Escape from Politics,” in Ezrahi, 
Mendelsohn and Segal (eds.), 29-37.
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craving social transformation. Conservatives and revolutionaries have more in 
common that just this, but pessimism is an illustrative nexus for the two, as will 
be discussed in part one below.
Darker versions of cultural pessimism lack the utopian horizon of 
redemption, and their apocalyptic overtones contribute to the image of their 
proponents as Cassandras. What remains sometimes is a cultural pessimism 
confined to nostalgia, locating its frame of reference not in a hypothetical future 
but in a bygone past, or rather, in its idealisation. After all, the nostalgic 
recollection is a displacement: the lived past is the material of nostalgia, but 
nostalgia is not its product. Nostalgia taps into the same anxieties over continuity 
of identity so central to cultural pessimism: to compensate for transition and 
discontinuity, nostalgia refines and rehabilitates aspects of past experiences and 
of our former selves.41 Yet persistent, unresolved nostalgia indicates not only a 
lack o f a vision for the future (and a ‘constructed’ grasp of the past) but a failure 
to grapple with the present. By extension, adds Ian Wright, “the idea of ‘the 
tradition’ is a reflex of the intellectual’s inability to live fully in his own 
present.”42 As such, nostalgia feeds back into pessimist conservatism, and its 
compelling benchmarks are akin to Brantlinger’s ‘negative classicism’.
In the face of ‘certain’ decline, pessimism throws up questions of 
redemption and utopianism, of thinking beyond decline. As a critical outlook it 
presents an uncompromising will to transcendence, which in cultural pessimism 
is also translated into a political will to collective transcendence. Not all forms of 
cultural pessimism are devoid of the possibility of redemption: nevertheless, 
redemptive or not, they address the horizon of expectations, Chang’s ‘power of 
possibility’, regarding a present decline. As Ilan Gur-Ze’ev suggests, “the present 
state is understood in consistent pessimism as a flawed death, and so the struggle 
against it is the expression of real life.”43 More’s original Utopia was itself
41 Fred Davis, Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology o f  Nostalgia (New York: The Free Press,
1979), 8-9, 34, 44.
42 Wright refers to Leavis’s idea of ‘the Great Tradition’ of English literature and dedicates his
article to contextualising it. Ian Wright, “F.R. Leavis, the Scrutiny Movement and the Crisis,” 
in Culture and Crisis in Britain in the Thirties, ed. by Jon Clark, Margot Heinemann, David 
Margolies and Carole Snee (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1979), 50, 64 n.53.
43 Gur-Ze’ev, 13 (my translation and emphases).
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conjured up as a pessimistic response to the political mayhem of his age, and so 
cultural pessimism can be said to have a strong connection to the utopian 
tradition.
Context: places and times 
Comparative periodisation
Facing the challenge of periodisation, John Brannigan argues that “the problem 
with periodicity, with certain received ideas of literary history, is an 
overdependency upon an uncritical narrative structure which posits a 
recognizable origin or turning point, followed by a teleological progression of 
literary events, leading inevitably to our situation in the present.”44 To Brannigan 
as to the present cultural study, the received label ‘postwar’ should be questioned 
and reasoned independently, as a period in cultural, particularly literary history.
This thesis emerged from an interest in the immediate postwar period 
ending with ‘the Sixties’, a period hardly discussed with regard to cultural 
pessimism. However, whereas the British ended the war when they ceased 
fighting, in August 1945, and while French troops contributed to the final 
submission of Germany, the gradual liberation of France, already begun in 1944, 
did not conclude definitively until May 1945. This year’s gap is not negligible, 
considering the amount of political and intellectual purges the newly liberated 
managed to execute during the epuration.
However, this study contends that the war’s end is of secondary 
importance here, as there was no significant cultural turnaround triggered 
specifically by the end of the war. Newly emergent trends and cultural 
phenomena occurred in the immediate postwar years either as a result of 
processes which had started before or during the war, or entirely after it, or yet 
completely independently of it. The time of the Second World War itself was 
culturally important to postwar reality as a considerably influential period with 
many delayed effects; but to this cultural study it is important as a period, a 
transition, a watershed, rather than the single event of its end. Therefore, this
44 John Brannigan, Orwell to the Present: Literature in England, 1945-2000 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 9.
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study will acknowledge rather than try to reconcile the different ‘ends of war’ in 
Britain and France. This temporal difference will be obscured by the growing 
relevance of wartime and interwar events as touchstones in the context of cultural 
pessimism.
Placing the other temporal boundary in the early- or mid-1960s 
introduces similar disparities of comparison. In Britain, its defining end could be 
the 1963 breakthrough of the Beatles, signifying the undisputed arrival of a new 
wave of mainstream youth culture. This could be coupled with Harold Wilson’s 
electoral victory of 1964, a political shift brought on by an anticipation of change 
and liberalisation. In France, two obvious watersheds of the 1960s are the 1968 
evenements and the 1962 Evian accords, ending the war in Algeria and leading to 
its independence. Decolonisation forced a reconsideration of French collective 
identity as a culture, a nation, and a disintegrating empire -  a painful experience 
at the time and a sobering legacy. In a culture that values its intellectuals, the 
mid-1960s are also important as the high point of structuralism and the 
beginnings of post-structuralism, both trends also being national products 
enjoying particular success abroad.
In existing scholarship on postwar experiences in Britain and France there 
are already several accepted periodisations, predominantly along political lines. 
In Britain these include the Labour victory of 1945; the ousting of Attlee’s 
reconstruction government in 1951; the Suez affair of 1956; and Labour’s return 
to office in 1964. In France a similar pattern emerges, with histories dedicated to 
the Fourth Republic (1946-1958), to the De Gaulle presidency (1958-1969), or to 
colonial conflicts in Indochina and in Algeria as discrete periods. Another 
prominent definition is the trente glorieuses, the thirty glorious years (1944- 
1974) of reconstruction, mutation sociale and growing affluence, ending with the 
first world oil crisis and Giscard d’Estaing’s election.45 Still, as contended above, 
political points of reference are of limited import to this cultural study and cannot 
serve as its sole periodising principle.
Other common modes of periodisation are similarly inadequate for a 
study o f culture. Looking at decades seems plainly arbitrary. Culture does not
45 Jean Fourastid, Les Trente glorieuses, ou la revolution invisible de 1946 a 1975 (Paris: Fayard, 
1979).
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follow the pattern of decades, and the addition of a definite article to a decade is 
misleading in suggesting it has an essence, an overarching Zeitgeist. That 
Zeitgeist, endowed in retrospect (usually by people who ‘weren’t there’), 
specifically in popular memory manipulated by the popular media, is prone to 
Americanisation, making ‘the fifties’ years of wholesome, clean-cut 
conservatism, and ‘the sixties’ years of free-loving, optimistic hippie high times. 
As Kermode points out, thinking in decades does allow us to define time, to 
endow it with some finitude which will let us parcel and label it.46 This gives a 
welcome sense of certainty with regard to time (including the tensual 
compartments of past and future), but following it would lead too easily to a 
mimetic fallacy -  to seeing, as cultural pessimist arguments often do, signs in the 
times -  so it is best avoided.
Initially, ‘the postwar years’ seem to be fuzzily defined by an in-between 
generation, since we already have a more definite idea of what had occurred 
before then (the war) and what happened afterwards (‘the Sixties’, ‘the 
postmodern world’). Reference to a ‘postwar generation’ as definitive of the 
period is misleading, not just because generations simply deflect the question of 
definition, but also because a period frames more than one particular age group. 
If anything, the people we see as producers or consumers of culture are defined 
by not being of a certain age group: they were bom before or during the war, and 
so were not bom into a state of affairs already altered by it.
It would thus make sense to frame, albeit loosely, the years -  about two 
decades -  during which the cultural spheres in Britain and France were generated 
by (and largely for) people who were all bom before the end of the war, but not 
yet by the ‘baby boomers’ bom after it. This definition has much to do with 
personal experience: while the first ‘baby boomers’ only matured in the early 
1960s, the cultural production of the immediate postwar period was left to people 
with a broader perspective on the new conditions emerging in the late 1940s and 
1950s. These were people shaped by the economic depression of the 1930s, by 
political extremism, and by wartime shortages and horrors -  and who did not 
therefore take for granted the slow postwar reconstruction, modernisation and
46 Kerm ode, 7, 16-17.
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eventual affluence. This study is about them, their cultures, and their tropes of 
cultural pessimism.
The rough framing of this study’s period from the mid-1940s to the mid- 
1960s allows me to examine those tropes. Bom in different times, the people 
whose works will be discussed below have the advantage of experience and 
perspective, of not taking postwar conditions for granted. It is through this 
experience that sense is made of both the persistence of some cultural 
phenomena and of the novelty of others. It helps to contextualise the cultures of 
‘the postwar’ and to better understand this important interim.
France and Britain: similarities and peculiarities
As suggested above, there are several major similarities between the processes 
undergone by France and Britain after the Second World War. These serve as the 
basis for further comparison and their discussion will introduce our common 
terms o f reference in the postwar experience.
War and reconstruction
Only after the war did it become widely apparent that this was a new age of man- 
made catastrophes, which had reached the point of genocide and the possibility 
o f total human annihilation. Accounts of Nazi concentration camps travelled 
back to France and Britain through troops and press reports, and through 
returning camp survivors, living proofs of the horrors epitomised by Auschwitz. 
If Auschwitz happened ‘elsewhere’, then the American nuclear bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki to force Japanese capitulation must have initially 
seemed entirely other-worldly. The message to Japan resonated globally, 
heralding a nuclear age and new understandings of peace and of security. In that 
sense, the initial postwar period was dominated by images of Auschwitz 
(symbolising the Holocaust) and Hiroshima (symbolising indiscriminate nuclear 
destruction), reflecting a new scale of possible human catastrophes.47
47 Ory suggests this regarding the first postwar decade in France, Pascal Ory, L ’Aventure 
culturelle Frangaise 1945-1989 (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), 124.
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More immediately, the Second World War had also considerably 
devastated and impoverished Britain and France. In France, material devastation 
was coupled by the shame of occupation and nationalist Vichy collaboration 
which, contrasted with the multitude of political and regional resistance 
organisations, created a picture of social fragmentation. In Britain, mass 
displacement in children’s evacuations and conscript mobilisation was 
aggravated by great damage to bombed industrial cities and by a countryside tom 
by a web of defences in anticipation of a German land invasion. However, the 
fact that Britain was not invaded and occupied during the war allowed Churchill, 
the charismatic wartime prime minister, to define it as ‘their finest hour’, a time 
of great national pride. This was certainly not evident in France where, after the 
Liberation epuration, a benevolent ‘victor’s history’ began to take hold, claiming 
that all France resisted occupation, except the misguided few. A first mental 
challenge to both postwar societies was therefore the challenge of stepping back 
from the brink: in France this was a challenge of cohabitation and fostering 
cohesion; in Britain it meant the translation of shared wartime heroism into a 
shared peacetime prosperity.
The new political order in postwar Britain and France, as almost 
everywhere else in Western Europe, included three major elements: social 
democracy (later dubbed the Third Force or Third Way), the welfare state, and 
consensus politics. Governments in both countries faced the task of stabilisation 
and reconstruction, steered by some version of socialism. In Britain’s largely 
bipartite system, the 1945 mandate was handed over to Labour under Attlee, 
astonishing many including Churchill, who felt the people had been ungrateful to 
him. In France, after a short interregnum under General de Gaulle, power was 
transferred in 1946 to the elected assembly of the newly established Fourth 
Republic, governed by a coalition comprising the SFIO (socialists), MRP 
(Christian centre), and PCF (communists), from which the communists were 
soon to be ousted. Over the 12 years of the Fourth Republic, the same familiar 
politicians replaced each other as premiers and cabinet members, contributing 
throughout its 26 governments and 21 premierships to a general sense of 
stability, if  not stagnation. The British face of consensus politics only became 
apparent in the 1950s, after Attlee’s tenure had transformed the state and its 
economy: the general agreement between Labour and Conservatives to build on
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Attlee’s achievements soon gained the name ‘Butskellism’, mocking the 
agreement between the Labour chairman Hugh Gaitskell and the Conservative 
grandee RAB Butler.
The greatest leap in postwar British and French reconstruction was in the 
reordering of their economies, to a great degree as modem welfare states. The 
British blueprint for such transformation was already present during the war. The 
1942 Beveridge Report defined ‘five giants’ to battle as part of a ‘British New 
Deal’: Want, to be remedied by a universal social security scheme; Disease, to be 
defeated with a new National Health Service; Ignorance, to be addressed by free 
secondary education until the age of 15; Squalor, to be remedied by a housing 
drive (which also had to redress a housing shortage due to bombardments); and 
Idleness, which was to be done away with through a ‘full employment’ policy. 
These principles were assimilated in the Labour programme of 1945 as 
‘Beveridge, plus Keynes, plus socialism.’48 Yet Labour’s transformative agenda 
also included elements less acceptable to its Conservative opposition, like 
nationalisation of major infrastructures (e.g. coal, steel, railroads) and the 
establishment of public boards for the state to manage them at arm’s length.
In France the Third Republic’s legacy of social legislation was burdened 
by the war and by a largely agrarian economy. The psychological thrust of the 
French anti-Nazi struggle was channelled domestically into a fight not only 
against political corruption (Vichy and its supporters), but also against the 
accumulated backwardness, deficiencies, instability and imbalance of France’s 
old liberal capitalist economy 49 The economie dirigee was the order of the day, 
and thanks to prudent economic planning under Jean Monnet’s two five-year 
plans de modernisation et d ’equipement (1947-52, 1953-58), to American 
financial aid through the Blum-Bymes agreement and to industrial instruction in 
‘rationalising’ the six designated development sectors (coal, steel, cement, 
electricity, transport, and farm machinery), France got a head start in postwar
48 Hennessy, 22-24. Most of these policies had precedents, but not to this extent; Arthur Marwick,
British Society since 1945, 4th rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 2003 [1982]), 28 (henceforth: 
Marwick, Society).
49 Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modem France: Renovation and Economic
Management in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 188 
(henceforth: Kuisel, Capitalism).
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reconstruction.50 This planned liberal economy was guided by the need for 
economic stability, which was necessary to increase France’s productive 
capacities; by some wish for social justice and solving capitalist inequalities; and 
mainly by the compelling desire for growth and breaking through economic 
backwardness, by whichever name: 'modernisation,’ ‘efficiency,’ ‘productivity,’ 
or ‘standard of living’.51
The reconstruction efforts in Britain and France were generally successful 
and by the end of the 1950s more people lived in greater material comfort. Yet 
they began in the late 1940s and early 1950s with some sweeping and unpopular 
belt-tightening moves. The promise of prosperity was not enough to pacify the 
frustration of initial hopes for a fast transformation at the end of a long war and, 
for those who could remember them, after the impoverished, fractious and 
violent 1930s. Instead, the political map remained largely the same: the French 
Fourth Republic was built in the image of the radical Third Republic, and British 
politics continued to reflect class and regional distinctions and deference to 
traditional authority. Wartime shortages persisted in peacetime: initial French 
redistribution of provisions angered farmers and left townsfolk wanting, while 
British rationing lasted until the mid-1950s, being at some early stages even 
more restrictive than during the war. It was the anticipation of change in 1945 
that led to Labour’s election into office, and in turn it was popular dissatisfaction 
with the pace of change that led to its replacement in 1951.
The new postwar social-economic order created new social realities and 
new social types. The effect of modernisation and welfare structures was a 
popular ‘bourgeoisification’. This phenomenon, dubbed ‘affluence’ in Britain, 
amounted to the growing feeling and reality of prosperity, especially among the
50 The Blum-Bymes agreement of 1946 cancelled France’s wartime lend-lease bill o f two billion
dollars, gave it a further international credit of 650 million dollars, and added a 720 million 
dollar allowance on American surplus -  for which France had to cancel its protective tariffs 
against American imports and abandon its price-equalisation procedures. Kristin Ross, Fast 
Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering o f  French Culture (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press/October Books, 1995), 37, 202 n.25 -  henceforth: Ross, Fast Cars.
51 Kuisel, Capitalism, 275-278.
52 Cf. Kristin Ross, “French Quotidian,” in The Art o f  the Everyday: the Quotidian in Postwar
French Culture, ed. by Lynn Gumpert (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 20.
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lower social strata. In the interwar years much of the working class was in partial 
or no employment, forcing many into casual criminality for mere survival. 
Indeed, the British political elites of the 1930s feared a popular uprising due to 
the great economic disparities. The postwar ‘new’ or ‘affluent’ working class 
was effectively the old working class, expanded thanks to full employment 
policies, which together with health and education provisions resulted in growing 
incomes and more spending power, and seemingly in greater opportunities for 
social mobility based on personal merit, blurring old class boundaries.
The ‘third industrial revolution’ of postwar France created new social 
mobility opportunities through the American-inspired growth of cadres (middle 
management) and through new requirements for individual professionalisation, 
enabling younger people to break away from bondage to the family business. A 
broad ‘national middle class’ was effectively created by modernisation, a 
mainstream of complacent urban professionals, defined mainly by their 
purchasing power and consumer habits, and making France a bourgeois 
‘democracy of consumption’, a mere ‘alibi of a class society.’ Yet even in this 
improved state of affairs distribution of wealth remained uneven and the 
increased opportunities for social mobility were mostly illusory, mainly affecting 
the younger generation, as shown below and in section 3.
Decolonisation and imperial dismantling
While seeing their respective imperial roles as beacons of civilisation, France and 
Britain translated that notion into differing values, administrative structures, and 
approaches to colonialism. Generally, the British imperial tradition had sought to 
establish an association of the colonies with Britain that would keep the various 
imperial inhabitants in their territories, exploiting their labour in exchange for 
provision of European-style modernisation, trade and maintenance of the peace. 
Following its republican tradition, France saw its imperial exploits as an 
emancipation of the colonised: the colonised were expected to take on French
53 Ross, Fast Cars, 1-14.
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culture and ‘universal’ values, and consequently to assimilate into the French 
polity at large.54
These premises help explain differences between French and British 
attitudes to decolonisation. If to the French colonisation was emancipatory and 
progressive, they treated secessionist tendencies and colonial independence 
movements as reactionary, offending the very kernel of the French Republic. At 
the end of the Second World War liberated France faced colonial insurrections 
and reasserted its imperial authority through colonial ‘pacification’ campaigns, 
most notably in Madagascar, Indochina and Algeria. Britain had had to negotiate 
colonial secessionism since the mid-nineteenth century and slowly formed a 
system of Dominions and then the Commonwealth, smoothing and decelerating 
devolution of power and maintaining links with devolved territories. In fact, the 
rigid French imperial assimilationism, along with its ideational and institutional 
underpinnings, was bound to make French decolonisation a painful, complex and 
profoundly divisive process, in ways that Britain simply did not have to face; 
British imperial associationism had been more flexible, and in any case the 
ardent nationalist opposition faced by Britain did not result in major large-scale 
wars as it did for France in Indochina and Algeria.55
The two states dealt rather differently with their changing imperial 
circumstances in the wake of war. The doggedly imperialist stance of Bevin was 
overruled by Attlee, his prime minister, and several territories across the Middle 
East and Asia (Palestine, India) were ceded in the interest of stabilising the 
domestic British economy. Colonial garrisons and administrations were too 
expensive and too troublesome to maintain, and Attlee believed Britain was 
better off without them. Subsequent Conservative governments upheld this line 
of reasoning, despite the Conservatives being traditionally ‘the party of empire’, 
led by imperialists like Churchill and Eden. Macmillan, a realist like Attlee, even 
carried out the first cost-benefit analysis of the British Empire.56 The French
54 Robert and Isabelle Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: The French and the British from the Sun King
to the Present (London: William Heinemann, 2006), 612.
55 Tony Smith, “A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization,” Comparative
Studies in Society and History 20, 1 (January 1978), 71.
56 Hennessy, 39. However, this analysis did not suggest that in any colony or overall the cost of
empire outweighed its benefits.
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resistance to decolonisation was not just a principled rejection but a product of 
the inability of successive Fourth Republic governments to lead major policy 
changes: too weak an executive and too fragmented a National Assembly both 
clung to an ungovernable and outdated imperial structure, prized as the basis for 
French international grandeur. The Mendes-France government policy 
affirmed this synthetic unity by reasoning the separation from Indochina in 1954 
with a consolidation of its colonial assets elsewhere, particularly in Africa, 
showing a clear retrenchment in its regard to colonial home rule and to the 
definition of the French Union itself (then still including French Algeria).58
A major crisis of decolonisation for both empires, and a major blow to 
their self-image as still-great empires, came with the Suez crisis. Following the 
1952 nationalist coup, Egypt under president Nasser had promoted itself in the 
Arab world as a regional leader, promoting pan-Arabism, strengthening ties with 
the USSR and generally defying British interests in the area, until finally 
nationalising the Suez Canal in July 1956. Eden, who regarded Nasser as a new 
Hitler, conspired with Mollet’s government in France and with Ben-Gurion’s 
government in Israel to stage an Israeli attack on Egypt which would ‘oblige’ the 
French and British to intervene militarily. This was disastrously executed in 
October 1956, taking both the USSR and the United States by surprise. President 
Eisenhower was particularly enraged at Eden’s deception and threatened to 
refuse a loan to Britain, putting the entire Sterling area in danger of collapse. A 
weak Eden conceded, announced (without consulting Mollet) a hasty ceasefire 
and withdrawal of British forces, and promptly resigned.
For both France and Britain this was a resounding defeat and a 
spectacular revelation of their weakness as world powers. In both countries, 
public opinion was divided regarding the importance of the Suez operation -  
when, that is, it was not wholly indifferent to it.59 For some people, Suez 
crystallised the need to shrink the imperial project; in France, after losing 
Indochina, its richest colony and a test-case for containment of colonial 
nationalism, it stiffened the resolve of leaders like Mollet and Gaillard to crush
57 Smith, 79-80.
58 Rod Kedward, La Vie en Bleu: France and the French since 1900 (London: Allen Lane, 2005),
371.
59 Cf. Kedward, 375; Hewison, 127-129.
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the emerging Algerian revolt.60 This Algerian fixation and lack of political 
solutions for it (barring independence) hastened the Fourth Republic’s demise 
and the quasi-monarchist restoration of De Gaulle following the 1958 
referendum. The French public yearned for alternatives to break the political 
stalemate, and de Gaulle was expected to somehow resolve the Algerian War, 
which was beginning to spill into metropolitan France through the activities of 
OAS, the armed colon underground. OAS actions and the war itself escalated as 
De Gaulle indicated in late 1960 that independence might be inevitable, but a 
political conclusion did not arrive until early 1962 with the Evian accords, which 
bundled Algerian nationalism through independence together with the 
preservation of French interests in the new state (e.g. rights for the colons, 
Saharan oil, trade privileges). However, the clear impression that France 
conceded in Algeria out of weakness, because it could not hold its ground, was a 
major blow to the image of French imperial grandeur.
Alongside and beyond decolonisation, domestic societies in France and 
Britain were affected by the influx of colonial immigration. Many immigrants 
filled demand for unskilled, underpaid labour for the expanding industrial sector 
and in urban and infrastructure development. While there was no official policy 
of segregation or ghettoisation, these immigrant populations congregated in 
separate, usually run down urban areas, in France even forming their own 
bidonvilles (shanty towns). Until 1964, when the French government resolved to 
clear bidonvilles, 75,000 people, mostly immigrants from the Maghreb, lived 
there.61 Successive postwar British governments were troubled by immigration 
demographics, increasingly returning to the question of the number of non-white 
immigrants that Britain could assimilate.62 Colonial immigration into Britain was 
indeed significant and growing: in 1951 there had been 36,000 non-white 
immigrants in Britain; by the end of that decade, the same amount were arriving
60 On Indochina’s importance, its loss, and the impact of France’s provisional government on
colonial policy, see: Martin Shipway, The Road to War: France and Vietnam, 1944-1947 
(New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003 [1996]), 1-5.
61 Kedward, 411.
62 James Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the Politics o f Demographic
Governance in Postwar Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 60.
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there annually.63 Prompted by concerns for limits to non-white immigration, the 
last Macmillan government was the first to cap migrant figures with the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigration Act.
In restricting immigration, the Macmillan government was concerned 
with the ways in which it was seen to grate against the native white population of 
Britain, in particular, as Butler presented it to cabinet, in competition over 
housing, jobs and women.64 What had prompted government action was the 
eruption of race riots in Nottingham’s St. Anne’s Well and in London’s Notting 
Hill in summer 1958. The government surprise at the riots probably attests to its 
lack of awareness of popular white reactions to immigrants and immigration; yet 
it was only later in the 1960s that this hatred found a political outlet. In France, 
by the mid-1950s pro-colonialist sentiment regarding Algeria compounded with 
other forms of French imperialist xenophobia and veteran militant feeling. 
Epitomising this approach was Pierre Poujade, founder of the surprisingly 
popular UDCA movement, representing small provincial artisans and traders 
who presumed to speak for la vieille France and who cloaked their xenophobia 
with patriotism. UDCA was a runaway success, gaining 52 Assembly seats in the 
1955 elections, but soon losing them due to its narrow, chiefly economic, 
political programme.65
Cold War and American predominance
After the First World War American influence began to develop but it was 
curbed by relative American isolationism. After its intervention in the Second 
World War, the United States revealed itself as a major player in world politics 
and a military force to be reckoned with. In the immediate aftermath of war it
63 Dominic Sandbrook, Never Had It So Good: A History o f Britain from Suez to the Beatles
(London: Abacus, 2006 [2005]), 314.
64 Hcnncssy, 500.
65 Kedward, 377-378. Among UDCA’s elected representatives was a young Jean-Marie le Pen,
later leader of the radical right-wing Front National. Barthes’s Mythologies is suffused 
throughout with cultural contradictions highlighted by French decolonisation, but he dedicates 
two essays in particular (‘Quelques paroles de M. Poujade’ and ‘Poujade et les intellectuels’) 
to Poujade’s own typically fascist view of (intellectual) culture as a malady; Roland Barthes, 
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showed itself crucial to the reconstruction of Europe and to the setting of a new 
world order. Economically, American leadership reasserted itself in the Bretton 
Woods system which, with the dollar and dollar convertibility as its basis (rather 
than the gold standard), established a co-ordinated system of national monetary 
policies and mutual aid through dedicated institutions like the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). System participants were all on the American-led allied side during 
the war, and strengthened the already established role of the United States as bloc 
leader. When the two nuclear powers, the United States and the USSR, turned on 
each other at the end of the war, American leadership of the allied bloc was 
reaffirmed in political terms. This effectively relegated Britain and France to a 
secondary position within the ‘free’ West.
British and French reliance on American financial aid in the early 
postwar years was desperate. While national reconstruction efforts and rationing 
regimes were implemented, the damaged infrastructure, housing and food 
shortages resulted in national crises. British and French colonies no longer 
provided sufficient support for reconstruction, with some of them turning into 
political liabilities. To complicate matters, the harsh winter of 1946-7 taxed 
national resources further, leading Britain to unilaterally suspend coal supply to 
France, which relied predominantly on coal for energy. French resentment grew 
two years later, when Attlee devalued the Pound without warning, affecting 
British-French trade and leading France to look to Germany for the bulk of its 
foreign trade.66 The unreliability and inadequacy of British and French resources, 
together with fear of encroachment of Soviet power in Western Europe, 
prompted the United States in summer 1947 to offer a comprehensive financial 
aid plan, the Marshall Plan, for European states within its sphere of influence. 
Britain and then France were by far the major beneficiaries, and for France this 
supplemented the aforementioned Blum-Bymes agreements.
American intervention in France and Britain was as much political as it 
was economic. The Cold War paradigm of the ‘free West’ severely limited the 
legitimacy of radical left political action, particularly organised Communist 
activity, in both countries. Beyond their internationalism, Communists were
66 Tombs, 607.
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suspected of taking their directions from Moscow, which was true to varying 
extents at least until Stalin’s death in 1953. American intervention in internal 
British and French affairs was also covert: American funding propped up ‘free- 
thinking’ cultural enterprises such as the British journal Encounter or Radio Free 
Europe.67 Still, the British Communist movement was relatively small and 
obscured in the political left by Labour, a party whose roots in Fabianism and 
Christian socialism were more local than internationalist. French communism 
was much more menacing to the United States: the parti des fusilles staked as 
potent a claim as De Gaulle’s to the resistance narrative and, due to its electoral 
success after the war, claimed its place in the governing coalition. Various 
elements conspired to check PCF power: the party became the foil of Gaullist 
nationalist ambitions, and catalyst for early plans for a second National 
Assembly chamber.68 Its ranks were infiltrated by CIA agents, and its 
increasingly uncompromising line under chairman Maurice Thorez, together with 
various disagreements among the trade unions, resulted in its dismissal from the 
Ramadier government in 1947.69 Henceforth, the PCF remained in opposition, an 
agitating force that gradually lost its importance, most notably after the 
establishment of the Fifth Republic, when Gaullist presidential fiat dwarfed the 
legislature.
The Suez affair was a watershed in American relations with France and 
Britain. American intervention to halt the operation caused anger in both 
countries, but Eden’s concession and resignation were also seen as his owning up 
to personal responsibility for a somewhat reckless move. His successor, 
Macmillan, was very careful to patch up relations with the United States and 
develop the bilateral ‘special relationship’.70 In the crumbling Fourth Republic 
no leader was inclined and empowered to do the same, certainly not de Gaulle, 
who carried on his anti-American attitude as president; this resulted in an 
impression of a French fall from favour with the United States, leading France to 
seek alternative solutions. As the Tombses put it, “for the British, Suez proved
67 See Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War 
(London: Granta Books, 1999).
68 Kedward, 356, 358.
69 Kedward, 359-362.
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that only America could be the buttress of their security, power and interests. For 
the French, Suez proved that America could never be that buttress.”71 Britain and 
France were to continue developing their independent nuclear programmes, 
initiated by Attlee in 1949 and by Gaillard in 1952.
The issues on which Britain and France were most clearly at odds were 
regionalist, and regarded European trade and European defence. The United 
States did not oppose European regionalism, and in fact encouraged France, 
Britain and other Western European states to agree on their own mutual 
arrangements. In defence, the French swallowed a bitter pill when, on the 
establishment of NATO in spring 1949, effectively agreeing to the eventual 
rearmament and addition of Germany.72 They attempted to compensate for this 
with a planned European Defence Community (EDC) for the six central 
European states, excluding Britain. However, the EDC treaty was failed by 
France itself as the National Assembly refused to ratify it: Gaullists feared it 
would harm French sovereignty and colonial interests in North Africa; the PCF 
saw it as a threat to regional peace; and Mendes-France, already associated with 
the failure of the Indochina War as one of its major critics and for ordering the 
retreat from Dien Bien Phu, offered only lukewarm support for the EDC.73 In 
trade, European cooperation initiatives were more successful, beginning with the 
adoption of the Schumann Plan of 1950, maturing with the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community in the Treaty of Paris (1951), which also 
included a planned expansion of integration. Britain chose to stay out of the 
ECSC and preserve trade privileges with its empire and Commonwealth; this 
protectionism also kept it from later joining the European Economic Community, 
established in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome; but Britain still attempted to 
establish a foothold in European trade with its own proposal for a Free Trade 
Area, vetoed by de Gaulle but still established in 1959.74
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'Americanisation’ and American cultural hegemony
The amazing American recovery from the great depression and its relative 
welfare during and after the Second World War were the envy of the declining 
European states. During postwar reconstruction they tried to emulate this success 
by adopting American industrial techniques. France led the way with the Monnet 
modernisation drive, sending functionaries and managers to the United States to 
study Taylorist ‘rationalisation’ of manufacturing processes and Fordist 
standardisation of mass production. Mass production assumed mass 
consumption, and since the sways of mass tastes were so influential, this required 
the services of market research companies, to better inform production, 
marketing and advertising. The American-assisted French leap soon left Britain 
behind: the French economy seemed not only richer but healthier and more 
geared to meet future challenges. By the late 1950s talk began of a maladie 
anglaise, a reluctance to change old ways, partly attributable to the lack of 
necessity to break with the past, which to France was cardinal, and partly to older 
hostilities toward industrialisation and its attendant social changes.75
Building on American-inspired production and marketing techniques, 
American culture -  or at least what was perceived in Europe as ‘American 
culture’ -  gained ground within British and French cultures. American cinema, 
radio and music (still broadcast in Europe through the American Forces 
Network), cars, home consumer goods like washing machines and refrigerators, 
and the entire American lifestyle furnished by them -  all were increasingly taken 
up from the early 1950s onwards, when consumer choice and personal income 
levels grew noticeably. Together with mass production techniques which lowered 
product prices, and mass marketing that increased its availability, the American 
lifestyle became affordable to all. In seeking this ‘affordable quality’ and in 
catering for it, the model for both producers and consumers was, again, the 
United States, as the only industrial country with an established experience of a
75 This discourse went on for several decades after. Cf. Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the 
Decline o f  the Industrial Spirit 1850-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); 
Correlli Barnett, The Audit o f  War (London: Macmillan, 1986); Keith Robbins, “British 
Culture versus British Industry,” in Debates in Modern History: British Culture and 
Economic Decline, ed. by Bruce Collins and Keith Robbins (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1990), 1-24.
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capitalist working class-dominated market.76 The hope that American-style 
prosperity would come by following an American example cast the United States 
as the face of the future; but also as a kind of mirror before which to preen, and 
through which to distinguish their cultural difference.77
Part of the European fascination with American popular culture was 
dedicated to the increasingly fashionable elements in it deriving from Black 
American or African-American culture. These included in particular the musical 
styles of jazz and blues and the dance routines and clothing fashions related to 
them. To some degree this fascination was primitivist and exoticist, and it also 
displaced the encounter with non-white and non-European culture to the 
convenient realm of American fantasies. This took place at a time when music 
and styles imported with immigrant populations were still resisted by national 
mainstreams: North African cultures in France, and West Indian and South Asian 
cultures in Britain. Otherwise, removed from their roots, American musical 
imports such as white jazz, skiffle and rock’n ’roll, performed by white men and 
women, became popular in France and Britain by the late 1950s. In fact, ‘white’ 
derivatives of ‘black’ music were even appropriated, with local offshoots and 
imitators: Lonnie Donegan, Tommy Steele and Marty Wilde, and later the 
Rolling Stones and Lulu in Britain; and French jazz-pop artists like Sacha Distel 
and ‘yeye’ singers like Johnny Hallyday and Fran^oise Hardy.
The popular reception and adaptation of American styles and tastes 
prompted contemporary discussions of ‘Americanisation’ as threatening national 
cultures, although such discussions did not diminish its popularity. 
‘Americanisation’ was welcomed by some as an alternative to national culture, 
which fused with it over time thanks to local artists and interpreters, liberating 
people from the tyranny of traditional popular culture by inspiring new, home­
made cultural forms. Thus, ‘Americanisation’ transformed its host cultures and 
drew them toward massification and democratisation of tastes. This is not to 
suggest that British and French societies had not been leaning toward cheap,
76 Abrams, a market researcher, suggested this of Britain, but it is true a fortiori of France; Mark
Abrams, The Teenage Consumer (London: The London Press Exchange, 1959), 19.
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mass-produced and kitsch cultural products before and during the Second World 
War, but rather that postwar ‘Americanisation’ accelerated this process and gave 
it an identifiable image and agency.
‘Massification’ and cultural democratisation
The distinction between ‘Americanisation’ and cultural massification is 
somewhat artificial: in postwar Britain and France the two processes fed into 
each other. However, cultural massification extended beyond ‘Americanisation’. 
The growth of purchasing power since the early 1950s had resulted in a 
concomitant rise in spending, an activity that signified to many French and 
British people the end of wartime shortages and want. As domestic industries 
recovered and grew, the bulk of industrial manufacture shifted from heavy to 
light industry, and more (and cheaper) consumer products became available. 
Even before domestic recovery, British and French markets were flooded with 
American-manufactured goods, being at least in France part of American 
reconstruction aid. In this respect ‘Americanisation’ assisted consumerism 
indirectly, as a technological facilitator. By 1958 eleven million French homes 
had radio sets, and by the end of the decade almost a quarter of all homes had 
both a frigo  and a washing machine, multiplying threefold over six years. 
Refrigerators or formica-clad kitchen fittings held a particular cachet as bringing 
the American lifestyle to the French home and freeing housewives from domestic 
drudgery.78
Probably the most representative of commodities of postwar 
technological, cultural, and socioeconomic transformation were television sets 
and cars, both available before the war but only booming after it. In Britain from 
1947 to 1951 the purchase of television licences multiplied a thousand-fold to 1.5 
million; by 1953, 56% of the adult population, some 20.5 million people, tuned 
into the Coronation proceedings on television, compared with the two million on 
London’s streets on the day; by 1961, three out of four British homes had a 
television set; and, despite the predictions of BBC director-general William 
Haley, attention was shifting from wireless to television, attracting audiences and
78 Kedward, 375.
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performers alike, as in the case of Hancock’s Half-Hour.79 The commercial 
Independent Television Authority was introduced in 1955: with half the 
population watching by 1960 on any given evening, it quickly drew advertising 
from newspapers and from cinema, and together with the BBC accounted for a 
sharp plunge in cinema attendance during the fifties and early sixties.80 In 
France, television caught on rather slowly and as late as 1960 only 2 million 
homes across the country had a set. Here again, the popularisation of television 
as the 1960s progressed came at the great expense of film, with many cinemas
O  1
being shut down late in the decade.
Between 1950 and 1965 car ownership in Britain grew nearly fourfold, to 
over 9.1 million vehicles; they were driven over new infrastructures, like the Ml 
motorway, the first section of which was opened in 1959; and were considered 
by planners to be the more flexible alternative to an old and inefficient railways 
system.82 In France, too, the rise in purchasing power throughout the 1950s was 
mainly used to buy cars, which were no longer considered luxury items but were 
not yet everyday necessities. The broadening of car ownership was a slow but 
accelerating process: by 1960 one in ten French people owned a car, but by the 
end of the following year this rose to one in eight. Paris, France’s largest 
metropolis, was particularly transformed to accommodate more vehicles: its 
inner city was ‘cleaned’ of poorer dwellings by the redevelopment and 
resettlement scheme of the new Haussman, Paris prefect Paul Delouvrier 
(formerly Monnet’s aide), who was also responsible for its permeable wall of 
traffic, the Peripherique (constructed 1956-7) and for its fast-growing suburban 
sprawl.84
79 Marwick, Society, 79, 91; Hennessy, 111-112.
80 Hennessy, 104, 534-535.
81 John Lough, Writer and Public in France: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978), 392.
82 Christopher Booker, The Neophiliacs: a Study o f  the Revolution in English Life in the Fifties
and Sixties (London: Collins, 1969), 39; Marwick, Society, 92-93.
83 Ross, Fast Cars, 19, 27-29, 201 n.22 ; she cites Jean-Pierre Bardon, La Revolution automobile
(Paris: Albin Michel, 1977).
84 Ross, Fast Cars, 53-54, 153-156; the urban experience was fictionally rendered in a popular
novel of the period, Christiane Rochefort’s Les Petits Enfants du siecle (1961).
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Industrial transformation in postwar Britain and France and a greater 
availability of private transportation, marketed at newly affluent workers and 
middle classes, created a demand for a new kind of worker. British heavy 
industries were being eclipsed by lighter production, not least of domestic 
consumer goods. The challenge of full production during the remainder of the 
forties forced some modernisation of industrial methods, making highly skilled 
all-round workmen redundant in a segmented assembly method and leading to
* * O Cthe ‘de-skilling’ of labour. In the short term this was particularly beneficial for 
younger workers, as industry required a less skilled and more flexible workforce 
to perform simpler work. Factory work was easy to find in the full employment 
economy, and as real earnings rose across the economy, for the first time British 
people were working less for more. In France, the car was portrayed as 
instrumental to the kind of flexibility that made one a desirable worker: here was 
I ’homme disponible (available man), the mobile worker who had broken with the 
rigid traditionalism of the past and was at the centre of the French vision of the 
future, of a France ‘marrying its epoch’, catching up with the times.86
This image of new opportunities in technologised massification was not 
entirely borne out by fact. For many Frenchmen, ‘rationalised’ industries offered 
work, but no new avenues for social mobility; ‘de-skilled’ work had the potential 
to trap workers at their assembly lines, as managerial ranks were filled by 
specially trained professional cadres. Much frustration was occasioned by the 
realisation that one could only take part in the new wealth of a future-oriented 
France by adapting to a specific slot allotted by the social order, that is, by the 
ruling classes. This condition, that Alain Touraine dubbed ‘dependent
• 07participation’, led to alienation from the social and cultural order. Due to the 
traditional centrality of the British class system, ‘dependent participation’ by any
83 Bill Osgerby, “‘The Young Ones’: Youth, Consumption and Representations of the ‘Teenager’
in Post-War Britain,” Anglistic & Englischunterricht vol. 63: Youth Identities: Teens and 
Twens in British Culture, ed. by Hans-Jurgen Diller, Erwin Otto and Gerd Stratmann
(Heidelberg: Winter, 2000), 10 -  henceforth: Osgerby, “Young Ones”.
86 Ross, Fast Cars, 22; the image of France ‘marrying its epoch’ is de Gaulle’s, from a speech
made on 14 June 1960, quoted in Kedward, 402.
87 Kedward, 402; he refers to Alain Touraine, The Post-Industrial Society, trans. by Leonard F.X.
Mayhew (London: Wildwood House, 1974 [1969]).
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other name was a common affair. The promise of social mobility through 
newfound affluence and better education was problematic here because it left 
status gaps untouched. The paradox of 1950s British affluence was that greater 
spending power was structurally prevented from giving everyone access to what 
Fred Hirsch later called ‘positional goods’: ‘room at the top’ was by definition 
limited, and the fact that more people could afford cars or better homes in quieter
on
suburbs did not raise their social status. The British class system was one 
obstacle, but the problem was that goal posts moved as affluence spread: 
positional goods can only be enjoyed in scarcity, and so the wider availability of 
cars, for example, made them too common to distinguish their owners as being 
ahead of the Joneses.
Increased free time and spending power made the family household the 
location of more of people’s leisure. Affordable radio and television sets offered 
workers rest and recreation at the end of the working day in the comfort of their 
own home, without needing to go out to pubs, cafes, social clubs or movie 
theatres. Yet on both sides of the Channel people were not just staying in more, 
they were also getting away. In France, a fourth week of annual paid holiday was 
introduced in December 1962, spearheaded by the nationalised Renault factories. 
Le weekend became an indicative leisure phenomenon and a microcosm of the 
extended annual summer vacances, both marked as ‘real’ leisure by the departure 
from the big cities out to the countryside in the family car.89 The British were 
also increasingly getting away: domestic tourism boomed at English holiday 
camps (taken over by the working classes) and seaside resorts like Blackpool or 
Scarborough90 Numbers of people taking foreign holidays also increased, 
doubling from 1950 to 3.5 million in 1961, helped by a relaxation of travel 
money restrictions, allowing more than “Five! Five pounds in notes!” as a public 
information announcement had instructed.91 As staying in and getting away
88 Hennessy, 518-519; he relies on Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (London: Routledge,
1977 [1976]).
89 Kedward, 404.
90 Marwick, Society, 49-50.
91 In 1954 the limit (unrealistic to most travellers) was raised to £100. Hennessy, 11-12, 539;
relying on Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls and 
Consumption, 1939-1955 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2, 33-37, 83. Graham
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became easier, they had a necessary effect on public spheres: the development of 
private leisure pursuits and greater satisfaction with them and with a generally 
growing affluence understandably decreased the potentiality of social 
confrontation and contributed to political quietism.
Concerned for the growing leisure time of their publics, French and 
British governments saw fit to steer their publics toward more valuable and 
enriching pursuits. Shortly after the founding of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle 
appointed author and activist Andre Malraux to head a newly created Ministry 
for Cultural Affairs, which for some time administered highbrow culture through 
its network of maisons de culture. In Britain, BBC founding director-general 
Lord Reith’s maxim for public broadcasting to ‘educate, inform and entertain’ 
was upheld, not least through the BBC’s short-lived highbrow Third Programme. 
A similar approach was adopted in public funding by the Arts Council, until the 
mid-1960s a patrician sponsor on behalf of the state of alternatives to the pub and
09music hall. These regulatory tendencies had several aspects: they were clearly 
the product of paternalistic and centralised approaches to popular culture, but 
they can also be seen to match Fordist management techniques in the belief that a 
better use of leisure time contributes to better work (and by extension political) 
performance. A third aspect regards purpose: at least in its initial stages, postwar 
reconstruction was taken to be a national project that required collective effort, 
and mass cultural conditioning was perceived as part of building a better society.
Rise o f ‘youth culture’
The prized asset of national reconstruction projects was national youth, invested 
with national expectations, hopes and fears of the future. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War rising birth rates were recorded. The British 
‘baby boom’ was the product not just of contingent factors like the return of 
husbands to their wives, but was also the result of a public government- 
sponsored drive to boost procreation toward the end of the war -  with similar 
encouragements from de Gaulle to the French in the last stages of the war. Much
Greene offered an amusing take on the £5 limit and ways of bypassing it in his Travels with
My Aunt (1969).
92 Geoff Mulgan, “Culture: the Problem with Being Public,” The Ideas that Shaped Post-War
Britain, ed. David Marquand and Anthony Seldon (London: Fontana Press, 1996), 197.
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discussed in the years after the war, the ‘baby boom’ created anticipations of an 
early 1960s demographic ‘bulge’, as it was known in Britain, around the time 
adolescents were meant to leave school and vocational training and join the 
workforce and adult society. The French ‘baby boom’ peaked around 1947-49 
and not only expanded society but also made it younger, with one person in three
A T
being under twenty in 1967. By comparison, the British ‘baby boom’ was only 
relative (21 births per thousand), the bucking of a trend of falling birth rates 
plaguing Britain since the late nineteenth century.94 The qualitative difference of 
‘baby boomers’ from their elders was more noticeable than the quantitative one: 
with rising standards of living, children enjoyed a better quality of life. Infant 
mortality rates were the lowest on record, and the postwar generation was 
growing up to be visibly different: taller, heavier, hitting puberty sooner and 
getting a better education.
The family was still the prominent social institution in postwar British 
society, holding its ground through the 1940s, the 1950s and the 1960s; yet while 
marriage rates remained the same, marriages seemed to become increasingly 
fragile, as divorce rates rose steadily throughout the fifties and more sharply 
during the sixties.95 Yet while this basic relation between men and women 
remained fairly constant, the relations between parents and children could be 
seen to be changing: already in 1951, suggests Marwick, “there was little belief 
in the innocence or innate goodness of children,” and it was widely thought that 
“children need more discipline.”96 In the early 1950s a relaxation of morality 
among the young was recorded, a ‘moral decline’ also cited for the growth of 
public interest in sex; in fact, the young were more sexually active -  partly
• 0 7because of earlier physical maturation -  but not sexually promiscuous. “Never
93 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History o f  Europe since 1945 (London; Pimlico, 2007), 331.
94 Sandbrook, 413.
95 Marwick, Society, 136.
96 Marwick, Society, 47; relying on the 1951 survey in: Geoffrey Gorer, Exploring English 
Character (London: Cressett Press, 1955).
97 Booker, 42; Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the
United States, C.1958-C.1974 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 75-76 
-  henceforth: Marwick, Sixties; see also Michael Schofield, The Sexual Behaviour o f  Young 
People (London: Longmans, 1965).
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before had the young been so prominent,” claimed one observer, and feelings
go
were mixed as to whether or not this was a good thing.
France shared the initial still-traditional social structure that prevailed in 
Britain. Until the mid-1950s the Catholic Church and its traditions were still 
influential; boys and girls were segregated in schools, and family and home were 
where most youngsters spent most of their leisure, under watchful parental 
eyes." Nevertheless the emerging French postwar youth experience was different 
from that of earlier generations, and its generational gap seemingly wider than its 
British parallel. The shame of the Occupation and Collaboration considerably 
weakened the moral authority of postwar parents and other adults. The Gaullist 
myth (‘everyone resisted’) functioned here to reassert the authority of older 
generations and of tradition, which affirmed their superiority. Yet postwar 
French youths were unabashedly reluctant to follow in their parents’ footsteps, 
and were convinced of the viability of such a break with old ways.
Some elements enabling greater self-determination among postwar 
youths were mentioned above: employment was relatively easy to come by 
thanks to a demand for flexible and relatively unskilled labour; educational 
horizons widened considerably in the postwar period. Here France was ahead of 
Britain: the ecole republicaine had already been providing free and secular 
education to all under-15’s since the 1880s, but managed to increase bachelier 
numbers five-fold between 1950 and 1970; and the Lansonist higher education 
system was expanded, particularly under the Fifth Republic.100 In Britain, a series 
of governmental provisions slowly transformed education: the Butler Education 
Act of 1944 ensured universal minimal levels of education, further enhanced in 
1947 by raising school leaving age to 15; further vocational opportunities were 
introduced with compulsory National Service in 1948; higher education was 
expanded following the Robbins Report of 1963, to include ‘new’ universities, 
polytechnics and art schools; and the Newsom Report of the same year sought to
98 Booker, 132.
99 Marwick, Sixties, 95.
100 Judt, 391.
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enhance vocational and technical training, if only to turn youths towards 
modernised, high-tech industries.101
On the cusp of work and study, the business and administration schools 
turned out professionalised managers for the executive class. The French Ecole 
Nationale de l’Administration (ENA) was not just a grande ecole, a managerial 
finishing school and a tool for the social control of the managerial class. It was 
also intended as the fresh face of a postwar France, ‘modernised’ but also not 
associated with the war, as it replaced a network of similar Vichy institutions.102 
ENA was by design and function the training academy for technocrats, with 
enarques turning into captains of industry and state. Its general approach was a 
Keynesian revision of liberalism, and its teaching was similarly revisionist: for 
the first time in France, it stressed economics in its curriculum, made it more 
mathematical, and taught it through case studies.103 For comparison, such an 
important structural innovation was typically delayed in Britain, which waited 
until the 1960s for its first business school.104
In the late 1950s, two things about French and British youths became 
clear: they had distinct subcultures with their own values, norms and symbols; 
and even before they became participants in civic life, they were already part of 
its economy, distinguished by their different consumption patterns. Young 
people in postwar Britain and France started work early in life and, initially still 
living at home, had more money than ever before for ‘discretionary spending’, 
usually on clothes in young styles and on new music -  both heavily influenced 
by American youth fashions or their local interpretations. Young tastes, clearly 
distinct from adult ones, soon attracted accusations of hedonistic materialism, as 
well as exploitation by merchants and a ‘youth industry’ that sought to tap into a 
clearly defined niche market. Broadcast entertainment followed suit, first in
101 Marwick, Society, 37; Davis, 98-101, 107-109.
102 The Ecoles des Cadres, a network of over fifty institutions based in Saint-Martin-d’Uriage, 
was established in 1940 to train future elites for Petain’s ‘national revolution’. The Uriage 
school’s short existence established an important precedent and trained subsequently 
influential figures like the public educator Benigno Caceres and the founding editor of Le 
Monde, Hubert Beuve-Mery.
103 Kuisel, Capitalism, 215.
104 Hennessy, 53.
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Britain and then in France, with radio and then television programmes, with 
public broadcasting trailing behind the much more savvy commercial stations.105 
The adult search for ‘young style’ reflected a basic misunderstanding of youth 
culture, being not one but several distinct strains of interests and vogues, some 
following, for example, jazz and swing aesthetics, others following the emergent 
rock’n’roll (or yeye) styles. This plurality is unsurprising considering the 
unprecedented scale of cultural stimuli available after the war: old media, like 
radio and cinema, expanded significantly; newer media were introduced to 
popular use, like television and the 45/33rpm records (soon replacing sheet music 
as the musical commodity); and American expeditionary forces, still deployed 
across Western Europe, consumed and spread their own directly imported 
popular culture.
The rejection of authority implied in the young’s insistence on their own 
subcultures was bound to draw opprobrium. Apart from their ‘shallow 
materialism’, French youths were also accused of political ‘abstentionism’ and 
lack of social conscience. Some observers were careful not to wholly condemn 
the young, balancing their problematic image with suggestions (not wide of the 
mark) that the young were concerned about social affairs but felt themselves 
powerless to influence them. A similar duality was apparent in the British 
discourse on youth, exalting them as the subject of the national ‘vitality fantasy’ 
but also generating a moral panic about their ungrateful supposed ‘delinquency 
in affluence’. The charge of political ‘abstentionism’ was exaggerated, as young 
people were widely involved in political activism, be it in France, through the 
national student union (UNEF) and protesting against police brutality and the 
Algerian War; or in Britain, attempting to exert outside pressure on party politics 
through the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). Young people were 
generally misunderstood and misrepresented by their elders, not least because 
they were viewed through the fantasies (and anxieties) of their elders about a 
new national order. In fact, the only change heralded by ‘affluent’ British and 
French postwar youths was the expansion of their respective national middle 
classes.
105 Marwick, Sixties, 101-108; Osgerby, “Young Ones,” 13.
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The above sections have explained the concept of cultural pessimism and its 
relevance to the discussion in this thesis. A short historical exposition of postwar 
Britain and France then demonstrated the commonalities and similarities between 
the two national experiences as a foundation for their comparison in the 
following sections. The remainder of this introduction will include a short survey 
of the scholarly literature on the topics of this thesis, followed by an explanation 
of its methodology and structure.
Literature survey
Cultural pessimism
Cultural pessimism is a composite discourse that is still under construction, 
informed by several existing discourses on some of its constituent concepts and 
tropes. The body of scholarship regarding cultural pessimism per se is thus quite 
small for such a stock topic in modem Western experience. Two relevant 
discourses are of only limited import here: philosophical scholarship on 
pessimism (Schopenhauer and Nietzsche being its foremost proponents) restricts 
itself to the history of continental philosophy; and pessimism in psychology is 
regarded as a wholly individual attitude or mental disposition, excluding cultural 
pessimism. Most studies relevant to cultural pessimism are one-offs: each 
constructs the picture of a discourse to which it seeks to contribute, and there is 
also little agreement on the terminology and taxonomy of cultural pessimism. 
The topic lacks an exhaustive, definitive study of the breadth and historical depth 
of cultural pessimism, a touchstone for subsequent contributions. Two notably 
broad studies of pessimism as an aspect of collective consciousness are Joe 
Bailey’s general exploration Pessimism and Oliver Bennett’s Cultural 
Pessimism.106
Several studies are useful starting points into cultural pessimism, for what 
they lack as much as for what they contain. Arthur Herman’s The Idea o f Decline 
in Western History proposes an understanding of historical process by charting
106 Some works in this literature survey were already encountered in the preceding exposition and 
are revisited. Full citations of items discussed below are in the bibliography to this study.
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major works of pessimist thought of the past two centuries (mainly the nineteenth 
century) in their historical contexts. Herman tends to over-represent American 
thinkers, presenting DuBois and the Adams brothers as on a par with more 
influential thinkers like Spengler and Toynbee. A typical problem in Herman is 
his attempt to ‘reclaim’ pessimism for conservatism, dedicating the entire third 
section of his book to the condemnation of left-wing theoreticians (Marcuse and 
the Frankfurt School, Sartre, Foucault). Raymond Tallis’ lengthy polemic, 
Enemies o f  Hope: A Critique o f  Contemporary Pessimism is a similar British 
case.
More balanced, scholarly accounts tend to offer more critical insight, 
even when their scope is more restricted. Patrick Brantlinger’s Bread and 
Circuses: Theories o f Mass Culture as Social Decay goes back beyond the 
Renaissance to the ancient ideational roots of some modem pessimist concepts; 
in that it is akin to Frank Kermode’s similarly insightful The Sense o f an Ending. 
Brantlinger treats the historical process of the massification of culture lucidly, 
suggesting that aspect of cultural pessimism as fundamental to the understanding 
of other core concepts like degeneration and decadence.
Another useful starting point is Chamberlin and Gilman’s volume 
Degeneration: the Dark Side o f  Progress, demonstrating the pervasive influence 
of ‘degeneration’ in scholarly and creative fields. While useful, this book is 
potentially misleading, and in a way typical of studies of degeneration and 
decadence. The two terms are discussed in the context of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, where the elision between the two terms is 
understandable -  as noted above, a confusing slippage to the uninformed reader. 
The limited applicability of discourses on decadence and degeneration 
illuminates the necessary caution for deriving insights from them to a more 
general consideration of cultural pessimism.
Therefore, the prominent scholarship both on decadence and the 
Decadents and on degeneration is used in this thesis mainly as background, 
helping shape an understanding of tropes of cultural pessimism. Regarding 
degeneration, the main works consulted include Hayden White’s essay on “The 
Forms of Wildness,” Robert S. Nye’s Crime, Madness and Politics in Modern 
France, Daniel Pick’s Faces o f  Degeneration, the first section of Sabine Maasen 
and Peter Weingart’s Metaphors and the Dynamics o f  Knowledge on Darwin’s
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concept of ‘struggle for existence’, William Greenslade’s Degeneration, Culture 
and the Novel 1880-1940, and Edward Caudill’s Darwinian Myths. On 
decadence the list is much longer, starting with Norberto Bobbio’s The 
Philosophy o f  Decadentism and Cyril Joad’s Decadence, through Frank 
Kermode’s seminal The Sense o f  an Ending, Jerome Hamilton Buckley’s The 
Triumph o f  Time, and Matei Calinescu’s discussion in the revised Five Faces o f  
Modernity, to the most recent and inventive works: Richard Gilman’s 
Decadence: The Strange Life o f an Epithet, Thomas Reid Whissen’s Devil’s 
Advocates, and Charles Bemheimer’s posthumous Decadent Subjects.
The relatively small body of scholarship specifically on cultural 
pessimism forces one to tap unorthodox sources for useful points. While barely 
apparent in the body of this work, these sources deserve some mention. Robert 
Wohl’s The Generation o f  1914 provided an example of ‘generational’ collective 
pictures. Maasen and Weingart’s study elucidated processes of 
(mis)understanding of metaphors as influential to knowledge transfer. Terry 
Eagleton’s Ideology o f  the Aesthetic explained romantic and post-romantic 
ideological imagery. Krishan Kumar’s Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times 
enhanced this study’s understanding of the link between utopias and cultural 
pessimism. Connections between pessimism and theories of history were 
suggested in Ilan Gur-Ze’ev’s introduction to The Frankfurt School and the 
History o f  Pessimism, Mircea Eliade’s The Myth o f  Eternal Return, Fritz Stem’s 
The Politics o f  Cultural Despair, and parts of Gardiner’s survey in Theories o f  
History. Conceptual relations between decline and progress were enriched by 
Robert Nisbet’s The History o f the Idea o f  Progress and Christopher Lasch’s The 
True and Only Heaven, and James Thomson’s Decline in History puts the self- 
referential ity of European narratives of decline in perspective.
Postwar Britain
Britain enjoys a conspicuous abundance of summaries, surveys and assessments 
of its postwar literature and culture. The war period and its immediate aftermath 
merit this attention as social, economic and cultural watersheds. The majority of 
these studies tend to be oriented toward the mainstream, even when they indulge 
themselves in some less-known or less-remembered texts of the postwar period.
54
Thus, they maintain a canonical approach alongside an attempt to be exhaustive 
through inclusiveness.
Some of these surveys are overtly partisan, at times contentious, either in 
the choice of works covered or in the way they are treated, and this sometimes 
works to their benefit. Among these are Alan Sinfield’s Literature, Politics and 
Culture in Postwar Britain, Bryan Appleyard’s medley The Pleasures o f  Peace, 
Robert Hewison’s In Anger, Andrzej Gasiorek’s Postwar British Fiction: 
Realism and After, and Bernard Bergonzi’s equally stem English Literature and 
Its Background and The Situation o f  the Novel. These studies tend to view 
literature as somehow representative of its general contemporary cultural and 
social setting -  an interpretive attitude acknowledged by some as distinctive of 
the postwar period and its own reception of fiction.
This tendency is less common among the more straightforward literary 
histories, which tend to adhere to conventional judgments of cultural and literary 
(or literary-historical) merit. These include Dominic Head’s Cambridge 
Companion to Modern British Fiction 1950-2000, D.J. Taylor’s After the War: 
the Novel and English Society Since 1945, Stephen Connor’s The English Novel 
in History 1950-1995, Philip Tew’s The Contemporary British Novel, or John 
Brannigan’s relatively recent Orwell to the Present: Literature in England 1945- 
2000, which also takes many earlier accounts into consideration. These literary 
accounts were complemented by accounts of the postwar period from a social 
history perspective, which included Arthur Marwick’s British Culture since 1945 
and British Society since 1945, Peter Hennessy’s Having It So Good: Britain in 
the Fifties (and its antecedent, Never Again: Britain 1945-1951), and Dominic 
Sandbrook’s Never Had It So Good.
Postwar France
Unlike their British counterparts, postwar French cultural studies produced in 
France are disinclined to take the dynamics of literature as indicative, by 
metonymy or otherwise, of general French society and its culture. Instead, 
literature is surveyed broadly, including accounts of French publishing, literary 
prizes and their scandals, and critical discourse in the various reviews and 
periodicals. Foreign accounts allow themselves an altogether broader remit. 
Notable among French cultural studies in English is the great volume of output
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from Yale French Studies, which as a policy has always represented French 
literature and culture. The YFS group generates some significant works in 
English, like Nancy Wood’s Vectors o f Memory and Kristin Ross’s Fast Cars, 
Clean Bodies.
Seeing the literary and the social as two discrete realms, French postwar 
literary overviews also tend toward a more discriminating and strictly canonical 
approach than British accounts. The resultant picture tends to be retrospectively 
constructed and biased toward experimental and avant-garde works and ‘great 
writers’, at the expense of more popular works which probably enjoyed a wider 
readership at the time. There seems to be a striking agreement on ‘great works’ 
and how they should be classified: this runs, for example, through Maurice 
Nadeau’s Le Roman frangais depuis la guerre and Gaetan Picon’s Panorama de 
la nouvelle litterature frangaise in the 1960s, Germaine Bree’s Twentieth- 
Century French Literature in the late 1970s, and a recent work like Eliane 
Tonnet-Lacroix’s La Litterature frangaise et francophone de 1945 a Fan 2000. 
There is a similar agreement on groupings and classifications (Hussards, 
nouveaux romanciers, existentialists), taking authors’ political stances into 
account in a way that is deemed legitimate considering the formative influence of 
French politics (and political ideologies) on French culture.
Some works have been particularly instrumental in this study’s 
contextualisation of French cultural affairs, in particular with regard to politics. 
The most general overviews include Rod Kedward’s La Vie en bleu and Anne 
Simonin and Helene Castres’s chronology Les Idees en France 1945-1988, as 
well as Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-Fran9ois Sirinelli’s Le Temps des masses: le 
vingtieme siecle and Jean Fourastie, Les Trente Glorieuses ou la Revolution 
invisible de 1946 a 1975. Political histories consulted include Jean-Pierre 
Rioux’s, The Fourth Republic 1944-1958, Pierre Cabanne’s Le Pouvoir culturel 
sous la Ve Republique, and Richard Kuisel’s Capitalism and the State in Modern 
France. Some particularly useful sources on specific topics were Henri Rousso’s 
The Vichy Syndrome and Robert O. Paxton’s Vichy France', Brian Rigby’s 
Popular Culture in Modern France: A Study o f Cultural Discourse, Pascal Ory’s 
L'Aventure culturelle frangaise 1945-1989, and Richard Kuisel’s Seducing the 
French', Tony Judt’s Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals 1944-1956, Michael 
Kelly’s The Cultural and Intellectual Rebuilding o f  France after the Second
56
World War, and Ory and Sirinelli’s Les Intellectuels en France de Vaffaire 
Dreyfus a nos jours.
British-French cultural comparisons
As noted, there are relatively few comparative cultural studies of contemporary 
Britain and France. This could be due to the traditional disciplinary nature of 
academic research, or to a reluctance to compare these two national cultures for 
the lack of immediate similarities supporting such a comparison. The last decade 
has seen a change on both counts. The legitimacy of interdisciplinary studies in 
the humanities has been growing, as has the volume of scholarship, be it through 
(inter)cultural studies, European studies, or comparative literature, aided by new 
dedicated research degree programmes and journals like Franco-British Studies. 
As for the foundation for cross-cultural comparison, it cannot be taken for 
granted and needs to be argued on a case- and context-specific basis, and this is 
itself aided by the growing body of comparative work.
This thesis has benefited from several useful comparative studies. A short 
but important contribution comes from one British champion of such a 
perspective, Michael Kelly, in his article on “Comparing French and British 
Intellectuals: Towards a Cross-Channel Perspective.” Discussing British and 
French intellectuals, one cannot ignore the work of Stefan Collini, in his English 
Pasts (discussing the Lieux de memoire project) and more extensively in his 
recent Absent Minds. In one of his last books, The Sixties, Arthur Marwick 
offered a comparative cultural study of the makings of the Sixties Zeitgeist, 
illuminating the rise of youth culture. Another ambitious project is that of Robert 
and Isabelle Tombs, accounting for mutual British and French perceptions in 
their That Sweet Enemy: the French and the British from the Sun King to the 
Present. A broader panorama of contemporary Europe is Tony Judt’s Postwar, a 
massive tome that helps put national processes in perspective.
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Methodology and structure
Methodological considerations
This thesis proceeds from the set of ideas, concepts and attitudes that is cultural 
pessimism. It studies tropes of cultural pessimism in two contemporary cultures, 
examining the ways in which it is manifested, and how these manifestations are 
interlinked. Several methodological choices frame this research, regarding its 
understanding of ‘culture’, its designated objects of study, its choice among these 
objects, and the ways in which they are researched and interpreted.
‘Culture’ in this thesis will be used in its inclusive, anthropological sense, 
as the sum of the symbols, values and customs -  that is, ideational rather than 
structural elements -  of a human grouping, most commonly a society. The 
totality and inclusiveness of the term is conveyed when viewed, as Bennett 
proposes (following Raymond Williams), as a way of life. Culture is collectively 
constructed: it is always in flux, and what it means and includes is dynamic and 
ever-emergent.107 It has no essence, but rather a history, to explain the way it is. 
This chosen definition of ‘culture’ bears on this thesis in several ways. Firstly, it 
decides against strictly canonical views of culture that limit it to ‘high culture’: 
instead it will try to reflect various ‘popular’ cultural phenomena as well, and to 
discuss literary works irrespectively of received notions of literary-historical 
merit. Secondly, this thesis will look to the social and cultural history of Britain 
and France in order to contextualise and account for the literary works 
highlighted.
For its limited length, this thesis cannot have the scope of an exhaustive 
overview of postwar cultural pessimism and must remain a selective 
interpretation, proposing trajectories and recording contours and milestones. The 
‘consequential’ texts and cultural phenomena selected here are those which have 
proven from our contemporary vantage point to be turning points in the history
107 According to anthropologist Ulf Hannerz, “To study culture is to study ideas, experiences, 
feelings, as well as the external forms that such intemalities take as they are made public, 
available to the senses and thus truly social. For culture, in the anthropological view, is the 
meanings which people create, and which create people, as members of societies. Culture is in 
some way collective.” Ulf Hannerz, Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization 
o f Meaning (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 3.
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of their medium or genre; exemplary models that have inspired emulations or 
critical reactions; and texts and cultural phenomena that are representative of a 
popular or specific Zeitgeist. These three main interpretations of the 
consequential -  the influential, the pivotal, and the representative -  share a 
common bias: they are not aesthetic qualities, which supervene on taste or canon, 
but rather historical categories (including here the art-historical and literary- 
historical).
The texts chosen for discussion serve a variety of purposes in this study. 
Texts can illuminate the contexts of their production and reception: Sillitoe’s 
Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, for example, is representative of the 
changing writing and reading (and film viewing) trends in Britain of the late 
1950s. Texts can illuminate each other by force of juxtaposition: considered 
together as contemporaneous attitudes to social structure, Sillitoe’s debut novel 
and Genet’s play Le Balcon, otherwise disparate, show thematic affinities in their 
respective treatments of marginality, the fixity of social order, and the resultant 
sense of entrapment. Texts can also illuminate the cultural comparison itself: 
Wilson and Duras and their divergent treatments of national identity and 
collective memory highlight two different tendencies of British and French 
national imaginaries. Ultimately, the chosen works were selected for their textual 
richness and the wealth of topics and devices they allow me to discuss: the 
popularity of Franfoise Sagan’s Bonjour tristesse (1954) does not compensate 
for its shallow, skeletal narrative, and so it remains in the background of a 
discussion focussing on Vian’s L 'Ecume des jours.
The readings offered of the literary texts are meant to propose a 
consistent thematic interpretation, assisted by secondary literature and suggesting
• I HR *a narrative of cultural pessimism in the particular juncture studied. This series 
of readings will also allow the present thesis to do something different: to 
explore cultural pessimism from within, through its tropes. Cultural pessimism 
will form the horizon and the vanishing point of the perspectives I bring to bear 
in this thesis: using it as a conceptual system will enable an unconventional
108 On thematic interpretation in literature see: Menachem Brinker, “Theme and Interpretation” 
[in Hebrew], in his About Literature: Essays on the Borderline o f  Philosophy o f  Art and 
Literary Theory (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2000), 220-231.
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examination of the literary texts and their cultural contexts; and, in turn, by 
instantiating cultural pessimism, the texts and contexts discussed will illuminate 
it as an overarching narrative in the postwar period.
Thesis structure
This thesis will examine the tropes of cultural pessimism as they appear in 
literary texts and cultural contexts of Britain and France roughly during the two 
decades after the Second World War. The thesis will suggest the prominence of 
cultural pessimism in these settings, and will seek to understand the particular 
forms it took during this period of transformation and their relative novelty. The 
following thematic sections are laid out as juxtapositions, presenting Britain and 
France separately and in their respective terms. These juxtapositions are 
complemented by comparative section summaries, which isolate the tropes of 
cultural pessimism discussed in the chapters and consider their similarities and 
divergences.
Section 1 will survey tropes of postwar cultural pessimism with regard to 
social structure, and discuss their literary manifestation in Alan Sillitoe’s 
Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (1958) and Jean Genet’s Le Balcon (1956). 
This section also shows the two nations, and cultural critics within them, 
grappling with received and problematic notions of culture (as ‘high’ culture), 
and with their redefinition as more inclusive of hitherto unrepresented ways of 
life. Within the general anxiety at the time for the transformation of social orders 
by welfare systems and new affluence, these two works also help illustrate the 
sense of entrapment on the margins of those old orders which, for all their 
transformation, seemed to persist.
Section 2 will discuss culturally pessimistic attitudes toward national 
identity and collective memory, elaborating on Angus Wilson’s Anglo-Saxon 
Attitudes (1956) and on Marguerite Duras’s screenplay (and Alain Resnais’s 
film) Hiroshima mon amour (1959). The combative approaches to national 
traditions and memory reflected the sensitivity of the issue of national identity, 
‘rediscovered’ as already endangered and in need of defence by its vanguard. Yet 
beside these preoccupations, some of which had already had their precedents in 
the interwar period, wartime and postwar experiences also added a new sense of
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semiotic crisis, a crisis of representation, which informed attitudes of cultural 
pessimism.
Section 3 will continue the discussion of several tropes and approaches 
discussed in the preceding sections, carrying them on to an examination of 
postwar figurations of youth in a rapidly modernising age. The two texts chosen 
will frame this period and will thus be presented chronologically, beginning with 
Boris Vian’s L ’Ecume des jours (1947), and concluding with Colin Maclnnes’s 
Absolute Beginners (1959). These works, and the rise of youth culture on the 
crest of the wave of affluence and modernisation, will serve to illustrate two 
seemingly conflicting views of postwar youths: as similar to their elders, yet 
disappointing them in their lax ways; or as completely different to their elders, 
presenting an inscrutable new social force that was perceived as threatening to 
established order.
These three themes present some of the contribution of cultural 
pessimism to understanding postwar Britain and France. They also demonstrate 
the flexible applicability of cultural pessimism as an interpretive tool in literary, 
cultural and historical studies. However, most immediately they show the 
ubiquity of images and tropes of cultural pessimism and their continued 
relevance to the postwar period as to our time. The idea of decline and reactions 
to it remain important keys to understanding the way we were but also the way 
we are still, through our accommodation of the idea and possibility of finitude.
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Section 1: Cultural Pessimism and Social Structure
Chapter 1: Cultural Pessimism and Class in Britain
The issue of social structure in postwar Britain is inextricably linked with the 
traditional centrality of class to British identities. The story of British postwar 
reconstruction is also the story of the growth of the working class: its expansion 
through full employment policies, organisation through the widening of trade- 
unionism, and rise to relative welfare and affluence (dubbed embourgeoisement), 
widely thought to blur distinctions between it and a middle class impoverished 
by the war. From the early 1950s, members of the working classes enjoyed 
opportunities that had not previously been available to their elders. Yet, in the 
hands of the interwar middle classes, cultural production was slow to catch up 
with Britain’s social transformation. Only around 1956 did literary fiction, 
theatre and film begin to reflect the new predominance of the affluent working 
classes as cultural consumers. It was around then that their growing influence as 
cultural producers also became apparent in literature (working-class fiction), 
drama (‘kitchen sink’ theatre) and film (British New Wave cinema), to mixed 
responses.
This chapter will interpret several responses to these social changes. The 
postwar cultural scene will be surveyed, concentrating on the public emergence 
for the first time of new working-class and regional voices, some of which were 
associated with the label of Angry Young Men. An interesting cross-Channel 
influence that fed into this belated cultural shift was the translation of fashionable 
French existentialist fiction and thought, introducing concepts like ‘commitment’ 
and ‘the absurd’ to English readership. Technological and legislative changes 
also aided this diversification of culture, with affordable paperbacks now 
offering more popular literature, government investment in libraries and gradual 
relaxation of controls on theatre and film productions.
Reactions to social and cultural changes did not follow class definitions. 
The erosion of the old middle class (discussed below in chapter 3) 
notwithstanding, the working classes were not always pleased at the 
opportunities of affluence. Many saw in these opportunities false choices, leading
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to false lives betraying their spiritual grounding in traditional working-class 
roots. These opinions found their way into academic critical discourse, owing in 
part to the culturalist redefinition of English studies espoused by F.R. Leavis, and 
in part to the newly formed discipline of Cultural Studies, corresponding to 
similar political changes in the formation of the British New Left. The New Left 
exasperation with party politics has affinities with frustrations concerning the 
production and study of British culture, forming a tangle of anxieties about the 
new postwar social reality. These anxieties found some outlet in Alan Sillitoe’s 
debut novel, Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (1958), which will be 
discussed at the conclusion of this chapter.
The British Postwar Cultural Scene
The changes outlined above began during the war years and manifested 
themselves, at least politically, shortly afterwards. The collective experience of 
the war effort shaped among working-class men an egalitarian understanding of 
social relations: their lengthy and intimate intermingling with middle- and upper- 
class men for the common goal of King and Country eroded a sense of deference. 
Back home, most women, burdened during the war by the double load of 
homemaking and industrial work, looked forward to material improvements 
(education, housing) on interwar conditions, hoping for jobs that would allow 
their husbands to be sole breadwinners.109 For these reasons, the Labour electoral 
victory of 1945 was unsurprising: people expected change, and the Labour 
programme promised just that.
The surprise in Attlee’s election was in the widespread politicisation it 
reflected, which had its roots in wartime discussions of war’s outcome and the 
promise of what would follow. The USSR was particularly admired for its 
military might, industrial prowess and perceived model of social justice, 
trumpeted in Britain since the 1930s through the Communist Party and 
organisations like the Left Book Club. The United States, at least through the 
extensive deployment of American troops in Britain, antagonised the British 
public, creating tensions around issues of racial segregation and male
109 Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000 [1998]), 521,531.
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competition over British women. The working classes, previously loyal to the
‘natural party of government’, the Conservatives, were now willing to question
leaders and mobilise politically, mostly toward the left.110
This political change also reflected the erosion of the interwar social
order. The disintegrating, impoverished interwar middle class was antagonised
by working-class affluence: their prevalent 1930s progressive individualism
soured into a criticism of the postwar social-democratic vision. However,
“outside the realms of social services or nationalized industries the visitor would
not have observed a social democracy.” 111 The ideal of social order changed, but
many established ideological formations of British society remained in place
until the mid-1950s, as the working classes, the great beneficiaries of the welfare
state, indulged in the commercialised cultural fruits of capitalism.
Embourgeoisement had its own popular mythology (similar to those of French
modernisation, as will be shown below), and idealised new social types: the
practical and hard-working ‘bourgeois worker,’ attached to the homestead
governed by his partner, ‘the housewife,’ a woman liberated by consumer goods
bought on instalment plans on Saturday shopping trips with her husband; and
their offspring, the ‘teenager’, a misunderstood but privileged creature who held
112great promise for the future. This vision, mixing reality and fantasy, was 
predominantly conservative: modernity and the fruits of ‘affluence’ were at 
home, with the traditional nuclear family, which now, while still nominally 
working-class, could afford hitherto middle-class tastes. Wartime working-class 
radicalism dissipated in postwar affluence, as the myth of affluent Britain 
concealed for some time the social cost of transformation.
Along with slow derationing, following the 1951 Festival of Britain, and 
against the recent background of Sir Roger Bannister’s four-minute mile, the 
regaining of the Ashes, Sir Edmund Hilary’s ascent of Everest, and the advent of 
the ‘new Elizabethan age’ with the summer 1953 coronation -  a reinvigoration of 
national prowess, relying heavily on tradition and familiarity, emerged by the 
mid-1950s. A sense of back-to-basics renewal was also apparent in the literature
110 McKibbin, 524-525, 531-532.
111 McKibbin, 536, see also 533-534.
112 Bill Osgerby, Youth in Britain since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 31-32 (henceforth: 
Osgerby, Youth).
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of the period, particularly in what was dubbed the Movement: the embrace of 
sober, rational, apolitical British realist writing was marked in the first novels of 
Iris Murdoch (Under the Net), John Wain {Hurry On Down) and Kingsley Amis 
{Lucky Jim), published in 1954.113 The Movement’s rejection of both poetic 
romanticism and experimental modernism made room again for epistemic 
certainties, conventional narrative construction, a referential adequacy of 
language, and the assumption of a common, shared experience. All this could 
also be mocked, as in Amis’s comedy of conventions.114
The watershed year, if not the annus mirahilis, of British postwar 
literature is widely considered to be 1956. Several political and cultural events 
frame this. In May a new West End theatre opened in defiance of Theatreland’s 
governing cartel. One of the first productions of George Devine’s Royal Court 
Theatre was the unknown John Osborne’s incendiary play Look Back in Anger. 
Subverting the genteel (Osborne even placed an ironing board on stage), the play 
addressed social continuities and changes in contemporary England through the 
troubled new marriage of upper-class Alison to working-class Jimmy Porter, a 
frustrated man with a considerable Weltschmerz. Through extensive trumpeting 
by the critic Kenneth Tynan and a scandalised journalistic reception, the play 
became a hit. While remaining characteristically middle-class (and generally 
traditional in style), the frankness of Osborne’s play nevertheless managed to 
attract younger audiences, who usually sought their entertainment in cinemas and 
dance halls.115 Three weeks later came Colin Wilson’s book of essays, The 
Outsider, also tackling new themes frankly and passionately. Soon journalists 
were speaking of Angry Young Men.116
Politically, from the Suez crisis of late October 1956, it became gradually 
clear that Britain had reached the end of Empire and was becoming a second-
113 George Watson, British Literature since 1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 67-70. Watson 
suggests that despite the misrepresentative label, Movement writers still shared a commitment 
to the ‘pr°gramrne’ of new realism.
114 Watson, 78-79, 92-93.
115 Robert Hewison, In Anger: Culture and the Cold War 1945-60 (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1981), 145-146, 155.
1,6 For more on Wilson’s The Outsider, see below in this section.
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117class world power. As the aggressor in Suez, Britain could not protest at the 
Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising shortly afterwards. Both events 
exacerbated for the British leftist intelligentsia various dissatisfactions about the 
Establishment, the class system, and the promised alternative. Effectively, “if 
imperialism had been mortally wounded at Suez, so had Communism at
1 | o
Budapest.” In literature, Movement writers such as Wain and Amis had
already expressed some of this unease, but it was the Angry Young Men who
gave that dissatisfaction both direction and focus. Anger seemed to intensify 
from Amis’s Lucky Jim to Osborne’s Look Back in Anger (1956), through John 
Braine’s Room at the Top (1957), to Alan Sillitoe’s Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning (1958), which a Daily Telegraph reviewer famously thought made 
“Room at the Top look like a vicarage tea-party.”119
This crescendo of frankness, aggression or scandal suggests that
discontent and disillusionment were finding their outlet in an increasingly 
working-class literature. Politically, working-class dissent at the time was only 
legitimate where cultural (effectively class) distinctions were institutionalised by 
power structures: in government, education or industry. Otherwise, resentment 
was depoliticised by its removal from the public sphere and confinement to the
1 70personal or the private sphere. Working-class material advancement
notwithstanding, this was what young men were really Angry about: they were 
unwilling to acquiesce with the class system or to keep quiet about their feelings. 
These “literary Teddy Boys,” who were “the first generation of ‘Butler 
[education act] kids’... were in their mid-twenties. They had missed the war... 
[and were] ungratefully slashing the philanthropic hands that had helped them up 
in the world.”121 A suspicion of affluence was typical of writers shaped by the
1,7 Hewison stresses that “‘Suez’ was a far more evocative image in 1958” than at the time of the 
crisis, so its effect was a longer process rather than a momentary impact. Hewison, 127-129.
118 Ian Haywood, Working-Class Fiction: from Chartism to Trainspotting (Plymouth: Northcote 
House, 1997), 92.
1,9 Stuart Laing, Representations o f Working-Class Life 1957-1964 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1986), 62.
120 McKibbin, 528.
121 John Sutherland, Reading the Decades: Fifty Years o f the Nation's Bestselling Books (London: 
BBC Worldwide, 2002), 32.
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interwar period; their sediments of class consciousness could not be easily 
removed by the promise of social mobility through education or work.122 
Inasmuch as young working-class writers were wary of contemporary ‘bread and 
circuses’, they could be said to be pessimistic about the prospect of reconciling 
‘affluence’ with authenticity.
The case of Sillitoe exemplifies many of the literary and cultural 
transformations of the period. Although grouped with the Angry Young Men in 
later literary surveys, on his literary debut he was not regarded as such.123 
Perhaps it was merely bad timing, as by October 1958, when Saturday Night and 
Sunday Morning was published, the media craze over the Angry Young Men was 
effectively over.124 Initially the book was not a commercial hit, and only in late 
1959, after the success of the film Room at the Top, did the producer Joseph 
Janni manage to secure funding for Sillitoe’s adaptation.125 Film was where 
several of the young writers collaborated -  and generated income from cinematic 
adaptations of their works, principally through Woodfall Films, the production 
company set up by Osborne and the director Tony Richardson.126 The delayed 
commercial success of Saturday Night and Sunday Morning -  fourteen reprints 
in five years -  came with the almost simultaneous release of its film adaptation 
and the Pan paperback edition, whose cover featured stills from the controversial 
film. This was a turning point in British book history, both for the mutual
122 Haywood, 100; Alan Sinfield, Literature Politics and Culture in Postwar Britain, rev. ed. 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1997), 232-235.
123 “I’ve never thought of myself as angry, particularly... I didn’t know John Braine or Kingsley 
Amis or John Osborne, and I hardly knew at all what they were writing. We’re all much 
unlike, as our subsequent work has shown. I don't think I have been influenced by any of 
them in a significant way.” Sillitoe quoted in Joyce Rothschild, “The Growth of a Writer: an 
Interview with Alan Sillitoe,” Southern Humanities Review XX, 2 (Spring 1986), 133.
124 Humphrey Carpenter, The Angry Young Men: A Literary Comedy o f  the 1950s (London: 
Penguin, 2002), 203-204,
125 Laing, 119. The adaptation, directed by emigre director Karel Reisz, introduced stylistic 
elements from French nouvelle vague cinema into British social realism. The British New 
Wave, a working-class cinema, was forged; Marwick, Society, 118.
126 The playwright Arnold Wesker joked that “There never was an Angry Young Man... On the 
contrary, we were very happy. Our work was being performed and we were earning more 
money in a year than in our entire lives until then”; quoted in Carpenter, 192.
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advancement of a book and its film adaptation, and for a paperback best-seller 
being taken as ‘serious fiction’.127
British publishing trends were also changing in the late 1950s. 
Previously, publishers saw working-class fiction as a risky business and were 
reluctant to pursue it, at least until the 1959 Roberts Act set up a national system 
of local public libraries, hedging publishers’ investment in unusual new titles. 
This legislative step, together with the Angry Young Men fad, made the late 
1950s and early 1960s a period of heavy cultural investment in working-class 
narratives.128 Just preceding this change, Sillitoe’s Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning still had to rely on the trust of its young editor, Tom Maschler. Still, 
Maschler’s confidence in Sillitoe was justified: Sillitoe drew extensively on his 
1940s Nottingham working-class background, and readers were increasingly 
interested in ‘that kind of book’. This interest was largely reductive: much of the 
novel’s critical acclaim praised it “largely for its documentary qualities.”129
Sillitoe’s case illustrates a reading of fiction as journalism and of 
working-class authors as conduits of ‘real’ experience. Saturday Night and 
Sunday Morning addressed a contemporary issue: what had the new, ‘affluent’ 
working class to complain about? Arthur Seaton’s open enjoyment of affluence 
did not contrast with his otherwise unchanged life in local circles of family, 
factory and community. This also helped a non-working-class readership, curious 
about the ‘New Estate’ of ‘affluent workers’, and its relation to traditional 
working-class life.130 The general persistence of popular ways of life and thought 
from the 1930s and 1940s, the quotidian violence, delinquency, and strong anti­
authority sentiment in the new setting of the 1950s was represented by Sillitoe as 
the real working-class experience, prompting some critics to place the novel 
centrally in a “post-industrial minatory fiction” tradition going back to
127 Laing, 64-65. He outlines this process of transformation over three novels/adaptations: 
Braine’s Room at the Top (1957/1959), Sillitoe’s Saturday Night and Sunday Morning 
(1958/1960), and David Storey’s This Sporting Life (1960/1962).
128 Haywood, 93.
129 Brannigan, 55; Harry Ritchie, Success Stories: Literature and the Media in England, 1950- 
1959 (London: Faber & Faber, 1988), 198-200.
130 Sinfield, 243, 256-257.
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Dickens.131 The novel’s challenge to the idea of the quiescent, contented 
generation who had ‘never had it so good’ was one of its outstanding features.
An earlier influence on British literature in the first postwar decade was 
existentialism. Like working-class fiction, its readership was mainly middle- 
class, but whereas working-class fiction came ‘from below’, existentialism came 
from without, an accessible continental cultural import. French Existentialist 
works, both fiction and thought, arrived in Britain shortly after the war, starting 
with Camus’s LEtranger, translated by Stuart Gilbert as The Outsider (1942, 
reissued in 1946). Sartre’s Roads to Freedom came in 1947, and hot on its heels 
followed Existentialism and Humanism and Camus’s The Plague in 1948, 
Sartre’s Nausea in 1949, and What is Literature? in 1950. This ‘invasion’ caused 
a stir in the British cultural discourse. Introducing and defending it, the critics 
Cyril Connolly (who prefaced Camus’s English Outsider), Herbert Read and 
Stephen Spender, emphasised the shared premises of British and continental 
(particularly French) art. Read and Connolly embraced existentialism as 
expressing a conscience of constant revolution, daring romantically to defy 
empiricist insular traditions. The foreign and agitating element of existentialism 
was however challenged by the likes of T.S. Eliot and the philosopher A.J. Ayer,
1 T9who rushed to defend established traditional home ground.
Initially taken monolithically, French existentialism was viewed as 
problematic by British intellectuals politically constrained by Cold War 
allegiances. The existentialist understanding of freedom challenged preconceived 
ideological notions and was only taken on from 1952, after the Sartre-Camus rift 
following Camus’s The Rebel and Sartre’s fellow-travelling. Camus’s espousal 
of political non-commitment and anti-communism, replacing political revolt with
131 Keith Wilson, “Arthur Seaton Twenty Years On: A Reappraisal of Sillitoe’s Saturday Night 
and Sunday Morning,” English Studies in Canada VII, 4 (December 1981), 414. Sillitoe 
rejected the autobiographical reading of the book and the ‘working-class novel’ label. See 
Alan Sillitoe, “Introduction to the 1979 Edition,” Saturday Night and Sunday Morning. 
(London: Flamingo Modem Classics, 1994 [1958]), 6. All subsequent page numbers refer to 
this edition
132 One of Ayer’s students, Olivier Todd, relayed his teacher’s thoughts on ‘the Alice-in- 
Wonderland logic’ of non-being in Being and Nothingness to its author, his godfather. Sartre, 
who had hardly read critiques of his work, much less engaged with them, gleefully exclaimed 
“Ayer est un con!” Olivier Todd, Un Fils rebelle (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1981), 90-91, 105.
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a ‘metaphysical revolt’ allowed political quietism. This was more amenable to 
British intellectuals, who preferred to defend artistic freedom with public 
intellectual commitment coupled with political withdrawal.133 One outspoken 
advocate of Sartrean existentialism was Iris Murdoch, an Oxford philosophy 
lecturer who, before her novelistic debut, had already published a monograph on 
Sartre (1953).134 For Murdoch, Sartre was “a natural stepping-stone, in the 
1940s, along a well-trodden path” from wartime communism to a later public
13Sdisavowal of Marxism. She was not uncritical of Sartre’s passion for a “big
theoretical machine” and his inability to write a great novel; but she did discount
these as symptomatic of a general contemporary predicament, “the spiritual crisis
of our time” -  the inability to express, except in abstract thought and ideology,
1“that the human person is precious and unique.”
French existentialist thought was represented by its advocates in Britain 
as a grand rhetorical gesture of tragic heroism in the face of a “sense of absence 
and failure,” although probably not the same kind of failure (the occupation) it
117had faced in France. Existentialism created another Angry Young Man, Colin 
Wilson, whose first published work, The Outsider, was a scandalous hit, widely 
known if not widely read. Lifting its title from the Camus translation in order 
to suggest a conceptual link (and perhaps similar sales figures), the book was 
praised by Connolly and by Dame Edith Sitwell, who even wrote its dust-jacket
133 Sinfield, 86-91.
134 Bryan Appleyard, The Pleasures o f  Peace: Art and Imagination in Post-war Britain (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1989), 154.
135 Watson, 81-82.
136 Iris Murdoch, Sartre (London: Fontana, 1968 [1953]), 119-120. For another diagnosis of the 
Sartrean philosophy of crisis as decadent see: Norberto Bobbio, “The Decadentism of Sartre,” 
in his The Philosophy o f  Decadentism: A Study in Existentialism, trans. by D. Moore (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1948), 53-60.
137 Appleyard, 53; Steven Connor suggests that 1950s British existentialism was mainly a 
popularised and faddish form of its French origins. Steven Connor, The English Novel in 
History 1950-2000 (London: Routledge, 1996), 55.
138 Carpenter, 112-113. Bernard Bergonzi, Wartime and Aftermath: English Literature and its 
Background 1939-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 173-174. Like Osborne’s 
Jimmy Porter, Wilson played the trumpet: Sinfield thinks this image elision to be part of an 
altogether “misunderstood, diluted, combined and appropriated” mixture of black American 
jazz, Beat culture and French existentialism in early 1950s Britain; Sinfield, 163.
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blurb.139 The book was a popular essay pitched as serious hardback literature, 
arguing passionately but loosely against the pessimism of French existentialism, 
mobilising against it the mysticism of Blake and others. Yet British 
existentialism had also had its local roots in English ‘personalism’, a kind of 
Anarchist quasi-existentialism linked with literary Neo-Romanticism. Wilson’s 
Outsider, too, stressed the “decay of conventionally-held cultural values” and 
treated this in personal, depoliticised terms, displacing material social problems 
to the realm of the mind; this was probably its real timeliness.140
The British reception of existentialism was still predominantly 
intellectual. In their respective ways Sartre and Camus carried their concept of 
freedom finally to the artist and writer, and Sartre also offered firm philosophical 
grounding for the role and status of intellectuals in society.141 The ‘modem 
condition’ of the artist was encapsulated by Sartrean ‘alienation’ (a concept 
carrying its Marxist origins with it) and by Camus’s unaddressed yet pervasive 
‘Angst’. To British postwar writers existentialism offered a systematic 
vocabulary, a thematic crux in cultural discourse, and an alternative to both 
modernist experimentation and traditional realism. To Sinfield, non-Movement, 
non-Modemist writings, like Wilson’s Outsider, shared with Beckett and Ionesco 
in France a concern with the overarching theme of Man’s existential 
predicament.142 However, the literary reflection of the modem predicament also 
preoccupied Movement writers, who saw their brand of realism as a “rejection of 
what art has become.”143
Politically, the British take on Sartre’s postwar maxim of commitment 
became dominant in the late 1950s, just as the French discourse of engagement 
exhausted itself.144 Adding to prior disillusionment with party politics, in
139 Carpenter, 107-111.
140 Hewison, 131-132.
141 Sinfield, 87, 90.
142 Sinfield, 93, 189, 192.
143 This, more than the progressive social realism, was a specifically conservative pessimism, 
informed by a “myth of a better past” and affecting “cultivatedly philistine sensibilities”; 
Appleyard, 96-97. Still, conservative critics like Herman regard twentieth-century cultural 
pessimism as characteristic of leftist attitudes; Herman, 445.
144 Hewison, 174.
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particular with Communism following the Hungarian invasion, this commitment 
was enacted in the New Left through anti-politics, committing instead to ‘issues’. 
This took various forms, from the establishment of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) in 1958, to the elaborate critique of society through culture, 
as in the case of the work of Richard Hoggart, Michael Young, Raymond 
Williams, and Stuart Hall.145 The political protest of New Left commitment was 
thus directed at the Old Left of the 1930s which, after the Attlee government, 
included not just the Labour Party establishment but State Establishment itself -  
Whitehall and the BBC. The adversarial pitting of ‘new’ against ‘old’ informs 
both the Angry Young Men in literature and the New Left in politics, converging 
around issues of commitment and disillusionment about individual 
transformative possibilities. Their intellectual pessimism, which mirrored similar, 
perhaps more deep-seated anxieties in France, will be discussed below.
British Culturalism: Leavis and After
The reception of Sillitoe’s Saturday Night and Sunday Morning quickly placed 
him in two distinct categories, as an Angry Young Man, and as a provincial 
writing ‘proletarian’ prose. The northern roots and working class tableaux linked 
Sillitoe to an imposing precedent -  that of Nottingham bom D.H. Lawrence. The 
comparison with Lawrence was not unjustified: both Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning and Lawrence’s Sons and Lovers (1913) are passionate fictionalised 
autobiographical tales of their authors’ tough upbringing in working-class 
Nottingham, and of attempts to transcend these circumstances. Sillitoe admitted 
that Lawrence had been a major influence on his writing.146 By the mid-1950s 
F.R. Leavis, too, declared Lawrence a literary giant, standing at the zenith of ‘the 
Great Tradition’ (the title of Leavis’s 1948 book) of the English novel.
The valorisation of Lawrence by Leavis and the Scrutiny group is part of 
an important literary debate linking interwar and postwar English letters. The 
figure of Lawrence was central in Leavis’ attempts to break away from the
145 Hewison, 175-176.
146 Michel Lefranc, “Alan Sillitoe: An Interview with M. Lefranc,” Etudes Anglaises: Grande- 
Bretagne, Etats-Unis XXVI, 1 (janvier-mars 1973), 36; John Sawkins, The Long 
Apprenticeship: Alienation in the Early Work o f Alan Sillitoe (Oxford and Bern: Peter Lang, 
2001), 85.
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influence of his former mentor, T.S. Eliot, and from The Criterion, Eliot’s 
literary review. He did this first by establishing his own review, Scrutiny (1932- 
53), and then by going on to argue against most of Eliot’s major literary 
judgments, primarily his disdain for Lawrence as a religiously-inspired moraliser 
with a spiritually inadequate vision of intellectual independence.147 Leavis was 
particularly animated by the close relations between Lawrence the suffering man 
and Lawrence the creating writer, whereas Eliot disapproved of the vision of
148literature as an expression of emotion and personality. By the 1930s, Eliot had 
come to be identified with a pessimistic variety of literary modernism that was 
increasingly dismissive of contemporary culture as expressing a fractured, 
ungodly existence. As he concluded in ‘Thoughts After Lambeth’ (1931), “The 
World is trying the experiment of attempting to form a civilized but non- 
Christian mentality. The experiment will fail; but we must be very patient in 
awaiting its collapse; meanwhile redeeming the time.”149 Following his mentor’s 
crisp and brusque style of critical writing, Leavis reinvested it with his own 
pathos, agenda and influences.150
First among those influences was a synthesis of cultural elitism with a 
gospel of culture as moral and intellectual guide (replacing religion), in the 
tradition of Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy (1869). A second influence 
on Leavis was I.A. Richards’s ‘practical criticism’ (the title of his 1929 book), 
which advocated close reading as the sole scientific tool of the literary critic.
147 E.M. Forster lamented the low public profile of Lawrence’s death in an obituary letter to The 
Criterion which Eliot dismissed, “along with Lawrence and his entire work”. Forster 
suggested that Lawrence had actually written for the younger generation that matured over the 
1940s. Macdonald Daly, “Lawrence, Leavis, and the Left,” Durham University Journal 87, 2 
(July 1995), 344-345.
148 Cf. Barry J. Scherr, “Leavis’ Revolt against Eliot: the Lawrence Connexion,” Recovering 
Literature: A Journal o f  Contextualist Criticism 15 (Summer 1987), 42-44.
149 George Watson, The Literary Critics, revised edition (London: The Hogarth Press, 1986 
[1962]), 174; quoting Thomas Steams Eliot, “Thoughts After Lambeth,” Selected Essays, 3rd 
rev. edn. (London: Faber & Faber, 1951), 387.
150 For critical accounts of Eliot and Leavis see Watson, The Literary Critics, 161-177, 187-194; 
for a more sympathetic account of the Leavises and Scrutiny see Francis Mulhem, The 
Moment o f Scrutiny (London: New Left Books, 1979); Gary Day, Re-reading Leavis: Culture 
and Literary Criticism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996).
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Coincidentally, Richards, who placed great (and probably inordinate) trust in 
literary culture as a redemptive undertaking, also championed an Amoldian 
revival in the interwar years. Arnold and Richards were taken up by Leavis and 
the Scrutiny group as key figures in the trajectory of European decline. Their 
pessimism also found vent in a nostalgically romantic view of a ‘homogeneous 
reading public’, made irredeemably extinct by industrialisation. This view was 
most fully articulated by Leavis’s wife Queenie, in Fiction and the Reading 
Public (1932), where she attempted an ‘anthropological’ approach to 
literature.151 A third influence was Leavis’s own experience in the Great War and 
a cultural pessimism inspired by reading Spengler. Leavis, who was haunted 
throughout his life by his military service in the First World War, was too young 
to appreciate the detached and somewhat rosy Edwardian premises of 
Bloomsbury liberalism. Instead he was fascinated by Spengler’s The Decline o f  
the West, a hugely popular book in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, 
and he read his contemporary discontents into Spengler.152 Faced with the social 
crisis of the 1920s and 1930s, Leavis sought to reinvigorate culture and reform 
society in a way that would give it a new life, but which also revealed his 
misinterpretation of Spengler, who had condemned Western culture irretrievably. 
It is one of Leavis’s self-contradictions that, drawing from unsentimental 
Spengler as well as on a nostalgic picture of extinct (or non-existent) 
communities, he advocated a reliance on culture and continuity as a means to 
reform and social change: essentially a gaze back as the way forward.
A final influence was that of Eliot, as poet and critic, which Leavis 
eventually rejected, seeing Eliot’s modernism failing to deliver on its promise. 
Lawrence was but one, albeit major bone of contention between Eliot and Leavis 
throughout the 1930s, receiving Leavis’s special attention from Mass Civilization
151 Iain Wright, “F.R. Leavis, the Scrutiny Movement and the Crisis,” in Culture and Crisis in 
Britain in the Thirties, ed. by Jon Clark, Margot Heinemann, David Margolies and Carole 
Snee (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1979), 46-49, 60 n.13.
152 Wright notes that Leavis was quoting Spengler extensively as early as 1930. Wright, 41-42; 
D.L. LeMahieu, A Culture for Democracy: Mass Communication and the Cultivated Mind in 
Britain Between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 298-299, 302.
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and Minority Culture (1930) and especially D.H. Lawrence: Novelist (1955).153 
Besides the Lawrence issue, Leavis, a ‘revolutionary conservative’ type like his 
old master, adopted Eliot’s notion of ‘tradition’, in the sense of hard labour and 
research pitted against romantic individualism.154 By the 1940s Leavis and Eliot 
developed differing understandings of ‘tradition’. Leavis came to define 
‘tradition’ as a historical-cultural trajectory of literary moral concern laced with 
vitalism, as expressed by George Eliot, Joseph Conrad and primarily D.H. 
Lawrence -  authors whose work Eliot had rejected expressly for reasons of 
ungodly, lax morality and individualistic disrespect for ‘tradition’. Eliot’s 
American origins and broad, European-oriented outlook became increasingly 
foreign to Leavis, who dealt with culture more narrowly defined along national 
lines of Englishness. Leavis eventually remarked on Eliot’s un-Englishness and 
how foreign his brand of modernism was to English literature.155
The critical rivalry of Leavis and Eliot highlights two distinct strains of 
contemporary cultural pessimism. Eliot’s is a bleaker, modernist pessimism, that 
of displacement, exile and alienation. As he grew older, his vision was 
increasingly infused with a normative sense of Anglo-Catholic spirituality and 
obligation. Leavis is a nostalgic cultural pessimist, whose ‘negative classicism’ 
yearned for a golden age of self-sufficient pre-industrial life. To him good 
writing revolved around moral concern, ‘concrete’ vitalism and nostalgia, which 
are closely linked with an agnostic ‘groundedness’ in national values (if not 
essences). These differences demonstrate the various and divergent faces of 
cultural pessimism, and Eliot’s influence on Leavis without requiring their 
reconciliation.
The influence of Eliot on Leavis could be felt in the new voices that 
assessed contemporary culture through its literature and linked the study of 
culture and the critique of socioeconomic conditions. The two most notable
153 The Lawrence book, like The Great Tradition before it, collected articles Leavis had 
previously published in Scrutiny, allowing him to reach new readers beyond the limited 
subscription of Scrutiny.
154 This was argued in Eliot’s 1919 essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent”.
155 “I am a fellow-coutryman of D.H. Lawrence. Mr. Eliot is not -  the fact that is in any case 
sufficiently obvious insists here upon recognition.” F.R. Leavis, “Mr. Eliot and Mr. 
Lawrence,” Scrutiny 18 (1951), 56; quoted and discussed in Scherr, 93-94.
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publications of the latter kind were Richard Hoggart’s The Uses o f Literacy 
(1957) and Raymond Williams’s Culture and Society (1958).156 Of the two, 
Hoggart was closer to the Leavis brand of cultural pessimism and shared his 
vilification of ‘mass civilisation’ and its hegemonic machinations as ‘shiny 
barbarism’. Like Leavis, Hoggart’s critique was coloured by moral concern and 
nostalgia, and highly personalised: The Uses o f Literacy is a mixture of 
autobiographical and sociological observations about the Leeds he had known. 
Williams, who was, like Leavis, a member of the Cambridge English faculty but 
unlike him was committed to Marxism, offered a more benign view of human 
potentiality which rejected the definition of ‘mass’ from a position of 
exclusionary cultural elitism. Nevertheless, Williams’s history of the idea of 
culture in England suggests the importance of the Leavis (and Arnold) tradition 
of cultural thought: culture had increasingly come to mean something distinct 
from society and from history, an independent, ahistorical cumulative cache, 
which, for its intrinsic value, was untouched by rampant utilitarianism but which 
still must be protected from ‘the masses’. Against this understanding Williams 
suggested an essentially anthropological definition, that of culture as a whole 
way of life. This led him to explore culture not normatively, as ‘high’ or elite, but 
descriptively, as ‘ordinary’.
Williams and Hoggart must be understood in the context of 
disenchantment among the British left intelligentsia following the political and 
ideological developments of the postwar decade and particularly of 1956. Both 
were particularly concerned with the indigenous cultures of the British working 
classes that were seemingly threatened by their social advancement in postwar 
affluence. The postwar working classes seemed poised to be ‘improved’ out of 
existence by their embourgeoisement, however welcome the actual improvement 
in their lives was. Like Williams and Hoggart, other New Left socialist thinkers 
and critics, including Stuart Hall, E.P. Thompson and Perry Anderson, sought to
156 Both books are similar to Sillitoe’s Saturday Night and Sunday Morning in being products of 
long contemplation, taking several years to complete. Michael Skovmand, “Culture, Anger, 
Community: Hoggart, Williams, and the Strange Conjuncture of the Late Fifties,” The 
Dolphin: Publications o f the English Department, University o f  Aarhus 4 (December 1980), 
60.
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restore the image of the contemporary and historical working class as ‘authentic’ 
cultures and as the source of the future social revolution.157
The New Left and cultural studies moment was also related to imperial 
dismantling insofar as it affected English writing. Jed Esty suggests that English 
cultural studies took decolonisation as an opportunity to consolidate national 
culture and repair it, indeed to rethink the nation as defined by its local culture, 
rather than by its imperial power. For these leftist thinkers, Suez was as 
important as Hungary, and the two were effectively linked. Both enabled a 
recovery of England’s cultural particularity by redefining it first as a minor 
culture, a shrinking island, and then as post- or de-modemised, somehow 
preserving Marxist class conflict in industrial England within nativist
ICO
Anglocentric wholeness. This ‘English exception’ was “both a cultural essence 
and an essential culturelessness,” and the decolonisation of the English meant 
“not only to demystify the myths of English cohesion and insularity... but also to 
demystify English universalism” -  thus inspiring an adaptation of tradition 
(through cultural studies) as well as its fetishisation in ‘heritage’ (discussed in the
\  159next section).
Williams and Hoggart’s legacy in the study of English culture was also 
institutional. Both contributed to the foundation of English cultural studies as an 
academic field, endowing it with many of the themes, concepts and methods that 
have subsequently become associated with it. In 1964 Hoggart joined the 
founding team of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
(CCCS), its first ever dedicated university unit. However, the CCCS only made 
its impact on British social research from the late 1960s and early 1970s, when it 
managed to break through the traditional intellectual embarrassment about 
analysing mass culture seriously.160 In the 1950s and early 1960s, the prevalent
157 See Haywood, 92-93.
158 Jed Esty, A Shrinking Island: Modernism and the National Culture in England (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 7-8, 20-21, 175, 187.
159 Esty uses the language of myths and mystification that will be discussed in the following 
chapter through Barthes’s Mythologies. Esty, 196, 224.
160 Bentley enumerates several of the early studies; Nick Bentley, “The Young Ones: A 
Reassessment of the British New Left’s Representation of 1950s Youth Subcultures,” 
European Journal o f  Cultural Studies vol. 8, no. 1 (2005), 65-83 (67); Sinfield, 154.
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institutional-intellectual trends in Britain were still an inward-looking empiricism 
and a resistance to metaphysical ‘big issues’ associated with continental thought. 
As discussed, Structuralism and Sartrean existentialism made it across the 
Channel and became popular in some quarters but then were not taken up by 
scholars in a significant way.161 Gradually, the scholarship boys became new 
dons for ‘new universities’ and after the mid-1960s student culture converged 
with popular youth culture.162 In turn, as part of its examination of mass- and 
popular culture, the CCCS influenced scholarly attitudes to youth, as we will see 
in the third section of this thesis.163
In political terms, Williams and Hoggart were true to their principles, 
involved in adult education and acting as vocal cultural critics in the media, not 
least through the new journal New Left Review: on its launch in 1960 they were 
both on its editorial board, headed by Stuart Hall, and subsequently contributed 
to it extensively.164 More broadly, the New Left movement was somewhat 
unfocused and did not seem to cohere around a clear set of objectives. This was 
exemplified by two collective manifestos of the late 1950s, Declaration (1957, 
edited by Tom Maschler, shortly afterwards Sillitoe’s editor) and Conviction 
(1958, edited by Norman MacKenzie), to which Williams and Hoggart 
contributed essays. Declaration grouped together several writers associated with 
the new literary trends, like Wain, Osborne, Wilson and Doris Lessing, together
161 Marwick, Society, 72.
162 Sinfield, 287.
163 CCCS studies liberalised previously disapproving approaches to youth, suggesting that various 
youth “subcultural styles were strategies of symbolic resistance,” informed not just by 
generation but by structural considerations of society, that is, by class; Osgerby, Youth, 71. 
Major youth studies of CCCS include: Phil Cohen, “Subcultural Conflict and Working-Class 
Community,” Working Papers in Cultural Studies 2 (1972), 4-51; Resistance Through 
Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain, ed. by Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson 
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1976); and Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning o f  Style 
(London: Routledge, 1979).
164 New Left Review was created through the union of two older publications, Universities and 
Left Review and New Reasoner. Hoggart was certainly more influential on public affairs than 
Williams, going on to testify in favour of Lawrence’s banned Lady Chatterley’s Lover, to 
participate in the Albemarle and Pilkington committees and the Arts Council, and even to 
serve as assistant director-general of UNESCO.
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with Tynan, Osborne’s champion, and film director Lindsay Anderson, to 
address contemporary issues. As a point of convergence between so-called 
Angry Young Men and other dissatisfied persons more clearly identified with the 
New Left, Declaration has come to be regarded mainly as a self-serving and 
confused manifesto, its sense of urgency mainly directed at ushering in the new 
self-proclaimed intelligentsia and to oust the still-prevalent elitist establishment. 
In that sense, Conviction was a clearer gesture toward the political, in both roster 
(Hoggart, Williams, the already disillusioned Iris Murdoch) and content. Topics 
discussed included the recently established CND, new directions for the Left in 
the face of embourgeoisement and growing popular cynicism, and the waning 
influence of the Labour party facing Macmillan’s growing popularity.165
Declaration and Conviction are but two examples of a larger trend 
outlined above, showing the British interpretation of Sartrean commitment -  on 
both sides of the Channel mainly a left-wing ideal -  as a move away from party 
politics and towards ad-hoc convergence around positions and issues. 
Declaration certainly illustrated underlying confusions, along with anxieties for 
self-establishment and deposition of existing elites, not only regarding definitions 
of politics and principle, but also along generational distinctions. The new voices 
all matured during or shortly after the Second World War, and sought footholds 
for themselves in an otherwise outdated British structure of governance. The 
socioeconomic transformations that enabled most of them to advance to their 
positions in the late 1950s were proof of a changed social order that, not being 
reflected in official culture, imposed a low glass ceiling over them. The New 
Left, cultural studies, ‘Angry’ and working-class fiction -  all protested a 
widening gap between the way things ought to have been and the way they were, 
and all expressed disillusionement with traditional or conventional forms of 
protest and transformative action. Effectively, only their own idealism stood 
between this and a similar disillusionment with their own chosen methods.
165 On Declaration, see Carpenter, 177-185; on Conviction, see Hewison, 176-177; for a 
comparison and assessment of the two, see Skovmand, 73-79.
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Sillitoe and Saturday Night and Sunday Morning
Sillitoe has always maintainted that while he had read widely in Sartre and 
Camus their work did not directly influence Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning.166 It was realism Sillitoe claims to have had in mind, not existentialism. 
Moreover, he intimates that ‘“ typical’ is not what I wanted Arthur Seaton to 
appear” but rather as much “an individual in some way recognizable by those 
who worked and lived in similar conditions.”167 Arthur was then to be familiar 
but distinct, so his story would not be taken schematically either as a working 
man’s morality tale or as an existentialist tale of the general human condition.
Nevertheless, many scholars read Saturday Night and Sunday Morning in 
terms of existentialist thematics. Existentialism underlay many of Lefranc’s 
questions to Sillitoe, for example, and is central to Nardela’s interpretation.168 
Bergonzi thinks that sympathetically but without collusion, “Sillitoe presents 
Arthur as an existentialist hero, asserting the values of selfhood against an inert 
world.”169 Several other existentialist themes are clearly present in the novel: the 
modem predicament of man’s life in a mechanical environment which distances 
him from nature and authenticity; the consequent sense of entrapment in life and 
its cycles of factory, family, community, convention; the contempt for stifling 
familiarity and even proximity (echoing Sartre’s Huis Clos)\ and an absurd 
ambivalence toward solitude, powered by opposing drives of sociality and
166 “I read [Sartre’s] novels and his stories but I haven’t read his long philosophical books. On 
the other hand I read Camus quite a lot... It's difficult to say whom I have affinities with... 
Just after the war and for quite a long time, one was very much influenced by Sartre. He was a 
great influence in English writing... I read all his books, the fiction, and I read Camus quite a 
lot. The mixture obviously had some influence. But I think apart from that if I had not known 
about Sartre, I think I would still have made these characters as they were, somehow.” 
Lefranc, 41; Sillitoe, “Introduction to the 1979 Edition,” 6.
167 Alan Sillitoe, Life Without Armour (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 252.
168 Nardela sees Arthur living in an “existential universe” (470), fighting “existential nausea” and 
the “thirst of a wastelander” (471), living raucously as “a hedge against isolation” (473), and 
searching for his “vital self’ and defining “himself for himself’ so as “to live with 
nothingness” (469). Anna Ryan Nardela, “The Existential Dilemma of Alan Sillitoe’s 
Working-Class Heroes,” Studies in the Novel 5, 4 (winter 1973), 469-482.
169 Bergonzi, 150; Laing, 79.
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misanthropy. In many ways, Arthur Seaton’s narrative can be considered 
existentialist.170
To discuss Saturday Night and Sunday Morning along the lines of 
existentialist thematics is to read it as a culturally pessimistic narrative: after all, 
Sartrean ‘alienation’ was a result of a perceived decline in the social state of 
affairs, the ‘modem condition’, a systematic figuration of modem pessimism.171 
This introduces an interpretive template and a second-order unity to the
1 7 7unfolding of the plot, supporting its own formal, narrative unity. Arthur Seaton 
feels alienated from anything and anyone outside of his immediate social sphere 
-  the government, the military, the factory hierarchy (excepting his foreman), 
even most of his town folk -  and he is mostly, by self-definition and by action, 
his own man. His present-oriented life, misdirected violence, abuse of himself 
and others, and dogmatic rationalisations of these, are all reflective of his 
dormant stage of Sartrean ‘bad faith’ (mauvaise fo i). Eventually he comes to a 
distressing realisation of this, one that leads him to re-evaluate his situation and 
to change his demeanour and attitude toward himself and the world. Even before 
it becomes the “symbolic moment of transformation” in the novel, the move 
from Saturday night to Sunday morning serves as a “redemptive time” of growth,
* 1 7 Twhen Arthur gains enough inner distance from his life to question it.
Shortly after the novel’s appearance, Sillitoe expressed his disdain for an 
emergent ‘bread and circuses’ attitude, hoping to have shown in Saturday Night 
and Sunday Morning its rejection by contemporary workers who “show some 
sign of being beyond the reach of dead symbols and false values.”174 The novel’s
170 Dominic Head, The Cambridge Introduction to Modern British Fiction, 1950-2000 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 4.
171 British writers of the 1950s engaged with Sartre’s earlier, ontological notion of alienation. 
This dated back to his work of the 1930s, which only arrived in Britain in the late 1940s. His 
later, Marxian notion of alienation was only formulated in Critique de la raison dialectique 
(1960), and similarly took about 15 years to be translated.
172 Even Sawkins, a highly sympathetic reader, acknowledges that the novel’s raw materials -  
short stories, sketches, and poems -  were put together in a way that made an episodic, even 
fragmented text, and that some passages are quite redundant. Sawkins, 66.
173 Quoted from Brannigan, 58; see also Haywood, 103.
174 Alan Sillitoe, “Both Sides of the Street,” Times Literary Supplement (8 July 1960), 435; 
Laing, 66.
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existential rebellion is against bad faith, characteristic of late-1950s British 
mindless hedonism. This is Sillitoe’s defiant reply both to the Establishment and 
to those who, like Amis and Braine, purport to rebel against it, producing instead 
rather “peaceful” and unthreatening fictional gestures that indicated a “shift in
17^sensibility” rather than a counter-current. Jim Dixon and Joe Lampton, like 
their respective creators, were struggling social climbers whose hunger was sated 
by their very success, disclosing what was otherwise an approving outlook on 
contemporary Britain. Arthur Seaton, on the other hand, fights with his back to 
the wall, participating in an existential struggle against self and circumstances, 
the success of which is uncertain and temporary, and thus absurd. As with many 
of his contemporaries from working-class backgrounds, Sillitoe’s gesture was 
informed by traces of old interwar and wartime working-class consciousness that 
implicitly cast those days nostalgically as (in some ways) the ‘good old days’ and 
that viewed the 1950s as representing a falling off in consciousness.
Machines and Violence
Arthur acknowledges becoming an extension of his lathe, doing repetitive, 
menial work; this only rewards him with money, itself of no ‘real’ value, buying 
him momentary pleasures but not redeeming him from daily struggle. Sillitoe 
blends organic and mechanical by describing them in each other’s terms: 
generators sound like whining cats; Arthur’s Saturday night drinks are to him 
“high octane fuel” (10); he throws punches “as if he were a robot” (107); and the 
factory motor stoops at the back of the hall like a stranded whale.176 When 
Arthur and his brother Fred clash with the drunken driver and overturn his car, 
Sillitoe’s account encapsulates “in a single moment the conflicting values -  
machine/human, artificial/natural, dull weight/exhilarating lightness,
177submission/assertion -  that the novel explores.” This helps explain Arthur’s 
violence, and most violence in the novel, as constructive: not gratuitous but 
transformative. Overturning the car is serious rather than reckless; it is about 
everything the car stands for -  a sublimated existential struggle elucidated only
175 Bergonzi, 206.
176 Wilson, 415,421.
177 Wilson, 420.
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by the narration. “Is Arthur abnormally violent?” wondered Sillitoe, “He 
probably is... It’s a way of maintaining his own identity, the only way he knows 
perhaps is to overcompensate by violence.”178 Another act of violence, Jane 
whacking Jim over the head at Aunt Ada’s Christmas party, leads to Arthur's 
reckoning. It is preceded by the drunkard breaking the undertaker’s window: 
“Arthur was stirred by the sound of breaking glass: it synthesized all the 
anarchism within him and was the most perfect and suitable noise to accompany 
the end o f the world and himself’ (108, my italics).
Arthur’s violence is provoked by a sense of entrapment as his life and 
circumstances close in on him. Sillitoe admits as much of the obvious loci, the 
army and the factory: “they’re all prisons, some slightly more agreeable than 
others.”179 The regularity of community and family time-cycles and temporal 
milestones is almost parodic at times (falling out over football results on 
Saturday evening to reconcile over Family Favourites on Sunday morning), and, 
following Brenda’s remark, Arthur experiences them as a disquieting “personal 
memento wor/.”180 To Wilson, Arthur’s contempt for this intimacy is 
understandable: “tribal activity seems always to provoke eventual division and 
the assertion of isolation or individualism; community seems always to break 
down in a display of unenlightened self-interest.”181 In his withdrawal, Arthur is 
left with no friends outside his family and, perhaps, his women. Even so, Sillitoe 
insists that Arthur is not so solitary: “He is in a factory all day and when you’re 
working, you can’t talk. When you are out of the factory, you find more 
immediate things to do than... go through the subtleties of establishing a 
friendship.”182 Shaped in part by material conditions, Arthur’s social life leaves 
him alive enough to feel contented in some elementary way, but no more.
Becoming more aware of his flawed life, Arthur tries to put it right, 
although marrying Doreen as he intends is not the obvious solution. For Sillitoe 
at his most Lawrentian, “Solitude is in a sense craving after comfort and death...
178 Lefranc, 45-46.
179 Sillitoe quoted in John Halperin, “Interview with Alan Sillitoe,” Modern Fiction Studies 25, 2 
(summer 1979), 186.
180 Wilson, 416.
181 Wilson, 418.
182 Lefranc, 42.
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When two people come together... that’s the life force taking over. He sort of 
swings between the two”; therefore, “violence takes place when he is in limbo 
between the two... In his case it is certainly a way of defence against isolation 
and also against assimilation... the worse sort of defence because the most 
expensive and the most destructive.” So Arthur does not choose Doreen for 
romantic reasons, and being his girlfriend does not privilege her over other 
people in his life; indeed, she performs a similar function to other people in 
Arthur’s orbit, namely affirming him without smothering his self.184 Again we 
come to recognize Arthur’s violence as a regulating, transformative practice used 
to maintain identity, only not always as positive or stabilizing as Wilson 
suggests. Arthur’s violence might be an acte gratuit, gratuitous, unpremeditated 
action: as he instinctively resorts to it he has not fully shaken off his existential 
slumber and awakened his consciousness to the responsibilities of free choice.
Arthur Seaton could be described as trying to be what Lionel Trilling 
called “the Opposing Self’ in his eponymous book of 1955.185 Taken from a 
remark on the eighteenth-century young individual that Trilling attributed to 
Hegel, Arthur as literary hero opposes his self to the culture in which he has 
grown, and makes this a salient element of his self-definition. Loyal kinsman and 
kind lover though he is, Arthur’s first allegiance is to himself alone, and only 
from his individual authentic experience is his character animated -  in ways 
which, unsurprisingly, make him an enigma to people around him, like Doreen 
and his brother Fred. Arthur also makes a point of assessing people by their 
demeanour (42-43) and taking this as an advantage he has over them, as he 
resists the social and so resists being ‘read’. Yet at the beginning of the novel “he 
had not thought of applying [the character perception] with any great force to 
himself’ (43), and perhaps that is why he has not been able to ‘weigh-up’ Jack,
183 Lefranc, 46.
184 This picture of human psychology goes back to Sartre, and from him to Kojeve and Hegel. Of 
the three primary modes of being — in itself (en-soi), for itself (pour-soi), and for-others 
(pour-autrui) -  the third is the most important and most problematic as agent of the human 
economy of desires, chiefly the desire-for-the-desire-of-the-other, our need for social or 
intersubjective affirmation.
185 Lionel Trilling, The Opposing Self: Nine Essays in Criticism (London: Seeker and Warburg, 
1955).
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his factory colleague and Brenda’s cuckolded husband. Coming from a similar 
background, Jack represents Arthur’s Doppelganger figure, personifying the 
choices Arthur actively avoided: committing to a job, to a wife, to parenthood. 
Towards the conclusion, as Arthur gets to know himself better, he is reconciled 
with Jack (188-190), and at this point of agreement on their differences the gap 
between them and their respective choices begins to close, as Arthur 
consequently comes to choose commitment and sociality over being an opposing, 
but lonely, self.
An interesting aspect of Arthur’s consciousness is his full and mature 
awareness of his social condition as a worker, which complements our picture of 
his physical self at work with which we began. To Arthur, his work is more than 
the necessary and bothersome passage of exertion to the end of the working day, 
when ‘real life’ begins in his leisure time. His time at work is a time of 
accomplishment, a time for some social contact (as much as he cares to allow) 
and a time for looking toward the future. His alienation from work enables an 
inner distance from it, thus creating his ‘room of one’s own’ in his mind because, 
being his only waking time alone, “it was the only time you have to think, and... 
you thought some lovely and marvellous things” (39). In fact, it is noteworthy 
that Arthur does see a future in his work, although he reminds himself that if it 
does not progress he can leave the bicycle factory and go to work somewhere
1 RAelse -  a recent privilege bom of postwar full employment policies.
Arthur works his lathe expertly, but he is also acutely aware of his social 
position as a factory worker. His gaffer and the factory hierarchy are ‘the enemy’ 
(61), barely tolerable, with which a truce is struck once a week, on the occasion 
of the pay packet (40). Arthur enjoys his job and appreciates its benefits, but is 
also acutely aware of a social and organisational structure of exploitation, which 
he accepts pragmatically, perhaps cynically, as it keeps him in Teddy boy suits 
and drinking to his heart’s content (202). Still, he seems to content himself with 
knowing the structure of manipulation, having figured it out “this lathe is my 
everlasting pal because it gets me thinking” (202). He will try to “screw the 
world” mainly to get even, “because it’s trying to do the same to me” (203), but
186 D.J. Taylor, After the War: The Novel and English Society since 1945 (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1993), 113.
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he is not interested in political change, which he regards as futile: “there ain’t 
much you can do about it unless you start making dynamite” (202). D.J. Taylor 
takes Arthur as an exemplary case of British working-class quietism, “both in 
Seaton’s selfish anarchism and in the respectfully adhered to gradations of the
i o*7
world in which he operates.” It is this political quietism, rooted in 
“dissociation from official or public forms of life,” together with the wait for 
things to happen because ‘you never can tell’ that makes Arthur a representative 
figure of his milieu. As Hoggart puts it half-nostalgically, half-ironically, “the
i go
working classes have been cheerful existentialists for centuries.”
But Sillitoe’s stress on Arthur’s mental processes could also be seen as 
the kernel of his rebellion. Not being materialistic or socially ambitious, Arthur 
resists conspicuous mass consumption and the prospect of ‘moving up’ (perhaps 
to lower middle class status) in life, but the reader is impressed by the centrality 
of independent thought, and nonconformism in general, to his existence. In this 
mentality all authoritative institutions and figures are equally oppressive facets of 
the same overarching racket. Arthur rages violently against this order of things, 
and his anarchistic rage, however unfocused and ultimately self-damaging, is still 
more authentic than the conformist responses of most of his working-class
1 RQmilieu, which antagonise him just as well. This aspiring class was dazzled by 
the promise of welfare and respectability, and in 1959 voted en masse for the 
incumbent Conservatives, believing Macmillan’s assertion of 20 July 1957 that 
they had ‘never had it so good’. What Taylor described as the working-class 
dissociation from official life could therefore be seen as part of a wider 
(temporary) depoliticisation of the public sphere in an age of social and political 
transition.
Escape
As this thesis does not engage in a literary-critical study, formal considerations 
of fiction are not normally its concern. However, formal considerations are 
relevant in the case of Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, to the extent that, in
187 Taylor, 128.
188 Quoted in Taylor, 113, 116,
189 Haywood, 100-103.
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and of themselves, they embody thematic concerns. Gillian Hanson suggests that 
in many of his works, and not just in his first novel, Sillitoe makes use of a 
narrative structure of “existential escape.”190 His version of existential escape is 
different from those found in his contemporaries (Hanson mentions Wain, Braine 
and Waterhouse), as it is a twofold escape: a physical escape that heightens the 
need for a mental breakthrough, and then a mental transformation amounting to 
an escape from a previous rut. And Arthur does live in a mental rut, “a man who 
has his earthly bread but not his spiritual bread. He has no spiritual values 
because the kind of conditions he lives in do not allow him to have any.”191 This 
also translated into a technical, formal difficulty for Sillitoe, namely: how to 
write a book about a man who has never read a book.192
Arthur has some rules of thumb to guide him through the great campaign 
of life, most memorably in the repeated “it’s a good life, if you don’t weaken”, 
but his course is largely aimless and only oriented toward the here-and-now and 
the next pleasurable event, reacting rather than acting. Otherwise it’s “hard work 
and good wages, and a smell all day that turns your guts” (30). This closed 
circuit is revealed in Arthur’s internal monologues as too close for comfort. For 
all the newfound relative affluence he and his peers enjoy, there is a sense that 
power and influence are forever elsewhere, with the faceless “them at the top” 
(131) who “think they’ve settled our hashes with their insurance cards and 
television sets” (132).193 The only two exits out of his entrapment that Arthur 
sees are winning the pools (blind luck) or the onset of a Third World War 
(apocalypse brought on by the folly of those “higher up”).194
190 Gillian Mary Hanson, Understanding Alan Sillitoe (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1999), 26. She suggests that British versions of existentialism “very often 
presented through the lives of the working class who, both isolated and trapped in the new 
sociological and economic situations... found the need for escape imperative though all too 
often impossible.” Hanson, 29.
191 Sillitoe quoted in Hanson, 32.
192 The novel’s shifts in style and narration can be seen as ways of tackling that challenge; Laing, 
69.
193 Connor, 55.
194 Scanlan suggests that fictional apocalypse and its imaginary scenarios function as the 
levelling, nihilistic reaction of the oppressed. The symbolic ending of history enacts the anger 
and desperation of the oppressed and excluded. Arthur’s two perceived exits, luck and
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Arthur’s violence is to Sillitoe a key to understanding him as both an 
individual and as part of a collectivity, “like a key that opens the door to 
psychological situations that go further then the mere act of violence.”195 Still, 
individually and socially Arthur’s state of bad faith allows him to hide away his 
depersonalised, alienated, desperate reality: “now Jack’s... happy, and I’m 
happy, and I know Brenda’s happy. Everybody’s happy. It’s a fine world 
sometimes...” (40). This bad faith is sustained piecemeal: once by his wild 
weekend life, that of casual encounters with (mainly unhappily married) women 
and drinking himself into a stupor; and again when he escapes into his inner 
world of pipe dreams while working at his lathe (37-38). Arthur is happy to 
indulge away his cares: “To be alone seemed a continuation of his drugged life at 
the lathe. He wanted noise, to drink and to make love” (170).
Chapter 13 is Arthur’s watershed, where his world picture falls apart. Up 
to that point he generally ‘got away with it’ rather than ‘taken it’, enjoying 
cutting comers and escaping blame rather than acting in a premeditated, 
responsible way. Now he is finally caught and roughed up by the ‘swaddies’, and 
as he convalesces at home, his lack of motivation, vulnerability and terror creep 
up on him: “he felt a lack of security. No place existed in all the world that could 
be called safe, and he knew for the first time in his life that there had never been 
any such thing as safety, and never would be, the difference being that now he 
knew it was a fact, whereas before it was a natural unconscious state” (183). 
Arthur implicitly realises that what he perceives as safety stands as things are at a 
reverse ratio to his hitherto prized freedom. This is resolved in his life-affirming 
peak experience in chapter 14 on the Christmas he celebrates with his aunt and 
cousins: “feeling strange and joyfully alive, as if he had been living in a soulless 
vacuum since his fight with the swaddies. He told himself that he had been 
without life since then, that now he was awake once more, ready to tackle all 
obstacles” (201).
The rest of the “Sunday Morning” part of the book, chapters 15 and 16, 
shows Arthur gaining a new perspective on his life and for the first time deciding
catastrophe, suggest that in the present state of affairs he sees no real way of advancing 
himself. Margaret Scanlan, Traces o f  Another Time: History and Politics in Postwar British 
Fiction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 17-18.
195 Hanson, 37; Lefranc, 40.
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to commit to the social world (rather than remain an outsider) and to Doreen 
(rather than to scavenge on the passions of married women). In the process he 
realises the positive potential of this: “One more chance, he said to himself’; and 
later “Well, it’s a good life and a good world, all said and done, if you don’t 
weaken, and if you know that the big wide world hasn’t heard from you yet, no, 
not by a long way, though it won’t be long now" (219). Antagonised by mass 
culture and adamant to pursue his existential ‘essence’, Arthur’s direction is 
pointed out in the novel’s conclusion as a path of personal, individual growth 
rather than a renewed ‘engagement’.196 Consider the fishing scene, an image of 
(precarious) control and (inconclusively) regained balance, in which Arthur looks 
his caught fish in the eye, reaching a fleeting moment of eye-to-eye-ness, of 
equilibrium, of seeing himself mirrored in nature, the fish’s state analogous to his 
own: “one more chance... it’s trouble for you and trouble for me.. And trouble 
for me it’ll be, fighting every day until I die” (219).197 Thinking the world is 
‘fine’ or ‘good’ is only a temporary condition.
Arthur’s inner monologue in the last lines of the novel -  “you know that 
the big wide world hasn’t heard from you yet” (219) -  might suggest a third 
escape, beyond the physical and mental escapes suggested above. The answer 
remains unclear and depends on what qualifies it. By comparison, Arthur does 
not have the clear direction of D.H. Lawrence’s Paul Morel in Sons and Lovers 
in becoming a writer, nor does he share Lawrence’s romanticised vision of “the
1 QRcity’s gold phosphorescence” as a “glowing town.” Arthur’s horizon seems 
more blurred by immediate, concrete concerns, even though he trusts (perhaps all 
too eagerly) that “it won’t be long now” (219). It is equally likely that ‘the big 
wide world’ will not hear of Arthur. Beyond the novel itself, Sillitoe suggested
196 Laing suggests that accepting reality and making the best of it involved suspending other 
options, “particularly that of ‘culture’ as a way of giving life meaning.” Laing, 76.
197 Similar fishing endings are found in T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land and Ernest Hemingway’s In 
Our Time. The analogy of the working-class person to tinned fish is also featured in Sid 
Chaplin’s The Day o f the Sardine (1962).
198 D.H. Lawrence, Sons and Lovers (New York: Penguin, 1976 [1913]), 420.
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Arthur “is certainly coming down for a rest,” with no further escapes expected as 
he suspends his struggle.199
There is little doubt that British society in the 1950s was changing considerably. 
Indeed, unlike politics, which took much longer to reflect social transformation, 
the new kinds of cultural production and new patterns of cultural consumption 
were soon widely apparent. However, the change itself was for some a cause for 
concern, and its perceived direction even more so. The erosion of the old middle 
class was reflected in the erosion of the relative value of their cultural canon, a 
Great Tradition under threat by new styles of fiction and by entertainment- 
oriented mass communications. This cultural turn was also the source of 
discontents among working-class observers, who feared it came at the cost of 
community cohesion and cultural authenticity, in favour of a uniform ‘bread and 
circuses’ mass culture that, while displacing old cultural class differences, was 
preserving the structure of class oppression. In this context, too, Arthur Seaton’s 
struggle from Saturday night to Sunday morning gives the impression that an 
escape into another reality, or even to another representation (or experience) of 
reality, is impossible. This opinion, that individual and class struggles were 
frustrated by their definition, is also reflected in Genet’s Le Balcon and in several 
other opinions discussed in the following chapter.
199 Sillitoe quoted in Lefranc, 46. The trilogy taken to be this novel’s sequel starts with The Death 
o f William Posters (1965) and shows its protagonist Frank Dawley (originally Arthur Seaton, 
but Sillitoe felt constrained by his previous character) leave home after several years of 
marriage for more picaresque adventures motivated by his political commitment. Recently 
Sillitoe came full circle with Arthur in Birthday (2001), where Brian, his brother, visits him in 
Nottingham about forty years on. By then, Arthur is a changed man, barely recognisable as 
his old self.
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Chapter 2: Cultural Pessimism and French Social 
Structure
In 1944 France faced the tasks of material reconstruction and of reunifying a 
politically, regionally and economically fragmented society. France and 
Frenchness had to be redefined on a basis that steered discussion away from the 
divisive legacy of wartime collaboration and resistance. This role was assumed 
by the state under de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic in what became known as ‘the 
Gaullist myth’. Yet France’s bourgeois hegemonic culture was traditionally 
interlinked with its national definition, providing its own stock of longstanding 
myths, not just of Frenchness but also of the French Empire, French 
modernisation, and aspects of everyday life. Partaking in these myths served to 
perpetuate the social order they supported, and contributed to the relative 
stability of French social structure throughout the period observed.
This chapter will interpret several French attitudes toward social structure 
as manifesting pessimistic tropes. It will begin by observing the discourse which 
pitted a universal, normative Culture against the plurality of actual lived, 
primordial, local popular cultures. This discourse, drawing on considerations of 
canon, national utility, public improvement and leisure management, became 
increasingly important as the locus of fears for the continuity of French identity. 
Attempts to redefine Culture, by public educators, academic and public 
intellectuals, and the State itself, indicated converging anxieties about its 
prospects. The gap between descriptive and normative understandings of culture, 
widest among the working classes, particularly fascinated left-wing intellectuals, 
and later influenced the late 1960s and 1970s French intellectual fascination with 
Maoism.
Class was not as central to French social outlooks as it was to their British 
counterparts. In line with its bourgeois or petty-bourgeois character, French 
public discourse on social structure approached it mainly through questions of 
culture, making it “more controlled by the rules of good taste and good tone and 
thereby more intellectualised,” while keeping remote “a whole set of realities at
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once simple and scandalous.”200 To engage with social structure and with the 
working class, French leftist intellectuals also had to rely on the mediation of the 
Stalinist PCF, which in the late 1940s enjoyed an unprecedented (and 
unrepeated) political success. Distrusted and treated as inferior by the party, 
these intellectuals still found purpose and belonging in their gestural 
engagement, mitigating their guilt about their relative privilege and about their 
contribution, as cultural producers, to the struggle (first against occupation, then 
for the proletariat).201 This double bind made ‘authentic’ working-class cultural 
consumers barely detectible, unlike contemporary British accounts.
To some observers the very notion of authenticity seemed a naturalised 
fabrication, part of a web of myth spun by bourgeois hegemonic culture. In 
Mythologies (1957) Roland Barthes summed up several years of critique of 
popular culture with an essay arguing the pervasiveness and predominance of 
bourgeois myth. In fact, this myth was taken to be so unshakeable that the social 
strata oppressed by it, the working classes, were so debilitated by their 
complicity in it as to be a dubious source of potential revolt against it. Barthes’s 
view also fused with earlier leftist pessimism about intellectuals’ impotence and 
the futility of their public ‘commitment’. This pessimism about the prospects of 
resistance and the fixity of social structure was also reflected in a contemporary 
play, Jean Genet’s Le Balcon (first version in 1956), a reading of which along 
these lines will conclude this chapter.
‘Culture’ and ‘popular culture’
Raymond Williams suggested that the “development of the idea of culture has, 
throughout, been a criticism of what has been called the bourgeois idea of 
society.” Could this definition of culture, assuming an ‘organic’, bottom- 
upwards, locally particular identity, be applied to France of that time? After all,
200 Jean-Claude Passeron, “Introduction to the French Edition of Uses of Literacy,” trans. by 
Richard Dyer, Working Papers in Cultural Studies 1 (Spring 1971), 130.
201 David Drake, Intellectuals and Politics in Post-War France (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 25,
40-44 (henceforth: Drake, Intellectuals).
202 * •Raymond Williams, Culture and Society: Coleridge to Orwell, rev. edn (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1987 [1958]), 328.
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the ideological and class concerns that shaped Williams’s understanding of 
‘culture’ were not the main concerns of the French after the Second World War. 
Indeed, Brian Rigby, who traced the French postwar discourse on culture, notes 
that in France, ‘Culture’ means “a unified culture, whose values are permanent 
and universal” -  that is, ‘Culture’ is a normative concept. However, Rigby also 
notes that many related terms suggest the emanation of Culture from the State 
and its institutions, or its restriction to a certain class or elite. Thus, the common 
definition of French Culture is informed by two elements: its permanent and 
universal character, taken to reflect the universal humanistic values of the 
Revolution; and its unified and local character, closely linked to other contested 
terms such as Nation and Homeland (Patrie).
France’s postwar reconstruction also involved the State’s concerted effort 
to shape a national culture to replace local and regional customs. This also 
involved a cultivation of popular tastes, and was met both with enthusiasm and 
hostility on political, ideological, academic and personal grounds. This 
contestation politicised the understanding of culture more pervasively than in 
Britain, although, as in Britain, the distinction between (‘high’) Culture and 
‘popular culture’ was roughly along the lines of social strata, making the 
definition of culture a question of social inclusion, legitimacy and relative 
value.204 In interpreting culture, the French relied on universalistic notions like 
humanism to shape an inclusive definition of culture capable of accommodating 
Communists and Catholics, collaborators and resistants, Vichy-nationalists and 
Gaullists. This consensual picture of French national culture as a paradigmatic 
instance of humanist culture effectively contained divergent tendencies within 
the French political system until the late 1950s. While British representation of 
classes was through their cultures, French social structure was glossed over
203 Brian Rigby, Popular Culture in Modern France: A Study o f Cultural Discourse (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1991), 5-7.
204 The French cultural discourse goes back at least to the 1920s. The Front Populaire 
government of 1936 was the first to address popular pastimes. An earlier intellectual 
intervention was Jean Guehenno’s Caliban parle (1928) which, following Renan and against 
Benda, suggested that the common man (‘Caliban’) should partake in humanist culture.
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efficiently, albeit provisionally, by the cardinal agreement on the “global alibi” 
of humanism.
The two prevailing attitudes in late-1950s French intellectual discourse 
with regard to the working class were either a blatant, elitist intellectual 
condescension or a similarly patronising populism. In his reconstruction of the 
discourse, Rigby suggests that three main groups participated in this debate on 
popular culture: unaffiliated or academic intellectuals; popular educators; and 
later, the Fifth Republic itself.
Setting the academic tone regarding popular culture was the sociologist 
Georges Friedmann, with his 1956 study Le Travail en miettes. Friedmann was a 
vocal supporter of the personal intellectual development of the working-class
' } ( Y 7man in his leisure time. By this he meant to counter not just the working man’s 
alienation from his work but also to improve his more common natural 
preferences for his leisure time, taking either aggressive or passive outlets. 
Friedmann suggested that an alternative ‘humanist education’, an education to 
Culture in the Western and French canons, would turn proletarian frustrations 
and wasted time into productive pastimes. On this point Friedmann was 
representative of a milieu of leftist French intellectuals, who saw the French 
working class as culturally wanting, deprived and frustrated by its elementary
70Scultural activity, and needing improvement from outside. Yet Rigby notes 
other examples suggesting other left-intellectual leanings, seeing the working 
class as morally superior and mystifying its cultures: Sartre’s lurch toward La 
Cause du peuple\ some aspects of the Situationist movement, like Lebel’s 
condemnation of the Avignon Festival under Jean Vilar; and most clearly, the
205 Michael Kelly, “Humanism and National Unity: the Ideological Reconstruction of France,” in 
The Culture o f Reconstruction: European Literature, Thought and Film, 1945-50, ed, by 
Nicholas Hewitt (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1989), 114-115.
206 Intellectual condescension was sometimes unintended. In April 1953 Louis Aragon, the new 
editor of Les Lettres franqaises, had to apologise for printing a less-than-iconic cover portrait 
of the recently deceased Stalin, disappointing his readership with Picasso’s more lyrical 
interpretation.
207 Georges Friedmann, Le Travail en miettes: specialisation et loisirs (Paris: Gallimard, 1956); 
the English translation was used here: Georges Friedmann, The Anatomy o f Work: The 
Implications o f  Specialization, trans. by Wyatt Rawson (London: Heinemann, 1961).
208 Rigby, 64.
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rise of French Maoism in the late 1960s.209 Some general sentiment of concern 
for the working class, for various reasons, was prevalent among French 
intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s, yet it was not without opposition, as shown 
below.
This concern was shared by the self-appointed ‘cultural animators’ of the
postwar French popular education movement, like Joffre Dumazedier and
Benigno Caceres, co-founders of the leading association in that field, Peuple et
Culture. Yet the popular educators were not motivated solely by cultural
didacticism. Dumazedier, founding head of Peuple et Culture, tended to equate
‘culture’ with ‘leisure’, concluding that, since mass media transformed popular
leisure, working class culture was effectively extinct, replaced by mass culture 
210propagated to all. Caceres, an autodidact, saw in his advance a universal lesson 
to all working-class people, and in himself an example of an ‘enlightened 
worker’.211 Dumazedier and Caceres agreed on an etatiste consensus (reflecting a 
Third Republic mentality), holding that postwar cultural participation (le portage 
culturel) in wholesome leisure was a civic duty in aid of national reconstruction, 
showing solidarity with the modem, unified nation.212 For a short while in the 
early Fourth Republic, until the PCF’s expulsion from Ramadier’s government in 
May 1947, this rhetoric of social mobilisation appealed to the political left. The 
elision between the two meanings of 7e peuple\ as ‘nation’ and as ‘working 
class’, made it useful for pursuing, albeit provisionally, a leftist ideal of a just 
and equal society through all-national rhetoric.
A third stance in the popular culture debate was that of the State itself. 
The empowered president of a new Fifth Republic, de Gaulle created by decree 
on 24 July 1959 a national Ministry for Cultural Affairs, appointing the author 
Andre Malraux as minister. One of the first initiatives of the new ministry was 
the creation of local and regional Maisons de la Culture, effectively taking over 
the pastoral role of voluntary associations like Peuple et Culture. The Maisons de
209 Rigby, 139-145.
210 Rigby, 46-49.
211 Rigby, 60-63.
2,2 Rigby, 47, 59.
213 Rigby, 59. This was the basis for the PCF’s self-promotion as “the incarnation of French 
national interest”; Drake, Intellectuals, 28.
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la Culture were resonantly unsuccessful, not least for being remote and imposing 
state vehicles that intimidated their target audience or left it cold. The Maisons 
were also failed by Malraux’s ambitious vision, which sought to bring ‘the 
greatest culture to the greatest number of people.’ Malraux believed culture to 
represent the finest examples of human endeavour and wished it to replace 
religion as a modem spiritual anchor.214 The treasures of state-steered universal 
culture were meant to counter not just mass media but also local and regional 
customs, which Malraux considered not just provincial but cheap (‘une culture
^  I £
au rabais’). Only much later, in the wake of the May 1968 evenements, and 
under some pressure, were the severe policy and execution flaws acknowledged 
by the heads of the Maisons.
The policies of Malraux’s ministry, like the opinions of Friedmann and 
the popular educators, reflected attempts to impose canonical culture on ‘the 
masses’ instead of mass culture. This general attitude toward the ‘working-class 
predicament’ in the cultural debate provoked the anger and frustration of the 
socialist radical Daniel Mothe (pseudonym of Jacques Gautrat), who criticised it 
in the review Socialisme ou barbarie?16 Mothe, like Friedmann, thought that 
workers were alienated by their labour and could use some constructive outlet. 
However, he thought the popular education movement caused workers to be 
doubly alienated, from work and from their class. Cultural education promised 
workers tools for social mobility but delivered none: instead, popular educators 
provided cultural commodities, status symbols that were devalued like 
‘positional goods’ elsewhere. This to Mothe was la culture parcellaire (echoing 
Friedmann’s travail parcellaire), which he saw as being perpetuated by 
Friedmann’s ‘Fordism’ and by the popular educators’ ‘Stakhanovism’. Instead, 
Mothe held that culture is not a normative concept and so should not be 
manipulated: his term ‘culture vivante\ lived culture as the only culture there is,
214 Rigby, 133. This is clearly analogous to the Amold-Leavis culture in Britain.
215 Rigby, 134.
216 Daniel Mothe, “Les ouvriers et la culture,” Socialisme ou barbarie 30 (April-May 1960), 1- 
44. As a machine operator at the Renault factories, Mothe/Gautrat was immersed in working- 
class culture and produced several chronicles and theoretical critiques of working life and 
syndicalism.
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suggested a similar and near-contemporary understanding to that of Williams,
217albeit not in his wake.
Mothe’s position is a useful pivot between Friedmann’s earlier social 
analysis and some later assertions Mothe foreshadowed, made by Bourdieu in the 
1960s and 1970s, concerning the complicit role of the popular culture movement
^ | o
and of the working class in perpetuating the class system. Bourdieu saw the 
working class as an essentially barbaric opposite of culture, not socially 
dominant but still a point of reference, a foil, for other classes. To Bourdieu, 
culture was never democratised: state schools failed to compensate for social 
inequalities and create working-class ‘cultural goodwill’ {bonne volonte 
culturelle); popular educators projected their own experience onto the working 
class, seeing in cultural salvation {salut culturet) the only route of social ascent; 
and the mass media never homogenised the culture they relayed. The working- 
class ethos or ‘habitus’ were shaped by their material conditions, but their 
making a virtue of necessity should not be seen as submission. To Bourdieu, 
‘popular culture’ was not a culture of resistance (as it was to Mothe, and as 
‘subcultures’ were later to British cultural studies) but of deprivation, and its 
objective flaws made it no fitting alternative to universal, national culture. 
Bourdieu’s elitist pessimism was based on what he saw as scientific grounds, but 
its negative determinism made it contested. His view that the working class was 
passive (but should not be blamed for it) and victimised (by other classes, 
including the middle-class intellectuals) was being resisted, as Rigby suggests, 
because it was untimely after May 1968, in a new period of politicisation and
7 IQrenewed populism.
The discourse on ‘Culture’ and ‘popular culture’ collects together some 
French attitudes toward class, particularly the working class, from sociological or 
educational perspectives. Rigby’s reconstruction of it is invaluable for the unique 
juxtapositions it makes, although it sometimes ‘anachronistically’ arranges
217 Rigby, 70-78.
218 Most of Bourdieu’s major work is beyond the scope of this thesis, but he helps to historically 
contextualise the cultural debate. Unlike Mothe, Bourdieu was also an empirical social 
researcher of various socio-cultural issues (academics, art galleries, heritage and fashion).
219 Rigby, 119-122, 130.
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9 9 0discussions thematically rather than chronologically. It nevertheless 
compensates for the political slant most French studies take, confining 
themselves to Fourth or Fifth Republic discussions of intellectual life. Rigby’s 
study uniquely isolates the discussion of ‘culture’ versus ‘popular culture’, 
whereas most studies of French postwar cultural history, especially ones focusing 
on intellectuals, converge around common themes like engagement, communism, 
colonialism and the 1968 evenements. Rigby’s reconstructed cultural debate 
helps question the major-scale narrative of overtly politicised French intellectual 
action, and to challenge the minor status of class as a social issue in postwar 
French public and intellectual discourses. As recent election campaigns suggest, 
social structure remains a touchy issue in France: particularly in the postwar 
years the persistence of working-class culture could be seen as a failure of 
French dirigisme, modernisation and centralisation.
The French postwar discourse on culture is pessimistic in several 
respects. The very need to define or redefine ‘culture’ is an implicit admission of 
an already eroded sense of what ‘culture’ really is. The discourse on culture (and 
its reconstruction) is a problematisation of culture, an attempt to solve a problem, 
a real situation. It suggests that the need to redefine culture after war and 
occupation arose from the erosion of the French cultural canon and of French 
collective identity as social definition. This need was partly grounded in attempts 
to centralise French culture and make it a truly national culture. Cultural 
redefinition was also informed by the ostensibly democratising element of 
expanding commercial mass culture, threatening not only the cultural elites and 
their tastes but the very French-groundedness of French culture. There is also, as 
Susan Weiner acknowledges, the conscious construction throughout the 1950s of 
the ‘exception frangaise\ the reassertion of “a transhistorical and indeed
9 9  1exceptional ‘Frenchness’.” That effort was assisted by the Gaullist formulation 
categorically pitting ‘eternal’ France against a Vichy ‘episode’. Politically the
220 In 1991 Rigby discussed only two books dealing with the cultural debate in postwar France 
with any considerable breadth of scope: Pierre Cabanne’s impressionistic Le Pouvoir Culturel 
sous la Verne Republique (1981), and Evelyne Ritaine’s polemic Les Strateges de la culture 
(1983).
221 Susan Weiner, “Editor’s Preface”, Yale French Studies 98, The French Fifties, ed. by Susan 
Weiner, (2000), 2.
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need for redefinition was driven by the double catastrophes of occupation and 
collaboration, and by a need to deal with the continuity of the implicated French 
public in a newly reinvented, forward-looking nation. The solution to that 
problem involved introducing the principle of universalist humanism into the 
united French culture, absolving betrayal as an error of judgment bom of 
weakness and human fallibility. Albeit defensive and provisional, that solution 
was long-lasting and was only challenged critically in the late 1960s.
Some of the stances presented in the culture discourse were themselves 
pessimistic. Mothe and Bourdieu share a kind of pessimism in their views on the 
working-class predicament as a state of ongoing exploitation, alienation and 
deprivation, with both frowning on attempts at popular education (by voluntary 
associations or Maisons de la culture) as perpetuating working-class deprivation 
and alienation. In fact, the alternative solutions each offers to this situation are 
rather far-fetched in that they aim radically to transform fundamental elements of 
social reality. Mothe trusted in the revolutionary potential of the working class 
and its cultural resistance to constmcted national unification. This element is 
absent from Bourdieu’s pessimist approach, seeing working-class ‘barbarism’ as 
bom of both material deprivation and cultural bias and therefore destined to 
remain subordinate and beyond amelioration, at least without a radical social 
reorganisation. Both Mothe and Bourdieu, then, do not see a constructive 
solution in a transformative political action, or, for that matter, in any way within 
the current social order.
Demystification of Life
Barthes and Mythologies
In discussing cultural pessimism in postwar France, one cannot overlook the 
figure of Roland Barthes, which reflected and sometimes inspired other opinions 
in the broader field of cultural critique. The sentiment of responsibility and 
concern evoked by Sartre in Les Temps Modernes and later in Qu ’est-ce que la 
litterature? (see below) was not lost on Barthes, who in 1949 settled in Paris
222 For a detailed account of those attempts see Kelly, “Humanism and National Unity,” 103-119.
99
after a decade of roaming Europe and the Middle East, studying and teaching 
intermittently, when not nursing bouts of tuberculosis. He also became 
acquainted with the Structuralist anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss, which 
saw meaning as ultimately derived from culture, that is, from the ideational 
aspect of the social system. Levi-Strauss also stressed interdisciplinary 
methodology (premised on the unification of the sciences humaines) and the 
belief in the primacy of society and its unconscious rules over the conscious 
action of social subjects. Barthes made his start in committed literary criticism 
with a series of articles in Combat, subsequently published together as Le Degre 
Zero de Vecriture (1953). In this book he linked Marxism to literature and 
commitment, positing the term ecriture, being the correspondence of form to 
content, as the uniquely creative element of literature, which is otherwise 
encumbered, through language, style and reference (the world), by values and 
meanings imprinted in it, as writers struggle to make it their tool of subjective
224expression.
Yet the vanguard of French literature increasingly showed Barthes writers 
treating their art as craftsmanship. Barthes admired the old bourgeoisie of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as the original progressive class 
responsible for revolution and toppling the ancien regime, and revered its literary 
high realism. As the bourgeoisie usurped its revolutionary role following 1830, 
their literary realism was degraded in later nineteenth-century naturalism, which 
Barthes saw as the precursor to the popular culture of his day, the uniform
223 In 1950, one year after publishing his Elementary Structures o f Kinship, Levi-Strauss 
introduced the first book-form selection (preceded only by course notes co-edited by Michel 
Leiris) of works by Marcel Mauss, his predecessor as chair of the fifth section of the Ecole 
Pratique des Hautes Etudes. In this famous and influential introduction Levi-Strauss not only 
presented Mauss as a ‘failed’ (proto-)Structuralist, but concisely presented the foundational 
principles of Structuralism. See: Marcel Mauss, Sociologie et Anthropologie, precede d ’une 
introduction a I ’eeuvre de Marcel Mauss par Claude Levi-Strauss (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires Fran^aises, 1950); Claude Levi-Strauss, Introduction to the Work o f Marcel 
Mauss, trans. by Felicity Baker (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987).
224 Systematic studies consulted about Barthes’s life and work: Louis-Jean Calvet, Roland 
Barthes: A Biography, trans. by Sarah Wykes (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994 [1990]); 
Michael Moriarty, Roland Barthes (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Annette Lavers, Roland 
Barthes: Structuralism and After (London: Methuen, 1982).
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twentieth-century petty-bourgeois myth, a mere parody of old bourgeois realism. 
Thus Barthes saw petty-bourgeois culture as a degradation and reduction of 
literary forms, as politically conservative and even as infecting the social realism 
of Marxist writing. This dim view of hegemonic culture illuminates Barthes’s 
understanding of the distinction between Culture (in the old bourgeois sense) and 
popular culture (the petty-bourgeois) and served as a thematic link to his 
following book.
In Mythologies (1957), Barthes elaborated on his consideration of the 
value-ladenness and implication of language and of writing (as signifying 
practices) by their historical conditions. The book presented a previously 
published (1954-56) series of short analyses, ov petites mythologies, of everyday 
phenomena and objects, most of them part of the new reality of consumerism and 
mass communications -  films, advertisements, cars, food and drink. In each 
analysis Barthes proceeded from the object or phenomenon, explored as a system 
of signs, trying to find the structure common to those signs, indicating the
j'jf.
object’s ‘deeper’ semiological reference. In the process, he suggested ways in 
which ideological abuse or a ‘theft of language’ have hijacked the meaning or 
function of the object of enquiry, turning it into a vehicle of bourgeois 
hegemony. Mythologies concluded with a theoretical essay, “Myth Today”, in 
which Barthes elaborated on the systemic predominance and ubiquity of myth in 
culture, noting the bleak prospects for subverting or overcoming this domination. 
Despite this theoretical essay and its pessimistic tone, and probably due to its 
otherwise accessible content -  as suggested in its prologue, demystification is not 
an Olympian undertaking -  Mythologies was a huge commercial success, 
introducing Barthes to a wider, non-academic readership and making him into 
something of a celebrity.
Mythologies can be read as Barthes’s take on the Sartrean maxim of 
commitment, with the project of ‘demystification’ or unmasking at the core of 
their respective projects. Steven Ungar suggests Barthes subscribed to the
225 Lavers, 61, 76-78; Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. by Annette Lavers and Colin 
Smith (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968 [1953]), 55-73.
226 In some critiques, like that of Abbe Pierre’s haircut, Barthes went beyond its iconography to 
discuss how it triggered complacent praise of (Abbe Pierre’s) charity, whilst simultaneously 
obviating the need to formulate concrete, structural responses to socioeconomic injustice.
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committed agenda by denouncing “attitudes toward sexuality, race, and national 
identity grounded in conventions of le bon sens and the natural that he took to be
77 7skewed and tendentious.” Yet while Sartre’s existentialist ethics concentrated 
on issues of human agency like injustice and accountability, Barthes, then a 
proto-Structuralist, was mainly interested in the ‘big picture’ of the system of 
signs, and was also aesthetically fascinated by his objects of scrutiny. Ungar also 
places Mythologies within a wider critique of capitalism going back to Marx and 
Engels’ The German Ideology, through the study of mythology, on to Barthes’s 
ongoing dialogue with Henri Lefebvre on mystification, and yet further forward 
to Guy Debord’s Society o f the Spectacle; Barthes’s import here was in 
establishing a Structuralist connection between capitalism and national
ideology.228 It should be clear, though, that neither Sartre nor Lefebvre accepted
the Structuralist approach: in fact, they regarded it as a model of enquiry 
complicit, as Lefebvre saw it, with “capitalist alienation and bourgeois
77 Qrationality.” Barthes nevertheless saw himself as a leftist, however
unconventional, and his understanding of myth as metalanguage, stealthily 
shaping the perception of self and experience, foreshadowed some more radical
7^ ftand ideological Marxist cultural critiques.
In Mythologies Barthes makes a strongly worded attack on the effects of 
consumerism as an interpellative mechanism in popular culture; and still, there is 
room too for two outstanding ambiguities in his position. Firstly, if, as he claims 
in “Myth Today”, the depoliticising power of bourgeois myth is so strong, 
inherently stronger than that of Leftist myths, then this implies that bourgeois 
hegemony is total and that the Left can only fail. The very existence of myths on
227 Steven Ungar, “From Event to Memory Site: Thoughts on Rereading Mythologies,” in Roland 
Barthes, ed. by Mike Gane and Nicholas Gane, vol. II (London: Sage, 2004), 101.
228 Ibid.
229 Rick Rylance, Roland Barthes (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 55.
230 Barthes’s take on myth is similar to Louis Althusser’s later concept of interpellation, referring 
to the mechanism producing social subjects so they can only conceive of themselves in terms 
of the dominant ideology. Moriarty adds to this the omnipresent nature of both myth and 
interpellation, and the way both imply recognition of bourgeois representations as facts of 
Nature. However, Barthes (unlike Althusser) regarded individuals as secondary to his largely 
systemic outlook. Michael Moriarty, “Barthes: Ideology, Culture, Subjectivity,” in Roland 
Barthes, ed. by Mike Gane and Nicholas Gane, vol. II (London: Sage, 2004), 68.
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the Left means it is depoliticised, barring a necessary trait of revolutionary 
speech and action, which are all politicised. Corruption lurks for the Left 
wherever it may turn, except for two directions: the utopian prospect of a 
successful revolution, restoring real speech and eradicating myth -  or the 
futureless possibility of being and remaining powerless, as the speech of the 
oppressed is too barren to sustain possible lies and mystification on their part.231 
It seems unclear whether hope for a revolution is not hollowed out by the 
respective natures of bourgeois and Leftist myths. Thus, Barthes’s clear support 
of dissent (or at least resistance) seems irreconcilable with his dismissal of it as 
useless.
A second ambiguity to Barthes’s position in Mythologies has to do with 
his own attitude toward the project, which seems at once pessimistic and near- 
deterministic, and confident and excited about the Structuralist and semiological
'yx'ytools and methods. These two ends of Barthes’s approach might be mediated 
by taking his conception of the mythologist and, implicitly, of himself, with 
relation to culture. Barthes expected the mythologist to be completely alienated 
and excluded from culture so he can retain his critical detachment and not be 
tainted by the culture of myth. The mythologist’s work, his critical, demystifying 
speech, is a metalanguage, and his realm of reflexive behaviour is (and should 
be) apart from the realm of action and production; he ‘acts’ nothing. This is 
consistent with Barthes’s ambivalence regarding the simultaneous futility and 
validity of dissent. It also reveals some of his non-conformist temperament and 
his disdain for political activism, viewing “society itself as inevitably injurious to 
individual integrity.” Barthes’s view of working-class popular culture was also 
condescending, and he famously described their speech, the language of the 
oppressed, as ‘poor, monotonous and immediate’, as not only not political but 
not even mythically depoliticised, rendering them unable to develop. This fits 
well with the patronising social concern typical of the French academic discourse 
on culture in his day -  but less so with his British contemporary Raymond 
Williams.
231 See Moriarty, “Barthes,” 71.
232 Rylance, 54.
233 Rylance, 59. Barthes carefully cultivated his non-conformism, fearing entrapment even by his 
own choices, so “this way of distancing himself is a common feature of his life” ; Calvet, 127.
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Williams and Barthes, though ignorant of each other’s work at the time, 
have much in common. They are both of the same generation (Barthes was six 
years Williams’ senior); each understood literature in social terms, although for 
different reasons; both were influenced by Marxism to varying degrees; both 
were interested in popular communications and their relations with art; and both 
started their writing careers in the context of postwar reconstruction, in a way 
reacting to it and to the cultural changes it ushered in. Nevertheless the two also 
clearly diverge in outlooks. Barthes viewed ‘the oppressed’ (a term he uses fairly 
indiscriminately, to coincide with his vague and dim view of them) as a hapless, 
ignorant and stunted lot for failing to realise their comprehensive exploitation in 
a culture shaped by the hegemonic petty-bourgeois class (again, itself a farcical 
imitation of the old grand bourgeoisie);234 whereas Williams saw that 
understanding of ‘mass culture’ as itself complicit with the bourgeois view, in 
that the notion of a universally trash-fed social multitude as a receptive audience 
clearly facilitates seeing them as a ‘mass market’, to be addressed through ‘mass 
communications’, themselves to be studied by the likes of Barthes as ‘mass 
culture’. Williams’s view of culture is, as noted above, inclusive and 
descriptive, and resents the self-exile of the precious few from a public sphere 
dominated by those they have dubbed ‘the masses’. His notion of culture is 
optimistic and dynamic, stressing its constantly constructed character. Yet for 
Barthes, contemporary culture is a static eschatology, where all one can expect of 
the future is the apocalypse of the present, itself so negative it overshadows all 
prospective positive development.237
234 Lavers suggests that “Barthes already found the proletariat embourgeoise,” and thus obscurely 
aware, like the petty bourgeoisie itself, of its own subjugation -  therefore pinning their hopes 
(like Arthur Seaton and his father) on conformism and luck; Lavers, 79, 81-82.
235 Moriarty, “Barthes,” 67. Leavis had held the view of ‘mass culture’ as passive receptors of 
bourgeois trash. Williams would have none of it, and reserved special vitriol for the very term 
‘mass’, as in Williams, 299-300.
236 Rylance, 56-58. He relies on Williams’ essay “Culture is Ordinary”, criticising the “new 
dissenters”, not having Barthes in mind, “but it might have done.” This fundamental point of 
Williams’s also appears in the last part of the earlier Culture and Society, and throughout the 
later Keywords.
237 Cf. Lavers, 69.
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Although the impression of the changing meanings of the concept of 
culture was already clear in Culture and Society, it was not until the 1970s and 
his Keywords (1976) that Williams attempted a broader, term-by-term analysis of 
the ideological investment of language and vocabulary -  a project comparable 
with Barthes’s mythologies. A new edition of Mythologies was first translated 
into English only in 1972, roughly coinciding with another contemporary of 
Mythologies, Richard Hoggart’s The Uses o f Literacy. The following spring, the 
French introduction by its co-translator, Jean-Claude Passeron, was translated 
back into English, relaying the sense with which Hoggart was received into the 
French intellectual discourse. Hoggart’s approach was mostly taken as novel, 
and Passeron could not place it in the European tradition of class sociology or 
anthropology, partly because it was doubled (or split) -  a participating observer 
retaining his intellectual critical outlook without the characteristic intellectual 
elitism. Concomitantly, Passeron found in Hoggart a refreshing absence of 
militant populism which he had come to expect from Left-wing intellectuals, 
certainly in the late 1960s.240 Preoccupied with the position and function of 
intellectuals in society and regarding the working class, Passeron had special 
interest in the autobiographical process of becoming that Hoggart suggested: how 
a working-class boy transcends his background to become an intellectual, yet 
seems prepared to question himself and re-examine his background from his new 
intellectual vantage point.241
This aspect of Hoggart’s work, so novel to Passeron and the French in 
1970, had been by then in British currency for over a decade and was considered 
old hat in both its argument and style. Likewise, the novelty and impressive 
systematic outlook Barthes’s Mythologies held for British readership owed much
238 Richard Hoggart, La Culture du pauvre. Etude sur le style de vie des classes populaires en 
Angleterre, trans. by Fran9oise and Jean-Claude Garcias and Jean-Claude Passeron, intro, by 
Jean-Claude Passeron (Paris: Minuit, 1970).
239 Rylance, 64. Passeron presented Hoggart as an ethnological innovator of a daring kind 
improbable in France, and so all the more instructive; Passeron, 120, 125, 127, 130.
240 Brian Rigby, ‘Popular Culture' in France and England: The French Translation o f Richard 
Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1996), 12.
241 Rigby, ‘Popular Culture' in France and England, 8, 10.
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to the relative newness of Structuralism to the Anglophone academic world.242 
While Structuralism had had an extensive and lasting influence on the very shape 
of the French conception of knowledge, not to mention the modes of its scientific 
enquiry, the turning point in its introduction to Britain and the United States was 
around the 1967 Johns Hopkins University conference on The Languages o f  
Criticism and the Sciences o f Man. By then, Barthes was moving away from 
Structuralism and tried to disavow some of the opinions expressed in 
Mythologies, though not its general tone of pessimism about bourgeois cultural 
hegemony over the masses. Barthes shares this pessimism with Hoggart who, 
while neither populist nor elitist regarding the working class, was still not 
sympathetic to their newly-acquired consumerism. Like Mythologies, The Uses 
o f Literacy is a text split between the affectionate, personal tenor of the 
descriptions of the Leeds of Hoggart’s youth, and the scathing scorn for the 
affluent working-class of the 1950s.
Perhaps this is also a matter of intellectual tradition, here being the 
Amold-Leavis tradition of moral concern for the corrupting powers of 
industrialised capitalism, in which “modem, industrial history is understood as 
tragedy, and twentieth-century consumer culture is the latest and most pernicious 
form of the resulting anarchy of values.”243 This moralising, traditional basis of 
Hoggart’s views is not shared by Barthes, who is more present-oriented and 
genuinely fascinated with modem life, which might explain his popularity with a 
younger readership. Yet apart from these differences, Barthes’s and Hoggart’s 
themes are rather similar: the nostalgic sense of a more integral bygone age and a 
related pessimism about the present state of culture, which seems to perpetuate 
itself and linger on with diminishing prospects of being overturned; the withering 
away of personal agency and cultural memory; and the disdain for increasing 
predominance of American-style rampant consumerism.244 This is also an 
example of an interesting characteristic of cultural pessimism: despite quite 
divergent premises and modes of reasoning, critics arrive at the same pessimistic 
conclusions.
242 Rylance, 64.
243 Rylance, 61.
244 Rylance, 62.
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The Everyday and Its Observers
The discourse on ‘Culture’ and ‘popular culture’, as traced by Brian Rigby, was 
offered here as the French counterpart to British cultural studies, with the two 
linked through assertions of ‘culture’ as a critical term. Yet while the French 
deliberation of culture was clearly a discourse, it could not be said to have 
formed anything like an academic discipline. For that, the French correlative to 
British cultural studies is the discourse on everyday life, or le quotidien. Because 
of the key function of material and cultural consumption -  as a social interaction, 
a ‘deep’ signifying activity -  the processes of French modernisation and British 
affluence were felt in factories and highways but also in kitchens and sitting 
rooms. By the late 1950s this made every French and British citizen an informed 
stakeholder in the processes of modernisation and ‘Americanisation’, which 
touched on everyday life and its pace of transformation.
There are some striking similarities between the discourse of British 
cultural studies and the French discourse of everyday life. Both were rooted in 
Marxism and its revisionist theorisation: Williams combined a revision of the 
Marxist base-superstructure model with culture-based English studies; 
Lefebvre’s interwar work included treatments of Hegel and Marx and a 
theorisation of dialectical materialism. Both discourses also had unusual origins: 
Williams was a literary scholar in a field expanded both by a critical tradition 
going back to Richards, Eliot and Leavis, and by institutional changes in postwar 
English university departments (see chapter 3); Lefebvre was a philosopher 
whose extra-Marxist concerns included Schopenhauer, Sartre and Gide. Both 
ended up performing a kind of heavily theorised ‘domestic ethnography’, 
highlighting everyday life as a field worthy of critical analysis, remaining outside 
traditional disciplinary divisions but as ongoing /«/mlisciplinary discourses. 
Neither discourse was established primarily as an academic discipline (although 
cultural studies departments do now exist), and this was due in part to their 
explicitly politicised nature as critical discourses with leftist transformative 
agendas, committed to linking theory and praxis. Perhaps most importantly, from 
our perspective, both British cultural studies and the French discourse of the 
everyday were distinctly of their time, distinctly postwar: while Lefebvre had 
worked on mystification (with Norbert Guterman) and alienation before the
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Second World War, his interest in the everyday was famously sparked
afterwards, by his wife’s remark on their washing powder; in Britain, Hoggart’s 
Uses o f Literacy reflected the social fissure between interwar and postwar 
working-class lives and expectations.245
Michael Sheringham suggests two important dates in the history of 
theorising the everyday in postwar France that frame its initial period of 
introduction and dissemination: 1947, when Lefebvre’s first volume of Critique 
de la vie quotidienne was published, and 1960, the year of the publication of its 
second volume.246 During this period the exploration of everyday life was also 
undertaken by Maurice Blanchot, in the field of linguistic usage (“Everyday 
Speech”), and as we have seen by Roland Barthes.247 Lefebvre himself
formulated the everyday not as a new system, but as a link between existing 
systems: “Common denominator of activities, locus and milieu of human 
functions, the everyday can also be analysed as the uniform aspect of the major 
sectors of social life: work, family, private life, leisure.” Women, the working 
class and youths bear in their everyday lives the brunt of what we know as 
modernity, otherwise apparent through images, the cinema and television, our 
diversions from every day ness.249 Lefebvre thought the everyday was an
ambiguous category, reflecting the mixture of freedom and inevitability, breach
and continuity of the immediate postwar French experience. Rather than being 
defined negatively, as the residue of ‘Culture’, the everyday was a complex 
concept: it comprised (with modernity itself) the deep structure of contemporary 
life, typically an urban, bourgeois, prosaic life that had lost its aura of unity, 
stability, and continuity.250 The everyday was the point of insertion of
245 Ross makes much of Lefebvre’s anecdote in Ross, Fast Cars, 58; and Ross, “French 
Quotidian,” 19.
246 Michael Sheringham, Everyday Life: Theories and Practices from Surrealism to the Present 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5.
247 On the exchange between Barthes and Lefebvre see: Michael Kelly, “Demystification: A 
Dialogue between Barthes and Lefebvre,” Yale French Studies 98: The French Fifties, ed. 
Susan Weiner (2000), 79-97.
248 Henri Lefebvre, “Everyday and Every day ness,” trans. Christine Levich, Yale French Studies 
73: Everyday Life, eds. Alice Kaplan and Kristin Ross (1987), 10.
249 Lefebvre, “Everyday and Everydayness,” 10-11.
250 Lefebvre, “Everyday and Everydayness,” 11; Ross, “French Quotidian,” 20-21.
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‘Americanism’ into French lives as the paradigm of modernisation, and this deep 
structural penetration explains its importance. Most importantly, Lefebvre’s 
everyday was potentially a critical and transformative concept: observing the 
everyday was already critical action, questioning the images and spectacles of 
modernity that obscure it; as the all-but-gone, impoverished, prosaic trace of a 
former auratic plenitude, it contained the secret of its own potential 
transformation.
The critique of the everyday gains in importance when viewed through its 
1950s historical context, standing as an alternative take on the kind of 
generalising, abstracting outlook characteristic of ascendant Structuralism. Yet 
Structuralism itself was merely a symptom, enabling the ‘colonization of 
everyday life’ and complementing it by what Sheringham calls “the de-realizing 
spell of modernization.”251 ‘Objective’ Structuralist rules, codes and structures 
effaced the obsolete terms of bourgeois humanism, “subjectivity, consciousness 
and agency -  what passed for / ’homme,” enabling the eventual discourse of the
9 *?9‘death of man’. Ross notes that while ‘man’ was dying at the hands of 
Structuralism he was never more alive than with Algerian and other anti-colonial 
freedom fighters reasserting their human rights, shaking off the qualifying, 
animalising, colonialism of their Western oppressors, in their struggle for 
recognition as human beings. To Ross, a similar ‘de-realisation’ characterised 
historical accounts typical of the Annales school: the longue duree displaced 
causal agency, made individual action look trivial, and divorced historical
251 Sheringham, 11.
252 Ross, Fast Cars, 161; see also above in the introduction.
253 Ross, Fast Cars, 163-164. This is a resonant point, but the general picture was more complex. 
Despite its critical aspirations, French ethnology was constrained by colonialism and its 
conservative political and ideological underpinnings: it was effectively a science coloniale. 
Yet, as a traditionally left-leaning, liberal, ‘culturalist’ discipline, with its foundations in the 
work of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl and Mauss, French ethnology had the potential to mediate and 
advocate for the causes of colonised peoples. This line was represented by the review 
Presence Africaine, established in 1947, and by the outspoken advocacy of Michel Leiris: cf. 
Michel Leiris, “L’Ethnographe devant le colonialisme,” Les Temps modemes 58 (1950), 357- 
374; Michel Leiris, Race et civilisation (Paris: Gallimard/UNESCO, 1951). Jean Jamin, 
“L’Anthropologie et ses acteurs,” in Les Enjeux philosophiques des annees 50, ed. by 
Christian Descamps (Paris : Editions du Centre Pompidou, 1989), 99-114.
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memory from concrete events. Both Annales historiography and Structuralist 
social science thus reflect an ideology of capitalist modernisation seeking “to 
undermine eventfulness by masking social contradictions that engender 
events.”254
These ‘de-realising’ tendencies enjoyed continued predominance in 
France throughout the 1950s. Structuralism and the sciences humaines were 
challenged at the time, both by the older generation of intellectuals (Sartre in 
Critique de la raison dialectique, 1960) and by younger intellectuals, introducing 
new methods of analysis (Foucault’s Histoire de la folie, 1961). Nevertheless, 
French philosophical culture reasserted itself against these various 
epistemological transformations: the philosophy of subject and experience and 
the philosophy of concept and knowledge were the same two archetypal forms of 
intellectual engagement as in the 1920s and 1930s.255 The reflection on the 
everyday was nevertheless boosted institutionally in 1960: Lefebvre set up a 
centre for the study of everyday life with a regular research seminar; and Barthes 
assumed a new post at the sixth section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes
'ye*:
(EPHE), where his first seminar addressed modem signifying processes. Thus 
work on the everyday was disseminated to new generations of students, prepared 
to challenge the everyday by breaking it down to its constituent elements of 
signification. This should, however, be considered against a background of the 
institutionalisation of the sciences humaines at this time, owing in part to indirect 
American intervention, assisting institutions oriented toward the ‘modernised’ 
social sciences: ENA, while a wholly French enterprise, was modelled on 
American business schools; the sixth section of the EPHE had been established 
in 1947, originally as a base for the Annalistes (headed first by Febvre, then by 
Braudel), by a donation from the Rockefeller Foundation; and four years of 
lobbying by Braudel resulted in 1959 in the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 
funded by the American Ford Foundation.257 In fact, as in Britain, history and the 
social sciences soon eclipsed philosophy in institutional prominence.
254 Ross, Fast Cars, 190.
255 Jean-Louis Fabiani, “Sociologie et histoire des idees: L’epistemologie et les sciences 
sociales,” in Descamps (ed.), 115, 118.
256 Sheringham, 5.
257 Ross, Fast Cars, 185-187; Fabiani, 121.
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Lefebvre’s concern was not just about the ‘de-realising spell of 
modernisation’ in theoretical thought: unlike the Barthes of the 1950s, he reacted 
to the ‘de-realisation’ that seemed to be happening in literature and cinema. The 
male nouveaux romanciers (see chapter 4) produced fiction that exploited the 
human regard to create narratives which would view everything through its 
‘there-ness’ first, through its being an object. In that they believed they were 
creating a literature of production as a way of being in the world, countering 
Barthesian bourgeois myth (where nothing is produced) and its prefabricated 
styles that can only be consumed and aped.258 Likewise, the filmmakers of the 
nouvelle vague sought to purge the cinematic text of the utter functional 
meaningfulness and taut narrative surfaces familiar from classic Hollywood 
cinema: instead they offered a stylised ‘meaninglessness’ in some ways linked to 
the authentic everyday. Precisely because ‘nothing happens’ in the ‘superficiality 
of existence’ of the modem everyday, the films attempted to foreground the 
minute actions of real people in the real world in all their relative minuteness and 
personal momentousness. Like the nouveaux romanciers, filmmakers such as 
Truffaut and Godard were still making films about reality, but they rejected what 
they saw as the facile conventions of traditional realist representation.
An intellectual pessimism
Barthes’s pessimistic impasse, epitomised by the position of the mythologist, was 
not the initial mindset among intellectuals of the French left. Since Liberation, 
Sartre had been most influential in advocating commitment (engagement), not 
least through his newly-founded journal Les Temps Modernes (henceforth TM). 
Sartre’s October 1945 inaugural manifesto for TM introduced a maxim of 
immediacy and timeliness, a carpe diem, compelling committed writers to live 
up to their readers’ trust and respond to and act upon their own time.260 This was
258 Ross, Fast Cars, 75-76, 183. Ross takes particular note of Robbe-Grillet’s phrase de pouvoir 
laveur du regard’ (the cleansing power of the gaze) in her discussion of the new French stress 
on hygiene.
259 Peter Brunette, “But Nothing Happened: The Everyday in French Postwar Cinema,” in 
Gumpert (ed.), 79-81.
260 Mehlman mentions the Horatian maxim in his short introduction to Sartre’s translated 
manifesto in Postwar French Thought vol. II: Literary Debate, Texts and Contexts, ed. by
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not simply a change of tack for Sartre, from more metaphysical and aesthetic 
interests to more social and political ones -  but also a direct opposition to the 
predominant interwar intellectual agenda as put forward in La Trahison des 
clercs (1927), where Julien Benda had attacked hommes de lettres for neglecting 
detached, universal contemplation to intervene in current affairs. Sartre reframed 
the immediate postwar situation in terms of freedom and responsibility: ‘getting 
one’s hands dirty’ was not to become ‘contaminated’, as Benda had thought. 
Commitment was rooted historically in the wartime experience and as a literary 
maxim it fashioned a more inclusive committed realism than social realism
961commonly understood. TM’s commitment to the working class was 
nevertheless apparent in its intended role as platform for temoignage (witness 
documents) of working-class lives, taken as meaningful in and of themselves by 
Sartre and Michel Leiris. TM advocated ‘synthetic anthropology’ as an 
alternative to the growing influence of Structuralism in academic anthropology: 
meaning, insisted Sartre and Leiris, was still generated by individual freedom,
969even within the confines of the social situation.
In its early years TM was not alone in advocating a European 
exceptionalism that shunned both sides of the ‘dehumanising’ East-West bloc 
politics: communist totalitarianism and Western imperialism. European 
exceptionalism designated the continent as a neutral region with the moral core 
of social democracy and the new role of liberalising the world by example. 
Politically, this meant an intellectual search for neutralism and ‘third ways’ such
96"}as progressive Catholicism and existentialism. The Kravchenko and Rousset 
affairs served unaffiliated leftist intellectuals as proof of the oppressive power of
Denis Hollier and Jeffrey Mehlman (New York: The New Press, 1999), 29; see also Drake, 
Intellectuals, 26. For his later, more thorough qualification of commitment see Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Q u’est-ce que la litterature? (Paris: Gallimard, 1948).
261 Howard Davies, Sartre and 'Les Temps Modernes ’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 25.
262 Davies, 80.
263 Discussing the ‘battle of ideas’ between existentialism, Catholic personalism and Marxism, 
Kelly shows how each tried repeatedly to grapple with ideas and positions of others, and to 
assimilate some ideas into their own programmes (in particular, Mourner’s Esprit circle). 
Michael Kelly, The Cultural and Intellectual Rebuilding o f France after the Second World 
War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), cf. 158-159, 167-168, 170-172.
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communism, not just in France through PCF organs, but also internationally, 
several years before Khrushchev’s XXth party congress speech.264 A significant 
attempt at third-way political mobilisation was the formation of the 
Rassemblement Democratique Revolutionnaire (RDR), a short-lived experiment 
(1948-49) in extra-partisan politics that grouped anti-fascists like Rousset, 
Catholic humanists like Mounier and Sartre himself.265 Sartre nevertheless went 
on to become a communist fellow-traveller, if only from 1952 until the Soviet 
intervention in Hungary in late 1956. This drove him and many others worldwide 
to overt criticism of Soviet communism, and led to a widespread disillusionment 
among the French intellectual left with their political representation through PCF 
and SFIO (which, in coalition, was complicit in both Suez and Algeria). As in 
Britain, this disillusionment was channelled toward hopes for a ‘new left’-type 
movement. Moreover, the Hungarian invasion raised questions about the 
impact and validity of intellectual action.
By the mid-1950s French leftist intellectuals were pessimistic about the 
possibility of transformative action and the widespread withdrawal from politics. 
As French society and its political map changed, they lost faith in their 
transformative potential as public leaders, or, indeed, about the influence of any 
single individual as political agent. As the exercise of State power became 
increasingly authoritarian, that widespread pessimism infected the eroding trust 
in cultural production as a political and social vehicle. With the waning of French 
international influence, it also seemed justifiable to be pessimistic about France’s 
national role (and that of its intellectuals) in the brutal world politics of the Cold
264 In both affairs the PCF journal Les Lettres frangaises tried to defend Stalin’s USSR by 
accusing public figures of false allegations about it, leading to libel trials which it lost. Viktor 
Kravchenko’s book, I  Chose Freedom (1946), recounted his dissidence and defection to the 
West. David Rousset, an anti-fascist fighter and Buchenwald survivor, called in November 
1949 on other survivors of German camps to help investigate similar Soviet crimes. See 
Herbert R. Lottman, The Left Bank: Writers, Artists, and Politics from the Popular Front to 
the Cold War (London: Heinemann, 1982), 266-274. For the PCF and its supporters these 
affairs simply heightened siege mentality; Drake, Intellectuals, 65-68.
265 Lottman, 277-282; Drake, Intellectuals, 60-62; Michel-Antoine Bumier, Les Existentialistes et 
la politique (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 63-75; David Drake, Sartre (London: Haus, 2005), 72- 
75.
266 Drake, Intellectuals, 96; Drake, Sartre, 99.
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War and the nuclear arms race. The whole of French culture, everything that 
France stood for> seemed to pale in comparison to the emergent world picture. 
Merleau-Ponty thought that “everything will be decided by brute force. Why 
speak since brute force is incapable of listening?”, and Simone de Beauvoir 
wondered, “What could one do, at this time, in France?”267 This feeling of 
impasse on all levels -  individual influence, collective action (of intellectuals or 
of the working class) and national power -  is allegorised in Jean Genet’s play Le 
Balcon. Genet confronts intellectual ambivalence toward popular culture, toward 
authenticity and mediated experience, toward cultural production as effective 
transformative action, indeed toward the possibility of social change at all. As the 
following discussion shows, his view of social structure and its prospects is 
similarly dim.
Genet and Le Balcon
Sartre’s thoroughgoing ‘existential psychoanalysis’ of Jean Genet in his Saint 
Genet (1952), which from a preface became the entire first volume of Genet’s 
collected writings, summed up the man’s early life and work systematically. Yet 
the occurrences give an impression of a man who for four decades lived a 
disjointed, displaced life. Unwanted and abandoned by his mother to the 
assistance publique, Genet was placed variously in care institutions and with a 
foster family. Turning to petty crime as an adolescent, he was sent to a 
reformatory, escaped by joining the army, and after seven years deserted and 
began roaming Europe, living on theft and prostitution, until returning to Paris in 
1937. Here, for over a decade, Genet was in and out of prison for desertion and 
other offences. It was during these spells in prison that he began to write, 
producing mostly autobiographical poetry, drama and prose. In 1944 Genet 
began publishing his work, starting with his poem Le Condamne a mort, 
published at his own expense, and with Notre-Dame des Fleurs, which got 
published thanks to his new friend Jean Cocteau. These were followed by the
267 Merleau-Ponty translated and quoted in Drake, Intellectuals, 77, citing Jean-Paul Sartre, 
“Merleau-Ponty vivant,” Situations IV  (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 236; Beauvoir translated in 
Lottman, 284-285, citing Simone de Beauvoir, La Force des choses (Paris: Gallimard, 1963).
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novels Le Miracle de la Rose (1946) and Querelle de Brest (1947), by the play 
Les Bonnes (1947), and by a volume of collected poetry (1948).
In 1948 Genet was suddenly, and mainly due to a court mix-up, faced 
with a life sentence for recidivism. Thanks to Cocteau, together with Jean-Paul 
Sartre, who published in Combat an open letter to President Auriol on his behalf, 
backed by another plea endorsed by Picasso, Colette, Claudel, Ayme and others, 
Genet was pardoned in August 1949; he was never again imprisoned. His 
following publications -  the play Haute Surveillance and particularly the 
fictionalised autobiography Le Journal du voleur -  together with the intellectual 
pleas on his behalf, made 1949 the year of Genet’s establishment as the ‘noble 
rogue’ of French letters. By early 1951, Gallimard started preparing Genet’s 
collected (and now unexpurgated) works for publication, starting with Sartre’s 
Saint Genet. Then, after three unproductive years, Genet wrote Le Balcon (and 
the outline for Les Negres) throughout most of 1955, and published it in June 
1956. Yet alongside Genet’s clearly established fame and familiarity, his 
continual displacement and outsider lawlessness cemented his position as an 
untouchable. These were also the cause of his classlessness, which stands out in 
comparison with the clear working-class identification of both Sillitoe and Arthur 
Seaton. In his mid-forties, rich, esteemed and delightfully controversial, Genet 
was still writing from the margins of French society.
In London in late 1956, Le Balcon was being prepared for its world 
French-language premiere. The great theatrical sensations of the season were 
Osborne’s Look Back in Anger and a much celebrated tour of the Berliner 
Ensemble, recently bereft of their director and playwright, Bertolt Brecht.268 Not 
concerned with commercial success, a combative Genet soon fell out with the 
director, Peter Zadek, accusing him of making the play too polite, too English.
268 Barthes in the 1950s was preoccupied with Brecht, who remained his major non-French object 
of study. Barthes engaged with Brecht mainly through his essays in the journal Theatre 
Populaire, and was greatly responsible for Brecht’s introduction to French theatre and theatre 
studies. Moriarty, Roland Barthes, 4 46-47, 50; Calvet, 111, 140. Earlier treatments of the 
‘estrangement effect’ (Shklovsky) and of the communicative functions of language 
(Jakobson) were only introduced to French readership in the 1966 translated anthology 
Theorie de la litterature: textes des formalistes russes, trans. and ed. by Tzvetan Todorov 
(Paris: Seuil, 1966).
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The working relationship deteriorated until Zadek was thrown out of the last 
rehearsals, but on premiere night at the Arts Theatre Club, on 22 April 1957, it 
was Genet who was barred from entering the building. Some scandal ensued, 
which might have contributed to extensive censorship of the English-language 
version later staged in London. The French, however, were less impressed, and 
the May 1960 Paris premiere of Le Balcon (directed this time by the abler 
experimentalist Peter Brook) failed to attract scandal, critical acclaim, or indeed 
large audiences.269 Nevertheless, Le Balcon was soon recognised as Genet’s most 
substantial play.
Genet’s theatrical work, and chief among it is Le Balcon, has since 1961 
been considered as part of a wider theatrical genre dubbed by the critic Martin 
Esslin ‘the Theatre of the Absurd’. This trend, which groups together works by 
Beckett, Ionesco, and the earlier Adamov, among others, essentially evokes 
concrete, expressive poetic images instead of rational, intellectual concepts and 
narrative structures, so as to communicate to the audience the authors’ perplexity 
in the face of the human condition, and to challenge the audience to make sense 
of the theatrical spectacle and of their own experience of it. The absurdity 
presented to the audience is twofold: firstly, the absurd play deals with the more 
profound absurdity of human existence, reeling with a tragic sense of loss at the 
devaluation and disappearance of ultimate certainties; and secondly, it is a 
satirical mockery of automatic lives unconscious of this ultimate existence. 
Esslin claims the Theatre of the Absurd plays with language and its devaluation 
through gaps between spoken dialogue and stage occurrences. By privileging 
actual experience of things over the mere knowledge of them, the Theatre of the 
Absurd was part of a wider ‘anti-literary’ movement.270 Despite criticism, 
Esslin’s definition of the Theatre of the Absurd remains influential by virtue of 
Esslin’s perception: almost in real time, he pointed out a trend or regularity in 
twentieth-century European theatre, and by giving it a collective name identified 
it and made it a frame of reference. In a way, Esslin’s definition of the Theatre of
269 See Richard N. Coe, “Unbalanced Opinions: A Study of Jean Genet and the French Critics, 
followed by a Checklist of Criticism in French,” Proceedings o f the Leeds Philosophical and 
Literary Society -  Literary and Historical Section, XIV, II (June 1970), 43,49.
270 Martin Esslin, The Theatre o f the Absurd, third edition (London: Methuen, 2001 [1961]), 23- 
26,400,419,428.
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the Absurd also helped ‘sell’ it to the wider public, much like the title ‘Angry 
Young Men’ helped ‘sell’ Amis, Braine, Wilson and Osborne, and, as will be 
shown in chapter 4, like the label nouveaux romanciers promoted the work of 
Robbe-Grillet, Sarraute, Butor and others.271 In this gain, something was also 
lost: after all, as Barthes himself noted, writing only really remains new for the
j'j'y
duration it takes to be recognised and familiar.
Esslin defines Genet’s theatre as a Theatre of the Absurd by enumerating 
the various traits it shares with other examples of the genre: an abandonment of 
character and motivation, as well as of a narrative plot; a focus, instead, on 
human situations and states of mind; and a rejection of didactic purpose linked 
with a devaluation of language and an assault on the spectators using harsh 
realities and images. In particular, adds Esslin, Genet’s theatre is a theatre of 
social protest, but one which rejects all political prescriptions.273 As for Le 
Balcon itself, Esslin claims that its revolutionaries
try to abolish a system of power based on mythical images. But in the 
very act of trying to break out of the iron ring of myth into the world 
of reality beyond it, they are compelled to construct their own myth.
For it is by the fantasies of the masses that society is kept going.274
This, to Esslin, is the gist of Le Balcon, and it clearly qualifies the play — as a 
situation, a non-specific experience -  as the twofold theatrical moment of the 
Absurd. Furthermore, Esslin’s choice of terms (myth, construction, revolution, 
masses) make this passage relevant as an interpretive link between Genet’s 
pessimist outlook and that of the intellectual pessimists discussed in the 
preceding subsection.
271 Unlike the critical disinterestedness of Esslin and the journalistic glibness behind the AYM 
label, the nouveau roman label was intentionally adopted (from a Maurice Nadeau review) by 
the publishers Minuit in order to promote their ‘stable’ of writers.
272 “The proliferation of modes of writing brings a new Literature into being in so far as the latter 
invents its language only in order to be a project: Literature becomes the Utopia of language.” 
Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 88.
273 Esslin, 233.
274 Esslin, 221.
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Summarising Le Balcon in a short synopsis highlights a problem which, 
though typical for Genet, was particularly pertinent here: over a decade, Genet 
rewrote his play several times, and there are four different editions of it available 
in print. The 1962 Barbezat edition is considered definitive and is the most 
inclusive as far as the contested and rewritten parts are concerned.275 Madame 
Irma is proprietor of a brothel, the Grand Balcony: this setting for most of the 
play is fully equipped to enact clients’ scenarios of wish-fulfilment. In the 
opening five tableaux, the clients cast themselves in roles of captains of State, 
such as Bishop, General and Judge, in situations which highlight and aggrandise 
their roles and importance. Outside the brothel a revolution is in progress, in 
which the rebels are successful enough to overthrow the figureheads of the old 
regime. One of Irma's girls, Chantal, escapes the brothel to become her own ideal 
figure -  a revolutionary heroine -  but is then killed and made into a second ideal 
figure, that of the martyr. As the tables turn, the clients who played Bishop, 
General and Judge replace the ‘real’ officials who were killed, and Irma is 
crowned as the new queen, addressing her new subjects from the Grand Balcony. 
Roger, a defeated revolutionary leader, arrives at the brothel to enact a scenario 
in which he is the Chief of Police; all along, as the oppressed party, he has craved 
the position of his oppressor. When he realises this -  both materially and 
mentally -  he castrates himself, symbolising the exhaustion and invalidation of 
the revolution at the moment of its very success. In conclusion, the Chief of 
Police assumes the role of Death in another of the brothel’s fantasy spaces, a 
mausoleum studio. Irma then closes shop for the day and sends the spectators 
home, to their real lives, where she promises everything will be less true than in 
the theatrical spectacle.
A central trait of Le Balcon is the intentionally blurred, and often ignored, 
distinction between ‘representation’ and ‘reality’. Not only do some characters 
on stage have difficulty distinguishing their real roles from their performed ones 
(and thus fall back on empty truisms: who is the real plumber? the one who fixes 
the taps) but it is also unclear whether the entire revolution is another grand
275 Edmund White, Genet, with a chronology by Albert Dichy (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), 
480. For a comparative discussion of the versions see also: David H. Walker, “Revolution and 
Revisions in Genet’s ‘Le Balcon’,” The Modern Language Review 79, 4 (October 1984), 817- 
830.
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spectacle of titillation enacted within the Grand Balcony, or whether a ‘rear 
revolution penetrates the brothel to crown Madame Irma as Queen. More 
noticeably, theatrical difference between stage and audience is breached when 
Irma turns to speak directly to the audience in the last scene. And where is the 
false ‘here’ that she implies: is it the brothel, the entire play, or the whole 
theatrical experience of the audience? Clearly, Genet’s professed aim of 
glorifying Image and Reflection was meticulously adhered to; it does, however, 
leave the audience confused as to what the play is about and what they should 
make of it. Of course, that was Genet’s intention: the theatrical spectacle 
cannot be the scene where external, social issues are resolved.
Despite ostensibly resisting inferred referential readings of his play, 
Genet did start writing Le Balcon about a specific historical context: the Spanish 
Civil War and its outcome. Genet admitted as much at the time, adding that the 
self-castration of Roger was equivalent to the Republican concession of defeat, 
but claiming that it was more an original inspiration than an ongoing model.277 
Yet Le Balcon cannot be separated from the social reality in which it was created 
or received. In fact, its content and mise-en-abyme structure (of a representation 
within a representation, theatre within theatre) carry a complex political message. 
The blurring of theatre (the performative) and real life (the material) recasts the 
staged event as a significantly more authoritative locus, and the deliberate baring 
of its artificiality is not simply demystifying but also aiming straight for the 
principles and attitudes of the audience. Therefore, despite Genet’s personal 
anarchism and his insistence that Le Balcon not be read as referring to a specific 
political situation, its unrealistic artificiality “does not betoken political nihilism” 
but rather a resentment toward “the essential unreality of ideology” or other
276 Jean Genet, “Comment jouer Le Balcon,''' CEuvres Completes vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), 
276.
277 “My point of departure was situated in Spain, Franco’s Spain, and the revolutionary who 
castrates himself was all those Republicans when they had admitted their defeat. And then my 
play continued to grow in its own direction and Spain in another.” Translated and quoted in 
White, 476-477. For the original interview see Michel Breitman, “J’ai ete victime d’une 
tentative d’assassinat,” Arts no. 617 (May 1957).
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“dangerous aspects of the theatricality of everyday life.” The mise-en-abyme 
in Le Balcon is anti-realist, but its target is a particular kind of social reality.
This is one way in which Le Balcon's artificiality can be reconciled with 
referentiality. A second way was suggested by the Belgian Marxist sociologist 
Lucien Goldmann. In his first commentary on the play, written after seeing Peter 
Brook’s 1960 Parisian production, Goldmann asserted that “it is perfectly 
realistic insofar as it transposes onto the literary level the fundamental 
transformations that modem society has undergone over the past forty years.”279 
As Goldmann reads the play, the main loci of power in the play are Irma 
(enterprise technocracy, economic power) and the Chief of Police (State 
technocracy, political power), and so in this and other ways the play reflects -  
beyond its more immediately apparent themes of mirroring, sexuality and 
representation -  contemporary social reality in a didactic way, thus making it the
^ o n
first French Brechtian play. Goldmann sees Le Balcon as a literary 
transposition of the experience of the European (and, in that, the French) radical 
Left between 1917 and 1923, which had shaped its mentality as a critical but 
frustrated consciousness, oriented toward a vision of overcoming capitalism by 
revolt, a fantasy frustrated by the fascination of the mled with their rulers.281 The 
contemporary experience of the European Left is thus another facet of the 
realism of Genet’s plays (or of Robbe-Grillet’s fiction, on whom Goldmann was 
to elaborate later, in his Toward a Sociology o f the Novel) by reflecting the 
changed nature of experience under capitalism, where the relationship between 
society and its cultural products is no longer mediated by group consciousness 
(of class or ideology) 282
278 Walker, 830; White, 487.
279 Lucien Goldmann, “Genet’s The Balcony. A Realist Play,” trans. Robert Sayre, Praxis: A 
Journal o f Radical Perspectives on the Arts 4 (1978), 129. Originally published as Lucien 
Goldmann, “Une Piece realiste: Le Balcon de Genet,” Les Temps Modernes 171 (June 1960).
280 Goldmann, “A Realist Play,” 125, 127, 130.
281 Lucien Goldmann, “The Theater of Genet: A Sociological Study,” trans. Pat Dreyfus, in 
Genet: A Collection o f Critical Essays, eds.: Peter Brooks and Joseph Halpem (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979), 33, 35, 39-40.
282 Robert Sayre, “Goldmann and Modem Realism: Introduction to the Balcony Article,” Praxis: 
A Journal o f Radical Perspectives on the Arts 4 (1978), 117.
120
Goldmann suggested two ways of interpreting Le Balcon as realistic: 
firstly, because it conveys the worldview of the European Left, which, to 
Goldmann, was shaped by a specific historical dynamics, of the threat and 
frustration of revolution in our times; and secondly, because it transcribes social 
structure independently of group consciousness: it is a ‘social realist’ piece 
without the usual reference to class or ideology (certainly expected by 
Goldmann’s great inspiration, Georg Lukacs). Goldmann’s suggestions take 
Le Balcon as a significant realist piece in spite o f  Genet’s intentions and not 
because of them; not for its main themes and characters, but for its secondary 
content and categorical structure. As such, Goldmann’s interpretation withstands 
Edmund White’s insistence that “Genet’s analysis of power is not Marxist”:
* )Q Aindeed, it was not Marxist in any conventional sense. Goldmann did not 
interpret Genet’s intentions, but rather the (unintended) reflection of his 
worldview in the structure of his play. Goldmann’s more systematic (and 
‘committed’) interpretation is thus reconciled with Genet’s anarchism and non­
conformism, and captures Genet’s disdain for ‘revolutionary types’ and his 
cultivation of actual exclusion into a worldview.285
Goldmann’s interpretation is not inconsistent with Sartre’s suggestion in 
Saint Genet that the central theme of all of Genet’s works is oppression; although 
Goldmann interprets oppression in the Marxist social-economic sense, whereas 
Sartre was more interested in constructing an ‘existential psychoanalysis’ of 
Genet, showing the limits of both psychoanalysis and Marxism in the face of a 
total explanation offered in terms of liberty and (self-)liberation.286 At the time 
Sartre attempted a systematic introduction of the (existentialist) problem of 
freedom into Marxism, in the face of its current and oppressive political 
interpretations in Soviet Stalinism and in monolithic PCF Communism.287 Saint 
Genet marks a turning point in Sartre’s attitude toward Marxism, signalling the
283 This elaborates the final point in Sayre, 120.
284 White, 487-488.
285 Goldmann, “The Theater of Genet,” 32, 35.
286 See Jean-Paul Sartre, Saint Genet: Comedien et martyr (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), 536.
287 Ian Birchall, “The Politics of Saint Genet,” in Flowers and Revolution: A Collection o f  
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start of a succession of events -  the Paris demonstrations against General 
Ridgway, the arrest of Jacques Duclos, Sartre’s break with Camus over The 
Rebel -  which eventually led to Sartre’s fellow-travelling years. When Saint 
Genet was published as the first volume of Genet’s collected works, it was so 
comprehensive that it immediately became an unavoidable point of reference for 
later critiques of Genet, particularly in his non-theatrical work. Sartre’s 
conceptual analysis of Genet’s scandalous life in crime and writing, which was 
mostly considered obscene, installed Genet as an archetypal existential man, and 
sought to understand his choices along the lines of existential choices and his 
double exclusion and oppression as a homosexual and a criminal. Genet’s 
biography is reconstructed by Sartre’s ‘existential psychoanalysis’ as harking 
back to an abrupt moment of trauma when his personal expression was 
introduced into the social as a crime, leading (and here Sartre follows Nietzsche 
and Scheler) to a resentment, which then manifests itself in a willingness to adopt 
society’s conception of him and become the morally reprehensible figure of 
legend -  that is, until he discovered a positive way to correct his bad image
■noA
through poetry. Genet offered various responses to Sartre’s essay, ranging 
from the resentful to the dismissive, claiming he had never read it through (it is 
nearly 700 pages long).290
Betrayal is an important theme in most of Genet’s works and can be read 
in several ways. Preliminarily, the treachery shown by some of Genet’s 
characters can be understood, like revolt (which sometimes accompanies it), in 
terms of reaction to oppression, as the excluded and downtrodden taking their 
revenge on society. Edward Said has attributed Genet’s recurrent treatment of 
betrayal as an assertion of identity, arising from the need of an independent 
individual who has created his own selfhood and values to stay creative and 
unbound.291 Another explanation has been proposed recently, and it proposes to 
close a gap left by the greatest systematic interpreter of Genet after Sartre, his
288 Birchall, 178.
289 Davies, 29, 59, 87; see also Max Scheler, L ’Homme du ressentiment, traduction revue et 
corrigee (Paris: Gallimard, 1970).
290 Birchall, 177.
291 Edward Said, “On Jean Genet’s Late Works,” in Imperialism and Theatre, ed: J. Ellen Gainor 
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biographer Edmund White. White seems puzzled by the pride a traitor might take 
in his disloyalty. But in Le Balcon, unfaithfulness is displayed as a matter of 
course, indeed of pride: the revolution deposes one queen only to replace her 
with another (Irma); Chantal abandons her mistress and is then shot by the 
revolutionaries when she is introduced to the new queen; Roger betrays the 
revolutionary ideal by trying to imitate the Chief of Police.
Reviewing White’s autobiography, Adam Phillips suggests that disloyalty 
can be the source of pride just as it is certainly a source of gratification, as Genet 
has a “sense of the ethical necessity, indeed the ecstasy of betrayal.” That 
ecstasy is not merely a reaction to oppression or a protection of a sense of self, 
but a gesture toward the future with a new social programme -  like the revolution 
in the play -  which fails. In that programme Genet replaces fidelity and 
obligation by a new kind of intimacy, an impersonal intimacy or communion 
which is ad hoc and almost Situationist in character, and which is purportedly 
more reflective of one’s true sentiments at any given moment. Phillips goes 
on: “Loyalty may be the traditional bond, but it may not be the only one; trust 
may be cherished, but what if it is something of a protection racket?”294 
Therefore, if fidelity is not categorical but contingent, to be most truthful and 
honest to someone would lead one to eventually betray their trust. Conceptually, 
this creates a nihilistic equation of truth and lie which voids good and bad, 
consistency and validity. This seems to be the most socially encompassing and 
the starkest reading of betrayal in Genet, and so the most relevant to our thematic 
of social structure.
Reading Genet in these terms casts him as a pessimist. Certainly, if only 
from notes like Comment jouer Le Balcon (appended to the 1962 version), Genet 
is utterly pessimistic about culture, and expressly theatre, as a means of 
transformative action. Unlike dramatists such as Brecht, he acknowledges no 
way in which theatre can be a mobilising or even constructively alienating 
medium. Worse still, theatre (especially realist theatre) creates the dangerous
292 Adam Phillips, “What You Really Want,” London Review o f Books 27 (21), 3.11.2005, 7.
293 As such it sits well with the great inspiration Genet took from the anarchist movement and its 
thought, and anticipates the future direction both of Genet’s work and of the French radical 
Left.
294 Phillips, 7.
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illusion that social problems are being resolved on stage. Le Balcon's methods 
resist this illusion.295
Despite his insistence on the exclusive efficacy of direct political action 
over cultural action, Genet is ultimately also pessimistic about the transformative 
prospects of real-life revolt. As an anarchist, Genet was unimpressed by 
‘revolutionary types’ and saw them as compensating with zeal for merit. Lucien 
Goldmann was not wide of the mark in seeing Genet’s vision of revolutions as 
always already frustrated by the fascination with the rulers they aim to 
overthrow, which then leads revolutionaries to imitate them (Genet makes this 
point in Le Balcon but opposes it later in the more immediate Les Negres). Le 
Balcon also portrays revolution as an illusion, a play of images and roles like any 
other in life, which is moreover premised on ideological foundations, illusory in 
their own right. This kind of programmatic commitment to ideals seems deeply 
artificial, and Genet resists it and presents it as flawed.
It is tempting to read into Le Balcon a third kind of pessimism, an 
essentially elitist fear of the masses tempered by a fascination with the alternative 
and irreverent. Irma fears the crowd’s victory as the dull and unimaginative 
erotics of the rebels would ruin her business of purveying illusions. Likewise 
Genet, in his demanding construction of Le Balcon and repeated dissatisfaction 
with its ‘vulgarisation’ in stage productions, searched for discerning crowds with 
more complex tastes. Genet’s sympathy toward the oppressed was not akin to the 
French leftist intellectual’s populist fascination with workers and peasants: Genet 
could not have been a Maoist because, while seeing sense and even moral 
superiority in the position of the subordinate, empathy toward it would entail 
identification with it. He clearly had no illusions that alongside the moral high 
ground was an agenda of conservative tastes and reactionary morals which could 
not win his solidarity.
These pessimistic elements in Genet are similar to those of Barthes in 
Mythologies, the effective contemporary of Le Balcon. Both works express an 
ambivalent attitude toward revolution, its prospects and its moral status; and a 
trenchant belief in an individualism which defies conformism. Ungar suggests
295 Cf. David Bradby, “Genet, the Theatre and the Algerian War,” in Read and Birchall (eds.), 
158, 163.
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that while Barthes is obviously keen to disclose the mythical structure of 
bourgeois culture, he is also fascinated by its power and mechanisms naturalising 
bourgeois hegemony, suggesting an aesthetics of artifice in which our idea of 
Nature is completely constructed by the capitalist system.296 In pursuing an 
aesthetics of artifice, in which reality and illusion are blurred, Barthes and Genet 
read like latter-day Decadents.
296 Ungar, 105.
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Summary: Marginality and Entrapment
Several of the attitudes surveyed above express a sense of marginality and of 
entrapment in the given social order. These positions sometimes seem 
paradoxical. Lamenting the immutability of the postwar social order, they belittle 
the effects of the great mutation sociale brought about by modernisation and 
changing state policies. Conversely, protesting against social changes, usually 
massification, in their respective societies, writers like Genet and Sillitoe, as well 
as Leavis and Lefebvre, downplay underlying cultural and structural continuities.
In Britain, the opinions presented highlight disillusionment with the 
newly affluent society, leading Hoggart and Sillitoe to invoke ‘bread and 
circuses’ imagery to illuminate the disappointing ‘wrong turn’ members of the 
working class had taken in seeking individual mobility, rather than class identity 
and solidarity. The ‘bread and circuses’ trope is also applied to the intellectual 
elites: here it taps into a long tradition of intellectual pessimism that had begun 
with Arnold, was updated in the interwar generation by Leavis, and inspired the 
postwar work of Williams. According to this tradition, culture in its normative 
sense, demanding of each person to develop his ‘best self through the 
compelling inspiration of cultural canon, is continually threatened by the 
democratising processes of massification, rooted in the catastrophic legacy of the 
industrial revolution.
This prevalent ‘bread and circuses’ trope was initially informed by a 
discontent with progress: the detrimental effects of the industrial revolution on 
local communities and their ‘organic’ cultures was seen as irreversible; as the 
postwar British welfare state deepened its dependency on industrial labour, and 
effectively created the ‘affluent workers’ as the predominant, and philistine, type 
of cultural consumer. Inasmuch as the image of Sillitoe’s Nottingham is 
essentially that of Blake’s dehumanising ‘dark satanic mills’, there is a romantic, 
reactionary streak to this trope which renders it a basic shade of technological 
pessimism. This conservative approach is thoroughly imbued with nostalgia for 
bygone days (Hoggart’s and Arthur Seaton’s youth) or for extinct golden ages 
(imagined by Frank and Queenie Leavis), invoked as benchmarks to indict the 
fallen, dissolute present.
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It is easy to see how redemptive horizons might have narrowed. Leavis 
saw it as the role of the literary scholar to preserve the embers of English culture 
and its great tradition in the halls of academe, where only the willing would tap 
into them in earnest. Hoggart and Williams turned to excavating contemporary 
Britain and its literature in order to recover older working-class traditions; both 
also tried to revise Marxist theories in view of contemporary mass society and to 
find political alternatives to Labour socialism. But it emerges from Saturday 
Night and Sunday Morning that Sillitoe did not have a clear idea of ways in 
which Arthur, the discontented nonconformist worker, could break out of his 
existential entrapment.
Sillitoe gestures at the hopelessness of Arthur’s situation, suggesting it 
cannot be ameliorated except through a total dismantling of the social order, as in 
a nuclear catastrophe: the only way to break out of the ‘bread and circuses’ trap 
is to bum Rome down. However, it is not at all clear that its inheritors would be 
more virtuous than the deposed: in fact, Genet’s Le Balcon suggests that the 
revolutionaries are just as flawed as the establishment they overthrow. This is 
partly because the pretenders to cultural hegemony implicitly admire and imitate 
the authoritarian ways of their rulers, becoming ultimately impotent as agents of 
transformation. Setting his play in a brothel, Genet was indicating the inessential, 
prostituted nature of power as well as its confinement to situations of complicit 
submission; that the brothel should specialise in fetishistic role-playing suggests 
the fantasised, mythical element of all social types, and so their essential 
similarity.
The more things change, the more they stay the same. This is the 
pessimistic truth of entrapment in the social order, viewed with the knowing 
disillusionment of a belated Ecclesiastes who deciphered the cultural code. For 
both Sillitoe and Genet, and Barthes in Mythologies, the revolution of the 
oppressed is doomed to fail, at least inasmuch as it perpetuates a structure of 
domination. Moreover, to Barthes as to Lefebvre, the very system of everyday 
signs conveys a constructed discursive order that is part and parcel of the 
consumerist ‘bread and circuses’ of mass culture, from politics, through cars and 
washing powders, to the cinema, sports and public spaces. ‘Demystifying’ the 
signs of systematic oppression is for Barthes and Lefebvre the beginning of
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undeceived resistance, but at least to Barthes, it also marginalises the 
‘mythologist’ in an otherwise complicit mass society.
There is no nostalgia for premodemised society in these French writings. 
This distinguishes them sharply from the British works discussed, in part because 
of the legacy of occupation. Rather than drawing on the historical or pseudo- 
historical memory, the French tended to measure the present against abstract, 
ideological normative notions of society. This abstract normative notion of 
culture as a redemptive endeavour was challenged by Genet and Barthes: Genet 
is careful to dissociate between theatre and transformative action, and Barthes 
does not expect change from the depoliticised, mythologised cultures of the 
bourgeoisie and the left. Abstract normative notions are thus no less compelling 
than romantic nostalgia as foundations for critical and pessimistic outlooks on 
present culture. It is the source of these abstractions that distinguishes between 
Barthes and Genet: while the former affected it as an intellectual posture, the 
latter’s cultivation of marginality sprang out of earlier real exclusion.
In sum, Britain and France shared a common disappointed reaction to 
progress and its social effects, which cast the postwar social situation under the 
sign of the ‘bread and circuses’ image. To different observers this common 
reaction, which had its precedents at least since the industrial revolution, either 
reinforced the prevalent social order or threatened it. The national divergences in 
cultural pessimism regarding social structure concerned attitudes toward history. 
In Britain, discontents with the effects of progress led observers to seek their 
affective compensation in history or (no less usefully) the pseudo-historical, 
leading to nostalgic reactions. In France, a long legacy of political discord was 
compounded by recent experiences that many French wished to forget. Unlike 
their British counterparts, French observers wishing to criticise the present had 
no recourse to the model of history; instead, their reaction to the discontents of 
progress was a flight from  history and to the abstract normative values of culture 
which had proved so important to French collective definition. Both 
compensations -  the nostalgic and the universal -  were attempts to grapple with 
a challenging present that was still in flux. The fact that different observers saw 
this flow leading in opposite directions -  affirmation of the social order and its 
transformation -  demonstrates the self-referential character of the culturally 
pessimistic gaze and its pliability in the service of different agendas.
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Section 2: Cultural Pessimism and National Identity
Chapter 3: Eroding British Realities
The gap between the middle and the working class diminished after the war. The 
social processes that led to working-class affluence also resulted in middle-class 
impoverishment. The erosion of clear class boundaries contributed to already- 
growing anxieties about Britian’s role as an impoverished country with a 
crumbling worldwide empire. British politics and culture were dominated by a 
search for stability and by a desire to redefine national identity. Many of the most 
radical changes in these fields took place in the cultural realm.
In the following chapter, the moves from ‘British’ (present) to ‘English’ 
(past) identity are not accidental elisions, but reflect the lacking nature of the 
‘British’ label and identity, which for that reason were all too often used 
interchangeably with the more primordial and meaningful ‘English’, regardless 
of the problematic and reductive nature of this trend of usage. The relative 
synthetic newness of ‘British’ was validated by the longstanding ‘English’ to the 
point of their equation by many in the cultural hubs of south-east England.
A preoccupation with the image of Britain is manifest in the postwar 
reformulation of academic pursuit, at least in three disciplines informing it. The 
image of history and of historians as its custodians was redefined, becoming 
more accessible to the public, not least through the mass media. English as an 
academic discipline grew in scope, student intake and importance. In the early 
1960s, through the expansion of higher education and the changes in academic 
history and English, the new discipline of cultural studies also found an 
institutional foothold. Yet in spite of their modernisation, the humanities were 
considered to be in crisis, chiefly because their role as cultural canon and moral 
compass seemed to be usurped by science and technology which promised to 
steer humanity -  and Britain in it -  toward a more peaceful and more prosperous 
future.
Popular fascination with the future was countered by attempts to redefine 
the British present by reference to the traditions of British past. The Arts Council 
promoted a particularly and distinctively English kind of popular culture. The
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failed experiment of the Third Programme illustrated how out of date, 
economically, politically and socially, such attitudes were. A different response 
to changed postwar circumstances came from the voluntary National Trust, and 
its growing success in making ‘tradition’ popular became a precursor of the 
British ‘heritage industry’. The notion of ‘heritage’ as history, together with an 
exploration of changed middle-class socioeconomic conditions, and the changed 
status and image of academics in postwar Britain, are all addressed in the novel 
Anglo-Saxon Attitudes. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of this, the 
best-known of Angus Wilson’s novels.
Reformulating Knowledge
The 1950s saw slow but decisive changes in British frameworks of knowledge 
and culture, accompanied by much, and mostly public, deliberation. The social 
historian Peter Burke has described the 1950s as a period of transition in the
“70 7history of academic historical research in Britain. This transition mainly 
consisted of the opening of the discipline to external influences, diversifying its 
subject matters and the emergence of specialised fields within it. British 
historians had previously displayed what Gareth Stedman Jones in 1967 
famously called a ‘peculiar myopia’ -  an almost exclusive interest in particular 
historical episodes or subjects, neglecting general interpretations of the past, 
historical theory and historical method.298 British historians until the 1950s had 
been decidedly English, by which I mean they believed that empiricism, common 
sense and the perspective of the interested amateur (rather than the qualified 
professional) were essential, national traits that set them apart from Continental 
historians.299 The ‘peculiar myopia’ of British historians was coupled with a 
general suspicion of sociology (considered too general in comparison with the
297 Peter Burke, “Historiography and Philosophy of History,” in History and Historians in the 
Twentieth Century, ed. by Peter Burke (Oxford: Oxford University Press/The British 
Academy, 2002), 233.
298 Gareth Stedman Jones, “The Pathology of English History,” New Left Review 46 (1967), 29- 
43.
299 Burke, 232; compare with Wilson’s tirade on British ‘sins’ of the 1950s: Angus Wilson, 
“Fourteen Points,” Encounter XVIII (January 1962), 10-12.
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specific, concrete fieldwork of anthropology), both taken by Perry Anderson in 
1968 to be symptoms of the ‘absent centre’ of British bourgeois society: 
reinforcing the stability of British social structure by having no total and 
synthetic theory of itself.300
The transformation of British history writing in the 1950s was most 
conspicuous in the proliferation of new works on questions of historiography by 
the likes of Isaiah Berlin, Amaldo Momigliano, Herbert Butterfield and Hugh 
Trevor-Roper. These new attempts at theorising historical research and historical 
explanation, previously thought redundant and foreign to historical enquiry, now 
dragged the most basic terms, like ‘historical fact’, ‘historical process’, and 
‘causation’, into deliberation. The most influential works framing these ‘long 
1950s’ were R.G. Collingwood’s posthumous The Idea o f History (1946), and 
E.H. Carr’s 1961 Trevelyan lectures, published as What Is History? (1961). 
Secondly, following American and continental historical research, the work of 
John Pocock and Quentin Skinner was later credited with the establishment in 
Britain of the sub-disciplines of cultural history and history of ideas. Thirdly, 
British economic and social historians began to extensively revise their methods 
and assumptions. This due in part to growing interest in historiography, and in 
part to the new influence of Marxist thought on historical research, introduced 
into Britain by the work of members of the Communist Party Historians’ Group, 
the likes of Christopher Hill, Eric Hobsbawm, and Edward Thompson. In the 
following decade this enabled wider introduction of translated Continental 
‘theory’ (e.g. works by Levi-Strauss and Foucault) which would have been 
improbable in the late 1940s.301
Like the profession itself, the popular face of history was changing. 
Elaine Showalter traced this change through fictional representations of 
academics, particularly historians, between C.P. Snow’s The Masters (1951) and 
Kingsley Amis’s Lucky Jim (1954).302 The transformation consisted of a
300 Perry Anderson, “Components of the National Culture,” New Left Review 50 (July-August 
1968), 12, 56. Of course, the positions of Anderson and Stedman Jones share another specific 
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301 Burke, 233-237, 243, 249.
302 Elaine Showalter, Faculty Towers: The Academic Novel and Its Discontents (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 14-33.
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weakening of a Trollopian mode, which had represented British academe as a 
small, cohesive community, a mise en abyme of traditional Little England 
through which larger social and moral issues could be examined. True to the 
Trollopian mode, Snow’s historical fiction presented an idealised view of an 
irredeemable past of fixed hierarchies, reinforced by constant reference to age 
and generation. Snow focused on careerism as played out regarding academic 
hierarchy, intellect, wealth and class. Nevertheless, the pettiness he contrasted 
with human rationality did not weaken his faith in the ideal of professional
* 303enquiry and academic knowledge.
Lucky Jim set a new trend in the academic novel. Comical but not always 
light-hearted, Amis’s send-up of historians effectively rejected the model of 
Snow’s The Masters. Snow’s self-sufficient mandarins sheltered among 
dreaming spires were replaced by Amis’s struggling young lecturers in a 
suffocating Red-Brick prison. Jim Dixon lacked conviction in the validity and 
importance of his research (into medieval ship-building) and, disillusioned with 
lecturing, longed for another life. In Amis’s contemporary setting, the sublimated 
homoerotic passions of Snow’s all-male faculty were breached by women 
academics, awful but still real and embodied objects of desire.304 Amis’s 
academic fiction was an influential but effectively minor vision for the 
intellectual elites: it reflected and addressed a limited group that, like the rest of 
the old middle class, found itself in a postwar crisis of identity.305
A marked change was also apparent in English departments. Originating 
in the late nineteenth century, English as a discrete field of study sprang from 
two disparate motivations: the utilitarian pursuit of literacy, and a romantic- 
conservative view of English literature as an inspirational fount of national 
spirit.306 In its latter capacity, English studies became in the interwar years the 
foundry of national cultivation, entrusted with the spiritual mission of guarding 
‘national conscience’ by instilling the ‘literary values’ represented in the national
303 Showalter, 16,22, 118.
304 Showalter, 23-25, 33. In Anglo-Saxon Attitudes, the characters of Gerald Middleton and Rose 
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literary canon. However, Britain’s postwar cultural and economic position 
pressured English departments to redefine themselves in terms of the social value 
of humane education, indeed all higher education, in the new welfare state as a 
liberal democracy. ‘High’ culture was considered to have declined in authority 
and influence as science and technology grew more popular. Many feared that 
the study of English literature was no longer considered intrinsically important to 
the formation of British subjects. Leavis was a dominant voice in this debate, 
advocating (not without opposition) the broadening of English from literary 
criticism to more encompassing studies of culture.
In the British welfare state of the early 1950s, general university 
attendance grew dramatically, and there was a considerable demand for English 
studies. More staff positions were created and the discipline itself grew, not least 
through new interdisciplinary and joint programmes (like ‘general studies’) in 
Red Brick universities and polytechnics. A further expansion followed the 
adoption of the 1963 Robbins Report on higher education, in the establishment of 
eleven ‘new universities’.308 Still, questions of principle regarding the value of 
English studies in higher education remained: Kingley Amis, for example, 
insisted that in educational expansionism ‘more will mean worse’.309 Not only 
was ‘high’ culture seen to be losing currency, Amis’s elitist critique also implied 
the qualitative degradation of expert knowledge, retreating into a conservational 
yet merely functional role. As the historian J.H. Plumb asserted, this was ‘the 
crisis in the humanities’, and it was a crisis of purpose and value, a qualitative 
and moral crisis unsolved and even aggravated by the growing demand for higher 
education.310
Universities were not the only settings for critical engagement with 
English literature. As Leavis’s journal Scrutiny folded in 1952, other literary 
journals were flourishing, notably Stephen Spender’s Encounter and Cyril 
Connolly’s Horizon. These were based among the metropolitan literary and
307 Doyle, 98, 106, 114.
308 Doyle, 99-100, 108, 111-112. Significantly, the Robbins Committee (discussed in chapter 6) 
was instructed to reassess English higher education in terms of ‘national needs and resources’
309 Kingsley Amis, “Lone Voices,” Encounter XV, 1 (July 1960), 9.
310 J.H. Plumb, “The Historian’s Dilemma,” in Crisis in the Humanities, ed. by J.H. Plumb 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin/Pelican, 1964), 24-44. See also his introduction to the volume.
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beiletrist intelligentsia, which relied less on formalised contact with their 
readership and more on proximity to literary publishers and to authors. The 
metropolitan literary intelligentsia was committed to the exacting standards of 
high culture without academic self-justifying agendas, and their critical 
endeavour seemed to cater solely to elite audiences and their interests. As 
‘natural Luddites’, 1950s metropolitan literary intellectuals opposed the popular 
vision of redemption-by-technology, and their opposition to the promethean
• • 311image of scientists put them in an impossible position of perceived irrelevance.
The problematic popular image of the literary intellectuals was publicly 
highlighted by Sir Charles Percy Snow, a novelist but also a Cambridge physicist 
and civil servant. His contentious 1956 essay, “The Two Cultures,” was 
elaborated in his 1959 Rede lecture at Cambridge, later published as The Two 
Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. Snow suggested there was an epistemic 
and conceptual split between science and literature, rupturing communications 
between them; he also argued plainly for the primacy and superiority of science. 
In the ‘Sputnik years’, Snow did not see his literary traditionalism as contrasting 
with his confidence in scientific innovation, at a time of high hopes for 
technology’s social and political benefits.313 His wish that technology spearhead 
a pragmatic new politics to lead mankind to better future was typical of the ‘end 
of ideology’ age.314
Snow’s lecture angered Leavis, another self-appointed guardian of culture 
and public morals, who responded with a general and personal attack in his 1962
311 Krishan Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modem Times (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 
388-389. The Classical Prometheus, like the Christian Faust, is a tragic, pessimist figure, 
demonstrating the sorrows reaped by the pursuit of greater knowledge and ability.
312 Charles Percy Snow, The Two Cultures, introduction by Stefan Collini (Cambridge: 
Canto/Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1959]); originally C.P. Snow, “The Two Cultures,” 
New Statesman and Nation LIII (6 October 1956), 413-414.
313 Stefan Collini, “Introduction,” in Snow, viii, xxxii, xli-xlii.
314 This refers to Daniel Bell’s argument that old Western humanist ideologies were spent and 
unable to guide or explain social behaviour. Western democracies triumphed in reducing 
ideology (and history) to insignificance. Most of Bell’s End o f Ideology work was done in 
connection with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an anti-totalitarian organisation (and 
covert CIA operation) also supporting Encounter. Daniel Bell, The End o f Ideology: On the 
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Richmond lecture, “Two Cultures? The Significance of C.P. Snow.”315 Leavis’s 
response stoked a heated debate that extended to national newspapers and even 
internationally.316 Leavis and others were incensed by Snow’s treatment of the 
old chestnut of the human consequences of the Industrial Revolution in British 
society. Then again, Snow’s views were as idealised and nostalgic as Leavis’s. 
Stefan Collini suggests that Snow’s late-1950s outlook was shaped by his 
nostalgia for the 1930s, the time of his personal formation, recollected (as his 
fiction, mentioned above, shows) as a ‘golden age’ of science and positivism. It 
was in 1930s Cambridge that Snow also became hostile toward literary
1 1 n
intellectuals whom he saw as snobbish enemies of ‘progress’. Snow’s wish, to 
depoliticise the public sphere so as to enable the leadership of scientists, was 
guided by his progressivist optimism and by Soviet destalinisation, as Lionel 
Trilling observed in his intervention late in 1962; Trilling also condemned 
Leavis’s attack as parochial.318 Trilling thought that while “the world will not be 
saved by teaching English at universities, nor, indeed, by any other literary 
activity,” the wish to see scientific Reason manage the world was also 
inadequate, even dangerous “if it leads us to deny the actuality of politics in the 
present.”319 Trilling was probably right to call a stalemate in the Two Cultures 
debate; but he too conceded the problematic state of literary culture.
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There were other manifestations of the ‘crisis in the humanities’. In a 
1964 book of that title, scholars from various humanities disciplines moumed the 
seeming disorientation and decline in status of the humanities. The popular 
historian J.H. Plumb, surveyed with concern the loss of faith in Western progress 
since Macaulay.320 Historians, he claimed, could no longer affirm the belief in 
human progress: their newfound interest in historiography, partisanship and 
interpretation ruled out the force of historical objectivity. Together with the rise 
of the natural sciences and the scientific attitude, this put historians in a barren, 
increasingly irrelevant position.321 In the same volume, Ernest Gellner 
considered the crisis of ‘humanism’, as he called it, as a real challenge to the 
practical applicability of wide learning and liberal values. “The issue of the ‘two 
cultures’ is utterly misconceived... as a problem of communication between two 
cultures,” he suggested, “the real and deeper problem concerns just what, if 
anything, it is that the humanities have to communicate.” Gellner’s comments 
reinforced a broader sense that no grand narrative or sense of overcoming was 
emerging from postwar British literary culture.
Amid these jeremiads for the humanities, the emerging field of Cultural 
Studies seemed fresh, focused and optimistic. As shown in chapter 1, two of its 
founding works did not conform to traditional academic disciplinary divisions or 
to the humanities as a whole: Williams’s book was a cultural history, and 
Hoggart’s book blended social theory, ethnography and autobiography. Cultural 
studies finally gained its institutional foothold in 1964 with the establishment of 
the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. Leavisite culturalism in English 
studies and the reorientation of historical study toward social history legitimated 
the kind of enquiry typical of cultural studies; its brand of ‘home anthropology’
320 J.H. Plumb, “The Historian’s Dilemma,” in Plumb, 26-30, 36. The Cambridge historian Sir 
John Harold (‘Jack’) Plumb was Snow’s colleague and friend, similarly schooled in the old 
liberal tradition. Over his long career he championed broader social history and its 
communication to wider, non-specialist audiences, thus mentoring today’s public (or 
‘television’) historians.
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then distinguished Cultural Studies from English and history. To contemporary 
observers like Anderson, this kind of critical cultural holism, heavily influenced 
by Marxism and socialism, seemed an important, if preliminary, step toward 
filling the ‘absent centre’ of British bourgeois society’s image of itself.324
The first generation of cultural studies was united around an implicit 
agenda of rediscovering or reappropriating Englishness as identity and the 
construction of England as a minor culture (early British cultural studies 
concerned England and Englishness almost exclusively). There was an important 
shift involved in this post-imperial demetropolitanisation, from an imperial ‘view 
from the top’ universalism to a typically eccentric particularism, concerning a 
whole series of Little Englands. The mixed methodology of cultural studies 
offered models for studying British (effectively English) culture that retained 
rather than resolved the fundamental split between a longstanding cultural whole 
(the English model) and materialist social antagonisms (the Marxist model).325
Observers outside cultural studies were less convinced of the merits and 
import of the academic exploration of English ways of life. For the journalist and 
essayist Anthony Hartley -  who, as arts editor of The Spectator, had 
commissioned Leavis’s essay attacking Snow -  the imperial dismantling and 
national consolidation in which cultural studies emerged “caused a narrowing of 
horizons and a sense of frustration in English society, which has been frequently, 
though not always consciously, expressed by English intellectuals.” Hartley 
saw the late 1950s discourse on culture and class as pointless leftist 
sentimentalism, showing an immodest expectation that academics would 
intervene, however secondarily, in the social state of affairs. To Hartley, 
intellectuals had a pastoral role “to give the nation the thought and ideas it 
deserves” but without committing Benda’s ‘treason of the intellectuals’ and 
involving themselves practically.327 Unsurprisingly, Hoggart took issue with 
Hartley, noting that he “particularly dislikes free-wheeling intellectuals who 
strike moral attitudes without recognizing the complexity of issues and the need
324 Anderson, 5, 50-56.
325 Esty, 20-21, 183, 187.
326 Anthony Hartley,^ State o f England (London: Hutchinson, 1963), 15
327 Hartley, 244.
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for compromise and maneuver.”328 Hoggart and Hartley could not agree on the 
legacies of their common influences, Matthew Arnold and Orwell. However, 
they represented typical postwar reactions: Hoggart responded to ‘new affluence’ 
with liberal socialist tools, while Hartley reacted to the failure of 1930s 
liberalism, to imperial dismantling and to the welfare state, producing “a 
compendium of journalistic idees regues on the matter of intellectuals from a 
period which... was formative for subsequent discussion.”
A central claim of Collini’s Absent Minds is that the 1950s was a time in 
which the definition of the intellectuals in Britain was realigned. Reinvigorated 
by old perceived contrasts with continental Europe, the ‘nationalised’ definition 
of intellectuals in postwar Britain was closely related to a renewed identification 
with Englishness and with the ‘state of England’ questions. Two essays of the 
period were particularly influential: Noel Annan’s “The Intellectual Aristocracy” 
(1955) and Edward Shils’s short polemic “The Intellectuals” (1955). Both argued 
for the integration of British intellectuals into the ruling classes and social 
elites.330 Annan and Shils presented a picture which, while true historically, soon 
became outdated in the wake of more radical positions, like those of Perry
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Anderson and Tom Naim. Anderson and Naim’s thesis, that there was an 
absence of critical political intellectuals, became curiously influential in 1960s 
and 1970s Britain. In close examination the exceptionalism/absence thesis of 
British intellectuals crumbles: as Collini has argued, tropes of absence or denial 
of intellectuals appear in other cultures; foreign accounts see Britain as a hub of 
intellectual activity where intellectuals are prominent members of society; and in
328 Richard Hoggart, “Too Much Mustard,” New York Review o f Books I, 11 (23 January 1964), 
18.
329 Thus, while of ephemeral influence, Hartley’s book is still instructive as a timely contribution. 
See Stefan Collini, Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 165, see also 166-169.
330 Noel Annan, “The Intellectual Aristocracy,” in Studies in Social History, a Tribute to G.M. 
Trevelyan, ed. by J.H. Plumb (London: Longman, Greens & Co., 1955), 243-287; Edward 
Shils, “The Intellectuals: (1) Great Britain,” Encounter 4 (1955), 5-16. See also Collini, 
Absent Minds, 140-150.
331 Naim’s is a later and more limited claim, but phrased in similarly ‘pathological’ terms. Tom 
Naim, “The English Literary Intelligentsia,” in Bananas, ed. by Emma Tennant (London: 
Quartet, 1977), 57-83; see also Collini, Absent Minds, 175-182.
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fact, as early as the 1920s many foreign accounts hold Britain together with 
France -  its polar opposite according to exceptionalist accounts -  to be enviably 
intellectual cultures. On the whole, then, there is no proof or agreement that 
British culture is uniquely unfavourable to intellectuals.332 Yet the suggestion of 
the absence of intellectuals seemed reasonable in the wider context of British 
postwar popular culture.
Culture and Tradition
One of the most influential intellectuals in interwar and postwar British culture 
was the economist and essayist John Maynard Keynes, a pillar of the 
Bloomsbury circle and standard-bearer for liberal humanism and socialism. 
Despite disenchantment with Bloomsbury ‘softness’ and its association with 
appeasement and defeat, Keynes’s postwar reputation continued to grow, 
particularly after his death in April 1946. He was recognised as an architect of 
the British postwar welfare state, as well as of the Bretton Woods system, the 
prevalent international economic order until the early 1970s. Keynes became 
aware of the earlier stages of imperial decline in the 1920s, and realised that it 
implied the end of an economic order for Britain. In his magnum opus, General 
Theory o f Employment, Interest and Money (1936), he reconsidered the British
33  3 *state and its vehemently laissez-faire economy. The later adoption by the 
government of his proposals for state economic intervention to aid full 
employment was an economic manifestation of the broader shift from a diffuse 
cosmopolitanism figured through British imperial power to a closer-knit, 
consolidated nation-state figured in English cultural traditions (in the tradition of 
Arnold). To Keynes -  and his was at the time a minority view -  imperial decline 
did not reflect British national decline but was actually an opportunity for 
national redefinition and revival.334 Unlike France, as the next chapter will show, 
Keynes’s embrace of decolonisation slowly spread among the postwar liberal left 
and, for utilitarian reasons, in official circles.
332 Collini devotes an entire chapter to these comparisons; Collini, Absent Minds, 201-220
333 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory o f Employment, Interest and Money (London: 
Macmillan & Co., 1936).
334 Esty, 170, 173, 181, 191-192,215.
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Keynes used his wealth and influence to promote artistic and broader 
cultural causes and projects. In 1945 he lobbied the new Labour government to 
create a sponsoring body for the arts in Britain that would enable the government 
to support them indirectly, ‘at arm’s length’, thus mitigating the impact of 
government intervention. For this the government designated the existing 
Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA), a sponsoring 
body for arts practitioners, governed since its establishment in 1939 by Lord De 
la Warr, president of the board of Education. CEMA was renamed the Arts 
Council of Great Britain and was granted its first royal charter in 1945, with 
Keynes as its first chairman. In his short tenure Keynes established several 
lasting policies and precedents, later reinforced by a continuity of leadership: for 
example, its third chairman, Kenneth Clark, serving until 1960, had been a 
founding governor. Soon the Arts Council became the focus of a new cultural 
public policy.
A central intention of the new Arts Council’s cultural policy was an 
ambition to present the working class with attractive, healthier alternatives to the 
pub; as such this public sponsoring of the arts was conceived as a medical and
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moral service for  the people, rather than a service o f  the people. The Council’s 
paternalistic approach, typical of the evangelical side of Labour socialism, relied 
in part on the Amoldian conception of culture as the replacement of religion and 
as the embodied spirit of the nation; this justified state intervention to mediate 
and defend national spirit, in a template already provided by Keynes. Turning 
CEMA into the Arts Council entailed a total reconfiguration of its system of 
sponsorship: occasional grants were replaced by ongoing patronage, implying the 
ongoing dependency of the sponsored; professional bodies purveying classical or 
‘high’ culture were now preferred over amateur practitioners of popular, often
335 Geoff Mulgan, “Culture: the Problem with Being Public,” The Ideas that Shaped Post-War 
Britain, ed. by David Marquand and Anthony Seldon (London: Fontana, 1996), 199, 201,
213. Above all other recurrent themes in the history of British cultural policy -  laissez-faire,
enhancing national prestige, economic benefits -  Bennett highlights its ‘civilising mission’,
particularly as a corrective to commercial popular culture; Oliver Bennett, “Cultural Policy in
the United Kingdom: An Historical Perspective,” Cultural Policy and Management in the
United Kingdom, ed. by Oliver Bennett (Coventry: University of Warwick / Centre for the
Study of Cultural Policy, 1995), 20-24.
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regional, culture; and the works produced were intended to be sober and 
balancing rather than challenging or originally creative,336 This custodial 
approach to the vessels of national spirit rendered Arts Council policy a retreat 
into preservation of ‘heritage’ and fetishisation of tradition; but since this policy 
was selective and elitist, it was in fact creating and imposing a national tradition, 
a unified, supra-regional ritual around the mythical image of English primordial 
collectivity. This normative approach to cultural provision and consumption 
might be compared with the Malraux policies introduced later in France, except 
that the Fifth Republic did not attempt indirect cultural management but typically 
retained its direct control. In Britain, as in France, this led to a popular linkage 
between social democracy, traditionality and elite concerns, a link that was also 
influential in other cultural arenas.337
In fairness, this image was largely true: Attlee’s government was 
deferential toward tradition; British socialism had always been concerned with 
improving the working classes out of existence, economically and culturally; and 
the benefits of Labour policies were only felt throughout British society from the 
mid-1950s. The link tying traditionalism and elite concerns with Labour social 
democracy was neither necessary nor exhaustive, and the Conservatives also 
affected populist gestures: but if Labour promoted the 1951 Festival of Britain, 
the Conservatives preferred the 1953 Coronation celebrations. On the whole, 
British cultural policy in the first postwar decade was consistently didactic and 
elitist, offering the public responsible diversions.338 The tendency toward ‘high’ 
culture was also apparent in other enterprises of the period, like the Edinburgh 
Festival (1947), London’s Institute of Contemporary Arts (1947), the Aldeburgh 
Festival (1948), and a fourth body, probably the most publicly accessible, the 
BBC’s Third Programme.339
336 Mulgan, 198-199,201.
337 Mulgan, 205, 212-213. Annan’s anecdotal survey of the interconnection of British social, 
cultural and economic elites supports this.
338 Keynes, for example, committed the Arts Council to funding the Royal Opera House (of 
which he was a trustee), and in 1948 its support still comprised more than 15 per cent of the 
whole arts budget. Mulgan, 201.
339 Similar in purpose to the Arts Council, the British Council had been operating since 1934 and 
represented the British legacy of cultural imperialism. Yet until the late 1950s its postwar
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The Third Programme started broadcasting in September 1946 and joined 
two existing radio services: the mainly informative Home Service, and the 
entertaining Light Programme; television was still limited to about 13,000 set- 
owning households. From the outset the Third Programme was intended as a 
haven for elite values, a tool for the self-improvement of the general public 
through arts broadcasts, many of them new commissions or continental 
productions, informed discussion programmes (mocked as “two dons talking”), 
and themed documentaries.340 Whereas television was perceived as the vehicle 
and product of democratisation, the BBC intended the Third Programme for 
more specialist interests. It thus made some figures of otherwise limited appeal, 
like Isaiah Berlin and Dylan Thomas, into household names, as well as 
promoting the newly established cultural festivals.
However, nearly a decade later, the experiment was all but over. In 1957 
the Third Programme was made to share its broadcasting hours with the more 
accessible Network Three; by 1970, it was officially extinct, replaced by Radio 
Three. The original pretext behind the establishment of the Third Programme 
changed: deference toward ‘high’ culture decreased, to be replaced by a more 
inclusive noton of high and low culture. The Third Programme also had enemies, 
ranging from the BBC’s founding chairman Lord Reith, who opposed the genre- 
based split of broadcasting, to Lord Beaverbrook’s Daily Express, which 
launched a public campaign to scrap it. Finally, in 1955, BBC monopoly over 
public broadcasting funding was broken with the establishment of the 
Independent Television Authority (headed by Lord Clark, simultaneously 
chairman of the Arts Council). Shrunken finances made the BBC more 
susceptible to external pressures on its policy and output, and the Third 
Programme, never particularly popular, was thus phased out.341
activities were significantly reduced due to political (Cold War, Suez) and economic 
constraints.
340 Sillitoe, for instance, credited the Third Programme with arousing his curiosity about high 
culture. The Third Programme: High Culture for All, BBC Production (aired on BBC Four, 
25 October 2005).
341 Asa Briggs, The History o f Broadcasting in the United Kingdom vol. IV: Sound and Vision 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 65-77.
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Arts Council and Third Programme policies represent attempts to frame 
Britishness, or, rather, Englishness, through its culture -  understood singularly 
and normatively -  and through its tradition, taken as culture’s cumulative cache. 
The histories of the two institutions reflect concerted efforts to refashion the 
postwar idea of Britain into a positive new collective definition. Until the mid- 
1950s, these efforts were premised on the implicit belief that English ‘culture’ 
was already fully existent, an experience into which one was initiated by 
consuming its closed set of tropes and exemplars. This outlook pitted 
spontaneous, immediate everyday life against mediated and premeditated 
‘culture’. Yet there were other, more immediate and spontaneous treatments of 
culture and tradition, which were perhaps more open to subjective interpretation 
and participation. The National Trust exemplifies that approach.
Since its foundation in 1895, the National Trust had aimed to preserve 
and protect sites of considerable beauty that were historically significant to 
‘national heritage’ -  a term the Trust effectively coined, using ‘national’ to mean 
‘English’ (the Scottish National Trust was only established in 1931). The 
initiative for the Trust’s foundation and its slowly growing support reflected the 
fm-de-siecle anxiety about preservation, grounded in a growing concern among 
the educated classes for the future of traditional, rural England, threatened by 
modernity, industrialisation and urbanisation. Surveying the National Trust’s 
political history, the historian David Cannadine pointed out that “as the economic 
importance of the [English] rural world diminished, its cultural importance 
significantly increased” as the embodiment of moral decency and Englishness.342 
Late-Victorians and Edwardians such as Ruskin, William Morris and Hardy 
perceived modernity and in particular technology as eroding Englishness itself. 
Like them, the National Trust founders -  Canon Hardwicke Rawnsley, Sir 
Robert Hunter and Octavia Hill -  preferred the rural past to the urban present, 
and sought to preserve a countryside that they saw as beleaguered.
The National Trust (and its cult of rural, decent Englishness) gained 
popularity in the interwar years, benefiting from its collusion with the consensual
342 David Cannadine, “Conservation: The National Trust and the National Heritage,” In 
Churchill’s Shadow: Confronting the Past in Modern Britain (London: Allen Lane/ Penguin 
Press, 2002), 226.
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politics and rural nostalgia for ‘spiritual values’ espoused by the Conservative 
Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin.343 By the mid-1930s the Trust adopted a 
paternalistic rhetoric and policy, reflecting the landed interests massively 
represented in its governing bodies; from preserving rural, natural sites of 
‘national heritage’ (and its ‘spiritual values’) the Trust turned to conserving 
country houses sold off by aristocrats because of mounting inheritance tax. The 
Country House Scheme completed the Trust’s slow transition from left-liberal, 
urban, middle-class civic mindedness to conservative, patrician interests.344 
However, the public face of the National Trust remained non-partisan and 
‘national’ throughout, and by its fiftieth anniversary in 1945 it had been 
transformed into a mass organisation (while remaining structurally an oligarchy). 
As postwar affluence grew, the patrician hold on the Trust’s governance 
loosened, as did the Trust’s focus on conserving country piles and its invocation 
of endangered ‘spiritual values’. The countryside, or some convenient idea of it, 
was still appreciated, but popular interest shifted to the technology and 
modernisation that enabled Britain’s economic leap.345
The National Trust, the Arts Council and the Third Programme defined 
their roles in terms of custodianship and conservation of traditional elements of 
national culture, but only the National Trust saw its activities and popularity 
grow absolutely. This could be due to its voluntary nature, which made it 
somewhat more responsive to its popular membership; yet its fortunes and 
directions were mixed over its history. Of the three bodies presented, only the 
National Trust’s history extends back before the Second World War, giving some 
perspective to the history of national English cultural organizations as arbiters of 
‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ in postwar Britain. Yet whereas the activities of the Arts 
Council and the Third Programme had future-oriented agendas, the raison d ’etre 
of the National Trust was the conservation of natural and built sites threatened 
with extinction. This extinction was perceived not as an inherent process of
343 Patrick Wright regards Baldwin’s On England (1926) as the ur-text of the vague, emollient, 
sensualist and non-rational view of English identity qua national heritage. Patrick Wright, On 
Living in an Old Country: The National Past in Contemporary Britain (London: Verso, 
1985), 82.
344 Cannadine, 299-231, 235.
345 Cannadine, 233, 235, 237. 243.
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change but as the consequence of human neglect or corruption, an unwelcome 
degradation of the material past indicating cultural decline. Thus, the postwar 
National Trust became part of a wider trend to conserve ‘heritage’. During the 
1950s, as Raphael Samuel claimed, the cry of ‘Heritage in danger’ became a 
general reformist cause encompassing popular audiences and reflecting not so 
much Britain’s economic decline as a recoil from sweeping postwar 
modernisation.346
The changing understanding of English heritage (or cultural essence) and 
its condition paralleled a similar transformation of British perceptions of social 
essence, ‘the British way’. Here, too, the Second World War was a watershed, if 
only for the impression that it represented ‘their finest hour’. Samuel suggested 
that the notion of the ‘finest hour’ was the product of a reformulation of ‘the 
British way’ during the interwar period, as the jingoistic nationalism of the Great 
War gave way to an anti-heroic, domestic and minor mode. A new staple of ‘the 
British way’ emerged to reflect this transformation: gardening, being inward- 
looking domestic cultivation, became an immensely popular pursuit during the 
1920s and 1930s, partly also due to suburbanisation and the decline of domestic 
service. This grounded, staid image of ‘the British way’ animated ‘their finest 
hour’, the afterglow of which informed the postwar British self-image.347 English 
heritage was recognised as the dependable wellspring of ‘the British way’ that 
sustained the nation during wartime.
The concept of ‘heritage’ was used flexibly in the mid-twentieth century 
British discourse on national identity. According to Patrick Wright, ‘national 
heritage’ essentially involves extracting the (potentially) significant past and 
redefining it as ‘the historical’, an object for generalised public attention that in 
its abstraction loses any political tension. Thus, ideas and objects of national 
heritage function as social mediators: ‘the past’ is there to be unearthed and 
visited, a quasi-archaeological tourism into another, vague and utopian world, 
offering seemingly neutral meaning to present lives. The ‘heritage’ perspective 
casts the past as an irreplaceable, threatened trust placed in our custody for
346 Raphael Samuel, Theatres o f Memory vol. I: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture 
(London and New York: Verso, 1994), 243.
347 Samuel, 218-220.
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posterity, inevitably viewing history as entropic decline. Paradoxically, this 
perspective eternalises history by freezing it as an immobilised, foreclosed record 
of past achievements.348 Wright suggested that the heritage orientation fosters 
‘neo-tribalism’, a mythical image of a constantly threatened Deep Nation, 
founded on imagined participation, exclusive and primordialist, ‘since time 
immemorial’. Invoking this ‘neo-tribalism’ replaces the contingency of existence 
with rightful necessity.349
Wright reacted to what he saw in the mid-1980s as a gross 
misrepresentation of the national past and its commercial exploitation for popular 
consumption. He claimed heritage had become a ‘heritage industry’ (a coinage 
after Horkheimer and Adorno’s ‘culture industry’), a strategy for maintaining
ica t
social hegemony by lulling the masses into acquiescence. Yet this strong 
opposition had its opponents: Samuel later called Wright’s position conservative 
and snobbish intellectual ‘heritage-baiting’ in the name of radical politics. Its 
leitmotiv, the charge of ‘vulgarity’, echoed for Samuel Amoldian prejudices 
against commerce and provincialism and Leavisite recoil from ‘degraded’ mass 
culture and consumerism. Samuel thought heritage was being attacked not 
because it was too historical, imprisoning the country in a time-warp, but because 
it was not historical enough: inauthentic but pretending to be real, and
* 351entertainment-oriented at the expense of education.
Stefan Collini revisits several of Wright’s points in his discussion of 
Pierre Nora’s Lieux de memoire project of a history of symbolism. Collini 
distinguishes between two concepts that Nora employs extensively, ‘tradition’ 
and ‘memory’. To Collini, ‘tradition’ is lived in and not retrieved, constantly 
adapted at the expense of some amnesia, conferring the legitimacy of continuity 
on what is actually always in flux. ‘Memory’, then, is the willed attempt to 
recover and fix a source of significance perceived as endangered by oblivion, an 
attempt that presupposes discontinuity. This distinguishes a piece of memory, or 
a lieu de memoire (site of memory) from history: memory is more self-conscious,
348 Wright, 69-70, 74-75, 78-79.
349 Wright, 76, 83-85.
350 See also: Robert Hewison, The Heritage Industry: Britain in a Climate o f Decline (London: 
Methuen, 1987).
351 Samuel, 260, 265-267, 270.
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reflexive and discordant, given to associations, allusions and symbols.352 Nora 
claimed that the English have tradition while the French have memory. Collini 
considered Britain as afflicted with a National Trust model of political memory -  
whereby national literature and the ‘Whig history’ ideologically reinforce the 
English distinctiveness -  leading him to suggest that the English have a ‘memory 
of tradition’, a deliberate incorporation of the past into current life so as to 
maintain a national consensus.353
Tony Judt goes even further, suggesting that the heritage industry shows 
the cultivation of “genuine nostalgia for a fake past” and the way things 
weren’t.354 After all, as Davis defined it (in the introduction above), the past is 
the material but not necessarily the cause of nostalgia, which is the deliberate 
summoning of a past-to-remember. Sometimes, the contemplation of nostalgia
Kc
becomes part of the nostalgic experience itself. Affirming the past and 
contrasting it with the present, social nostalgia cultivates a sense of history from 
a sense of collective displacement, creating an image of the past by conserving 
its constituent elements.356 The duality of continuity (of identity) and (real or 
imagined) discontinuity defines nostalgia -  Wright’s ‘heritage outlook’ or 
Collini’s ‘memory of tradition’ -  as auxiliary to larger mental and social 
processes constructing collective identity. In postwar Britain, through the 
distorting nostalgic reflection, the historical was turned into another symbolic 
mode, that of myth, through which the past was made to speak meaningfully to 
its postwar beholders -  through heritage sites as through literary fiction.357
352 Stefan Collini, “French Contrasts: From the Pantheon to Poets’ Comer,” English Pasts: 
Essays in History and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 44, 54-55.
353 Collini, “French Contrasts,” 56, 65-66.
354 Judt, 773.
353 Davis, 1-9, 14, 17-27.
356 Davis, 15,34-35, 44,50, 111, 115.
357 Tew, 121-126; Connor, 135, 149.
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Anglo-Saxon Attitudes
Wilson in context
Angus Wilson’s career exemplifies many of the themes and events discussed 
above. His play The Mulberry Bush (1956) inaugurated the Royal Court Theatre, 
only to be eclipsed shortly afterwards by Look Back in Anger. Wilson was 
consoled by the success of his second novel Anglo-Saxon Attitudes later that 
year. The novel reflected the change in the public image of historians and 
academics not long before the eruption of the ‘Two Cultures’ controversy and 
Plumb’s ‘crisis in the humanities’. In 1956 Wilson was already 43 and had just 
given up his position as librarian to concentrate on writing: his occasional work 
for media like the Third Programme convinced him he could live off his writing. 
However, he remained an oddly unplaced figure, not associated either with the 
interwar Waugh and Greene or with the Angries of the 1950s: he was a ‘writer 
between generations,’ loyal to a sensible, socially-oriented realism and urban,
•y c o
middle-class topics.
Like the Angry Young Men, Wilson was outraged by British life in all its 
baselessly staid but unchallenged hypocrisies and structural anomalies. Looking 
back on the 1950s, he bemoaned the ‘triple sins’ of England -  snobbery, 
intellectual dishonesty, and the cult of the expedient: the English had never 
needed to sharply define their liberal morality, he argued, and this rendered them 
intellectually poor, entertaining facile notions of ‘the British way’ like 
“backward-looking pastoralism” and an “excess of nostalgia” for rural virtue.359 
While unsentimental, Wilson’s fiction until the mid-1960s reflected his nostalgia 
for the 1930s and a preoccupation with the social changes obliterating the old 
England he had known. He repeatedly portrayed the interactions of new social 
milieux with older social structures, taking both to manifest “the universal 
complexities of human experience.” Wilson’s realism was of a different sort to
358 Shyam Sundar Agarwalla, Angus Wilson and His Works (New Delhi: Mittal, 1995), 117, 179
359 Angus Wilson, “Introduction,” in Edwin Smith, England (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1971), 10; Aruna Pandey, Chaos and Order in the Novels o f Angus Wilson (Jaipur: Ritu, 
1998), 1; Angus Wilson, “Fourteen Points.”
360 Pandey, 2.
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that of the ‘kitchen sink’ novelists and he criticised them for producing flat 
fictional characters who confuse their social ‘masks’ for their true natures. 
Wilson characterised the fictional Angry Young Men and their notorious authors 
(e.g. Amis and Braine) as reactive types, who ended up nourished by the
ij:  i
institutions and establishment they had attacked.
Wilson was not only influenced by 1930s literary aesthetics but also by 
the political and ideological frameworks of the period, particularly the liberal 
humanism of the Bloomsbury set, whose influence was felt not only in interwar 
literary fiction and criticism (in E.M. Forster -  what Bernard Bergonzi has called 
the foundational ‘Schlegel-Wilcox opposition’) but also, as we have seen, in 
economics and social planning (Keynes).362 Wilson’s understanding of the 
‘magical’ power of art and literature was shaped by Bloomsbury sensibilities, as 
was his understanding of the novel as a liberal tool, presenting freedom as 
leading to (self-)understanding. But Wilson had witnessed what he called “a 
decline of liberalism in our time” in the futile political action of 1938 and the slip 
into violence and authoritarianism throughout the 1930s. After the Second 
World War, and with a Cold War looming, the confidence of Bloomsbury 
liberalism had to be re-evaluated. Wilson saw his pessimism as “realistic”; and 
Bloomsbury self-confidence was now “a delusion.”364
Like many other postwar writers Wilson was influenced by Leavis’s idea 
of a Great Tradition. Indeed most overviews of the English novel for decades 
retained its “characteristically moral and prescriptive” tone. For novelists, the 
sense of a Great Tradition of accumulated influence bore heavily producing an
361 Agarwalla, 127; relying on Angus Wilson, “Diversity and Depth,” TLS (15 August 1958), 
special section, viii.
362 Bergonzi anachronistically uses Forster to understand Wilson. Bernard Bergonzi, The 
Situation o f the Novel {London: Macmillan, 1970), 152; Agarwalla, 89.
363 Agarwalla, 26; Brooke Allen, “The Mimetic Brilliance of Angus Wilson,” The New Criterion 
15, 2 (October 1996), 35.
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‘anxiety of influence’ of sorts.365 Byatt suggests that Wilson’s writing was a 
paradigmatic example of the Great Tradition’s influence, in particular the work 
of George Eliot and Jane Austen.366 But Wilson’s literary studies extended
367beyond the Leavisite canon to Dickens, Zola and Arnold Bennett.
Wilson liked what his biographer, Margaret Drabble, called Dickens’s 
“intuitive radicalism” and “his refusal to patronise or sentimentalise.” To him, 
“the Dickens tradition” stood for a “worldly” wide social scope (a ‘condition of 
England’ writing), for an idealistic engagement with “socially responsible 
setting,” and for creating characters who failed the benchmark of humanistic 
social relations.369 Wilson also saw in Dickens a theatrical quality, one which
3 70allowed the implausible interconnectedness of diverse characters. But most of 
all, “the Dickens tradition” promised Wilson a form of redemption through a 
belief in the Enlightenment ideal of universal freedom and equality as a moral
365 A.S. Byatt, “People in Paper Houses: Attitudes to “Realism” and “Experiment” in English 
Postwar Fiction,” Critical Essays on Angus Wilson, ed. by Jay L. Halio (Boston, Mass.: G.K. 
Hall & Co., 1985), 170-171.
366 Byatt, 172-175.
367 For its broad social tableau, Anglo-Saxon Attitudes was compared by Rabinovitz to Eliot’s 
Middlemarch. Bennett served to signal Wilson’s early opposition to literary modernism, 
particularly to that of Virginia Woolf, whose essay “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” (1917) had 
criticised Bennett’s use of overly detailed realism to capture character. Rubin Rabinovitz, The 
Reaction Against Experiment in the English Novel, 1950-1960 (New York and London: 
Columbia University Press, 1967), 67, 71-72, 75-76. However, Dickens, Wilson’s greatest 
influence, was only rehabilitated by Leavis and brought into the Great Tradition canon around 
1970.
368 Drabble also sees Wilson exercising Dickensian powers of exaggeration, caricature and 
mimicry, and using Dickensian expressionist violence as social display. Margaret Drabble, 
Angus Wilson: A Biography (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1995), 371, 390-391.
369 Wilson, “Diversity and Depth”; Michael Millgate, “Angus Wilson: The Art of Fiction,” 
Critical Essays on Angus Wilson, ed. by Jay L. Halio (Boston, Mass.: G.K. Hall & Co., 1985), 
44,46. Reprinted from: Malcolm Cowley (ed.), Writers at Work: The Paris Review Interviews 
(New York: Viking, 1959).
370 Wilson in a 1979 interview: Jack Biles, “Some Worlds More, Some Years Later: A Talk with 
Angus Wilson,” Critical Essays on Angus Wilson, ed. by Jay L. Halio (Boston, Mass.: G.K. 
Hall & Co., 1985), 63-64.
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maxim.371 Wilson accepted Orwell’s 1940 reading of Dickens’s fiction as 
bourgeois, informed by secularised, individualist Christian morals checked by 
* good-tempered antinomianism’.372 Wilson’s study of Dickens also overlapped 
with another published in the same year, where Raymond Williams characterised 
Dickens’s individual human drama and social situations as inescapably general, 
while also claiming that Dickens tried to convey clear social criticism without
373necessarily resolving the social problems his novels expose.
Wilson thought his own irony and dark humour reflected Dickens’s 
“extraordinary mixture of black and comic vision,” his embrace of the profound 
and the ridiculous.374 Wilson was praised by V.S. Pritchett for seeing England 
“with what looks like a foreign eye,” critically but compassionately exposing 
previously ignored madness, morbidity and sourness over “years of austerity, 
black market, faded gentility -  then a somewhat brash and uncertain 
recovery.”375 But more importantly, Dickens offered Wilson a version of 
humanism, more plausible than that of 1920s and 1930s liberalism. The 
critique of liberal humanism was a major ambition of Wilson’s fiction and 
criticism. Often he presents liberal humanists as preoccupied with individual 
redemption through cultivated critical examination, while remaining deluded and
371 Wilson’s chronological study of Dickens’s fiction by periods does not acknowledge Dickens’s 
influence on him, which is amply available elsewhere. Angus Wilson, The World o f Charles 
Dickens (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1970).
372 George Orwell, “Charles Dickens,” Inside the Whale and Other Essays (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1940), 81-85.
373 Raymond Williams, “Charles Dickens,” The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), 48-49, 51, 58.
374 Angus Wilson, “Dickens and Dostoevsky,” in Diversity and Depth in Fiction: Selected 
Critical Writings o f Angus Wilson, ed. by Kerry McSweeney (London: Seeker & Warburg, 
1983), 87.
375 V.S. Pritchett, “The World of Angus Wilson,” New Statesman and Nation 199 (18 October 
1957), 521-522; Pandey, x; Patrick Swinden, The English Novel o f History and Society, 1940- 
80: Richard Hughes, Henry Green, Anthony Powell, Angus Wilson, Kingsley Amis, V.S. 
Naipaul (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), 133.
376 Jack Biles, “An Interview in London with Angus Wilson,” Critical Essays on Angus Wilson, 
ed. by Jay L. Halio (Boston, Mass.: G.K. Hall & Co., 1985), 53. Reprinted from Studies in the 
Novel 2 (Spring 1970), 76-87.
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ignorant of their own less pleasant aspects.377 His three early novelistic 
protagonists (Bernard Sands, Gerald Middleton and Meg Eliot) were older 
humanists, being, like Wilson himself, relics from another time who felt that
* 1 7 0  §
society was increasingly unsympathetic to their outdated ideals. Wilson thus 
criticised liberal humanism from within, expressing a concern that it take into
account the immanence of evil, suffering, loneliness and the frustration of most
379human aspirations.
Wilson challenged not only the Bloomsbury set but also more 
conservative liberals, like Leavis. The fallacy of both Forsterian and Leavisite 
humanists, he argued, was their pessimistic tendency to simplify history and 
view modernity as fallen. This, he felt, misrepresented reality.380 Wilson shared 
Leavis’s and Forster’s pessimism about contemporary humanism, but he argued
■701
that the fall was due to real, historical violence and authoritarian threats to it. 
Wilson’s liberalism was reanimated by an affinity to Dickens and the influence 
of Lionel Trilling (who in turn acknowledged Dickens).382
Wilson was also critical of the modernist reliance on subjectivity, and 
Virginia W oolfs ‘too narrow’ fiction was a favourite Aunt Sally. Another 
mode of modernist escape from the modem West was out toward ancient or non- 
Westem cultural sources -  what was known as primitivism. This spatial and 
temporal construction of primitive alterity reflected, according to Marianna 
Torgovnick, the modernist longing for dissolution, and the image of the primitive 
-  fixed because it was a projected, utopian fantasy -  reflected anxieties about the 
fragility of modem identity. Ironically, the fetishistic rhetoric of the primitive
377 Swinden, 141.
378 Cox, 123.
379 Cox and others after him suggest the influence on Wilson of Trilling’s The Liberal 
Imagination. Cox, 122-123; Pandey, 24, 36.
380 Cox then discusses William Golding’s fiction as a more recent humanistic accommodation of 
human evil. Cox, 171-172.
381 Trilling also suggested in The Liberal Imagination that liberal humanism tends to oversimplify 
life by embracing the world as it is, uncritically; Wilson’s Anglo-Saxon Attitudes is less 
extreme. Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society (London: 
Seeker & Warburg, 1951); see also Padney, 24-25, and Cox, 4-6.
382 Trilling, The Liberal Imagination, xi-xiii.
383 Wilson, “Diversity and Depth.”
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remained Western and therefore controlling: the primitive was ultimately kept 
apart so it could be desired and exploited.384 Wilson thought modernist 
primitivism was simply childish -  both a great flaw and a covert attraction, as the 
treatment of its adherents in Anglo-Saxon Attitudes shows. Most importantly, 
modernist primitivism was similar to the traditionalist fetish of heritage, similarly 
pessimistic and with a conservative orientation: both fetishes kept the past as 
usable for present observers, as a basis for their criticism of the culturally 
degraded present. Both betray the fascination of culture not with alterity (be it 
primitive or ‘heritage’) but with itself.
Realising the affinities between literary modernism and literary 
traditionalism, Wilson eventually saw the absurdity of the 
realism/experimentation dichotomy so prevalent in the 1950s. Surveying postwar 
British realism Andrzej Gasiorek suggested this dichotomous view misrepresents 
the wide variety of authorial approaches and styles in both camps, and only 
contributed to what Byatt called “irritable territorial definitions.”385 As Gasiorek 
put it, siding with realism at the time was akin to committing to “‘good old 
English tradition’ (empiricism, common sense, social comedy along the lines of 
Fielding and Dickens),” and to liberal humanism. The implication was that
* 'ISAexperimental writing was politically reactionary. Wilson had always been 
wary of the vehement attacks on modernism, and his eventual change of heart led 
him to openly criticise apologists of traditional realism. In 1961 Wilson blamed 
both Snow and Leavis for helping perpetuate a literary climate unwelcoming to 
any form of writing outside traditional, moralistic realism. Both Snow’s and 
Leavis’s demands for ‘healthy’, ‘life-enhancing’ literature reflected to him a 
snobbish and dishonest attitude that needed to be purged from contemporary
384 Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modem Lives (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 18, 172-174,244-245.
385 Gasiorek thus opposes influential accounts like that of Rabinovitz (1967). He also laments the 
historical condescension in casting early postwar realists as naive and ideological, which 
renders later postmodernist reflection as “ironic, self-reflexive and detached.” Andrzej 
Gasiorek, Post-War British Fiction: Realism and After (London: Edward Arnold, 1995), 12- 
13; Byatt, 170.
386 Gasiorek, 4-5. French nouveaux romanciers were regarded similarly, as the next chapter 
shows.
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British letters. Wilson’s public break with the literary traditionalists, some of 
them (like Lord Snow) his personal friends, was unequivocal, and showed his
387turn away from some of his own previous convictions.
Even before this break, Wilson had tried to transcend the 
modernism/realism dichotomy. He shared Sillitoe’s grumble about the tenuous, 
too-close-for-comfort relations that readers saw between fiction and reality, 
literature and society. “I do not care for exact realism,” he claimed, adding “the 
tendency to confuse the novel with sociology seems to me the weakest aspect of 
modem English fiction.”388 Literary fiction may use realism to represent real-life 
events (as Wilson treated New Towns in his Late Call, 1964) but this does not 
make it documentary. Moreover, and this is a point Wilson shared with Dickens 
as well as with his contemporary Genet, ad hoc resolutions of narrative matters 
in fiction are not prescriptions for social matters in real life. This was the kernel 
of his newly disillusioned approach to literature and old realism. That attitude 
was best articulated across the channel, where Alain Robbe-Grillet was writing, 
“All writers believe they are realists... each one attempts as best as he can to 
create ‘the real’.”389 Robbe-Grillet had already understood what Wilson was just 
coming to accept, that realism has no definitive theory but is merely a flag under 
which to rally; that the novel explores itself (as fiction) without attempting to 
express, inform or reform real life; and that the demand for ‘healthy’ literature 
was actually suffocating it.390 While Robbe-Grillet (discussed further in chapter 4 
below) addressed French literature, Wilson later noted he may as well have been
387 Angus Wilson, “If It’s New and Modish Is It Good?” New York Times Book Review (2 July 
1961), 1, 12; reprinted in McSweeney, 134-139; Rabinovitz, 65; Agarwalla, 33-34; Gasiorek, 
97.
388 Wilson responded to an unattributed critique by Raymond Williams and to Kermode’s review 
of his The Middle Age o f Mrs. Eliot (1958), where he claimed that Wilson’s broad scope and 
keen observation had failed him in his task of making lifelike characters. Angus Wilson, The 
Wild Garden, or Speaking o f Writing (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992 [1963]), 137; Frank 
Kermode, “Mr. Wilson’s People,” Puzzles and Epiphanies: Essays and Reviews 1958-1961 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 193-197.
389 Alain Robbe-Grillet, “From Realism to Reality,” For a New Novel: Essays on Fiction, trans. 
by Richard Howard (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1965 [Paris: Minuit, 1963]), 157.
390 Robbe-Grillet, 157, 160-161, 167.
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writing of British literature, which must have seemed even more old-fashioned to 
foreign eyes.391
The perceived rupture between older and newer modes of representation 
grew out of traditional realism’s seeming inadequacy in reflecting social reality. 
While this was an entirely literary affair, many were inclined to see it as a 
symptom of a wider problem. Gasiorek was struck by “how persistently 
commentators linked the crisis o f the novel with the crisis o f s o c ie ty like Arthur 
Marwick, he suggests that a fear of national decline, an impression that Britain 
was falling behind the times, was pervasive and irrespective of political 
colours.392 To Krishan Kumar, the ‘crisis of the novel’ reflected another aspect of 
the ‘crisis of society’: a decline in its power to offer through literary utopia an 
imaginary ideal, a model and telos for society. Kumar suggests several 
explanations of this crisis: the decline of Christianity as an inspiration for certain 
millennial and paradisiac expectations, both religious and secular; and the 
disillusionment with socialism (Mannheim’s last Western utopia) and its 
redemptive prospects in its replacement by welfare capitalism. British 
socialism was certainly a popular discontent, first for not delivering marked 
change fast enough, and then because change was so sweeping that it 
transformed British society. Finally, Kumar suggests that the ‘crisis of the novel’ 
reflects a ‘crisis of society’ because it reflects a crisis of social prospects, of a 
social horizon of expectations eroded by the retreat from the social in general. 
This he suggests was reflected in the novelistic plunge into the psychological, in 
absurdist resignation, and in the decline of literary utopian and anti-utopian 
visions beyond Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), which seem to fail to provide 
comprehensive ideas of hell or heaven on future earth.394
391 Biles, “An Interview in London with Angus Wilson,” 50.
392 Gasiorek, 5 (my italics); Arthur Marwick, British Society since 1945 (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1986), 274. Here again cultural pessimism is a common conclusion to divergent 
thought processes.
393 Kumar, 420-421.
394 Kumar, 421-422.
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Anglo-Saxon Attitudes in focus
In Wilson’s fictional postwar society, the loss of faith in traditional institutions, 
even in marriage and family, was writ large; yet in their search for stability his 
characters remain drawn to those very institutions. They seem trapped in their 
sociality, between the two hellish poles Wilson defined as the self-pity and 
neurosis of the solitary self, and the human failure to communicate, precisely by
395aping communion in social activities that are in fact empty charades. In Anglo- 
Saxon Attitudes, he conveys the modem predicament with familiar, sympathetic 
irony, leading one scholar to label the work a ‘novel of compassion’.396 The 
novel’s title itself suggests the characters’ absurd enjoyment of their moral 
convulsions -  yet it also presents them as typical, almost part of English ‘nature’. 
Indeed, Wilson thought his protagonist was important only in illustrating broader 
human and social situations, and intended the novel itself not to reform Anglo-
-in '!
Saxon moral attitudes but merely to portray them.
Despite its convoluted plot, Anglo-Saxon Attitudes is a well-structured 
novel. The exposition is a series of interconnected scenes (similar to the 
expository structure of Genet’s Le Balcon), introducing each character through 
their attitude toward medieval history and toward the protagonist, a leading 
medievalist of his day, 62-year-old Gerald Middleton. The nature of truth soon 
emerges as the novel’s main theme; it is developed, seriously and comically, 
through various quests for truth, dramatically charged by the Wilsonian leitmotiv
m o
of a late crisis of consciousness in a life wasted to delusion. Chief among those 
are Gerald’s own quests after the truth of his relationships with his wife Inge, his 
lover Dollie, his children, his old teacher, his profession, and even (for his 
profession) historical truth itself, the past ‘as it really was’. Gerald’s quest for the 
truth, not least through flashbacks, is the main narrative drive of the novel. 
Central to the novel, and drawing in most of its minor characters, is an 
archaeological hoax in which Gilbert Stokesay, a modernist poet and son of
395 Wilson, The Wild Garden, 33; Padney, 22-23.
396 James Gindin, Harvest o f a Quiet Eye: The Novel o f  Compassion (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1971); Cox, 121; Padney, xi.
397 In this sense, Wilson and Robbe-Grillet were in agreement. Millgate, 46.
398 This was also a dominant feature in Wilson’s other early novels. Padney, 1; Agarwalla, 63, 
147.
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Gerald’s mentor, places a pagan fertility idol in the excavated grave of Bishop 
Eorpwald. Gerald, the only surviving member of the dig, has kept quiet about the 
hoax for decades, helping perpetuate it as a misleading historical aberration.
Gerald’s flashbacks illustrate his old behavioural pattern: an intellectual’s 
evasion, retreating consciously into disillusioned quiescence.399 Yet he looks 
back in order to move forward, and his flashbacks not only inform the reader but 
expose his past mistakes and compel him to ‘exorcise’ them. This exorcism 
unfolds over the second part of the novel, redressing Gerald’s evasions, self- 
delusions and inertia, and renewing his appreciation of personal life and of 
historical scholarship. Wilson portrays this emotional journey unsentimentally: 
Gerald reclaims his past but cannot undo what is already done, and his attempts 
to ‘correct’ past mistakes are not always welcome. Some relationships (with his 
wife and children, with his lover, with most of his colleagues) have simply worn 
out or are too entrenched in the past. Here Gerald finds solace in his emotional 
buoyancy, which is rooted in his sensual nature, indicated by Wilson as a likely 
potential subversion of Gerald’s moral preoccupations.400 Wilson’s irony renders 
morally ambivalent Gerald’s increasing frankness and disregard for manners, as 
well as his secret pleasure in observing young women (like Elvira and the child 
Caroline), enhanced when he realises he is being a ‘dirty old man’. This 
sensuality is portrayed as a conatus proper to Gerald, and it supports him through 
a tough transitional period late in life.
The novel’s historians are a queer lot, as careerist as Snow’s and almost 
as ridiculous as Amis’s. The academic novel could now include characters such 
as the disillusioned Gerald and the desperate, idealistic Rose Lorimer. The 
character of novelist Clarissa Crane was also inserted to reflect the distinctions 
between history and fiction and the importance of each in representing the
399 Agarwalla, 82; Arthur Edelstein, “Angus Wilson: The Territory Behind” in Contemporary 
British Novelists, ed. Charles Shapiro, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1965), 
145-153.
400 Pandey, 46; Wilson, The Wild Garden, 34. Gerald’s ‘sensual’ character is one of the clumsier 
points made in Anglo-Saxon Attitudes.
401 Wilson also used the extra-narrative passages framing the novel to add ‘impersonal’ 
viewpoints on the hoax which have the authoritative air of historical records. Anglo-Saxon
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The hoax is a rather direct gesture toward a modernist primitivism 
associated with D.H. Lawrence and Wyndham Lewis. The primitive paganism 
underlying England’s Christian progressivism is highly recognisable in the figure 
of the protean, large-membered male idol, reflecting the primitivist fantasies of 
Gilbert. Rose Lorimer, too, delights in uncovering the ‘conspiracy’ of the 
assimilation of pagan elements into English Christian rituals, but she is also 
nostalgic for the simplicity lost in England’s conversion. She becomes so 
involved in her thesis that her sanity hinges on it, and she, too, turns to male 
figures to ground her world -  Professor Pforzheim, Gerald, and the key fertility 
idol. The last two turn out to be false idols. Finally, Wilson gently mocks notions 
of primordiality: ‘Englishness’ is illustrated as merely the sum of preconceived 
notions about the English, either by themselves or by the numerous foreigners in 
the novel. As the hoax reveals, the Saxon past proves very hard to access 
directly, obscured as it is not just by material absence but by solid human 
fantasy.
In his long study of Wilson, Peter Faulkner suggests that Anglo-Saxon 
Attitudes is a self-conscious ‘condition of England’ novel.402 Wilson’s broad 
canvas and numerous characters, settings and temporal occurrences, together 
with the gesture toward the typical and representative in his title, all support 
Faulkner’s claim. While being less political than Wilson’s preceding novel, 
Hemlock and After, Anglo-Saxon Attitudes can also be read as a conflict between 
liberals and conservatives, a conflict that overlaps with a generation gap.403 This 
casts the differences and mutual disapproval between Gerald and two of his 
children, John and Kay (and Kay’s husband Donald), as another twist in the 
Whiggish narrative pitting liberals against conservatives throughout history. 
Here, however, it is the older Gerald who represents moral liberalism, while Kay 
and John, the younger, postwar generation are the conservative ones. Wilson 
suggested that “the old pre-war middle class Left... had... to share both in the 
triumph and the failure of Welfare England,” but seemed out of touch with the
Attitudes demonstrates the fickle nature of memory in both biography and history, its yielding 
to the facile, the convenient, and the self-affirmative. The novel also shows the relative nature 
of conceptions of truth, memory and history. Cf. Faulkner, 72-73.
402 Peter Faulkner, Angus Wilson: Mimic and Moralist (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1980), 70.
403 Faulkner, 71; Rabinovitz, 88.
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new realities of the 1950s.404 Yet Wilson focused almost exclusively on his own 
class, generation, and ideology, which considerably narrowed the panoramic 
tableau he tried to convey.405
Conflicts between conservatives and liberals, between the old class 
structure and the setting of ‘new affluence’, between interwar and postwar 
generations comprise Wilson’s impression of ‘the condition of England’. This 
impression is informed by the juxtaposition of older and younger generations, 
borne out in the relations between parents and children, between grandparents 
and their grandchildren. This picture is also informed by several foreign 
characters -  Inge Middleton, Marie-Helene Middleton, Stephanie and Yves 
Houdet, Professor Pforzheim -  who reflect on English or Anglo-Saxon attitudes. 
Some foreign characters perform this function more straightforwardly, like 
Pforzheim, who acts on his many assumptions regarding the English way only to 
discover they are false; or Marie-Helene, Gerald’s daughter-in-law, who 
inwardly scorns Tax’ English ways from a French-Catholic outlook.
Despite the inevitable generation gap, there is no ‘generational spirit’ or 
Zeitgeist that unites characters; Gerald, Gilbert, Dollie, Inge, Stephanie Houdet, 
and Arthur Clun are of the same age group and at roughly the same point in their 
lives, but this only emerges on second reflection. Still, the novel is mainly about 
them, who had been adolescents around the Great War, and who, nel mezzo del 
cammin, were thrust again into the Second World War, more devastatingly at a 
later age, and then faced the rapid postwar changes. These characters all look 
back nostalgically on their formative years in the 1920s and 1930s, projecting 
experiences onto their youth that reflect adversely on their later lives. Older 
characters, like Mrs. Salad (a Dickensian figure), Sir Edgar (a Snow figure), and 
Lilian display outdated demeanours and opinions. Younger characters, like 
Gerald’s younger colleagues, his children and their partners, while in stride with 
the times, are still trying to establish their professional status (Stringwell- 
Anderson, Donald Consett) or their direction in life (Johnny, Elvira), if they are 
putting in the effort at all (Yves Houdet, Vin Salad, Larry Rourke). Gerald’s
404 Wilson, The Wild Garden, 45-46.
405 Tew, 51-52.
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generation still commands the age, but it is undoubtedly slipping away from 
them.
Wilson presents the entire project of moral Bildung in Anglo-Saxon 
Attitudes unsentimentally. The narrative voice sometimes registers as contempt 
toward the characters: they are either self-deluded or irrational, and so they fail; 
or they strain at their own self-education, only to discover that it offers no 
redemption.406 Indeed, the success that Gerald can claim for himself is his 
disillusionment and break with self-satisfaction and self-distrust 407 Doing so has 
made him none the happier. This raises the general question about what Wilson 
regards as the ultimate motivation for the search for truth -  a question that must 
remain unanswered. If truth hurts, its principled invocation seems more punitive 
or cruel than instructive. This reflects ambivalently on the self-knowledge maxim 
fundamental to liberal humanism.
Wilson presents Gerald as the exemplar of the lonely man, as the 
elementary unit of society, typically striving for personal freedom and the 
loosening of all social ties, a tendency evident in his turn away from society and 
the guarded approach to his emotional world. Thus, Gerald’s initial non­
interference in the Melpham hoax or in Inge’s smothering upbringing of their 
children should be understood as a disavowal of his social and personal 
responsibilities as husband, father, lover and scholar.408 Anglo-Saxon Attitudes 
can thus be read as the narrative of Gerald’s slow assumption of his individual 
responsibilities to others and to himself, which breaks through his solitude and 
his image of social relationships as inherently unhappy “props and prisons.”409 
This shift nevertheless leads Gerald to an impasse between Wilson’s ‘two hells’. 
He eventually must go through both to emerge in the end a seemingly happier 
man. Faulkner suggested that Gerald’s ultimate happiness relies on the kind of 
gambit he makes. On the one hand, Gerald gains an inner freedom by facing 
what he had hitherto evaded, but he is left isolated from those closest to him: his 
wife, his three children, and his lover Dollie. On the other hand, he is thus left
406 Rabinovitz, 84.
407 Swinden, 153.
408 Judit Szabo-Pap, “The Lonely Man in Angus Wilson’s Fiction,” Hungarian Studies in English 
IX (1975), 96-98.
409 Faulkner, 70; Cox, 141.
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alone, which to Faulkner seems a positive outcome, considering Gerald’s retiring 
temperament and hermit inclinations.410 If he is happier like this, it is because he 
persisted in being true to himself, rather than because he was willing to transform 
in order to reform.
The cultural pessimism of Anglo-Saxon Attitudes might be further 
illuminated if we consider it as an example of what might be called a ‘failure’ 
story, or a story of exhaustion.411 In a 1958 essay Thomas Munro presented a
model of the Failure Story against the more familiar Success Story, largely 
discredited by the 1950s. The failure story, he argued, was more ‘realistic’ as it 
better reflected contemporary experience: “[T]he literary types which we are 
designating here as the ‘failure story’ and ‘contemporary pessimism’ are often 
described simply as ‘realism’ or ‘naturalism.’”412 ‘Failurism’, as Munro dubs it, 
relies on no specific, reasoned creed, and is more of a directionless or unfocused 
emotional outburst: failure is taken as rejection of success, progress or positivity 
by any standard, “reviling the symbols of authority, maturity, order, ability, 
conventional morality, beauty, and politeness.”413 At its darkest, this pessimism- 
as-realism reflects and rages against illusory success and the futility of human 
efforts toward any constructive goal. Yet ‘failurism’ goes beyond nihilism and 
unhappy endings; the literary model is variable and its tropes differ regarding the 
depth of misery experienced, the scope of the tragic sense of life, the degree of 
failure’s inevitability or the extent of assumed human corruption. The drama of 
the failing protagonist usually regards the futility of efforts to find a place in the 
world, or disillusionment with reformatory ideals by which to live.414 The failing 
protagonist, says Munro, is “characteristically undistinguished, petty, weak, and 
often contemptible,” and his actions are often misguided, reflecting his 
foolishness in thinking his ideals worthwhile, striving too hard for the wrong
410 Faulkner, 70.
411 Munro’s contemporary article defines the ‘failure story’ and, while never gaining currency, is 
still a useful interpretive tool. Thomas Munro, “The Failure Story: a Study of Contemporaiy 
Pessimism,” Journal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XVII, 2 (December 1958), 143-168.
412 Munro, 161.
413 Munro, 154, 156, 162.
414 Munro, 145, 148-150.
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things (being externalities rather than spiritual values).415 His ultimate failure, 
however minor, is part of a broader picture of futile efforts and senseless 
experience.
It would seem that Gerald is more of a failure protagonist than Anglo- 
Saxon Attitudes is a great ‘failure story’. While not petty and contemptible, 
Gerald is rather undistinguished: he is too weak to face himself and others 
around him, or to face the basic truths about his life; in private life he is not the 
most charming man, nor is he a great husband, lover or father; professionally he 
approaches retirement without notable achievements or discoveries, a school of 
student followers, or positions of influence acquired by more than sheer 
seniority. The precious little he acted in his life seems to have been misdirected: 
breaking up with Dollie to marry Inge; then cheating on Inge with Dollie; 
keeping silent over Gilbert Stokesay’s hoax and allowing its perpetuation as an 
historical aberration. The consequences of his reform are themselves not 
encouraging: his hope to restore warm family ties with his estranged wife and 
children is dashed and he ends up estranging them further; Dollie refuses to take 
him back and Elvira is a hopeless new object of his affections; his silence over 
the Melpham fraud is regarded as regrettable, even suspicious, and loses him the 
appreciation of his more principled colleagues, like Rose Lorimer. Gerald’s story 
seems particularly bleak and pessimistic in that both his efforts and his inactivity 
are represented as futile. He is ultimately helpless against the power of 
circumstance: his realisation of his past errors has come too late in life for his 
corrective efforts to be significantly successful. His acknowledgment of this is 
not tragic but rather reflects a resignation to the frustration of his efforts, which 
yielded only a clearer conscience and a greater sense of certainty.
The nihilism lacing Wilson’s pessimism in the novel seems benign. 
Humanist values are presented as worthier than others, but not as absolutely 
superior, and the limitations to the redemptive prospects they can offer seem 
clearer. The ironic narrative is generally cheerful, even amusing, and does not 
end terribly or sadly, suggesting Gerald’s journey has ended not with great 
catastrophe or tragedy but ‘only’ with failure. Gerald is no more miserable than 
when he is first encountered, and the reader soon realises he rather cherishes his
415 Munro, 145-146.
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maudlin, even morose ‘attitudes’. His emotional ineptitude in his dealings with 
other people prevents any major tragic sense of experience: in a way, Gerald’s 
initial emotional failings preserve him. He is not a bad person and the failure of 
his efforts was not necessary, but perhaps his sense of failure was limited by the 
vagueness of his expectations from his late reformation. The habitual, inert 
persistence of conditions and people in their ways is figured merely in the diffuse 
image of ‘what has been, so it shall be’. Here is no Camus or Beauvoir, no 
Faulkner or Mann or Sinclair Lewis, certainly no Eliot or Orwell (all Munro’s 
examples), but a pessimist whose morose sense of reality is rooted in an 
undeceived disillusionment, an author and narrator who is a frustrated optimist. 
The narrative of Anglo-Saxon Attitudes is the obverse of a Success Story, yet 
success, through its lack, still defines the novel as its frame of reference.
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Chapter 4: French Trauma and After
The wartime trauma of occupation and the shame of collaboration left their mark 
on French public affairs and private lives. Especially problematic for a nation 
that defines itself by modem universal principles and abstract notions, France’s 
postwar reconstruction presented the challenge of containing and transforming 
the material legacy of humiliation and division. The challenge of creating a 
regenerated, proud France unavoidably involved, as in Britain, redefining the 
French nation-state independently of its shrinking empire and, to a degree, a 
separation from its past. This re-telling of the French story also provoked some 
literary reactions.
Reformulating France’s national identity essentially required recovering a 
sense of continuity with glorious elements of its past, in which it was living up to 
its constitutive ideals, and carefully editing more problematic elements to mask 
some internal contradictions. Regarding the occupation, France was (and 
probably still is) afflicted by what Henri Rousso dubbed ‘the Vichy Syndrome’, 
which was itself dominated by versions of the Gaullist myth of near-universal 
resistance.416 Another failingly managed contradiction was that of French 
colonial rule, especially in Algeria, clearly elucidated by Sartre before the 1958 
referendum that returned de Gaulle to power. Essentially, the mystification of 
France and Frenchness was a construct meant to naturalise the colonial and 
Gaullist orders.
Things were changing in postwar France, but not all cultural production 
went along with the convenient misrepresentation of past and present. Younger, 
less established writers, all of whom coincidentally were published through the 
resistance symbol Editions de Minuit, tended to see the postwar situation as new 
and requiring new modes of literary, critical and cinematic representation. This 
chapter will consider the theoretical writings of three nouveaux romanciers who 
conveyed their visions for this new writing, and Barthes’s essay Critique et 
verite, which set out his idea of a new reading. These, and the French fears about
416 Henri Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, trans. by 
Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1991), 10-11.
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continuity of identity, will be discussed in conjunction with the screenplay for 
Hiroshima mon amour, a film drawing analogies between the French occupation 
trauma and the Japanese nuclear catastrophe, made by Marguerite Duras and 
Alain Resnais, two of the most challenging new postwar artists.
French fears
Stefan Collini is mentioned in the last chapter as suggesting that the English have 
a ‘memory of tradition’, while the French have a ‘tradition of memory’, a 
habitual self-conscious reference to the significance of things past, in order to 
legitimate with continuity an otherwise changing national face.417 The nature of 
this continuity is as sensitive an issue as the premise of constructed national 
narratives, and without it any progress is only regarded as temporary and
o
piecemeal, part of a larger, pessimistic picture of decline. The traditional 
national imaginary persisting in postwar France figured nationality in 
primordialist terms, springing from ancient sources of collective history in 
common territory. It also had to deal with two major crises of identity: the legacy 
of wartime experiences (the ‘strange defeat’, collaboration, occupation, the 
advent of the nuclear age) and the prospect of imperial dismantling (compounded 
by colonial wars, the Cold War, and increased dependency on American aid). 
Gaps in the collective memory of these two elements disrupted the picture of 
French greatness and progress, introducing uncertainty, fracture and fears of 
national decline. Later, the recovery of these gaps and absences became part of 
the reconsideration of historical narration and memory typical of the 
historiographic turn of the 1960s and 1970s.419
Reshaping French collective memory was part of an earnest effort to 
regain confidence in the French state and the republican idea; in France as nation,
417 Collini, “French Pasts,” 54-56.
418 Bennett, Cultural Pessimism, 9.
419 Admittedly, the Annales school of historians (e.g. Febvre, Aries, Braudel, Le Roy Ladurie) sits 
uneasily with this broad suggestion. However, with its stress on broad social and economic 
histories of longues durees and mentalities, and with Febvre’s understanding of historical 
enquiry as problem-directed, the Annalistes still influenced the way history in general (if not 
recent French history) was perceived.
165
both uniquely particular and the epitome of universal humanistic values; and in 
France as a righteous people who could prosper once more. This was 
compounded by France’s struggle to reassert its position as a colonial empire 
under the combined pressures of maintaining empire and the West’s position in 
the Cold War. Losing Indochina in 1954, France now faced a rapidly spreading 
nationalist rebellion in Algeria, which the colons and the military garrison that 
supported them tried to suppress. The Algerian war highlighted a fundamental 
paradox in France’s narrative of its recent history. Only when levelled in 
universalist terms could wartime suffering and resistance become constitutive of 
the new French collective identity: even returning camp survivors were told that 
‘we too have suffered.’ Yet the French also clearly regressed into older, 
particularist arguments justifying French colonial rule and supporting harsh 
measures to maintain it. More than a practical confusion, this was an ideological 
struggle between universalist humanism, seeing liberty and equality as essential 
to human existence -  and an amalgam of French nationalism, metropolitan 
racism and traditional colonialism. The Algerian problem divided French society 
and threatened to throw the French polity into greater turmoil. It was certainly 
the fault line ending an initial period of national unity narratives: as the historian 
Henri Rousso noted, in the first postwar decade the fight against the Germans 
was portrayed as an all-encompassing struggle against foreign oppression, 
regardless of political colours -  that is, as ‘resistantialism’.420 The start of the 
Algerian uprising in 1954 ended initial resistantialism, and its later mishandling 
was a major factor in the Fourth Republic’s collapse and the Gaullist restoration.
The Fourth Republic’s uncompromising line over decolonisation 
regarded anything less than the demonstration of imperial fortitude as a symptom 
of imperial decline -  a surprisingly aggressive, reactionary approach from an 
otherwise liberal succession of centrist coalitions, also responsible for the
420 Rousso differentiates between ‘resistantialism’, as active opposition to the Occupation, and 
‘resistancialism’, specifically related to membership of the Resistance and conferring 
privileged status within the struggle for liberation. Rousso sees ‘resistancialism’ as definitive 
of the second stage (1954-1971) of French public remembrance of the Occupation, 
constructing the Resistance, identified with the nation as a whole, as an alternative object of 
memory to Vichy. Rousso, 10-11.
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Monnet plans and for promoting European integration.421 Imperial dismantling 
had always been a sensitive issue, touching French fears and insecurities over 
loss of space and of imperial identity. Martin Shipway suggests that the French 
‘official mind’ stressed imperial continuity as a reassurance in the face of defeat 
and decline, and that the persistence of colonialist rhetoric and propaganda 
(assisted in Algeria by strict control of news reportage) also obstructed the
A')')development of popular attitudes reflective of France’s colonial role. But more 
than other colonial struggles, Algeria had in it the makings of a crisis. In 
nationalistic French fantasy, France was one empire straddling two continents: 
the Hexagon in Europe and Algeria in Africa, with the Mediterranean mare 
nostrum running through it. Administratively, too, Algerian departements were 
an integral part of the French metropole, and so privileged over other French 
colonies d ’outremer. Mendes-France’s decision to concede Indochina in order to 
keep Algeria and other African colonies rendered them a final French frontier. A 
decision on Algeria’s sovereign and identity was perceived as a decision on 
French sovereignty and identity.
This was a popular view of the Algerian situation, but it was not the only 
one. On 23 January 1956, Sartre addressed a rally for peace in Algeria at the 
Salle de Wagram in Paris, and this address, later published in TM, became a 
definitive document of French anti-colonialism in the following years.423 In “Le 
Colonialisme est un systeme” Sartre sought to clarify the political and economic 
workings of colonialism, and to expose the ‘neocolonialist mystification’ 
misleading the general public: the facile abstraction of politics into nationalist 
and imperialist imagery obscured the material reality of the colonial system and 
the human agents that sustain it.424 The worrying symptom was not the presence
421 Kedward, 372.
422 Martin Shipway, “La Decolonisation: une exploration a rebours ?” La Chouette 31 (2000), 2, 
16-17.
423 “Le Colonialisme est un systeme,” Les Temps Modernes 123, March-April 1956, later 
collected into his Situations V (Paris: Gallimard, 1964). All quotations here from the English 
translation: Jean-Paul Sartre, “Colonialism is a System,” in Sartre, Colonialism and 
Neocolonialism, translated by Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer and Terry McWilliams 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 30-47 (henceforth: Sartre, “Colonialism”).
424 Sartre, “Colonialism,” 30-31.
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of bad colons in Algeria, but the fact that, since 1830, it was still colonised by the 
French at all. The Algerian problem was not neo-colonialist but old-colonialist 
because, contrary to French universal humanism, it was supplemented by popular 
racism which dehumanised the Algerians and thus denied them their human 
rights.425
Standing at the heart of the colonial system, the colon was distinguished 
by function and by interests from the metropolitan Frenchman and from the 
Algerian. Sartre saw relations between colons and Algerians as taking place only 
through their mutually constitutive roles (coloniser/colonised) on the two sides of 
colonialist-racial difference. But while colons and Frenchmen alike benefited 
from the colonial system, they were not the same: colon economic interests 
contrasted with France’s political interests, but their allegiance was split between 
homeland (France) and country (Algeria). Sartre thought that the colonial system 
had become self-destructive, and that France was caught in the fold: “colonialism 
obliges France to send democratic Frenchmen to their deaths to protect the 
tyranny that the anti-democratic colonialists exert over the Algerians.”426 Colon 
intransigence led Algerians to despair of reforms and opt for armed revolt. Sartre 
suggested that the French arrive at similar conclusions, as colonialism “is our 
shame... it infects us with its racism... Our role is to help it to die... wherever it 
exists.”427
Another critique of colonialism and racism, linking it with French 
nationalism, was articulated in Barthes’s Mythologies. The Algerian war was at 
the background of the book, where Barthes famously unpicked mythical and 
semiotic elements in French colonialist rhetoric and imagery (like the Black 
African soldier saluting the tricolore). Barthes noticed other nationalistic 
epiphenomena, like the seemingly benign symbolism of cleanliness and purity in 
soap and detergent advertisements, which to him was akin to the moral 
laundering of terms regarding the Algerian situation, kept largely hidden from 
metropolitan France. Similarly, French culinary rudiments like wine and steak- 
frites were more than nourriture terrestre; they were a nationalised ‘totem
425 Sartre, “Colonialism,” 31-32, 45.
426 Sartre, “Colonialism,” 44-46.
427 Sartre, “Colonialism,” 47.
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vivace’ that sustained one’s sense of Frenchness (Francite), thus turning
4 28mystified foodstuffs into agents of social cohesion.
Barthes paid particular attention to the stationer-tumed-deputy Pierre 
Poujade and his movement, UDCA (Union de defense des commergants et 
artisans).429 Formally, Poujade represented the interests of some 2.3 million rural 
shopkeepers, petty merchants and artisans, who in 1955 voted 52 Poujadists into 
the Chamber of Deputies. UDCA supporters felt disenfranchised by the fast- 
growing French corporate capitalism, urbanisation and retail chains offering 
cheaper, mass-produced goods. Poujade and UDCA reclaimed their ground by 
representing themselves as la vieille France, meaning not just the pre-war 
economic order, but also a world Empire ruled by a primordially-deflned Gallic 
nation. Through Poujadism the petty-bourgeois cause of shopkeepers allied itself 
with colonialism in public demonstrations (from January 1955) and by holding 
the UDCA national congress in Algiers in 1954.430 Appealing to ‘old French’ 
values, Poujadism replicated an old ideological pattern, familiar from the 
Dreyfus affair and most of interwar politics: casting its xenophobia, racism and 
pro-colonialism as basic patriotism, its envy of Capital as care for the Tittle 
man’, and its anti-intellectualism as ‘common sense’. In so doing Poujadism 
opened the door for the relegitimation of other shades of right-wing 
conservatism. Significantly, this coincided with the actual rehabilitation of some 
Vichy figures in government and the civil service by the mid-1950s.
Barthes saw the historical repetition of a familiar ideological pattern as 
ominous, a ‘theme malefique’ that multiplied itself synchronically (as with the 
American preacher Billy Graham) as well as diachronically. To Barthes, 
Poujade’s ontology was closed and immanent, and a world of Tittle people’ with 
material ‘common sense’ that relied on a quantitative calculus and resisted any 
qualitative difference. This resistance sustained an anti-intellectualism which 
portrayed the ‘professors’ in mythical terms as detached and rootless individuals, 
lazy and idle (intellectuals do nothing), whose excess of intellect made them into 
thinking machines, lacking in human soul and savvy (roublardise), disgraced by
428 Barthes, Mythologies, 85-86, 88-89; Lavers, 82.
429 “Quelques paroles de M. Poujade” and “Poujade et les intellectuels”, in Barthes, Mythologies, 
96-98 and 205-212 respectively.
430 Kedward, 377-378.
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their own lack of prowess which thus separated them as degenerates from the 
healthy, Poujadist French race. Culture to Poujade was a malady, a foreign 
element to be resisted, and this refusal of alterity was to Barthes approaching 
fascism.431 Poujadism went far beyond Poujade himself: tapping into Romantic 
sentimentalist traditions it amounted to a general hatred of ideas, intellectual 
culture and critical scrutiny. It identified ‘real’ France in the great French 
quantity, the strong vulgar mass of Gauls grounded in their provinces. Therefore, 
by some reverse Decadent outlook, Paris became in the Poujadist outlook the 
locus of all French vices: the sadistic establishment, the fatigued, alienated 
intellectuals in their Left Bank cafes, and the literal and metaphorical head down 
from which, Poujade believed, the fish rots 432
From the critical outlooks of Sartre and Barthes emerges a picture of 
systemic contradictions plaguing French society, known to most French through 
their symptoms and fault lines: Vichy, Indochina, Algeria, Poujade. These 
symptoms are bound together into one system of incongruent values of 
Frenchness. Attempts to resolve French crises were portrayed, not least by Sartre 
and Barthes, as struggles for the future face of France as a synthetic collectivity -  
a republic and a people, a state and a nation. Essentially, as the historian Pascal 
Ory claimed, old French culture and politics were devastated in the ‘strange 
defeat’ of 1940 and never recovered.433 Ory’s insistence on the historical 
discontinuity of French culture and politics taps into broader concerns for 
continuity: the left-liberal tradition of the short-lived Front Populaire government 
and the Third Republic’s typical radicalism; the continuity of traditional French 
nationalism and monarchism; the traditional link to the universal humanistic 
values that had informed the revolution; and the ongoing deference to certain 
symbols, customs, social and political institutions. While many of these 
ostensibly survived the Second World War, they or the public perception of them 
were transformed in the wake of changing circumstances and the growing 
fragmentation of changing French society.
431 Barthes, Mythologies, 96-98, 205-210.
432 Barthes, Mythologies, 211-212.
433 Pascal Ory, L ’Aventure culturellefrangaise (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), 9.
170
Ironically, the Fourth Republic was effectively undone by elements 
linking it with the interwar period: immutability with regard to the crumbling 
empire, and toleration of extreme ideologies.434 As its popularity eroded, its 
vocal critic de Gaulle seemed to offer a majority of the French a viable 
alternative. Since 1946 the General was leader of the opposition party RPF until 
resigning this role in 1953 in desperation at the surprising stability of centrist 
politics despite frequent changes of government. The five years of his ‘traversee 
du deserf, ending in his triumphant return in 1958, allowed him to write his war 
memoirs and have his own authoritative say; in so doing, he fully exploited his 
imposing image as the almost mythical saviour of France, towering (in height as 
in prestige) over any other resistance leader, and played up his historical role and 
grand prospective vision.435
The General’s version of the events from 1940 to 1944 was the basis for 
what was known as ‘Gaullism’. In this narrative most French had resisted the 
Occupation and Vichy was a minority of misguided wrongdoers; it was the 
Germans (or their direct collaborators) who had perpetrated the ‘real’ crimes of 
the Occupation. More grandly and symbolically, the Resistance represented 
French continuity as a republican regime and a patriotic nation, whereas Vichy’s 
paternalistic authoritarianism was an aberration. This story cast de Gaulle as the 
supreme head of all resisters and thus as saviour: his role and the role of the 
resistance had been to bring on the (self-)liberation of the French, and so to 
preserve national honour 436 The Gaullist myth (for so it was) relied heavily on 
the abstraction that cast the Nation, the Resistance and the State as agents 
independent of their constituent parts: Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, the 
resistants themselves, and the French Republic as a corporate, bureaucratic 
polity. The Gaullist myth itself existed as an abstraction, an idea in the minds of 
people that had pre-existed de Gaulle’s return to power, an idea so effectively 
diffused that around the mid-1960s it seemed to take on its own independent
434 Kedward, 382.
435 Likewise, when voted out of office in 1945 Churchill turned to his memoirs, partly under 
pressure to counter an unfavourable account already published by Roosevelt’s son and 
adjutant. See David Reynolds, In Command o f History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the 
Second World War (London: Penguin, 2005 [2004]).
436 Rousso, 71-72; Stanley Hoffmann, “Introduction,” in Rousso, vii-ix.
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existence, allowing many to subscribe to Gaullism while critical of the President 
himself.437
The Gaullist myth offered the French a renewed sense of continuity and 
cohesion, rescuing the positive image of French national identity as progressive. 
If Vichy was an historical aberration, the timeless spirit of France-as-liberty was 
maintained elsewhere, going on to triumph and return, first abortively in the 
Fourth Republic, then victoriously in the Fifth Republic. However, the Gaullist 
stance was not unproblematic: it expropriated the narration of the past from many 
people who had experienced it themselves, like the resistants. Moreover, the 
myth’s glorified resistancialist element came at the expense of utterly vilifying 
Vichy and people implicated in it. This led to what Rousso dubbed the ‘Vichy 
Syndrome’ -  a post-traumatic phenomenon, a ‘neurosis’ relating to the 
Occupation -  and linked internal divisions, encompassing several symptoms, all 
identified by “the patent topicality of a reference to the past.”
The past is summoned to inform present identity through personal 
(private) memory, collective (public) memory and (scholarly) history, and it is 
not always the rationally-structured scholarly exploration that is predominant. 
Indeed, the journalist Alain Duhamel has recently argued that legitimate French 
fears, feeding off French expectations and experience, all lead to suspicions of 
the disintegration of French identity; thus they are as constitutive of French 
identity as the positive elements on which they supervene. “Behind all other fears 
lurks naturally the old fear of history, belief in decline,” claimed Duhamel, but 
this is but one of three aspects of disruption informing French cultural 
pessimism.439 Firstly, as suggested above, the fear of breakdown of national- 
historical continuity is a key element in a nation’s perception of its place in 
history. The rupture around the annees noires needed to be artificially bridged 
over, and the Gaullist myth contributed to this end.440 A second disruption is to a 
sense of national cohesion, concerning the nation’s persistence as collective 
subject, ‘one and indivisible’. Social cohesion is reinforced and transgressors of
437 Rousso, 82, 97.
438 Rousso, 10-11,303-304.
439 Alain Duhamel, Les Peurs frangaises (Paris: Flammarion, 1993), 15, my translation.
440 Both Duhamel and Ory identified this as pessimism, not as a real threat. Duhamel, 15; Ory, 
231.
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the collective narrative face delegitimisation of them and their memory for 
threatening national difference. The third aspect of experience which, when 
disrupted, contributes to cultural pessimism is the sense of safety and limits, of 
definiteness through definition, and of preservation of difference through 
exclusion.
De Gaulle was a master of elisions between rhetorical and ontological 
entities, which allowed him to gloss over the three kinds of disruption suggested. 
Appropriating Resistance legacy since the Liberation, de Gaulle propagated a 
vision of France in which he was both Saviour and embodiment. After becoming 
president, this relation between de Gaulle and France was elaborated. As head of 
State, de Gaulle was the personification of France as State and of Frenchness as 
identity: the Nation, however, was an earthly incarnation that needed to be led, a 
role tailored to the size of de Gaulle. Nevertheless, there was an intrinsic bond 
between the President and the People, evident in his oft-used term 
rassemblement, denoting togetherness, rather than the more common parti.441 
The rhetorical generation of such a surprisingly rich metaphysics of Francite -  
the State, the Nation, the People, ‘Frenchness’ -  served a partisan (personal or 
political) agenda, but was also an occultist mythology, concerning (indeed, 
generating) an elusive but constant entity which in its various guises was above 
all a unity, persisting through the numerous political changes in French history. 
Its purpose was to convey the continuity of an otherwise contingent, synthetic 
entity -  the French Republic -  pegged loosely on a constantly changing French 
society, naturalised by the rhetoric of unity as an essence, a given absolute.
De Gaulle’s rhetoric of French grandeur through continuity made him a 
popular opposition to the crumbling Fourth Republic, which was increasingly 
seen as aberrant. However, throughout the 1950s he had a vocal critic in Sartre, 
who saw him as the spectre of legitimised reactionary militarism, and sharpened 
his criticism of the political heir-apparent. This peaked in the weeks preceding 
the September 1958 constitutional referendum, when Sartre published in the new 
left-wing weekly L ’Express two essays on French society in crisis, on the eve of
441 Kedward, 389, 391.
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restructuring its polity: “The Constitution of Contempt” and “The Frogs Who 
Demand a King.”442
Sartre saw the French as facing a false choice between a defunct (Fourth) 
republic or a future (Gaullist) monarchy: the effectively crippled Fourth Republic 
was an unrealistic choice, focusing expectations on its alternative, which was not 
a programme but de Gaulle the man, promising a Fifth Republic in his image. De 
Gaulle’s popularity worried Sartre because it signified the French public’s 
political abstentionism when faced with tough decisions and a dead-end polity: 
by following a charismatic father figure, who for long had been pronouncing in 
the name of France, they were relinquishing rationality and responsible choice 
for what Sartre saw as childish idolatry.443 Here Sartre returned to a point he had 
made in “Colonialism is a System,” framing the inherent contradiction in 
‘Gaullist republicanism’ between universalism and particularism: “sick and tired 
of the ineffectual, our apolitical republicans are saying ‘yes’ to the irrational, to 
the sacred and by the same token saying ‘no’ to equality.”444 What was worse, 
De Gaulle was the popular choice but was also clearly partisan, owing his 
renewed prominence to collusion between interested elements in France and 
Algeria: reactionary metropolitan farmers, the Algerian colonels, and the winners 
of French colonialism -  Parisian capitalists and Algerian landowners.445
The most interesting aspect of Sartre’s two essays was his post-mortem of 
the Fourth Republic and of recent French society, again extending his anti­
colonialist speech of 1956. The Fourth Republic was a wretched political system 
which in the name of continuity and stability had become stagnant: the same 
government rotating among the same people, relying on the same majority and 
choosing to do nothing about the colonial crisis. Popular contempt for 
parliamentarians enhanced de Gaulle’s image as the expedient man of action who
442 “La Constitution du mepris,” L ’Express 378 (11 September 1958); and “Les Grenouilles qui 
demandent un roi,” L ’Express 380 (25 September 1958); both quoted here from Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Colonialism and Neocolonialism, translated by Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer and 
Terry McWilliams (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 88-95, 96-119 respectively 
(henceforth: “Constitution” and “Frogs” respectively).
443 Sartre, “Constitution,” 91, 93-95; “Frogs,” 96, 114.
444 Sartre, “Frogs,” 114.
445 Sartre, “Constitution,” 92-93.
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gets things done -  both those the public does not care about and those it would 
rather not face. For that de Gaulle would have to wrest France from its real 
rulers, because “the executive is in fact in Algiers; it is composed of civilians and 
soldiers, and decides about France on the basis of Algeria.”446 It was no wonder, 
then, that young people in France, timid and serious, were losing faith in their 
ability to influence public affairs, both within France, where they were 
indifferent to the referendum, and in the Cold War world, where France’s 
influence had diminished.447 The French public were confused: wanting an 
Empire without violence or exploitation, they turned to the only half-credible 
(and thus necessary) choice, with the lowered expectation that he stop hostilities 
somehow. But to vote ‘yes’ in the referendum, Sartre claimed, would be to dream 
on, whereas to vote ‘no’ would enable the public to awaken.448
In 1958 a huge majority of the French (about 80%) voted ‘yes’, thus 
signalling, in Sartre’s terms, their willingness to dream on. Nevertheless, Sartre 
was prescient in asserting that the ‘Constitution of contempt’ and the monarchic 
republic that it established were only a cosmetic change, whereas the causes of 
the republican crisis were objective and profound, and required similar solutions. 
Left intact, the infrastructures of French Algerian colonialism did bring its own 
destruction, as Sartre had foreseen in 1956.449 Both sides of the Algerian struggle 
supported De Gaulle in the hope that he might bring a conclusion favourable to 
their interests. However, as early as September 1959 de Gaulle signalled that he 
would consider deliberating Algerian independence if violence were to stop. A 
more sweeping confirmation of France’s intention to face decolonisation came 
the following summer. De Gaulle’s appel of 14 June 1960 came symbolically 
just before the twentieth anniversary of his definitive appel of 18 June 1940 to 
resist the German occupation, and stated clearly that despite the nostalgic 
symbols riddling French patriotic imaginary (and his own speech), France must 
modernise, conceptually and technologically, be “transformed into a new country 
and must marry its epoch.”450 The Gaullist vision of prefigured French grandeur
446 Sartre, “Frogs,” 98-99, 102-105, 109.
447 Sartre, “Frogs,” 111-112.
448 Sartre, “Frogs,” 108-109, 118-119.
449 Sartre, “Frogs,” 107, 117; “Colonialism,” 46-47.
450 Translated and quoted in Kedward, 402.
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expected France to move with the times and rise to its glorious destiny. Again, 
answers to questions about where, who and what France was seemed foretold to 
de Gaulle by the pre-existing essence of Frenchness.
Yet this essential and absolute conception of France and Frenchness was 
polemical, and the Algerian War was seen as another guerre franco-frangaise in 
reproducing old French political divisions for contemporary agendas, using 
memory and historical analogy. Rousso distinguished between the public 
mobilisation of the past as heritage (tapping into traditions); as nostalgic fo il; and 
as fantasy (being entirely imagined). The colons and their supporters, like 
Bidault, tried to appropriate the memory and moral legacy of the Resistance. 
Formed in 1960, the colon militia was named Organisation Armee Secrete 
(OAS), alluding to the Armee Secrete of the Second World War. Among the left, 
Rousso mentions Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s essay on the three groups of resistors to 
colonial rule in Algeria: the Tiers-Mondistes, the ‘Bolsheviks’, and those he calls 
the ‘Dreyfusards’, for whom the resistance to French rule in Algeria continued a 
historical fight harking back to the Resistance itself and earlier, to the original 
anti-nationalist Dreyfusards.451 In fact, Vidal-Naquet and Rousso seem to agree 
that the left-wing reaction of the ‘Dreyfusards’ -  and the argument could extend 
to include most right-wing positions -  had more to do, as suggested earlier, with 
their vision of France than with their vision of Algeria, being another instance of 
the French left-right political and ideological struggle played out at least since 
the Third Republic.
Eventually, the anti-colonialist stance prevailed, with or without its leftist 
historical and ideological credentials. De Gaulle came to realise and admit, in 
April 1961 that “/a decolonisation est notre interet.”452 By the 1962 Evian 
accords France severed Algeria from itself abruptly, reluctantly and violently, 
like a gangrenous limb whose severance was essential to the survival of the 
French body politic 453
451 The Dreyfusard label revived the Dreyfus affair as an outstanding collusion of French 
militarism, racist anti-Semitism, Petainist nationalism and traditional Catholicism. Rousso, 
75-76.
452 Quoted in Shipway, “La Decolonisation,” 16.
453 The gangrene metaphor comes from the scandalous publication in which Algerian authors 
criticised the French use of torture: La Gangrene, ed. by Jerome Lindon (Paris: Minuit, 1959).
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New outlooks on representation
The representation of reality, past and present, also became a scene of 
contestation for literary representation. Partly in reaction to the prevailing 
national narrative of the time and partly to escape the weight of its traditional 
underpinnings, younger artists in postwar France formulated their own principles 
and experimented with new forms of representing reality -  in literary fiction and 
its critique, in cinema and even in journalism. Among the more comprehensive 
of such experiments was the nouveau roman.
The nouveaux romanciers is a rather journalistic label for several 
novelists, all published by Minuit, whose experimental writing challenged 
common assumptions about the novel (and its relations to other media), realism, 
authorial intention, linguistic usage, meaning and interpretation, and the 
standards of literary criticism. Despite these common points the nouveau roman 
label is less misleading (but was also less commercially successful) than the 
‘Angry Young Men’ label, but a label it remains. Adopted at the encouragement 
of Minuit from the title of a 1957 Maurice Nadeau review in Critique, the 
nouveau roman label served with alternative labels of the day -  Ecole de Minuit, 
Ecole du regard, Chosisme -  to refer to a grouping that variously included Alain 
Robbe-Grillet, Nathalie Sarraute, Michel Butor, Claude Simon, Robert Pinget, 
Samuel Beckett, Marguerite Duras, and, later, Jean Ricardou. The nouveaux 
romanciers were not a definite group or school and shared no common ideology 
or manifesto: their publisher, Jerome Lindon, later admitted that they were united 
mainly in their opposition to the literary conventions into which they matured.
The kernel of nouveau roman approaches was the need to produce a new 
kind of novel to reflect a new kind of postwar reality, for which they considered 
the traditional mimetic, detailed novelistic realism (of Stendhal, Balzac, Flaubert) 
to be inadequate. Literary tradition was not opposed, it was reassessed: what was 
opposed was the privileging of its outdated devices as doxa. Sarraute criticised
Minuit, like other resistance publishers Maspero and Seuil, were active opponents of the war 
and the French use of torture. See also: Benjamin Stora, La Gangrene et I ’oubli: la memoire 
de la guerre d ’Algerie (Paris: La Decouverte, 1991); and Martin Shipway, “Forces de 1’ordre, 
forces du chaos: le syndrome algerien,” La Chouette 32 (2001), 87-98.
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the notion of character as an over-described, overly familiar figure, Robbe-Grillet 
thought the character, assisted by similarly outdated linear, progressive plots, 
preserved what he called the ‘myth of depth’.454 Sarraute, Robbe-Grillet and 
Butor believed that novelistic form should be more than a seamless narration 
foregrounding ‘content’: both ‘form’ and ‘content’ were equally, indivisibly 
important in conveying the novel to the reader. If ‘content’ could not be isolated, 
then its single ‘meaning’ was unreachable, thus decentering authorial intention as 
now secondary to readers’ interpretations. This view redefined the novel as a 
self-contained experiment, which was therefore resistant to Sartrean writerly 
commitment: every authorial choice in the novel was unavoidably informed by 
principle or ideology, so making the novel explicitly commit, for example, to 
social realism would regress it to didactic dogmatism. For these positions, among 
the French left the nouveaux romanciers -  like British experimental writing -  
were regarded as politically reactionary and derided as ‘formalistic’. To their 
detractors they symptomised a ‘crisis of the novel,’ a dead end in novelistic 
realism; to their (mainly academic) supporters they offered the solution to that 
crisis in leaping beyond the realist impasse.455
It is difficult to generalise about the finer points of the nouveau roman. Its 
chosisme or regard were distinctly associated with Robbe-Grillet, less so with 
Butor, and with Sarraute not at all. Robbe-Grillet’s concerns seemed more 
ideological in outlook, whereas Sarraute and Butor considered the novel chiefly 
from literary-aesthetic perspectives. Butor’s belief in a single valid truth in 
reality to be reflected in fiction was at odds with Robbe-Grillet’s subjectivism. A 
short elaboration on each writer’s distinctive position is therefore in order.
Nathalie Sarraute was the earliest published nouveau romancier with her 
Tropismes (1939). A regular contributor to TM, her first postwar novel, Portrait 
d ’un inconnu (1948) was prefaced by Sartre, who misleadingly analysed it as an 
existentialist ‘anti-novel’. However, by 1960 the two fell out and Sartre
454 Robbe-Grillet, For a New Novel, 23. All references below are to the English translations of 
Robbe-Grillet, Butor and Sarraute.
455 For a detailed history of the New Novel see: Pierre A.G. Astier, Encyclopedic du nouveau 
roman: la Crise du roman franqais et le nouveau realisme (Paris: Nouvelles Editions 
Debresse, 1968).
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denounced Sarraute’s fiction as bourgeois.456 Sarraute’s important critical treatise 
is the essay collection L ’Ere du soupgon (1956), where she praised the 
unthinking, unfeeling experience of the twentieth-century homo absurdus, whose 
literary presence suggested the absence of ultimate depth in the human mind -  an 
important counterbalance to Woolfian psychologism, which Sarraute, like Angus 
Wilson, regarded as too narrow.457 Instead, Sarraute suggested that unexplored 
states of consciousness were best borne out not by internal monologue but
AC Q
against an interlocutor, through what she called ‘sub-conversation’. In the title 
essay, Sarraute dubbed as ‘suspicion’ readers’ growing disbelief in realist 
fictional characters and the mutual wariness between readers and writers. 
Traditional realism had told readers too much and in excessive detail, and now 
new fiction needed to entice them back by minimising characterisation and 
description.459 To remain realistic, the novel must stop overcompensating for its 
fictional status by competing with the richness of reality, instead overcoming 
readers’ suspicion by offering “a deeper, more complex, clearer, truer knowledge 
of what they are, of their circumstances and their lives.”460 Sub-conversation, 
relying on the necessary fictional other, was Sarraute’s way of seducing the 
reader, and was influenced by Sartre’s concepts of authenticity, bad faith and 
‘being-for-others’. An existential fear of authentic contact with other humans 
underlies bad faith and makes interpersonal relations a constant intersubjective 
conflict, a play of psychological manipulation where resistance to the seduction 
of others is tempered by fascination with their influence.461
The most comprehensive statement of principle among 1950s nouveaux 
romanciers was in the essays collected into Robbe-Grillet’s Pour un nouveau 
roman, which show the development of his vision from 1955 to 1963 and his
456 Celia Britton, The Nouveau Roman: Fiction, Theory and Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1992), 32.
457 Nathalie Sarraute, “The Age of Suspicion,” in Tropismes and the Age o f Suspicion, trans. by 
Maria Jolas (London: John Calder, 1963 [Gallimard, 1956]), 59-60, 76, 97-101.
458 Sarraute, 105-109.
459 Sarraute, 83, 85-88, 92-94.
460 Sarraute, 134.
461 Britton, 32-35; exemplifying this is Sarraute’s second novel, Martereau (1953).
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takes on Sartre and on Structuralism.462 The earliest essays, “The Use of Theory” 
and “From Realism to Reality,” made the basic assertion that each novel must 
invent its own forms and constitute its own reality, rendering verisimilitude 
redundant and fostering trust in the impression of falseness. Thus, the novel is a 
discrete, autonomous domain that should not be a vehicle for expression (or 
reality) but of exploration (of itself). Considering the singularity of each novel, 
the label 1 nouveau roman\ like the label ‘realism’, was to Robbe-Grillet only a 
portmanteau term that in itself meant little 463 As he claimed in “A Future for the 
Novel,” the nouveau roman was mistaken for a botched literary experiment 
because “one is always decadent in comparison to things of the past” and so “a 
new form will always be seen more or less as an absence of any form at all.”464 
But the old realist novel stagnated because of its traditionality, ‘pseudo-mystery’ 
and ‘myth of depth’, and was surpassed by contemporary cinema, which could 
“construct a world both more solid and more immediate” by having “gestures 
and objects... be there before being something”465 The thrust of future novelistic
AAf .writing, then, is to ‘de-signify’.
This Chosisme was only a partial solution, and in “On Several Obsolete 
Notions” Robbe-Grillet suggested that other devices be discarded to revitalise the 
novel: the confidence in familiar character (following Sarraute); the primacy of 
plot; commitment (in the Sartrean sense); and the distinction between form and 
content that subjugated the former to the latter. Instead, Robbe-Grillet exhorted 
authors to not be afraid to make ‘art for art’s sake’, because “it is the style, the 
ecriture, and it alone which is ‘responsible’,” and only to itself.467 Conscious 
experimentation with literary form itself carried ideological weight and was all
462 Despite this, Robbe-Grillet suggested in the late 1960s that the ‘theoretical work’ in his novels 
makes his essays redundant. Arthur E. Babcock, The New Novel in France: Theory and 
Practice o f the nouveau roman (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997), 25.
463 Robbe-Grillet, 8-9, 12, 14, 157-158, 160-163.
464 Compare Robbe-Grillet, 167 and 17-18.
465 Robbe-Grillet, 19-21.
466 Leo Bersani, Balzac to Beckett: Center and Circumference in French Fiction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970), 246.
467 Note his adoption of Barthes’s term ‘ecriture\  Robbe-Grillet, 27-34, 39-40, 44-45.
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the social engagement that could be expected from literature. Sartre continued 
to be a problematic point of reference for Robbe-Grillet in “Nature, Humanism, 
Tragedy,” where his early fiction (e.g. Nausea), together with Camus’s concept 
of the absurd, was shown to reiterate the fallacy of the tragic abandonment of 
human freedom. To Robbe-Grillet, novelistic humanism merely fostered the 
myth of deeper meaning or transcendence, and its attachment to the 
fundamentally tragic character of ‘human nature’ meant that nature, humanism 
and tragedy all had to be discarded in new writing. Their replacement was to be a 
new subjectivism, or as Robbe-Grillet put it: “I am concerned... only with the 
world as my point o f view orients it; I shall never know any other.”469 As he later 
clarified in “New Novel, New Man,” this did not imply that the nouveau roman 
was anti-humanistic, ascetic or otherwise pessimistic: in fact, subjectivism meant 
an interest only in the existence and experience of the human individual, and this 
also left the freedom of interpretation in the hands of the reader’s subjectivity 470 
Like Robbe-Grillet, Michel Butor saw the novel as a self-contained 
system, and probably more than him, Butor believed in the organising, world- 
building power of the novel as a narrative governing our perception, and so, also 
influenced by Sarraute, he sought to examine the novel’s terms as a literary form 
and its relation to culture.471 Butor followed his first novel, Passage de Milan 
(1954), with a prolific career as author and critic, and by the mid-1960s had 
already published two essay collections, Repertoire I  (1960) and Repertoire II 
(1964). Butor’s initial position was already rather elaborate, taking in some 
points made earlier by Sarraute, Robbe-Grillet and Barthes. “The Novel as 
Research” already asserted the novel’s experimental autonomy and its reliance 
on formal innovation, which was inseparable from its ‘content’. Butor echoed 
Barthes in criticising the complicity of traditional narrative in the discursive 
order, and preferred to discuss the novel’s ‘symbolism’ rather than its ‘realism’, 
that is, how it signifies (its place in the reader’s experience) rather than what it
468 Britton notes that Robbe-Grillet was an early adopter of that idea in 1957; Britton, 26-28. In 
this sense Robbe-Grillet’s position is close to that of Sartre in his studies of Mallarme and 
Flaubert.
469 Robbe-Grillet, 51-52, 57-61, 73, 75; Britton, 23-25.
470 Robbe-Grillet, 133-141.
471 Babcock, 73-74.
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shows and means.472 However, Butor thought that the link between the novel and 
reality was closer and more stable than envisaged by Robbe-Grillet: literature 
was not altogether discrete but an experimental social function, and the novel 
was a way of living, of integrating individual experience.473 He added in 
“Research on the Technique of the Novel” that the novel as fiction imitated truth 
by rendering a false world, but through its literary structure it was useful to 
understanding real life, and therefore it had an earnest moral position. This led 
Butor to seek to secure the novel’s intelligibility through authorial control, 
anticipating and taking responsibility for the different ways it could be read.474
The nouveau roman implied a new literary criticism, and in this field the 
early, proto-Structuralist Barthes again emerges as influential. Robbe-Grillet, an 
enthusiastic early reader of Le Degre zero de Vecriture, mentions Barthes twice 
in Pour un nouveau roman: regarding the mystifying power of literature in “A 
Future for the Novel,” and in the epigraph to “Nature, Humanism, Tragedy,” 
supporting Robbe-Grillet’s condemnation of tragedy as complicit with misery.475 
Barthes lay beneath much of Robbe-Grillet’s criticism, influencing his objection 
to signification, his insistence on the indivisibility and parity of form and content, 
and his objection to committed writing. Barthes, for his part, was the first to 
consider Les Gommes seriously, following that with critical studies of nouveaux 
romans throughout the decade.476 Barthes and his increasing Structuralist bent 
were a certain, if not the only influence on the critical reception of nouveaux 
romans -  so much so that they were sometimes taken to be Structuralist 
novels.477
472 Michel Butor, “The Novel as Research,” trans. by Gerald Fabian, in Inventory: Essays by 
Michel Butor, ed. by Richard Howard (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 26-27.
473 Butor, “The Novel as Research,” 30; Babcock, 75.
474 Michel Butor, “Research on the Technique of the Novel,” trans. Richard Howard, in 
Inventory, 15-25; Babcock, 76; Britton, 60-62.
475 Robbe-Grillet, 49.
476 Roland Barthes, “Literature objective,” Critique 86-87 (July-August 1954), 581-591; and then 
also: Roland Barthes, “Litterature litterale,” Critique 100-101 (September-October 1955), 
820-826; Roland Barthes, “II n’y a pas d’ecole Robbe-Grillet,” Arguments 6 (February 1958), 
6-8; Roland Barthes, “Litterature et discontinu,” Critique 185 (October 1962), 817-829.
477 Britton, 48.
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Essentially, the Structuralist and semiological influences on nouveau 
roman writing and interpretation meant an insistence that meaning is diffuse and 
not explicit, and that it can only be inferred from the big picture rather than 
through isolated elements. The conjunction between the thought of the Swiss 
linguist Saussure and that of Levi-Strauss, his chief advocate in postwar France, 
rests on the fundamental claim that the human unconscious contains a set of 
universal structures which produce meaning. Social behaviour, being symbolic 
and having extra-literal ‘depth’, is generated by the unconscious structures. 
Social structures and relations were more representative of the tacit rules and 
implicit meanings of social interaction than conscious individual action. Levi- 
Strauss believed social relations, or any field of the sciences humaines could be 
examined by interdisciplinary Structuralist methods, reflecting the basic unity 
among them. In his own work, he synthesised anthropology and linguistics, and 
contributed to the study of mythology (in Anthropologic structurelle, 1958). But 
Levi-Strauss did not engage in literary criticism, where Structuralist influences 
hark back to the Russian Formalism school and the Prague school. Their legacy 
in linguistic and literary enquiry was the understanding of language as an 
unconscious system existing independently of observers (attributed to Jakobson); 
linguistic functionalism, locating the meaning of linguistic units in their symbolic 
function (attributed to Mukarovsky); and the focus on formal and poetic devices 
and narrative typologies.
Barthes used the Structuralist ‘symbolic function’ to project what he 
called ‘poetics’: rather than what a literary work means (which assumes meaning 
is extractable from within it), he examined the dynamics of how meanings were 
produced in texts, that is, how texts signify, or generate meanings, as systems. 
From Le Degre zero de I ’ecriture, through Mythologies, to Elements de 
semiologie (1964) and Critique et verite (1966), Barthes constructed a theory of 
signs and signification (Semiology) which, like the structure of the human 
unconscious, he understood as universal.478 But until the late 1950s, and “Le 
Mythe aujourd’hui” is a prime example of this, Barthes was more interested in
478 Another influence on both Barthes and Levi-Strauss was the work of the Russian Formalist 
folklorist Vladimir Propp, which suggested a finite and universal set of morphemes (functions 
and roles) structuring folk narratives. Vladimir Propp, Morphology o f the Folktale, trans. by 
Lawrence Scott (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958 [1928]).
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the ‘bigger picture’ of the ideological purpose of myth, rather than the workings 
of its semiological structure. As he confessed later, he had hoped that structural 
anthropology would cut through the social and historical thicket to find society’s 
systems of classification and expose its fundamental structure, its ‘socio- 
logique\ This total anthropology of contemporary culture was the aim of 
Barthes’s semiology.479
The position of Barthes’s critique was rather precarious, and eventually 
he needed, like the nouveaux romanciers (particularly Robbe-Grillet), to defend 
his critical viewpoint against established and traditionalist critics. Barthes’s Sur 
Racine (1963) and Essais critiques (1964) aroused the wrath of Raymond Picard, 
an eminent Sorbonnard, who had written on Racine a decade earlier. In Nouvelle 
Critique ou nouvelle imposture (1965) Picard attacked Barthes and other 
(pejoratively ‘new’) critics, like Lucien Goldmann, Barthes’s colleague at the 
magazine Theatre populaire. Responding in Critique et verite (1966), Barthes 
reiterated his position that criticism necessarily involved value judgments that 
reflect some ideological investment; the vanguard of French criticism relied on 
verisimilitude, being the similarity to the ‘tried and true’ common practice and 
‘common sense’.480 As an ideology, critical verisimilitude could be examined 
semiologically, through the unspoken rules that govern it at the time, being 
objectivity, ‘good taste’, clarity, and literality. To Barthes, what was presented as 
‘objectivity’ was a naturalised bourgeois consensus; ‘good taste’ was merely a 
system prohibiting unsanctioned topics, methods and language; ‘clarity’ was 
another form of social control, approving bourgeois ‘language’ and dismissing 
all else as ‘jargon’; and the inability of the traditional critic to fathom symbolic 
uses of language was his own failing, an a-symbolia.m
Barthes claimed that the realisation of the symbolic nature of language, 
partly through Structuralism, was evidence that times were changing: “we are
479 Roland Barthes, “Sociologie et socio-logique: a propos de deux ouvrages de Claude Levi- 
Strauss,” CEuvres Completes I: 1942-1965 (Paris: Seuil, 1993), 967-978; Lavers, 104-106, 
112,117-118.
480 Roland Barthes, Criticism and Truth, trans. and ed. by Katrine Pilcher Keuneman, foreword 
by Philip Thody (London: The Athlone Press, 1987), 30-35. Originally published as Barthes, 
Critique et verite (Paris: Seuil, 1966).
481 Barthes, Criticism and Truth, 39-40, 42-43, 48-52, 57.
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entering a general crisis o f commentary,” that corresponds to the already-familiar 
crisis of writing, and “brings the critic closer to the writer.”482 From a synchronic 
examination, “the very definition of the work is changing: it is no longer a 
historical fact, it is becoming an anthropological fact, since no history can 
exhaust its meaning.”483 Criticism, which had always been about asserting 
evaluative authority, had to change, too, as the literary fiction that Barthes and 
Robbe-Grillet wanted to see denied authoritative interpretation. To Barthes, 
while structural semiologists (as scientists) examined literature for the conditions 
of its signification and for its possible meaning, the critic’s work of interpretation 
was creative: “the author and the work are only the starting-points of an analysis 
whose horizon is a language.”484
This correspondence between two essentially creative activities -  the new 
novel and new criticism -  suggests their consideration in tandem. In fact, the 
1950s also saw the rise of a new school of French filmmakers who were 
influenced by the new fiction and criticism, who were accordingly named la 
nouvelle vague. The association between nouveaux romanciers and new wave 
cinema was cemented through collaborations: Alain Resnais, in particular, 
collaborated with both Duras (in Hiroshima mon amour) and Robbe-Grillet 
(L 'Annie derniere a Marienbad, 1960). The nouvelle vague struggled with the 
same cultural canon as the nouveau roman, and this was apparent even when 
they were not collaborating. In his Les Quatre cent coups (1959) Truffaut’s alter 
ego, the adolescent Antoine Doinel, discovers and idolises Balzac, plagiarising 
him for a school essay to his teacher’s pleasure (subtext: the establishment revels 
in the familiar) and creating a shrine for him, that bums down (subtext: parody of 
popular idolatry and its outcome). The affinity between new wave and new novel 
was more a matter of outlook than of generation: Duras was nearly a decade 
older than Resnais; and Truffaut, thirty-two years Sarraute’s junior, was 
influenced by her “Age of Suspicion” in his foundational text of the nouvelle 
vague, “Une Certaine tendance du cinema fran9ais.”485
482 Barthes, Criticism and Truth, 66 (my italics).
483 Barthes, Criticism and Truth, 67.
484 Barthes, Criticism and Truth, 77, 79; Moriarty, Roland Barthes, 3, 109-110.
485 Francois Truffaut, “Une Certaine Tendance du cinema franpais,” Le Plaisir des yeux (Paris: 
Cahiers du cinema, 1987), 192-206.
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The nouveau roman, nouvelle vague, and what Picard had named 
nouvelle critique are best considered together, as avant-gardist attempts to 
change their respective fields of practice, seen as falling out of step with their 
purpose. Later this was related to the idea of ‘the death of the author,’ associated 
with Barthes, Foucault and anti-humanism (as noted above in the introduction). It 
is a radical idea -  the death of the author as the liberation of the reader -  
highlighting the radicalism of what it opposed: the belief that the author is the 
ultimate signified of the text. But the idea of the reader’s liberation was current 
in postwar French literary discourse before 1968: the reader had been reasserting 
his position at least since Sarraute’s “L’Ere du soup^n” (published in 1950 but 
written in 1947), having tired of the author’s foreign presence in the text, and 
then again in Robbe-Grillet’s “On Some Obsolete Notions” (1957), relieved of 
‘content’ and ‘meaning’.
Lynn Higgins, who studied the new novel, new criticism and new wave 
together, suggested other elements informing their shared experience. Firstly, she 
introduces the Freudian notion of Nachtraglichkeit (deferred, belated action), 
which reveals “the belated necessity of negotiating the relative consequences of 
memory and continued denial.” The new ventures sought innovation to escape 
plodding the same traditional avenues, but by defining themselves in 
contradistinction to tradition, they affirmed its importance: Sarraute, Butor and 
Robbe-Grillet were acutely aware of the traditions of the novel; Truffaut and 
Resnais engaged with past cinema both in their early careers (as a film writer and 
an assistant director respectively) and in their films, through intertextual 
allusions and play with conventional anticipations; and Barthes was fascinated by 
traditions of writing, be it history (Michelet), drama (Racine), or utopian thought 
(Fourier). The nouveaux practitioners saw themselves as standing on the 
shoulders of giants, seeing further in no small part thanks to their predecessors. 
Then again, that also owed much to the specific postwar juncture: “World War II 
is never far below the surface, and its unresolved issues shape both postwar
486 Lynn A. Higgins, New Novel, New Wave, New Politics: Fiction and the Representation o f 
History in Postwar France (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 209- 
212 [henceforth: Higgins, New Novel].
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events and texts, and within texts, both anecdote and form.” In France, these 
unresolved issues were prolonged, as we have seen, by postwar distortions of the 
past and its memory, particularly owing to “the rhetorical power of Gaullist 
oratory to manipulate images and construct histories.”488 Lacking tools 
independently and objectively to assess the past, the nouveaux worked with what 
they had -  individual perception and memory. Their texts, as Hiroshima mon 
amour will demonstrate, “do not always represent, but they do re-present in one 
way or another: flashbacks, primal scenes, hysterical discourses, ironies, 
repetitiousness, and the uncanny.”489 Importantly, this expression took the form 
of the contours of mental experience, particularly of deferred or revisited 
experience, leaving the reader not even with sensory (or intuitive) perception but 
with its remains.
The post-war and anti-Gaullist elements of the new artistic ventures were 
also reflected in contemporary journalism and particularly in one new current 
affairs weekly, L ’Express. Starting publication in 1953 as a weekly supplement 
to the economic newspaper Les Echos, it was later relaunched as France’s first 
weekly magazine, taking an American format modelled on Time magazine. 
L ’Express was led by two young co-editors: its owner, Jean-Jacques Servan- 
Schreiber, a former journalist for another postwar paper, Le Monde', and 
Frangoise Giroud, until then the co-editor of Elle. From the outset L ’Express was 
a left-liberal paper, campaigning for the unpopular anti-colonialist cause and for 
its political champion, Pierre Mendes-France. Its trenchant anti-colonialism 
provoked official antagonism in censorship and seizures, and in 1956 Servan- 
Schreiber (formerly a Free France pilot) was even drafted to serve in Algeria 490 
Still, the fresh fighting spirit of L ’Express attracted a young readership, 
particularly among the up-and-coming cadres, and a stellar list of contributors, 
including Sartre and Camus, Malraux and Frangois Mauriac. This was also where 
Robbe-Grillet defended his second novel, Le Voyeur (1955), in articles which
487 Higgins, New Novel, 213.
488 Higgins, New Novel, 214.
489 Higgins, New Novel, 211.
490 On his return he published a controversial witness account of French brutality in Algeria: 
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Lieutenant en Algerie (Paris: Julliard, 1957).
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later became the kernel of Pour un nouveau roman491 In 1957 L 'Express 
conducted a survey exploring the experience of eighteen-to-thirty-year-olds, a 
cohort bom entirely in the interwar period, which Giroud adapted into book form 
the following year as La Nouvelle vague.492 The study, which gave the filmic 
movement its name and which shaped Sartre’s understanding of youth in “The 
Frogs who Demand a King,” showed a generally decent cohort, who nevertheless 
felt alienated from established notions of truth and collectivity, and were 
suspicious of the Establishment and the ideologies of the day. They were 
generally happy with their lot, believed in love, marriage, peace and freedom, 
and cared about democracy, social injustices and the Algerian situation. 
However, they turned away from politics and the public sphere, feeling that 
while things had gone awry they were also beyond their influence. As chapter 5 
will elaborate, these youths shared a discrete young culture, only partly 
influenced by French mainstream culture, for while they were France’s 
inheritors, it was not yet theirs.
Hiroshima mon amour
The film Hiroshima mon amour (1959) provides a useful focal point for any 
discussion of postwar relations of French people to their personal and collective 
pasts and to the nation. The film, directed by Alain Resnais, was based on a 
screenplay by Marguerite Duras which was developed by the two in 
collaboration.493 The cinematic text is still a richer, more familiar and more 
complex point of reference than the screenplay, and will be considered in 
discussing the screenplay. The film is set against the advent of the nuclear age, 
relating specifically to the nuclear catastrophe of Japan at the end of the Second 
World War. As mentioned in the introduction, the nuclear ‘option’ was on the 
French agenda since 1952 and met no significant public opposition, so by 1959
491 Babcock, 9, 11.
492 Franfoise Giroud, La Nouvelle vague: portraits de la jeunesse (Paris: Gallimard, 1958).
493 All page references to the screenplay will be in parentheses in the main text, and will refer to 
the definitive edition: Marguerite Duras, Hiroshima mon amour (Paris: Gallimard/Folio, 
1960).
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the issue of nuclear armament and its consequences concerned France directly 
and concretely.494
The plot of Hiroshima mon amour breaks all three Aristotelian dramatic 
unities: time, place, and action. Only skeletal details are apparent: She (both 
main characters are unnamed) is a French film actress in Hiroshima to make a 
film ‘about the peace’ (in the shadow of the nuclear stalemate), and before the 
shooting wrap meets Him, a married Japanese architect, falling into a fleeting 
and clearly hopeless affair. In the process of this affair both relive moments of 
their past traumatic experiences: He with the bombing of Hiroshima, and She 
with the aftermath of her youthful affair with a German soldier during the 
Occupation. She not only saw her lover shot dead, but had to endure the 
retribution of her townsfolk at Nevers, who shaved her head at Liberation as was 
the custom with French women who had associated with Germans {femmes 
tondues). After being forced into hiding in the family cellar, she was let out and 
told to leave for Paris and never return. In Her encounter with Him, it becomes 
increasingly apparent that she sees and relives her old love through Him -  
another reason for the hopelessness of their affair. The disruption of linear space 
and time with the elision between Hiroshima and Nevers, the Japanese man and 
the German soldier, the living and the dead, is also a disruption of action, as the 
short narrative duration covered by the film -  two days -  is shot through with 
eruptions and irruptions of the longer duration of Her traumatic experience and 
thirteen-year post-traumatic mourning.
Despite the centrality of Hiroshima in the film, its entire Japanese 
element was bom out of Argos Films’ need to use up Yen capital they could not 
move out of Japan: they decided on a Franco-Japanese co-production and asked 
Resnais, until then a documentarist, to make a full-length film about the atomic 
bomb. After two abortive attempts Resnais despaired of his own documentary 
method, heavily reliant on archival material, and decided to abandon it for a kind 
of fictional storytelling, a narrative (recit). Secretly happy that the celebrated 
young novelist Franfoise Sagan had declined to write the screenplay, Resnais 
approached Duras, who eventually accepted.
494 Kedward, 394-395.
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Both Resnais and Duras were initially apprehensive about the Franco- 
Japanese project. For Resnais, addressing the Japanese nuclear catastrophe 
seemed both fitting and unfitting after his previous production, Nuit et brouillard 
(1956), which had been the first postwar film to deal, successfully and 
controversially, with the Nazi extermination camps. Resnais was expected to 
make a film about the bomb, and precisely for that he was reluctant to do so, 
dreading a possible ‘message film’ that would amount to a simple ‘never again!’ 
Eventually, Resnais and Duras decided to move the nuclear theme to the 
background of events.495 Duras later claimed that for two weeks she could not 
write a thing. She saw the script of Hiroshima mon amour as her failure in the 
face of the staggering phenomenon of Hiroshima, and claimed that the words of 
the Japanese lover, n ’as rien vu a Hiroshima” (22) accuse her, too.
Two months later, when Resnais went to Japan, Duras equipped him with 
a preliminary version of the dialogues and with what they called the film’s 
continuite souterraine (‘underground continuity’): descriptive passages meant 
only as reference for Resnais and his two leads, Emanuelle Riva and Eiji Okada, 
and not intended to be part of the completed filmic text (although some remain in 
the published screenplay). One could say that in the process of making a film 
about loss something was already lost, and the definitive versions of the film and 
the screenplay, the product of continuous rewriting, must be taken as intertexts, 
referring to- or even relying on- hidden or implicit parts of each other while 
displaying a surface full of silences and lacks. This, together with Duras’s 
admitted ‘failure’ to address her subjects adequately suggests the ultimate 
impossibility of speaking of Hiroshima, which, together with the hopeless love 
story, is both “unforgettable and unrepresentable”.496
495 “I said to her, “...there are planes carrying atomic bombs which are perpetually flying... over 
our planet and over our conversation... But despite that... the day is carrying on as usual.” So 
the film we ought to have been making was... what you might call a traditional love story in 
which the atomic bomb would be... like a sort of backdrop.” Resnais in undated radio 
interview (anonymous translation), from Luc Lagier, Hiroshima le temps d ’un retour (France: 
CineCinema -  PdJ Production, 2004). The film credits the Archives sonores IN A as a source.
496 Lynn A. Higgins, “Durasian (Pre)Occupations,” L ’Esprit Createur XXX, 2 (Summer 1990), 
52.
190
Pascal Ory considers Auschwitz and Hiroshima to be the two images 
dominating French culture of the first postwar decade.497 European mass- 
extermination and the Japanese nuclear catastrophe symbolised an age of 
unprecedented brutality in the mid-twentieth century, but left odd traces in 
history and memory. This is because both events in their devastation and totality 
are what Hayden White called ‘holocaustal’, a new kind of event in human 
experience and representation -  the modernist event. White borrowed from 
psychoanalytic discourse in defining the modernist event as one which by 
magnitude and singularity is, like infantile traumas in neurotic individuals, 
neither completely forgotten nor adequately remembered. White followed 
Fredric Jameson in noting that literary modernism is the product of a ‘social 
crisis of narratable experiences ’ and a ‘semiotic crisis of narrative paradigms \498 
Realist representation, relying on human agency, causality and closure, is 
categorically inadequate for representing the modernist event; instead, it should 
be represented by ‘de-realisation’, by voiding it of any ‘intrinsic’ significance 
and reference. This ‘de-realisation’ functions as both a social and a literary 
effect: modernist narrative may de-fetishise signification in representation, and 
so may have a therapeutic effect, facilitating the process of mourning. Its biggest 
challenge is to preserve the not-fully-representable signified (catastrophe) as 
nevertheless more important than its signifier (the modernist narrative). 
However, this makes the expressive function the only stable unity of the 
modernist narrative.
The paradigmatic nature of Auschwitz and Hiroshima as the sign of the 
times after 1945 has been widely recognised, in literary and theoretical circles 
mostly as representation, what Duras called the ‘malady of death’. Addressing 
this, Julia Kristeva suggested that the problem of naming the ‘invisible’ leads to 
illogicality and silence, producing a new rhetoric of images based on our 
melancholy fidelity to the horror, leading Duras to aesthetic awkwardness. As 
she resists the glib catharsis of sheer verbal outlet, Duras offers only minimal
497 Ory, 124.
498 Hayden White, “The Modernist Event,” The Persistence o f History: Cinema, Television, and 
the Modern Event, ed. by Vivian Sobchack (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), 20, 
23-24; quoting from Fredric Jameson, Sartre: The Origins o f a Style (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), 37-38, n. 15 (my italics).
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catharsis: one is left with the pain itself and no redemptive horizons.499 The 
construction of the Japanese lover as the lost German lover, with whom (as 
object of loss and mourning) She had already been identified, could be 
interpreted as such ‘aesthetic awkwardness’. Their separation comes in the final 
scene, when She names the Japanese lover and lets him name her: the names, 
while not proper, are indices of individuation and a new apartness of self from 
other. A turning point in the process comes in the recounting scene at the 
riverside cafe, when She first manages to adequately express her experience, 
mastering absence by assuming control of her past and her dissociated self.
One of the first striking features of Hiroshima mon amour is the 
anonymity of its characters, giving it a fabulated, unrealistic feel, which can be 
understood as part of the fictional narrative’s attempt to ‘de-signify’ reality. After 
all, the nuclear cataclysm underlying the narrative beggars belief and creates an 
awkwardness (following Kristeva), being a symptom of the ‘social crisis of 
narratable experiences’ (following White). Yet the anonymity of the characters 
does not simply reference the external world; rather, as Emma Wilson suggests, 
the narrative depends on anonymity to highlight the constructed nature of the self 
as subject and object. The identity of the French actress rests here on the role she 
plays for other people, being her German and Japanese lovers.500 The role of the 
Frenchwoman as lover and love object only springs from an intense need of two 
alienated strangers to nurse their psychological wounds by taking refuge within 
each other.501 This anonymity is sustained within skeletal character formation, 
and led even Resnais to compensate for this meagreness with speculation: “we 
used to spend evenings making up all kinds of stories about her. For instance, she 
is really a compulsive liar and the Nevers story... is nothing but a fabrication. Or 
maybe she has just been released from an asylum and she has made up the
499 Julia Kristeva, “The Pain of Sorrow in the Modem World: The Works of Marguerite Duras,” 
trans. by Katharine A. Jensen, PMLA 102, 2 (March 1987), 138-141.
500 Emma Wilson, ““Duras mon amour”: identite et mensonge,” Dalhousie French Studies 50 
(Spring 2000), 10.
501 Peter Schulman, “Vercors et Duras: Toccupation des silences,” New Zealand Journal o f 
French Studies 19, 1 (1998), 19-20.
192
complete story. You can see to what degree her personality could evade us as 
well as the spectator.”502
Apart from the fabulation or de-realisation device, another possible 
reason for character anonymity is the metonymical position of the individual as 
the voice of the world: their singularity aside, characters are nameless tropes of 
universal humanity. In Hiroshima mon amour this could be a statement about the 
postwar West: people afflicted by a “functioning schizophrenia”, tom by the 
desire to unburden themselves of untold pain and untellable horrors, and the guilt 
in betraying that painful memory.503 This reflects all life after trauma: pulling 
away from the loss, if at all possible, makes it difficult to access the pain that 
became definitive of the self. Perhaps this is what drew the Frenchwoman to 
cling to her own disfigurement -  her shaved hair, her bleeding hands from 
scratching the cellar walls, her emotional scarring.504 In this context Kristeva’s 
suggestion that “we are survivors, the living dead... harbouring our personal 
Hiroshima in the hollow of our private world” rather overstretched 
universalism.505 In seeing the ‘survivors’ as all humanity after Hiroshima, 
Kristeva presumed to ventriloquise the real survivors, the Holocaust’s ‘living 
dead’, and to appropriate their shattered experience as a lesson and a badge. She 
overlooked the gulf of identification categorically distinguishing survivors from 
the rest, who can only approximate them with imagination and empathy. It is 
perhaps more appropriate to see the France-Japan link as a memory-by-analogy, 
whereby the foreign disaster made universal facilitates French negotiations of 
French pasts, which by their very parity with Hiroshima are revealed as the real 
subject of the film.506
502 Wilson, 11. Quoted from Alain Resnais, “Hiroshima mon amour: A Composite Interview with 
Alain Resnais” in Robert Hughes (ed.), Film: Book 2: Films o f Peace and War (New York 
and London: Grove Press, 1962), 63.
503 Keith Cohen, “Pleasures of Voicing: Oral Intermittences in Two Films by Alain Resnais,” 
L ’Esprit CreateurXXX, 2 (Summer 1990), 65.
504 Deborah Lesko Baker, “Memory, Love, and Inaccessibility in Hiroshima mon amour f  
Marguerite Duras Lives On, ed. by Janine Ricouart (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1998), 30.
505 Kristeva, 151.
506 See Nancy Wood, Vectors o f  Memory: Legacies o f Trauma in Postwar Europe (Oxford: Berg, 
1999), 185-193.
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The theme of the presence of death within life as permanent wound is 
apparent in Hiroshima mon amour in several ways.507 Most obviously, the 
doubling of the German lover in/by the Japanese lover is a symbolic 
reincarnation of death in life. As She repeatedly puts it, this is a devouring 
passion: “tu me tues, tu me fais du bien” (115).508 Because She loves a dead man 
(the German lover), the image of her living lover (the Japanese) blends with that 
of the dead one, as another instance of a desire for the impossible, leading 
Kristeva to ask rhetorically of the film’s title, “is my love a Hiroshima or do I 
love Hiroshima because its pain is my eros?”509 If the desire for death is 
symbolically the desire for alterity, the doubled lovers are unsurprisingly 
outsiders: both are not French, and both have paid a price for being on the side of 
the ‘enemy’. She, too, paid a price for her interaction with the other side in being 
‘buried alive’ in her parents’ cellar and being erased from Nevers when her 
parents pretended she had died. Her recollection and expression of that 
experience are severely disrupted by her madness then: she was alive, but 
socially and affectively dead, as something in her had died with her German 
lover. While her pain and wounds confirmed her physical being, her life was 
filled, even reasoned, by mourning. Striving to survive their dead love, She 
became like a dead woman, socially and temporally dissociated, fascinated and 
identified with the object of her mourning.510
Symbolically, death-within-life is analogous to a broader theme, that of 
‘having’ and losing, presence and absence (or lack), going well beyond the
507 It is perhaps unsurprising, considering Duras’s quasi-Heideggerian existentialism: “Death, the 
fact of death coming towards you, is also a memory. Like the present. It’s completely here, 
like the memory of what has already happened and the thought of what is still to come.” 
Marguerite Duras, Practicalities: Marguerite Duras Speaks to Jerome Beaujour, trans. by 
Barbara Bray (London: Flamingo/HarperCollins, 1990), 64 [Originally titled La Vie 
materielle].
508 Nancy Lane, “The Subject in/of History: Hiroshima Mon Amour,” Literature and Film in the 
Historical Dimension, ed. by John D. Simons (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 
91.
509 Kristeva, 142.
510 Kristeva, 143. Then again, in psychoanalysis mourning is always in a problematic relationship 
with its ‘origin’/source, as with representation; cf. Sharon Willis, Marguerite Duras: Writing 
on the Body (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 58, 60.
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interpersonal relations between the Frenchwoman and her doubled lovers. 
Hiroshima in the film signifies ‘nothing’, that is, both nil (rien) and nothingness 
(le neant), and its traces as seen by Her are illegible, traces of nothing.511 This is 
another way to read the Japanese lover’s resistance of Her attempts at 
signification: “tu n *as rien vu a Hiroshima” (she later names him Hiroshima, an 
avatar of the dead). The horrific devastation of Hiroshima is thus not only the 
horror of brutality but also the horror o f the void. It exerts immense pressure on 
Her: on what she takes as her self, on the validity of her experience and memory, 
on her understanding of event and history. Duras and Resnais chose not to 
resolve this impasse: Duras in her unredemptive, aporetic narrative, and Resnais 
in simply questioning the knowability of the past and distrusting narrativisation 
of experience.512
The obverse of death-in-life, as the human condition of the post-traumatic 
survivor, is life-in-death -  the continuation of the past and its dead through 
remembrance, and the issue of memory and forgetting it raises. Remembrance is 
broadly therapeutic, allowing the past to be recovered adequately and to be 
overcome in order for the rest of life to move on and not be stuck in repetition. 
Yet some memory is literally mute -  unuttered, unutterable -  like Her memory of 
Nevers. This muteness could be the ‘trace of an absence’ of which Kristeva 
writes, appearing as the ‘nothing’ constantly evoked in the plot, which fails (or
c  1 "1
perhaps succeeds) in being expressed. The Frenchwoman’s suffering, muted in 
Nevers, is given a voice in her narration at the riverside cafe, and in what it 
enables her to do: to plot her personal history, seemingly unintelligible to her 
until it was recounted.514 The apparent futility of her efforts to encompass her 
past trauma stokes a passion, perhaps an obsession, with doing just that: trying 
repeatedly to express this histoire (as story and as history).515
511 Lane, 96.
512 Dana Strand, ““Documenting” the National Past in French Film,” Pacific Coast Philology 39 
(2004), 24. The failure to perform, repeat or access that which may not even be there may be 
explained as a symptom of Freudian hysteria; Willis, 33-34, 37.
513 Kristeva, 146, 151.
514 Lane, 93.
515 Willis, 35.
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Precisely because this recollection is performative, indeed discursive, it 
relies considerably on the participation and actuation of an interlocutor. Gilles 
Deleuze suggested that here, with “two incommensurable regions of past, 
Hiroshima and Nevers”, and as the Japanese man refuses the Frenchwoman’s 
entry into his region of memory, She must draw him willingly into hers, thus 
creating in a sense a ‘memory for two’, independent of their respective 
persons.516 She might like to do so: as co-subject, the Japanese lover would thus 
help her shoulder its burden (which he does anyway by helping her tell her 
story); he would also be an object of that memory (as the dead German’s 
double). This is consistent with a broader tendency, which Lynn Higgins called a 
‘Durassian fantasme fondamentaV \ the centrality of the collapse of difference -  
temporal (concerning before and after, past and present), cultural, and most 
importantly personal, biographical -  and its figuration as both desired and 
feared.517 This explains the situated character of remembrance in Hiroshima mon 
amour. Hiroshima as a lieu de memoire is like a Benjaminian allegorical ruin: 
simultaneously difference unfolded and difference collapsed, its hollowed-out 
presence is both signified and signifier. By seeing the place and the trace, She 
thinks she recovered the past and has ‘seen everything at Hiroshima.’518 But 
unlike Benjamin’s allegory, what is recovered here is not necessarily 
enlightening: memory in itself, painful and at times barely intelligible, does not 
help the Frenchwoman.
Memory and forgetting in Hiroshima mon amour are both deeply 
ambiguous, being each a metaphor for both death and rebirth. Remembering is 
both a conquest of death-in-oblivion and a death in reasserting the loss of the 
German lover, fuelling a death wish (as identification with the object of loss). 
Forgetting is analogous to real death as both are discontinuities, but it also leaves 
the past behind, giving hope for a resumption of ‘normal’ life. Hiroshima mon 
amour probably foregrounds forgetting at least as much as it does memory. It 
was suggested that in her recovery as subject the Frenchwoman must move on 
from her site of remembrance and efface Hiroshima (her lover and the city). As
516 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1989), 117-118.
517 Higgins, 56; Willis, 51.
5,8 Lane, 95.
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she finishes expressing her narrative, in an alcohol-induced trance-like state, all 
that remains for her is the memory of her failure of memory. Her voice lingers as 
the picture moves on, saying (perhaps in internal monologue), “look how I forget 
you... look how I’ve forgotten you. Look at me” (110). The act of remembering 
becomes the moment of loss, death and forgetting. Her forgetting already blurs 
the Japanese lover who still sits across from her, looking at her, touching her: her 
re-emergence into the present is as much a lieu de memoire as it is a lieu d ’oubli, 
and that forgetting is already concerned mainly with itself.519
Nevertheless, neither forgetting nor remembering is concerned with the 
self alone: the sense of the social or the collective is an integral part of individual 
memory, of biography; in Rousso’s terms, ‘history’ is always already some part 
of ‘memory’. In this ‘age of testimony’ (following Elie Wiesel), the loss of 
individual subjectivity in the social function of telling may lead one to wonder 
whether anything other than collective experience can be represented. But 
collective memory is a precarious, fluid nexus of representations and narratives 
prone to revision and elision in favour of the common ground. The 
Frenchwoman’s private memories and biography are embedded in public history, 
with which she must engage and make her own histoire; and yet she experiences 
the public past, like her Japanese lover, as a lived past (le vecu). As Sharon 
Willis has it, “the moment of trauma is situated at the intersection of historical 
and personal past, which throws into question both the public-private split... and 
our thinking of history as a set of events collectively produced and retroactively 
interpreted, narrated...” Historical referentiality crosses here the problems of 
psychic representation and of meaning. It remains hinged on intention, on the 
subjective will to remember and, in the case of collective memory, to turn lieux 
d ’histoire into lieux de memoire.521
The Frenchwoman’s private experience is linked with the wider 
social/public experience in a chiasmus', between public liberation and private
519 Lesko Baker, 33-35; Lane, 94; Wilson, 12; Willis, 42; Deleuze, 300 n. 28.
520 Victoria Best and Kathryn Robson, “Memory and Innovation in Post-Holocaust France,” 
French Studies LIX, 1 (January 2005), 2; Lane suggested that, however diffusely, Hiroshima 
mon amour was Duras’s first work that foregrounded public (social, external, political) 
history; Lane, 90, 98.
521 Willis, 24-25, 59; Higgins, 50; Wood, 3.
197
suffering (the tragic love story with the German); between private liberation and 
public suffering (Hiroshima’s catastrophe as the context of the woman’s self- 
assertion); and between private passion and public horror. Her personal tragedy 
in Nevers is doubled by a social silencing that defines her grief; the silence is 
only broken in a faraway land, thirteen years later, in confessing to a kind 
stranger, with his cajoling and a generous helping of dutch courage. Perhaps She 
needed to come this far to get something from social interactions that she could 
not get back in France, namely sympathy with her story, which Duras requires of 
her readers/viewers. She cannot speak out her grief in France because it is 
considered illegitimate, and if her grief work is as imbued with the social as her 
personal experience is, then the withheld social sanction obstructs her recovery, 
overcoming and commencement. This sense of social solitude, coupled by a 
sense of imprisonment, even claustrophobia, is one of the symptoms of a deeper
522sense of alienation writ large in Hiroshima mon amour.
But what of the future? Since Nuit et Brouillard Resnais seemed to have 
become more pessimistic, and in Hiroshima mon amour he and Duras reaffirmed 
their belief that what had been is also what will be. Duras instructs that the film 
open with documentary images of the Bikini ‘mushroom’, the cloud towering 
over the thermonuclear test site in the South Pacific; the iconic image was to be 
simultaneously naturalised and denaturalised (22), and the viewers were to get 
the feeling of seeing this image again and of seeing it for the first time (21). 
Repetition seems inevitable, both as a repeated reduplication in space and as 
repetition in time, ending up with a picture of the hell of eternal return, the abyss 
of the same. This feeling of powerlessness in the face of history was shared by 
many French people in the mid-1950s and generally transcended generational 
divides.
522 Lane, 91; Lesko Baker, 32; Schulman, 17, 19; Yves Berger, “Marguerite Duras,” in Bernard 
Pingaud, Ecrivains d ’aujourd’hui 1940-1960 (Paris, 1962), 207-209.
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Summary: The Present Too is a Foreign Country
The issue of national identity is sensitive to challenges, not least because, as 
‘imagined community’, it is a construct, a narrativisation of social reality and 
hegemonic fantasy, sustained by ‘collective memory’ which is inevitably at odds 
with personal recollection.523 One reason that the postwar period was associated 
with decline in British and French imaginary is the transformation of the interwar 
social and discursive order. Considering the centrality of class in Britain, this was 
related to the erosion of the status of the old middle class, and the dismantling of 
the empire that sustained the old social order. Considering the centrality of 
France as nation and republic in its own public discourse, this was related to the 
failure of successive regimes to maintain France’s proud image of itself, be it in 
Vichy collaboration or in the Fourth Republic’s mishandling of colonial crises. 
The association of the postwar period with decline led to two contrasting 
reactions to the preceding wartime period: the British, who saw it as ‘their finest 
hour’, sought to perpetuate wartime mentality and the impression of war; the 
French, divided and shamed by their wartime experience, sought to escape it.
British postwar cultural pessimism with regard to national identity has 
several narratives embedded in it. Firstly, the narrative of ‘culture under threat’ 
was a conservative sentiment with regard to an extinct grand-bourgeois 
hegemony, informed in no small part by nostalgia for an imagined virtuous, 
rural, pre-industrial past. The threat in this sense was to established, hegemonic 
culture and its beneficiaries, the old middle class, whose hold on universities and 
‘high’ culture seemed to be weakened by the increasing involvement of the 
working class in British mainstream culture. The Leavisite reaction in the Two 
Cultures debate exemplified this defensive attitude in the face of the ‘threat’ from 
science, although elsewhere, regarding the primacy of traditional realism, Leavis 
and Snow were in accord, attacked together by Wilson as parochial and 
obstructing creativity. The ‘crisis in the humanities’ discourse suggests a similar 
sense of threat, but it is unclear whether it is a threat to the status of the
523 The term is taken from Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism, rev. edn (London: Verso, 1991 [1983]), 5-7.
199
humanities (as with the Two Cultures) or to their old purpose as part of the 
establishment (in favour of the critical role of covering British society’s ‘absent 
centre’). The resultant declinist mentalite was primarily elitist and change-averse, 
even when that change involved academic expansion or greater public access to 
culture, through the custody of the Third Programme and the Arts Council. It 
manifested itself in the siege mentality of ivory-tower elitists like Leavis, as well 
as in the sense of disorientation of more public-oriented intellectuals like Plumb.
Secondly, the secret and hitherto unexplored nature of Englishness itself 
came under scrutiny: as pointed out by Anderson and Collini, the idea of national 
entity was a French obsession and was something the British had never needed to 
contemplate seriously. The very ‘discovery’ cast it as already endangered and in 
need of a nostalgic endeavour to reference it in order to validate it. This view was 
influenced by the Leavisite culturalist turn in academic English studies which, 
together with Keynes’s perception of British decolonisation as an opportunity for 
national revival, informed the cultural studies endeavour of rediscovering 
demetropolitanised England. Drawing more popular attention to Englishness 
were the activities of the National Trust, which sought to salvage and conserve 
the endangered ‘heritage’ embodying national ‘spirit’. The evolution of a 
‘heritage industry’ in the model of the National Trust is one manifestation of this 
‘invention of tradition’ in the absent centre of culture; fictionally, the heritage 
fetish of identity (like the fetish of alterity of modernist primitivism) was gently 
mocked by Wilson in the picture of Anglo-Saxon attitudes that are merely 
projections, covering for no ‘essence’, either in the far past or in the present. 
Wilson’s bitterness reflected his frustration with this convenient nostalgic 
hypocrisy which, when massified, became part of a ‘bread and circuses’ 
perception of the past.
French postwar cultural pessimism regarding national identity was tied up 
with some of its own, more general narratives. Firstly, a particularly great 
challenge was posed by the need to re-establish continuity with the French past 
to validate the present, what Collini called its ‘tradition of memory’. Collective 
self-definition had been a French republican obsession as a polity founded on 
eternal, absolute ideals -  contrasting with recurrent political convulsions of one 
directoire, two monarchies, two empires and five republics. But the real legacy 
of contempt was that of the annees noires, from the ‘strange defeat’ of 1940 to
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the Liberation, which was a definitive fault line in French historical-cultural 
continuity and so sensitive that the mere reference to it, as Rousso showed, was 
topical. This ‘Vichy Syndrome’ regarding the past touched on what Duhamel 
defined as the French fear of decline, and remained profoundly influential on 
contesting postwar French national narratives and their outlooks on the future. 
The mutually constitutive narratives of Gaullist authoritarianism, French 
Communism, conservative social democracy and traditionalist reactionary 
Poujadism carried with them divergent prescriptions for French cohesion. Of 
these, the Gaullist line emerged triumphant, delegitimating Communist and 
traditionalist-nationalist narratives as splinter narratives and, as the 
Frenchwoman’s story in Hiroshima mon amour shows, overriding personal 
memory by collective remembrance. For a while, the contesting national 
narratives seemed to agree on a definition of France’s limits as an empire, but 
this agreement was fractured as the Algerian war wore on. Algeria turned out to 
be as contested as Vichy, drawing on French nationalism, colonialism and 
racism, and directly affecting fears for French difference and collective 
definition.
Secondly, the discourse that in Britain was shaped by the defence of 
‘endangered culture’ was in France associated with a brash ‘newness’. The 
nouvelle vague as the generational mentality of postwar youths, so different to 
their elders, joined the New Novel and its New Critique, and cinematic New 
Wave, and presented a picture of irreverence for tradition and authority that 
threatened orthodoxy. Postwar French youths, as will be discussed in chapter 5, 
felt their own value but also their own powerlessness to influence public affairs, 
a political aspect of cultural pessimism which led to their ‘abstentionism’. As for 
the practitioners of the new ventures, they were acutely aware of their belated 
place with regard to tradition, ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ and being 
defined by the tradition they criticised while attempting to take it beyond its 
impasse of representations of reality. These representations, as Sarraute, Robbe- 
Grillet and Barthes were fully aware, were mystifications that manipulated the 
public image and ‘collective memory’ of the past and present, not least through 
the Gaullist myth, which they and others opposed politically.
French and British varieties of postwar cultural pessimism share the 
common concern with a crisis in the representation of reality, past and present,
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and a crisis of prospective and ideal (utopian) thought. Marwick, Gasiorek and 
Kumar reiterate the link between a social crisis and a semiotic crisis outlined 
more generally by Jameson and White. In Britain, the Movement reflected this 
crisis in fiction, as did working-class ‘kitchen sink’ writing and the middle-class 
fiction of Angus Wilson. Anglo-Saxon Attitudes in particular presents the crisis 
of representation as multiple: the liberal crisis of individual self-representation, 
and the crisis of collective self-representation in the received, projected notions 
of Englishness. Wilson’s failed attempt at a ‘Dickensian’ ‘condition of England’ 
novel, together with the restricted social settings of mid-1950s new fiction both 
instantiate an inability to provide comprehensive realist narratives of 
contemporary British society. The French semiotic crisis was painful because the 
necessary reformulation of France and Frenchness also implied the critique of 
republicanism and imperialism and an admission of France’s shrinking size and 
importance. The Gaullist myth invoked French ‘destiny’ and ‘grandeur’ to cover 
both faults, de-realising the image of France until it was abstract enough to be 
acceptable. The Algerian war was also a site of recruiting political and 
ideological traditions to shape the changing circumstances of colonialism, 
invoking them as ‘heritage’, as nostalgic foil and as a nationalist fantasy. 
Hiroshima mon amour was another attempt to ‘de-realise’ experience, by which 
Duras and Resnais sought to articulate the unsaid: to make ‘holocaustal events’ 
like Hiroshima, and by analogy French personal and national traumas, 
representable through ‘modernist narratives’. Neither was convinced that their 
rendering was successful, and this collaboration reflects their pessimistic anxiety 
that such catastrophes might repeat themselves. Underlying it is a technological 
pessimism regarding the means that sustained the nuclear age and its ‘assured 
destruction’, being the manifestation of a general disillusionment with human 
technological progress.
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Section 3: Cultural Pessimism, Modernisation and 
Youth Culture
Preceding sections presented literary works that were more or less 
contemporaneous. Due to the wider time gap between them (over a decade), 
works discussed in this section are presented chronologically. This also allows 
me to suggest a frame to the period discussed, with Vian’s novel reflecting the 
immediate postwar experience, and Maclnnes’s envisioning the shape of things 
to come in the early 1960s.
Chapter 5: France -  The Big Leap
French youths were to a great degree misunderstood by their elders, whom they 
did not seek to emulate. The widening generation gap was aggravated for older 
observers by a whole new postwar socioeconomic order, enabled by France’s 
rapid reconstruction and modernisation. Wanting to turn their backs on the 
Second World War, and decidedly unattached to the interwar order, French 
youths who matured into the new reality were ready adopters of the elements 
informing it: American popular culture, consumerism, and the new symbolic 
order they brought with them.
To some extent the changing profile of French youth was anticipated, and 
it was addressed in several studies of the period, of which Giroud’s La Nouvelle 
vague is but one.524 In these studies the new ‘youth culture’ was seen to be 
culturally materialist and politically abstentionist; both traits could have been 
mitigated by considering the wider social context of France at the time, but that 
was not always done. Instead, the compensation for French youths’ perceived 
decline came in the form of reiteration of the great hopes attached to them as 
agents of the nation’s future -  a future which the sociologist Edgar Morin saw as
524 See the second part of chapter 4 above, introducing Giroud’s study with her L ’Express work.
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the juvenilisation of all contemporary culture.525 The extent of young people’s 
estrangement from French traditions as from the politics of the time was, in 
retrospect, underestimated: later, this frustration at their relative deprivation in 
political and social representation erupted in the student revolt of 1968.
To understand the factors informing the postwar cultural experience in 
France generally and among French youths in particular, this chapter will survey 
the ways in which France’s modernised new order was shaped by the adoption of 
American industrial, commercial and cultural models, and how this was linked to 
another important trend, French decolonisation. The hostile reception of youth 
culture reflected anxieties about American-style modernisation and the 
reformulation of France as a decolonised nation-state. The chapter will conclude 
with a consideration of Boris Vian’s experimental novel L ’Ecume des jours. This 
novel and the context of its production -  the immediate postwar period -  help 
illuminate the French anticipations of change at the end of the Second World 
War and the frustration of these expectations under the Fourth and early Fifth 
Republics.
Youth as Cult and Reality
In the postwar climate of rapid cultural and economic change, the difference 
between generations seemed more acute than ever. This gave rise to a 
mystification, almost a cult, of youth. More than before, the transitory period of 
adolescence was prized as a kind of paradise, distinct from the corruption of 
maturity and embodying all the hopes and future prospects of a fractured 
continent. The adult perspective valorised youth precisely because it inevitably 
represented what was lost.526 From an adult perspective, the fascination and 
preoccupation with youth was connected to the cultural-pessimistic trope of 
belatedness: the deja vu sense of living in an ageing world in which time and 
innovation seem to accelerate, leaving the adult observer behind. The belated 
perspective on youth also enabled them to be seen as inevitably, eventually 
corrupted and menacing: older observers no longer recognised themselves in
525 Edgar Morin, L ’Esprit du temps: Essai sur la culture de masse (Paris: Grasset, 1962).
526 See Davies, 246-256; and sporadic suggestions in chapters 3 and 4 of Christopher Robinson, 
French Literature in the Twentieth Century (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1980).
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their juniors, and this led to suspicion and to a rejection of the familiar projected 
innocence and promise of youth. This estrangement worked both ways: postwar 
youths were more inclined to distance themselves from their elders and create for 
themselves a new, ‘young world’, of which they were in command.
The common perception of postwar France was that it was an old and 
tired country that had lost its confidence.527 Such views in turn animated the 
French drive for a lengthy and all-encompassing process of modernisation -  of 
industry, of economy, of cultural and general consumption. Even in the early 
1960s the issue was seen starkly as either ‘“breaking through’ to modernity or 
declining.”528 In popular imagination the link between modernisation and the 
reinvigoration of France itself, as a state and nation, gained ground. Yet France’s 
drive to recapture its vitality, its youthfulness -  to ‘marry its century’ -  still 
acknowledged a certain lag that France needed to cover, and which was felt to be 
precarious. Inconveniently, France’s economic recovery and industrial 
modernisation relied extensively on American aid. Furthermore, in 
modernisation’s wake, the growing affluence of French youths increasingly 
offered them the opportunities to be less financially dependent on their elders and 
thereby to maintain cultural autonomy. By the end of the 1950s a distinct and 
‘Americanised’ youth culture had arisen, which attracted considerable popular 
and scholarly interest from the outset.
Sociological surveys of French youth started appearing in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. The overall impression in reading these publications, notes 
Marwick, is that French youth were considered primarily as adults-in-waiting, in 
the same way they had in the interwar periods and before. They were either seen 
to have ‘eternal problems’ that all youngsters before them had encountered, or 
some note was taken of the peculiarities of the current generation’s behaviour, in 
order to speculate about their potential influence as they matured.529 Journalism 
and art, on the other hand, responded quickly to the distinct cultural shift of 
postwar youths. Discernible youth subcultures were of course nothing new: 
during the war ‘zazous’ -  among them Boris Vian, discussed below -  had
527 Henri Perruchot, La France et sa jeunesse (Paris: Hachette/Les Grands problemes, 1958), 31.
528 Searching for the New France, ed. by James F. Hollifleld and George Ross (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), 5.
529 Marwick, Sixties, 96.
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celebrated spontaneous young life with clandestine parties and gatherings where 
they would listen to swing music and dance, all in defiance of Occupation 
restrictions. Frowned upon during the occupation, after the Liberation the zazous 
came to epitomise the pursuit of careless happiness among Parisian youths, and 
an anti-Vichy celebration of jazz, cafe society, existentialism and liberal
530sexuality, all in the name of fun.
The zazous were to a degree a taste of things to come, in that their 
rebellion was not so much against wartime restrictions as against all traditionally 
repressive authority; and in that their protest and alternative lifestyle did not 
discemibly present a consistent ideological alternative. This mindset certainly 
persisted and intensified over the thirteen years between the Liberation and the 
publication of the first popular accounts of youth culture, Henri Perruchot’s La 
France et sa jeunesse (1957), Fran9oise Giroud’s La Nouvelle Vague (1958, see 
my earlier comments on this), and Edgar Morin’s celebrated L ’Esprit du temps 
(1962).531 It was this defiant restlessness that the French government wanted to 
appropriate and co-opt. One way to do so was to better gauge public opinion 
through a national ‘soft statistics office’, the French Institute of Public Opinion 
(IFOP), which lent itself to part of Giroud’s 1958 study as well as to Jacques 
Duquesne’s 1961 survey, Les 16-24 Ans; another way, favoured by the Gaullist 
regime, was to influence the representation of youth in a triumphalist way, with 
government publications stressing the innovation and optimism of French youth, 
as well as the integral part they played in French society, rather than opposing it 
or revolting against it.532
Two things about French youths became clear at the turn of the 1960s: 
first, that there was a distinct subculture with its own values, norms and symbols; 
and secondly, that before they became participants in civic life, French youths 
were already part of its economy, distinguished among other ways by their own
530 David Meakin, Vian: L ’Ecume des jours (Glasgow: University of Glasgow French and 
German Publications, 1996), 2.
531 Perruchot’s journalistic essay incorporated an empirical, quantitative element, based on two 
surveys conducted in early 1957 by the reviews Arts and Les Nouvelles litteraires; Morin, the 
academic sociologist, produced a more speculative account of mass culture and its elements, 
one of which was youth culture, as the kernel of a general juvenilisation of popular culture.
532 Marwick, Sixties, 97-98.
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consumption patterns. Around 1958-9 rock’n’roll, or yeye, as it came to be 
known in France, reached such a level of popularity as to supersede jazz as the 
young music of choice, only a short time after it had caught on in the United 
States and in Britain. From the autumn of 1959 this new musical taste was 
purveyed to French youth audiences by a pioneering radio programme, Salut les 
copains, on the commercial Radio Europe Number 1, which won immediate 
popularity due not only to demand but to its attempts to involve its young target 
audience in, for instance, the compilation of play lists. Taking matters further, the 
programme’s initiator and presenter, Daniel Filipacchi, set up Salut les copains 
the colour magazine, again dedicated to les teenagers and again promising them 
their own say in a forum that, for a change, knew them and understood them. It 
came as no surprise that within a year the SLC magazine reached a circulation of 
one million copies and spawned imitator-rivals sponsored by both the PCF (Nous 
les gargons et les filles) and the Catholic Church (Coeurs vaillants and Ames 
vaillantes, followed by J2 Jeunesse and J2 Magazine). Nevertheless, Marwick 
claims, it was radio, a more accessible form of mass communication (SLC could 
be picked up as far away as Algeria), which was the more influential medium in 
disseminating youth culture.
A popular impression formed in the early 1960s, driven in no small part 
by sensationalist journalism, that the ‘new generation’ (the ‘Twist generation’ 
and later the *yeye generation’) was conspicuously materialistic and consumerist 
in its approach, and that it viewed money -  while corrupting -  as the most 
important means of serving a growing trend of individualism. But the so-called 
‘inheritors of culture’ were not completely devoid of a sense of social 
responsibility. Giroud’s survey, however crude, gives a sense of the complexity 
of the young mindset in 1958: to begin with, 85% of them thought that life was 
good in France, and 96% pointed to politics as the foremost negative element of 
French life, in particular the issues of the Algerian war, government instability 
and state finances. Yet when asked what they felt they were lacking or were 
being deprived of, the answers were predominantly non-political: holidays, a car, 
entertainment and home appliances. 91% of French 18-30 year-olds considered 
faithfulness essential, but only to another person in a romantic context, not to an
533 Marwick, Sixties, 101-108.
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ideal or to the state; only 6% declared they were willing to risk their lives for 
their country and, in fact, 42% stated flatly that there was no cause at all for 
which it was justifiable to risk their lives.534 Perruchot had arrived at roughly the 
same conclusion, linking young people’s political ‘abstentionism’ first to their 
impression of having been deceived by ideologies both left and right, and then to 
the individualism they developed through having no example or model in their 
elders, who had allowed them an unprecedented amount of freedom early in 
life.535
The young people in Perruchot’s book wanted to see France change 
direction but were discouraged by the lack of vision and enthusiasm in French 
public life, which they saw as dishonest, unprincipled, egotistical and self- 
satisfied. Yet, in summing up his discussion of youth and politics, Perruchot 
noted that young people were generally confident in the future, that is, in 
themselves.536 In presenting her survey, Giroud, too, took the opportunity to put a 
positive spin on her outlook and praise the transformative power of individual 
action, evoking the film Twelve Angry Men shown in France at the time (aptly, a 
popular, American film), in the face of what seemed in her results like a growing 
political apathy.537 Yet, as Marwick points out, viewed from without, France and 
its youth appeared more politicised than Britain and hers: while in Britain the 
Suez crisis of 1956 and the newly established CND did not seem to mobilise the 
majority of the public -  although the latter was popular among young people, as 
the next chapter shows -  French youth politics was highly animated by the 
Algerian campaign, the republican crisis and Gaullist authoritarianism. This 
could be attributed to a greater deference on the part of British youth. Another 
possible explanation, suggested by Marwick, is that French protests were simply 
more dramatic where repression or education were at stake, mobilised by student 
sections of political parties or by the national student union (UNEF), and 
aggravated by increasing police brutality, evident in the police march on the 
National Assembly building in March 1958, in the abduction of Mehdi Ben
534 Giroud, 10, 14-15; for the questionnaire and the full breakdown of responses see 27-31, 331 - 
338.
535 Perruchot, 18, 20-21, 38,41.
536 Perruchot, 30-31,33-34.
537 Giroud, 17-18.
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Barka by the Paris police in 1959, and most memorably in the February 1962 
police charge on a crowd of demonstrators in an anti-OAS demonstration,
f - I Q
leading to the death of nine at the Charonne metro station. It seems clear that 
during the 1950s French youth were not completely disengaged from formal 
politics, even if many of them (35% according to Giroud’s survey) said that 
‘people like them’ were unable to influence the course of events in France.
Politically engaged or not, French youth felt themselves to a great degree 
misunderstood and misrepresented by their elders, who either through traditional 
gloom, seeing them ‘in gangs’ or ‘in despair’, or through an outraged 
sensationalism, took their individualism to be a sign of selfishness, their more 
relaxed attitude to sex as loose morals, and their general appearance and 
demeanour as an ominous indicator for the future.539 Their ways were 
increasingly seen as impenetrably foreign to French custom. The methods used to 
analyse French youth betray a traditionalist bias: beyond the crude parameters of 
gender and marital status, it is their occupation that is taken as their main identity 
factor -  secondary school pupils, university students, agricultural workers, blue- 
collar workers and white-collar workers. Furthermore, even if a growing
538 Marwick, 100-101. As a union UNEF was part of the labour movement, that is, of the political 
left, and defined students as ‘young intellectual workers’. While the Metro Charonne event is 
memorable to any academic scholar of French contemporary history, to this day it is absent 
from French secondary school history textbooks. It was alluded to in Perec’s 1967 novel Un 
Homme qui dort and later memorialised in Didier Daeninckx’s Meurtres pour memoire 
(1984).
539 This seemingly blase attitude was probably part of a youthful search for ‘authentic’ identity in 
the face of alienation, as Edgar Morin later recorded. In the 1950s this contributed to the 
popularity of Angry Young Men fiction in France. John Wain’s Hurry On Down (1953) 
became Les Diplomes de la vie (Hachette, 1953); Kingsley Amis’s Lucky Jim (1954) was Jim- 
la-Chance (Plon, 1956); John Osborne’s Look Back in Anger (1956) was staged in 1958 at the 
Theatre des Mathurins as La Paix du dimanche and later published as Le Jeune Homme en 
colere (Gallimard, 1962); and the film adaptation of John Braine’s Room at the Top (1957, 
film 1960), which starred Simone Signoret, crossed the Channel as Les Chemins de la haute 
vide. However, on the whole, French readers were not impressed by the novels’ insularity and 
highly context-specific references: see Franpoise du Sorbier, “Jeunes Gens en colere,” in Les 
Annees 50, ed. by Jacques Demarcq (Paris: Editions du Centre Pompidou, 1988), 446-447. 
Perhaps Angry literature was a passing fad in France as it had been in Britain, a less attractive 
alternative to American culture.
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minority within French society were of different ethnicity or religion, this was 
ignored in favour of the assumption that French youth were all native 
metropolitan Christians.540 This was despite a constant immigrant influx from 
North Africa (not just Algeria) and from the rest of the French empire (later the 
French Community), who for the most part found themselves in bidonvilles, 
detached from the organic urban centres. From the early 1960s, French students 
faced a similar problem: the late war and postwar baby boom created shortages 
first in urban housing, then in places in elementaiy and secondary education and 
social services, and then in higher education. To cater for growing numbers of 
students new self-enclosed university campuses were built outside big cities: the 
University of Paris X campus at Nanterre is a prime example, built in the middle 
of a remote bidonville. As habitats they were mostly detached and offered only 
teaching and housing solutions, with inadequate transport links and no culture or 
diversions to speak of.
The Nanterre campus was also the workplace of the sociologist Alain 
Touraine, whose concept of ‘dependent participation’, mentioned in the 
introduction above, encapsulated the predicament of postwar French youths. 
Students were not the only ones who answered de Gaulle’s call for citizens to 
‘participate’, only to find their ways of participating severely limited. This was 
also the case for rural youths seeking urban employment, as well as for young 
urban working couples, who were ushered out to new suburban housing estates, 
finding soulless and cramped concrete blocks with scant leisure provisions and 
the added necessity of commuting to work.541 These real-life experiences 
inspired widespread discontent among young people. Needing to wait until they 
were 21 to vote, they were unhappy with being made to defer to state authority -  
traditionally a centralist etatisme and later Gaullist paternalism -  which, on its 
own part, provided for them and their advancement quite insufficiently. French 
youths were still at the charge of decision makers who were their elders, who 
regarded them as different and saw their economic performance -  gainful
540 To this day, France in fact prohibits the collection of data related to ethnicity and religion that 
might be used for profiling population. This policy rules out official acknowledgment of 
systematic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, as well as any ‘affirmative action’ to 
redress it.
541 Kedward, 402,404-405.
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employment and consumer spending -  as the chief measure of their 
participation.542
The regularities of young economic participation sparked the sociologist 
Edgar Morin’s interest and became an important part of his cultural study, 
L Esprit du temps. Morin saw ‘mass culture’, a term that he borrowed from 
American sociology, as being on the ascendancy in the West and particularly in 
France in the postwar period, a change that was initially restricted to quantitative 
transformations in material parameters but that caused a slow qualitative 
metamorphosis of modem culture as it had been known until the 1930s. This new 
mass culture consisted in providing private individuals with images and models 
that formed their aspirations in the world, as well as their escapes from everyday 
reality. Both integration in the world and escape from it were framed by mass 
culture in terms of acquisition and consumption, promising an earthly paradise in 
which everyone can take part. The rise in Western standards of living had shifted 
the concerns of many from the elementary desire to make a living to less 
immediate concerns such as social standing, wellbeing, love and happiness. 
These last two are of particular importance: the euphoric mythology of happiness 
became the leitmotiv of Western civilisation; likewise, modem love, neither 
courtly nor romantic, was elevated in mass culture, as the very kernel of human 
existence, the ultimate accomplishment. The ideal of love also provided symbolic 
support for a social shift: in the gradual erosion of the nuclear family, the ideal of 
love exalted the young couple (jeune menage) -  a man and a woman alone, being 
their own family to each other and searching for self-fulfilment.543 A literary 
precursor of the centrality of the young couple is discussed below in Vian’s 
L Ecume des jours.
Modem mass culture, Morin claimed, was dominated by a new trinity of 
aspirational goals -  love, beauty, youth -  which framed the new model figure of 
the juvenile adult. The authority of old age had eroded; adult age was juvenilised 
in the pursuit of total love and euphoric happiness a Vamericaine; and the
542 Kedward, 414.
543 The symbolic promotion of the idea of the couple as a new elementary social unit in American 
cinema of the 1950s is discussed below. Morin, 116-117, 167-188. He also offers a Freudian 
explanation for the suspicious but ultimately deferential attitude of young people, who ‘rebel’ 
against France by abstentionism and withdrawal. Morin, 204-207.
2 1 1
paradigm of this youthfulness was not to be found in adolescence. The juvenile 
adult qua adolescent still searched for ‘real life’ and showed a great need for 
what some might call authenticity, a need apparent in his refusal of taboos and of 
interpersonal relations that are hypocritical or conventional. Adolescence had 
become the fulcrum of modem mass culture, and correspondingly it was youth 
that felt most strongly the call to modernity. This affected older culture 
adversely: as culture advanced but aged, it compensated by aspiring to be 
younger. In other words, not only was old age devalued, but so too was the 
accumulated experience of culture for which it stood losing its appeal. In its 
stead, the adherence to movement, that is, updating and conforming, became the 
supreme imperative.544 The symbolic imperatives of flexibility and mobility 
corresponded to the material requirements of the modernised French market.
The understanding of mass culture as a wholly negative force of social 
decay provided a new twist to the old ‘bread and circuses’ adage. This context is 
twofold -  the belatedness of culture and its disavowal of that belatedness in the 
idealisation of youth. The experience of belatedness is that of the acceleration of 
time, a sense of a dynamic history in flux that only allows for a precarious and 
perishable culture that is in constant rupture with its past. This modernised mass 
culture, made in the image of the ‘juvenile adult’, was characterised by a mode of 
participation that Morin calls ‘ludic-aesthetic’: middle-aged adolescents toying 
with the spectacle of culture for the sake of their own gratification.545 For Morin 
and observers like him (such as Baudrillard) youth as cultural paradigm was a 
menacing prospect.
Effects of French Modernisation and Americanisation
French modernisation is of particular relevance to the experience of French 
postwar youth because of two main phenomena informing it: decolonisation and 
Americanisation. Decolonisation was already discussed above in chapter 4 in the 
context of nationhood; in this chapter it is presented as the complement of what 
was effectively an inward colonisation of French popular culture by a state-
544 Morin, 209-215.
545 Morin, 230.
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administered, heightened capitalist system. Young people in France as elsewhere 
were the foremost agents of this modernisation; as Lefebvre noted early on (see 
above, chapter 2), they also bore the brunt of it.546 The French national 
obsession with American cultural influences as the face of modernisation also 
had particular relevance for French youth. Americanisation carried the added 
significance of an alternative cultural template to still-traditional France, 
promising to update Frenchness as it updated -  and diversified -  France. 
Therefore, modernisation was not simply related to the new economic 
circumstances of widening affluence: it ushered in a new cultural order, which 
seemed to offer more room and opportunity for young people, who from the 
outset were more open to this change. Directly and indirectly, then, 
modernisation and its interconnected epiphenomena informed the circumstances 
and experiences of postwar French youths.
What might seem evident now, but was perhaps less clear in the postwar 
years and then later in their historiography, is the strong connection between 
France’s modernisation and its decolonisation. For decades French observers 
viewed the two phenomena separately: there seemed little to connect the process 
of decolonisation, which for France unfolded messily and painfully over decades, 
and modernisation, which by its nature was future-oriented and disregarded the 
past and its legacy. The separation preserved the Algerian war as a distinct, 
nameless event that was separate from the main plot of France’s grand historical 
narrative. This also allowed for French modernisation to be viewed discretely 
and, at least until 1974, affirmatively in its own right. Nevertheless, France’s 
decolonisation and modernisation are two aspects of the same social-economic- 
cultural process of advanced capitalism (obscured by their separation), 
relinquishing the colonies abroad for what Situationists later called the 
‘colonisation of everyday life.’547
Kristin Ross’s work on re-establishing this link between French 
modernisation and decolonisation goes to great lengths to demonstrate this 
inward colonisation, particularly of the symbolic order and in popular culture:
546 Lefebvre, “Everyday and Everydayness,” 10-11.
547 Michael Kelly, “Essay Review: Fast Cars, Clean Bodies,” French Cultural Studies 6, 3, no. 18 
(October 1995), 413-415.
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advertising, popular song, women’s magazines, fiction and journalism, and even 
theory. As well as the proliferation of cars, noted above in the introduction, she 
stresses the importance of the moving image, as epitomised in dynamic 
Hollywood films: “Their shared qualities -  movement, image, mechanization, 
standardization -  made movies and cars the key commodity-vehicles of a 
complete transformation in European consumption patterns and cultural 
habits.”548 With American goods and technology came also consumer market 
research and sector-focused advertising strategies that derived from it: home 
appliances advertising was aimed at women through women’s magazines, which 
boomed after the war; car advertising was aimed at the male breadwinner, 
accentuating the ease of commuting it enabled, making its owner a better worker, 
an homme disponible.
Another crucial image was the emphasis and promotion of hygiene and 
cleanliness, the particularly evocative power of which was discussed, for 
instance, in Barthes’s Mythologies essay on soaps and detergents. Commonly 
understood, there is an elision in hygiene metaphors between material cleaning, 
the expulsion of dirt, and moral cleansing, or the purge of evil and vice. As such, 
Ross’s examples are fairly straightforward: the epuration of collaborators and 
with them the moral stain of Vichy; Paris councillor Marthe Richard’s campaign 
to ‘clean up the streets’ of the city from prostitution; Alain Robbe-Grillet’s 
‘cleaning of the stables’ of realist fiction (discussed above); the establishment 
within the Ministry of Education of the Bureau de proprete to instruct people 
about modem standards of personal hygiene and domestic cleanliness; and the 
military ‘clean-up’ (nettoyage) campaigns aimed at Algerian nationalist 
resistance, as part of that sale guerre (dirty war).549 The desire to possess clean 
commodities such as a shiny car had at its basis a desire to possess material 
which time does not affect, thus a desire to immobilise time itself and so to avoid 
decline and degradation.550 Michael Kelly also notes the narcissistic element in 
the aspiration to cleanliness: it was, he argues, a desire to eliminate the otherness 
and resistance of the outside world so that, possessed and controlled, it would
548 Ross, Fast Cars, 33, 38.
549 Ross, Fast Cars, chapter 2 (71-122).
550 Ross, Fast Cars, 105-106, 213 n. 48; she cites Roland Barthes, “La Voiture, projection de 
l’ego,” Realites 213 (1963), 45.
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reflect back a positive image of the Self.551 Contentment and wellbeing derive 
from cleanliness, which in turn relies on (self-)control; what control France was 
losing on its African subjects, it was regaining among its metropolitan subjects.
Similarly, as in Algeria, ‘the inhabitant in his home’ was perceived to be 
the centre of the conflict, so the colonising campaign of modernisation targeted 
the domestic sphere. This cast the household -  the young couple or nuclear 
family -  as the basic unit of consumption, that is, of economic participation. The 
modernisation of the home was in its privatisation: the modem, urban, bourgeois 
home became the domain of an expanding leisure in retreat from the public loci 
and affairs of work/production and of politics. This myth of affective fulfilment 
within the jeune menage, a mainstream, bourgeois ‘ideal couple’, compensated 
for the modernisation of the urban space, endlessly redeveloped with modem 
thoroughfares and slum clearance in the interests of hygiene and social control. 
City life became the face of society, and so being urban became a token of social 
participation, of being ‘inside’ society, within the space of the national collective 
self.552
The ‘national middle class’ was effectively the product of postwar French 
modernisation. It was essentially a social and political mainstream of complacent 
urban middle management, defined, like French youth, mainly by its purchasing 
power and consuming habits. This corresponds with the British experience: 
postwar affluence increased the general public interest in stability so as to sustain 
growth and enable individual social mobility. By 1960 social wellbeing 
improved so considerably -  employment was high, real wages had risen by 40%, 
productivity soared by over 50% -  that many considered French economic 
modernisation an ‘event’. Emerging triumphant from this revolution, the 
bourgeoisie became the face of the French ‘democracy of consumption’. 
Neither productivity nor distribution of wealth was restored evenly and 
pauperisation only deepened -  processes that concerned the young people Giroud 
surveyed.554 Nevertheless, the French leap was heralded as a great success:
551 Kelly, “Essay Review: Fast Cars, Clean Bodies,” 417.
552 Ross, Fast Cars, chapter 3 (123-156).
553 Kedward, 373-374; Ross, Fast Cars, 1-14.
554 While aware of the opportunities in postwar modernisation (53% thought themselves luckier 
to live in that period), the kinds of injustice that most concerned the youths surveyed were
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Monnet’s contested plan de modernisation et d ’equipement, which enabled the 
leap, faced up to the challenge Monnet himself had defined as ‘modernisation or 
decadence’.555 In fact, French modernisation was so successful that it brought not 
only a socioeconomic change but a cultural transformation -  a mystification of 
modernity itself and the realignment of everyday life -  as Ross’s motifs of 
mobility and cleanliness demonstrate. Yet it was also a process fraught with 
anxieties and fears, giving rise to various forms of cultural pessimism.
To begin with, France’s rattrapage gave rise to the most common strain 
of cultural pessimism, that of conservatism: modernisation clearly disrupted both 
historical continuity of identity (discussed in the previous chapter) and the 
traditional order, which still benefited the traditional elites, the clerical 
establishment, the grande bourgeoisie of the liberal professions, and wealthy 
land-owning farmers. Feeling most squeezed by modernisation, its most vocal 
opponents were the provincial small businessmen, represented by Poujade’s 
UDCA, who were familiar with the old order and knew how to conduct 
themselves in it.556 Part of the old order’s familiarity was due to its distinctly 
primordial Frenchness: this explains the Poujadist compound of traditionalism, 
racism and imperialism, and suggests that its fear of change and the new was the 
horror of the loss of hegemony and difference. Still, Poujadists were not the only 
supporters of empire as part of the old order, and the postwar French imperial 
narrative was similarly conservative and paradoxical. Colonial subjects, 
particularly the Algerians, were considered transgressors for by wanting 
independence they were ‘breaking up the family home’ of the French empire and 
‘airing dirty laundry in public’. To maintain the modem image of the cleanliness 
of the French ‘new man’, the barbarity of the Algerian, his supposed need for 
being clean and civilised, was accentuated. This construction of difference was 
most intensified in the institutionalisation of torture by the French military: in the
social inequality and working conditions. Giroud, 331-338 passim (questions 3 and 24 in 
results appendix).
555 Monnet’s September 1946 report to the Conseil General du Plan, quoted in Kuisel, 
Capitalism, 225.
556 On Poujade and other, more intellectual reactions to French rattrapage, such as the emergence 
of academic sociological studies and critiques of technocracy, see: Kuisel, Capitalism, 270- 
271.
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torture chamber, Sartre explained, only one side could be human; torture
557maintained French difference by dehumanising the Algerian.
Fear for the loss of difference also informed other identity determinants, 
as modernisation created an unknown quantity, the ‘new man’. Talk of newness 
-  which more often than not was pejorative, chiding newfangled notions like 
nouvelle critique -  was bewildering because it concerned mainly normative 
prescriptions for how the ‘new man’ should be recognised, that is, his image 
rather than his definition. The ‘new man’ had inherited his metier and was 
expected to transform it into a technological profession, a career, within one 
generation; but becoming a jeune cadre, formed from the old strata of bourgeois 
and engineer, meant losing these traditional identity factors, and adapting to the 
intermediate position of up-and-comer; ‘new man’ was led to position himself by 
status symbols and consumption.558 These were young people whom Perruchot 
saw dreaming of their prospective furniture at the age of twenty, and who 
recorded with Giroud vacations, cars, diversions and home appliances as the 
things they lacked the most.559 The more the ‘new man’ changed, the more the 
‘new woman’ remained the same as the old woman of yore: A-line dresses and 
new domestic appliances did not particularly liberate her; care of the home was 
still her responsibility, and she only got the vote after the war; and she had her 
own ‘feminine’ pattern of consumption (fashion, cosmetics, women’s magazines) 
that distinguished her and her status. ‘New men’ and ‘new women’, particularly 
as young couples, faced the catch o f ‘dependent participation’: becoming flexible 
worker-consumers meant they were culturally afloat, but refusing the ‘national 
middle class’ excluded them from the kind of nation France was in the process of 
becoming. This state-produced anxiety (and state-produced compensation) 
separated spheres of life from one another, restricting intimate security and
557 Ross, Fast Cars, 114-116; see also, “Une Victoire,” Sartre’s introduction to Henri Alleg, La 
Question (Paris: Collection Documents, 1958): Jean-Paul Sartre, “A Victory,” Colonialism 
and Neocolonialism, trans. by Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer and Terry McWilliams 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 65-77.
558 Ross, Fast Cars, 167-171.
559 Perruchot, 172; Giroud, 331-338 passim (question 8 in results appendix).
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identity to the home and thus contributing to a retreat from the public to the
* *  560pnvate.
The French fear of Americanisation, which came invariably as part of the 
influx of American aid, methods and commodities, was also informed in part by 
nationalist fears for the Frenchness of French life. It was encapsulated in the 
double negation of the Poujadist slogan ‘Neither Ford nor Lenin’: neither 
rampant liberal capitalism nor Soviet-style collectivism, which during the Fourth 
Republic was the constant leftist ‘menace’ to the old bourgeoisie. The Fourth 
Republic also saw a principled anti-Americanism from the left, rejecting free 
market expansionism and the ideological indoctrination it threatened to bring. 
Under de Gaulle, when the perceived threat from the left was no more, anti- 
American sentiment revived, although, as Kuisel argues, it was altogether weaker 
for accompanying the General’s assertions of France’s independence and 
grandeur. In the 1960s the French left chose to struggle against ‘American 
imperialism’ in the Third World and to attack de Gaulle and the State as agents 
of Americanism, instead of America directly.561 Ultimately, as with every major 
fear, the French were also fascinated by Americanism, and their popular culture 
reflected that clearly and consistently; as Kuisel puts it, “The American model 
was a kind of mirror in which the French viewed themselves or, perhaps, before 
which they preened.”562 The sign and, to a degree, the cause of this fascination 
was precisely the French wariness of the dissolution of French-American 
differences: in the long run, as the two socioeconomic systems grew closer to 
each other, the United States became increasingly banal in the French imaginary. 
It was becoming clear that the two countries were not categorically or 
ideologically different, but rather simply two economic systems of organization, 
roughly within the same ideational framework. America had never been the 
absolute other; rather, it had been the painfully similar, reflecting French
560 Ross, Fast Cars, 106-107, 147-149.
561 Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma o f Americanization (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 132 -  henceforth: Kuisel, Seducing', Kedward 
claims that under de Gaulle complaints about consumerism came in fact mostly from sources 
on the left, rather than from traditional conservatives; Kedward, 409.
562 Kuisel, Seducing, 235.
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shortcomings during a period of tender self-confidence for an otherwise fiercely 
proud nation.563
The kernel of the American temptation and of the perceived danger it 
represented was consumerism, which was taken to threaten the French 
civilisation with a dumbing down through mass culture that was spoken of in 
terms of the old jeremiad of ‘bread and circuses’.564 Rationing ended in 1949, 
and the return to free consumption and supply abundance was cause enough for 
popular magazines like Paris-Match to declare it the year of the return of joie de 
vivre.565 A decade later, the French government could claim its society was a 
consumer society based on consent. But that consent to consume was initially 
bom out of the necessities of the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, 
a time of great shortages and great poverty. Initially, then, the market was there 
to be exploited, and indeed, French advertisers in the first postwar decade took it 
for granted that deprivation and discontent on their own could create an impetus 
for consumerism.566 Nevertheless, in the eyes of its critics American-inspired 
consumerism was thought to be contaminating culture itself, the Latin humanism 
the French regarded as their civilisation. From the cultural wasteland of 
consumerism and conformity in the New World nothing positive could proceed, 
only an infantile, technical mass culture whose levelling powers would transform 
civilisation into an exchange market of commodities.567 In fact, this was already 
in place: modem popular culture was a mass culture in which, as with other 
sectors of the economy, participation was through consumption.
563 Kuisel, Seducing, 234; Ross, Fast Cars, 42.
564 Kuisel, Seducing, 110; compare with Morin, 16.
565 Kedward, 372. Nevertheless, amid growing affluence and growing appetites for consumption, 
much work was still needed to alleviate the plight of the French poor and homeless. 1949 was 
also the year in which Abbe Pierre (then just Henri Groues) founded his organisation, Les 
Compagnons d ’Emmaiis, several years before becoming the iconic figure that caught 
Barthes’s eye.
566 Kedward, 375, 404. Kuisel, Seducing, 103-104. To some extent this explains the ‘paperback 
revolution’ that only arrived in France after the war. Even before the reading public grew 
through the baby boom and educational reforms, sheer consumerism had made paperbacks an 
instant success -  they were cheaper so people could afford to buy more of them. Lough, 372, 
384.
567 Kuisel, Seducing, 117, 119, 121.
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A curious case of French cultural Americanisation through mass culture 
unfolded throughout the 1950s in the genre of science fiction, which only 
became successful in France after the Second World War, as popular attention to 
it spread from the popular press (Le Figaro, France-Dimanche), through the 
journals (Mercure, Les Temps modernes), to the major publishers (Hachette- 
Gallimard, Denoel), resulting in dedicated paperback series. Initially deemed 
‘foreign’ and ‘popular fiction’, undeserving of ‘serious’ attention, American 
science fiction helped rehabilitate French futuristic writing (notably Jules Verne) 
as worthy fiction, but for some time longer remained the dominant form in the 
genre, indicating the French preference for the American quality in and of 
science fiction.568 However, most 1950s French translations attempted to 
exoticise and emphasise the ‘American-ness’ of American science fiction for its 
French readership, showing how the French literary pro-Americanism reacted to 
the French image of America. This suggests that, if only implicitly, the French 
recognised their psycho-social future as lying with their own Americanisation: 
American society was the horizon of French society.569
Yet science fiction was also the locus of the subversion of American 
imperialism. In the United States, an ascendant petty bourgeoisie employed in 
technological professions was linked with the science fiction they consumed, a 
genre that conferred fictional power on those who embrace change and ‘march 
with the times’. In France, too, this romanticised, ‘juvenile’ image was a literary 
call for social change, attracting both bourgeois culture and a young counter­
culture. Yet differing reactions to it suggested an emergent rift between the old 
French bourgeoisie’s technophobia and fear for established hierarchies, and 
younger generations who embraced technology as the key to social mobility and
568 Gerard Klein, “La Science Fiction,” in Les Annees 50, ed. by Jacques Demarcq (Paris: 
Editions du Centre Pompidou, 1988), 436-437; Jean-Marc Gouanvic, Sociologie de la 
traduction: La science-fiction americaine dans Tespace culturel franqais des annees 1950 
(Artois: Artois Presses Universite, 1999), 21-22, 89, 95, 99, 21-22; regarding Vian’s role as a 
major conduit of science fiction into France see: Gilbert Pestureau, Boris Vian, les amerlauds 
et les godons (Paris: Union Generate d’Editions / 10/18, 1978), 281-306.
569 In economics as in science fiction, American models were adapted rather than emulated. 
Monnet’s modernisation instructors altered instructions they had received in the United 
States, reducing them to their narrow technical side. Kuisel, Seducing, 81-84.
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to improvement of standards of living.570 Perruchot, too, saw a link between the 
easy approach of young people to modernisation, their confidence in themselves 
and therefore in the future, and their disdain for their unenthusiastic and self- 
satisfied elders at the helm of the country.571 In both technology and its literary 
representation, the nexus of Americanisation and modernisation had a particular 
appeal to French youths.
One of the anti-colonial essays of the period demonstrates just how the 
cultural elements informing youth experience and French experience in general -  
colonialism, ‘Americanisation’ through modernisation, and consumerism -  were 
perceived as mutually constitutive elements that were cause for cultural 
pessimism. Aime Cesaire concluded his essay Discours sur le colonialisme 
(1950, reissued 1955) by invoking the familiar comparison -  this time of the 
Fourth Republic -  with imperial Rome. He cited Quinef s observation that 
Rome’s destruction came not at the hands of barbarian invasions, but from the 
eruption of barbarism within it, bom of the Romanising of conquered 
surrounding nations. For contemporary France (and other European empires), 
this internal barbarism was latent racism and a colonialism which suffocated the 
cultural identities of colonised peoples. But the kernel of Western barbarism was, 
to Cesaire, American-style capitalism, which sustained the colonial system: 
“L’heure est arrivee du Barbare. Du Barbare modeme. L’heure americaine. 
Violence, demesure, gaspillage, mercantilisme, bluff, gregarisme, la betise, la 
vulgarite, le desordre.”572 The immoderate, vulgar and deceptive American age 
of barbarism was already upon the French; yet, as Cesaire pointed out, they 
continued to see their problems in the colonised -  Algerians as well as young 
people -  rather than in the culture that effectively colonised them. 
Americanisation and decolonisation, as two faces of French modernisation, thus 
affected not only the circumstances and experiences of youths, but also 
influenced the profoundly ambivalent way they were perceived by their elders: as
570 Gouanvic, 142-143. Curiously, Morin does not mention science fiction in L ’Esprit du temps, 
although he discusses at length many aspects informing it -  youth, Americanism, mass 
culture, literature, tastes and worldviews.
571 Perruchot, 18, 20, 23-25, 31.
572 Aime Cesaire, Discours sur le colonialisme (Dakar : Presence Africaine, 1955), 57.
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conduits of a future that was not entirely desirable, agents not so much of 
France’s transition as of its transformation.
A Waking Dream: Boris Vian and L’Ecume des jours
There is an inherent difficulty in approaching Boris Vian (1920-1959) and his 
works as they are both the subjects of a cult. Vian’s short and productive life 
inspired the romantic mystique of a great promise never fully delivered on as an 
author and critic, a jazz musician and singer, a satirist and a ‘pataphysician’. His 
background, however, did not set him up for creative prominence: bom to a well- 
off family in the Paris suburb of Ville-d’Avray, he initially trained and worked as 
an engineer. During the occupation Vian became active in the Paris underground 
jazz scene and with the Zazous. Among them he met and married his first wife, 
Michelle, and had two children by her. During the epuration Vian’s father Paul 
was murdered and this, together with his bourgeois status, gave rise to 
unsubstantiated suspicions that he had been a collaborator. These suspicions also 
attached to Boris and preceded him, for example, when he first met the initially 
disapproving (but later charmed) Simone de Beauvoir. Vian became a central 
figure in the formerly clandestine jazz scene of liberated Paris as performer 
(mainly on trumpet at the Club Tabou), wit and jazz connoisseur. This 
involvement earned him the title ‘prince of Saint-Germain-des-Pres’, with which 
he remained associated. It was shortly after the liberation that Vian also began to 
write ‘serious’ fiction (rather than occasional diversions for friends), typically 
working on several pieces simultaneously. His first postwar creative surge 
yielded two novels: J ’lrai cracker sur vos tombes and L ’Ecume des jours, the 
latter considered his finest work.573
J ’lrai cracker was labelled ‘immoral’, becoming the first high-profile 
literary obscenity trial since Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and Baudelaire’s Les
573 Boris Vian, L ’Ecume des jours (Paris: Union General d’Editions -  10/18, 1963 [1947]); 
Vernon Sullivan, J ’lrai cracker sur vos tombes, trans. by Boris Vian (Paris: Editions du 
Scorpion, 1946). J ’lrai cracker, a thriller written in a fortnight as a bet, was published under 
the pseudonym ‘Vernon Sullivan’, which Vian used for three subsequent noir novels. All 
further references to L ’Ecume des jours will note page numbers (or chapter numbers in roman 
numerals) in parentheses in the main text, and refer to the edition cited.
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Fleurs du mal a hundred years earlier. Its unrepeated succes de scandale gained 
Vian much public attention, but one which focused on a narrow aspect of his 
writing. In general, most of Vian’s writing remained until his death greatly 
underrated: his experimentation was mainly appreciated by likeminded writers 
such as Robbe-Grillet (who got Vian’s L 'Automne a Pekin published by Minuit) 
and his friend Raymond Queneau. It was only in the early 1960s, several years 
after his death, that his work returned into public attention: L 1Ecume des jours 
was republished in paperback as part of the successful 10/18 series, and his 
pacifist song Le Deserteur, written near the end of the Indochina war, was 
rediscovered by a new generation of anti-war protestors in the late Algerian war 
and the start of the Vietnam war. The fresh and imaginative L 'Ecume des jours 
was later adopted by student activists in May 1968 as a manifesto of sorts.574 A 
wave of academic studies into Vian’s work and life followed, peaking with a 
1977 conference at the Cerisy cultural centre, the two-volume proceedings of 
which are an indispensable source to any Vian study.
L ’Ecume des jours is a short but complex novel, pregnant with 
intertextual clins-d’oeil and symbolism, and its plot is not easy to summarise 
satisfactorily. Essentially, the story is about a young man falling in love with a 
young woman, but their happiness is short-lived, as the young woman then falls 
ill and dies. This is a very partial account of L Ecume des jours, although it does 
tell some of the story of protagonists Colin and Chloe, and the period between 
their wedding (in chapters XVII-XXII, immediately after meeting and falling in 
love) and Chloe’s death and funeral (chapters LXV-LXVI) is the main axis of 
plot progression.575 It is a plot in which things start out as positive and hopeful 
and end up somewhat depleted and darkened by circumstances.576 The novel is 
generally read as telling the story of the disillusionment attendant upon growing 
up. Most of the characters are young people -  Chloe, Colin, his friend Chick, 
Chick’s girlfriend Alise, Alise’s uncle and Colin’s cook Nicolas (who at 29 is the 
oldest of the main characters), and his girlfriend Isis -  and their world is narrated
574 Meakin, 4-5; for an extensive account of this largely posthumous success, see: Michel Faure, 
Les Viesposthumes de Boris Vian (Paris: Union Generate d’Editions -  10/18, 1975).
575 Meakin, 39.
576 J.K.L. Scott, From Dreams to Despair: An Integrated Reading o f the Novels o f Boris Vian 
(Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1998), 80,278.
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through their externalised subjective experiences: falling in love, for example, is 
described as being enveloped in a warm, fragrant, pink cloud (40). But growing 
up turns the world sour for these young people as they come out of their 
respective, self-involved, infantile cocoons to engage with the world and find 
that it is a hard place.
Colin is the main agent for Vian’s exploration of the ideas of 
transformation (of self and of world) and transience (of love, youth and 
happiness).577 Colin’s foil is his friend Chick, who is on his own quest. Chick is a 
fan of the celebrated philosopher Jean-Sol Partre, the great prophet of 
engagement, and obsessively collects Partriana. Alise is figured as Chick’s 
opposant, as she tries to divert him from his quest for Partre. No less important 
than Colin is his lover and wife, Chloe. If Alise is like the little mermaid, Chloe 
is akin to Shakespeare’s Ophelia, the lover neglected in life and exalted in death; 
for after their wedding Colin’s desire for her declines and in a way her illness 
could be read as the alibi for this.578 From the outset Chloe is characterised as a 
quasi-spectral character: named after a Duke Ellington piece, she is the product 
of the double projection of Colin’s subconscious (his desire to be in love) and of 
jazz music. She is not quite a full person: in a transference repeated throughout 
the novel, as she becomes ill, she becomes her illness, and is indistinguishable 
from the nenuphar, the malign waterlily growing in her lung. Chloe is a dream 
woman, an ideal figure whose reality supervenes entirely on Colin’s cognition.579
The last in the main group of characters in L *Ecume des jours is Nicolas, 
Colin’s chef, who in many ways is Colin’s adjuvant in his romantic quest. As 
well as being Colin’s employee, he also plays the role of friend and mentor to 
him. Older and more experienced than his employer, Nicolas seems an ideal
577 Alistair Charles Rolls, The Flight o f the Angels: Intertextuality in Four Novels by Boris Vian 
(Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1999), 100; Scott, 94-97; both refer to Michel Maillard, 
“Colin et Chick ou 1’Impossible quete, lecture semio-critique,” in Lecture plurielle de 
L’Ecume des jours, dir. by Alain Costes (Paris: Union Generate d’Editions / 10/18, 1979), 
197-236 -  volume henceforth abbreviated as Lecture.
578 Maillard, 263-266; Meakin, 52, 58.
579 Rolls, 54, 89; Scott, 98.
580 The terms of opposant (regarding Alise) and adjuvant allude to the Structuralist narratological 
work of Vladimir Propp, Algirdas-Jacques Greimas and Tzvetan Todorov on the literary 
motif of the quest. In Vian scholarship all subsequent studies refer back to Maillard.
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ersatz father to Colin: he ‘knows about girls’ and offers advice without the 
attendant assertion of authority, and even initiates him into the ways of the 
biglemoi erotic dance (24-26).581 Ever resourceful, his character is reminiscent of 
Wodehouse’s butler Jeeves, or of the archetypal figure of the magical Master, In 
fact, as the master and mentor to Colin, he plays a similar role to that of Chick’s 
object, Partre. Although Nicolas remains alive at the end of the novel -  most of 
the other characters meet their death one way or another -  he too suffers the 
ravages of time.
The rapid aging of Nicolas (seven years in a week) intensifies the gradual 
degradation, from chapter XXXIII onwards, of Colin’s household as a whole. 
This becomes most apparent when Alise comes to visit the ill Chloe and notices, 
apart from her uncle’s change, that there is less light in the flat than before (109), 
leading her to wonder what is going on (110), before Chloe turns her attention to 
the dying of the lamps and the retraction of the walls and window (111). Even 
Nicolas’ oven is softening and turning into a pot (127). Watching it, the formerly 
robust Nicolas (Colin had thought he was built like Johnny Weissmuller; 37) has 
noticeably aged. Colin, who already treats him as one of his possessions (he had 
acquired him from an aunt for his old chef and a kilo of Belgian coffee; 11), now 
wants to let him go as his worth has diminished (128). This personal 
deterioration is metonymic of a general, creeping degradation that seems to 
accelerate as the narrative progresses, unravelling the novel’s artificial, decadent 
utopia in the face of nature.
With its torturing desires, sad loves and unhappy endings, L ’Ecume des 
jours can be read as a failed quest, like those of Orpheus or Tristan, in which 
love is both desirable and impossible. This desire for the other enslaves the 
human spirit and leads to unhappiness: but Costes adds that all desires name their 
fulfilment, the object which, once attained, will extinguish them. Therefore, all
581 The biglemoi, as a sensual Black American dance, is part of the Vianesque leitmotiv of 
fascination with Black American culture: L'Ecume des jours was reportedly completed in 
New Orleans, Memphis and Davenport, three major hubs of American jazz; and the 
heteronym ‘Vernon Sullivan’ gestured toward Black American creativity and identity. 
Whereas Vian’s portrayal of women is at times clearly derisory, even misogynistic, his more 
complex relationship with Black American culture cannot be reduced to primitivist or 
exoticist fascinations, however clear their imprint.
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desires are doomed, and, in our case, all romantic passions disappear once 
sated.582 The impossible desires in the novel maintain its narrative tension, 
putting characters through necessary and senseless but aestheticised misery. Vian 
was defined as an Absurdist (albeit on the strength of his theatre), and the novel 
has been read as depicting a Camusian struggle against the absurdities of life so 
as to give it some sense. Such readings imply that the role of fiction is merely 
to lend form to things, a fleeting, temporary coherence doomed by the very 
nature of the world to disintegrate and decline like its constitutive elements.584
Vian presents his young people as interchangeable. They occupy a closed 
world that seems to belong to the world of fairytale rather than social realism.585 
This world is shaped by the subjective desires of its young characters: inner and 
outer worlds intermix and the external world metaphorically reflects their 
emotions. Square rooms turn round to the sound of a romantic record to ‘cuddle’ 
the lovers in their bed (88), the anticipation of Colin’s marriage hastens its 
occurrence (47) -  space and time become malleable in the service of the human 
self and its will. This is an unencumbered world of possibility, in which 
everything seems to happen as if by itself. On the whole, the abstract value of 
things takes precedence over the materiality of things and their actual use.586
David Walker points out a thematic link between the postwar literature 
documenting France’s new consumerism and a trend in late-nineteenth century 
fiction which he calls the ‘literature of consumption.’ The era of consumption 
has given rise to two kinds of (at least literary) entities: the consumer is a 
character defined by desiring and consuming new objects; the consumer object is 
a seemingly timeless commodity standing for fetishised newness that is 
inescapably squandered upon consumption. The discourse of consumerism is
582 Alain Costes, “Le Desir de Colin,” in Boris Vian: Colloque de Cerisy, dir. by Noel Amaud 
and Henri Baudin, vol. I, 170 -  henceforth this volume will appear as Colloque.
583 Esslin, 275, 361; Scott, 266-267; Doris-Louise Haineault, “Amour et/ou mort dans L ’Ecume 
des jours,” in Colloque, 161.
584 Meakin, 70.
585 Scott, 83; Meakin, 33,43.
586 Claudette Oriol-Boyer, “L’echo-nomie dans I ’Ecume des jours, lecture socio-critique,” in 
Lecture, 328.
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metonymic: consumers buy into totality by purchasing a part of it.587 Even before 
our age of disposability, the ‘literature of consumption’ presented the consumer 
object as one not meant to improve with age but to wear out, threatening the 
consumer by its degradation. Walker’s examples were Perec’s Les Choses (1965) 
and Beauvoir’s Les belles Images (1966), but this holds just as well for Vian’s 
Colin and Chick nearly twenty years earlier. Consumption in the novel is 
comforting: having more is equated with being more, and the loss of property (as 
with Colin and Chick) corresponds to a loss of selfhood. Ownership is perceived 
as a close relation: Colin’s romantic notion is of a ‘sacred’ relationship of 
‘having’ a lover who ‘belongs’ to him -  a role played for Chick not by Alise (55- 
56, 96, 147) but by his Partriana collection (LIV).588
Barthes’s comments on cleanliness and newness as timelessness (see 
above in this chapter, in Ross’s discussion of new cars) further illuminate this 
consumer mentality and link the rejection of the old with the rejection of work as 
two forms of degradation. Chapter XXV presents Colin’s taste for excess and his 
objection to work, which is tied up with his disdain for things that wear out or get 
used up (67-69, 82). We are introduced to Colin and into the narrative through 
the long, detailed sequence of his toilette (7-9). Colin, a precious dandy, 
describes the two things he does in life as learning and loving (131), and thinks
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work lowers man to the level of machine (124). This impression is supported 
by the description of Chick’s factory workplace (chapter XLVIII) and Colin’s 
work in the arms factory (chapters LI-LII). The necessity of taking up work saps 
the youth, indeed the life force, out of him: he is racked by fatigue and loses his 
fond outlook on people (165), and is crushed by the task of announcing Chloe’s 
impending death (166).
One of the defining features of youthfulness in the characters is their self­
absorption, to the point of narcissism. Colin’s is a completely self-absorbed life, 
revolving entirely around him -  his home, environment, leisure, chef and friends.
587 This discourse is epitomised in the name of Zola’s fictional store, Au Bonheur des dames 
(1873). David Walker, “Shopping and Fervour: Modem Literature and the Consumer 
Society,” French Studies LVIII, 1 (January 2004), 34-35, 38.
588 Oriol-Boyer, 297; Rolls, 78.
589 Compare this with Arthur Seaton’s more pragmatic attitude in Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning, acknowledging that at least machine work gives him time to think.
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Desiring to fall in love, he promptly does, but in a strictly youthful milieu of 
children-of-nobody who all look alike. There is a hint of suspicion that his 
infatuation might be either wholly with himself (narcissistic) or with his next-of- 
kin (incestuous).590 On the whole, the fundamental narcissism of the lovers, 
which has them smitten above all with themselves and with falling in love, can 
also be the source of a desire for obstacles, a desire for both the projection and 
deferral (or frustration) of love, in line with the Orpheus/Tristan template that 
renders love both desirable and impossible.591 A candid remark on this 
paradoxical formulation appears in chapter LIV, when Chick remains alone with 
his Partriana: Alise would have waited for him, but he would not accept it that 
she stay simply out of love (150). Colin does stay with Chloe out of devotion, but 
it seems to be precisely that quality that makes him fall out of love with her 
(chapter XXXVII). Mutual love is not enough; ‘real’ intimate relations are 
elsewhere.
In L 'Ecume des jours youth is clearly figured as a fool’s paradise: its 
initial happiness and optimism fade and the ideal and potential are replaced by 
the sobering real. The young characters only feel themselves free because they 
do not know the true costs that life demands; as they learn, their ‘armour of 
dreams’ is stripped away by disillusionment. Their youthfulness is crushed on 
encounter with the adult world.592 The narrative of VEcume des jours takes place 
in an open-ended present, devoid of background or afterthought, and it is this
£ Q 1
context that saves the young characters from the feeling of belatedness. Still, 
the novel as a whole can thus be seen as an elegy for lost youth, and a complaint 
against time and mortality. The fall into time is a tragic one, and time itself as it 
passes comes to be increasingly identified with unhappiness.
The novel’s fantastic mode and anti-utopian outlook shift from dreams 
and projects to dissolution and death. The passing of youth in attrition and misery 
becomes one manifestation of what Meakin called ‘anti-alchemy’ in L ’Ecume
590 Andre Jarry, “L’Ecume des mots: Un Janus Uni-Frons,” in Colloque, 157; Meakin 35.
591 Meakin, 53-54.
592 Scott, 80, 84-88, 126,266.
593 Jeanne-Marie Baude, “L’Espace vital. L’Imaginaire dans les structures du texte,” in Lecture, 
88-90.
228
des jours.594 Love itself is presented as immanent rather than transcendent, and as 
such it, too, is subjected to the rule of time and mortality; there is no ‘endless 
love’ beyond life, beyond this world, and even in life it has its limitations. And as 
most of the characters die, almost all of them violently, love is lost in the world 
and death asserts itself as the supreme reality of L ’Ecume des jours; love lost, 
violence, sickness, death as ‘supreme reality’ - all signs of the universe in its
1 595entirety running down.
This vision of degradation ties back with the novel’s contemporary 
outlook on modernisation and consumerism. L ’Ecume des jours starts out by 
presenting an affirmative view of technology, not least in the domestic sphere; 
and Vian seems to think that technology can do more to improve human life 
than, for example, the Sartrean politics of engagement, which is satirised 
throughout the novel. Yet as the novel darkens, the satire moves on to more 
sinister targets -  religion, the alienation of work, militarism -  and the portrayal 
of technology takes a turn for the negative, at times almost resembling a 
Naturalistic narrative.
From the famous pianocktail (12-14), through mechanical rocking chairs 
(32-33), to frogs with propulsion nozzles (95) and cyborg rabbits employed as 
pill extruders (96), the novel celebrates mechanical intervention in nature for 
human comfort. This fascination with modem technology is complemented by a 
horror of nature and the natural, of organic matter that kills -  like Chloe’s own 
jleur du mal, the nenuphar -  or dies, like the body parts strewn outside Dr. 
Mangemanche’s clinic (103-104). This is a story of the Fall, a fall into time, in 
which Colin’s living space becomes a dying space.596 Yet this Fall is not from a 
harmonious, natural garden of Eden, but from an artificial, engineered paradise; 
its opposite, the temporal, natural world, is therefore portrayed as inhuman (and 
anti-human), disintegrating and threatening, with hostile Nature irresistibly 
invading and disintegrating the mechanical world (140, 146). The plot that leads 
us from (Colin’s) bathroom to swamp (Chloe’s resting place) can be read as a
594 Meakin, 12,71.
595 Oriol-Boyer, 392; Rolls, 93; Scott, 91, 265.
596 Baude, 72.
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decline from culture to nature, undoing man’s artifice and returning to a primal
597chaos that finally reclaims the products of human endeavour (172).
For all its fantastical elements, L ’Ecume des jours is a novel of the 
everyday, approaching the familiar as strange and new, without attached 
significance that might endow it with what Robbe-Grillet later called a ‘myth of 
depth’. The reader is instantly struck with the novel’s liveliness; nothing stands 
still, and the whole fictional world is animated under the reader’s gaze: animals
c q o
are humanised, even inanimate objects are given organic life. Vian has the 
reader see the fictional world through Colin’s eyes, the gaze of a child ordering 
his world around himself. Then again, this is all but declared in his foreword: 
“...the brief demonstration that follows gathers all its energy from the fact that 
the story is entirely true, because I imagined it from one end to the other. Strictly 
speaking, its material realization consists essentially of a projection o f reality. .. 
onto an irregularly undulating reference plane, resulting in some distortion ”599
Vian’s great literary triumph in L Ecume des jours was in being ahead of 
his time, already anticipating the need to reinvent fictional representation and 
linguistic signification beyond the chosiste gaze of the nouveau roman.600 The 
narrative’s derealisation actually intensifies its affective impact, most noticeably 
in the disruption of Colin’s circumscribed, sheltered space -  an externalised 
disintegration reflecting the novel’s interest in the transformation of objects, not 
of feelings -  after all, “people do not change, things do” (149). Merleau-Ponty’s 
suggestion that sanity hinges not on personal critical sense but on the structure 
and constancy of one’s personal space, is reflected from the plot’s tipping point 
(XXXIII) onwards, in the deterioration of Colin’s household, his disorientation 
(137-138), the home’s dissolution (LXVII) and Colin’s final detachment during
597 Meakin, 61-62, 68-69; Costes in discussion, Colloque, 115.
598 Meakin, 14-15.
599 Boris Vian, Foam of the Daze, trans. and intro, by Brian Harper, annotated by Gilbert 
Pestureau and Michel Rybalka (Los Angeles: Tam Tam Books, 2003), 3 (my italics). This 
English translation of Pestureau and Rybalka’s 1994 French critical edition comes closest to 
an English critical edition. See also Rybalka, “L ’Ecume des jours Amour-Fiction,” Colloque, 
211 - 212 .
600 Marie Redonnet, quoted in Rolls, 84; Marguerite Nicod-Saraiva, “L’Univers de L’Ecume des 
jours. Vers une lecture poetique,” Lecture, 55, 61-62 ; Meakin, 45, 48.
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Chloe’s funeral (170).601 As Chick notices, some time before the confused Colin, 
the world seems to close in around them (116). The way the world is experienced 
is also tried through Vian’s linguistic usage, or what Jacques Bens called, in his 
postface to the first paperback edition, Vian’s 6langage-univers\602 This is 
immediately apparent, especially to the non-native French reader: not only do 
phrases and thoughts literally come alive, but the words themselves are 
transformed by inverted syllables, words with changed endings, several words 
condensed into one, colloquialisms, Anglicisms, onomatopoeias -  playful 
language conveying the narrator’s distrust of the whole naming, classifying and 
signifying system that is language. Vian distrusts language enough to privilege 
sense experience, particularly vision and the visual, over it as preceding it in 
evolution and importance.603
Nowadays, following much biographical and literary research, it is easier 
to trace the world of Colin and Alise in L ’Ecume des jours to the particular 
juncture of Paris in 1946. Severe shortages are in the background of the novel’s 
anticipation of more plentiful times and of France’s later consumer society. 
Elaborate, sometimes outlandish, clothes, objects and spaces are described 
extensively and vividly, celebrated in the style of Huysmans’s Decadent 
masterpiece A Rebours (1882). Sometimes this exhilarating effect of 
consumption is addressed explicitly, as when the narrator notes that large 
buildings were cheered up by shops (30). Rolls highlights the detailed 
representation of nylon stockings in the novel, at a time when they were already 
available but not yet universally adopted. He sees the nylon stocking as a fetish 
object, standing for the true object of French desires -  American normalcy. The 
interstitial period of the post-Liberation years reflected the double efforts of
601 Baude, 111-112, referring to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception 
(Paris: NRF, 1945), 337. Other postwar Absurdists, like Ionesco and Genet, manipulated 
performance spaces and employed ‘concrete metaphors’ in their works. The discussion of 
Maclnnes in the next chapter will show a similarly spatial representation of the disruption of 
life.
602 Jacques Bens, “Un langage-univers,” in Vian, 175-184.
603 Meakin, 24-29, 47. Considering this narrative is a ‘projection of reality’, it should perhaps 
only be natural that it privilege the visual. Then again, all vision is a projection, taking what is 
inside (retinal images) for what is (‘seen’) outside.
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recapturing the ‘rythme d ’avant-guerre,’ and attempting the effortless, quotidian 
glamour attached to the American lifestyle.604 Thus, in its symbolic order of 
fashion along with its modes of narration and textuality, L ’Ecume des jours 
engages with everyday life in general - cooking, music, dancing, work, 
recreations, social encounters, falling in love, falling ill -  and that of postwar 
Paris in particular.
A tone of growing anguish pervades the novel, also rooted in its context 
of production. Vian presents postwar youth as essentially decadent; but this is an 
updated decadence, no longer recoiling from industrialised, urbanised modernity 
and comfortable with technological artifice. Instead, it is the state of transition 
itself that causes their “moments of anguished aesthetic adolescence” -  be it the 
transition into adulthood within the novel or the seemingly delayed 
modernisation of France hors texte.605 The inverted values of the natural (here 
menacing) and the artificial (here sustaining an erstwhile Eden) is a typical but 
updated Decadent gesture: gold matures in lethal gases (163); rifle barrels grow 
in barren soil, a typical Decadent trope for the creative power of dead matter 
(143-144); and roses that grow in the barrels are both natural, being flowers, and 
artificial, being made of metal (144-146).606 Other Decadent characteristics are 
the character of Colin, as a disaffected hedonist; the exaltation of pathos and the 
senses for both the characters and the narration; Colin’s amoralism in his refusal 
to choose between good and bad, resulting in him marrying Chloe instead of 
Alise and living to regret it; Colin’s extreme individualism, and the exaltation of 
the personality and its world-conjuring quality; and the denial of culture and 
ethos typical of the enclosed juvenile world.
604 ‘Retrouve le rythme d ’avant-guerre. . .’ was a contemporary advertising slogan for Helios 
nylon stockings. Alistair Rolls, “In Olden Days a Glimpse of Stocking: Fashion, Fetishism 
and Modernity in Boris Vian’s L ’Ecume des jours” French Cultural Studies 15, 2 (June 
2004), 99-113.
605 Zurbrugg, 212, The formulation of L ’Ecume des jours as an ‘updated’ Decadent novel relies 
on the characteristics noted above in the introduction to this thesis: Zurbrugg, 209-222; 
Poggioli, 84-88.
606 Flowers in rifles are also an anti-war image evoking Vian’s anti-militarism (cf. his popular 
anthem ‘Le Deserteur’), as well as a sign of anti-aggression that was later revived in the 
Prague Spring.
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The Decadent sensibility evident in L ’Ecume des jours is also tied with its 
increasing sense of belatedness, reflected in the entropic degradation of light, a 
metaphoric end of the day. As the novel begins, Colin’s kitchen hallway enjoys 
two suns shining, simply for his love of sunlight (8). But night hems the lovers in 
as Chloe falls ill, forming concentric circles around them (87), encroaching on 
their lit realm, and soon the sun looks like an immense burning carcass (99) -  
reflecting either its already inanimate nature (like the barren earth in the 
armaments factory) or the impending dying of the light, as all funeral pyres 
extinguish when all organic matter bums out. Two chapters on, Chloe already 
notices the diminishing daylight (103), and Colin finally realises this, too, albeit 
in a poetic manner: the sun is leaving “en profondeur,” never to return (124).
Like Huysmans’s des Esseintes, Colin lives in an enclosed world of 
artificial pleasures, linked to the natural world but trying to shut out its less 
pleasant aspects. But des Esseintes shows that the uncompromising disavowal of 
the organic elements in nature is ultimately not viable as it disavows one’s own 
natural self. Risking his own death, des Esseintes eventually chooses life and the 
compromise of returning into society. Vian does not attempt to reconcile Colin 
with the real, adult world. Religion offers Colin no solace because its agents and 
establishment are risible, and even Jesus himself cannot give Colin’s misery any 
consolation or meaning (168-169). After the funeral Colin is left at the water’s 
edge, withdrawn, exhausted, desperate; the coda involving his grey mouse and a 
cat (172-174) could be taken as a sublimated suicide, an ultimate refusal of the 
world-by-its-own-rules. In that, Vian can be said to have stepped outside 
Decadent grooves, into a pessimistic and uncompromising expression.
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Chapter 6: Britain -  The Second Battie o f the Bulge
Like their French counterparts, British youths were perceived as a ‘national 
asset’ and the potential agents of their elders’ hopes for the future in the new 
welfare state.607 They also represented a social problem and were often 
represented as menacing and regarded as threatening to change the country for 
the worse. In short, British youth was both counted on and feared.
Postwar British youths attracted much official attention, as attempts to 
recruit them to the reconstruction project led to a series of assessments of their 
situation and new measures for their productive development (in the military, in 
education and in industry). However, the popular image of youths as criminal 
presented a challenge to this official approach and rendered successive stylised 
types of teenagers -  ‘Teds’, ‘mods’, ‘rockers’, ‘trads’ -  as ‘folk devils’ who, in 
their reputed criminality, reflected the morally corrosive potential of postwar 
affluence.608 Yet many of these conceptions of British youths were mythological: 
the new age of ‘classlessness in affluence’ never came, nor did the ‘teenage 
revolution’, and nor, for that matter, did teenage political influence (except in the 
restricted case of CND).
One representation that did match reality was that of postwar youths as 
affluent consumers. ‘Youth culture’, itself a simplifying term (there was more 
than one), was premised on discrete trends of consumption, particularly of 
fashion and cultural commodities and services. Indeed, a whole ‘youth industry’ 
sprang up in the wake of teen affluence, exploring and exploiting youths, first 
commercially, with public purveyors (mainly the BBC) following suit. As in 
France, youth culture was heavily influenced by American popular culture. In 
both countries American styles and fashions were filtered through national 
preoccupations to produce cultural products that reflected France and Britain as
607 On youth as ‘national asset’ see: John Davis, Youth and the Condition o f Britain: Images of 
Adolescent Conflict (London: Athlone, 1990), 93 (henceforth: Davis, Youth).
608 The term ‘folk devils’ was coined, with specific reference to British youth cultures, in: Stanley 
Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation o f the Mods and Rockers, rev. edn. 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987 [1972]).
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much as its American model. This situation of new opportunities and new 
frustrations was the focus of Colin Maclnnes’s novel, Absolute Beginners, a 
discussion of which will conclude this chapter.
Youth in the Eyes of Its Elders
In the postwar period, consecutive British governments were expressly 
concerned with increasing opportunities for young people, resulting in a flush of 
official discussions, reports, provisions, and policy reforms. These must be 
understood with respect to two guiding themes of official British discourse: first, 
the very emergence of adolescence or youth as a distinct age group for 
consideration, not unprecedented but never before of a national scope; and 
second, the official understanding of the newly circumscribed youth phenomenon 
as a national asset. This meant that despite their relative lack of political 
influence young people had to be taken into special consideration as their future 
was linked with the future of the nation as a whole. This was not unprecedented 
in British political discourse, but after the Second World War youth grew in 
national importance and postwar educational provisions for them were 
qualitatively different from interwar policies.609
The Butler Education Act of 1944, discussed briefly in chapter 1, was the 
opening move in a series of government educational provisions, all well-meant 
but not without their practical difficulties; hampered by supply and teacher 
shortages, it was only fully implemented in the 1950s.610 In 1947, school leaving 
age was raised to fifteen: this was controversial, as the longer children had to 
remain in school the longer they remained their parents’ financial responsibility, 
but children’s interests finally prevailed. In view of an overstretched and 
outdated empire, a compulsory National Service was introduced in 1948, taking 
in 200,000 new conscripts every year, excepting about 16% for their vocational 
training or higher education. By 1951 half the British military was made up of 
National Servicemen, but the quality of the annual intake reflected the still poor 
progress being made in the educational system.611 This experience was formative
609 Davis, Youth, 104-106.
610 Marwick, Society, 37.
611 Hennessy, 79-82.
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to all conscripts, giving most the opportunity to leave their birthplace and 
discover new regions at home and abroad, and offering some vocational training 
and possibly a military career. Certainly, since most conscripts were urbanites, 
their deployment across the countiy aided the dissemination of urban youth tastes 
and habits; moreover, it can be said to have helped foster a national synchronous 
cohesion, a generational consciousness.
Over its fifteen years of operation, National Service was a significant 
element in the experience of young British males. The 1950s and early 1960s 
saw it supplemented by other elements which became staples of young British 
lives, all brought about through processes of enquiry into the emergent youth 
experience. The Crowther Report of December 1959 redefined state secondary 
education as an education for adolescents that was therefore charged with 
containing their restless demand for more independence. As such it was credited 
with being the first -  and rather late -  conceptual and institutional point of 
separation of adolescents from children, and of their definition as a distinct age 
group.612 More importantly, it indicated an official understanding, albeit partial, 
of adolescents’ problems with an extended schooling system: teenagers were 
frustrated at being ‘trapped’ for longer, and looked elsewhere, to leisure, for the 
values, such as excitement and autonomy, that they felt were missing in their 
school experience. This has led some researchers to the contentious suggestion 
that teenage popular culture developed in no small part as a reaction to increased
f . i ' lschooling.
The Robbins Report of 1963, also mentioned in chapter 3, suggested an 
overhaul of the entire higher education and further education system so as to 
cater (somewhat belatedly) for the needs of the ‘bulge’. The measures suggested 
included an expansion of the existing, ‘old’, universities and polytechnics; and 
the creation of 11 new universities across the country, partly by promoting some 
existing technical colleges to university status. Controversial for allegedly 
devaluing higher education, the measures following the Robbins Report 
nevertheless shaped many young lives through the modem education of ‘new’
612 Davis, Youth, 95-98.
613 Alan Sinfield, Literature Politics and Culture in Postwar Britain, 2nd edn. (London: Athlone, 
1997), 157; Paul Rock and Stanley Cohen, “The Teddy Boy,” in The Age o f Affluence 1951- 
1964, ed. by Vemon Bogdanorand Robert Skidelsky (London: Macmillan, 1970), 316-318.
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universities, polytechnics, and art schools. Higher education expansionism also 
expanded the condition of studenthood, effectively extending the adolescence of 
postwar ‘affluent teenagers’ with a period of time and opportunity but little 
material affluence. In complement, the 1963 Newsom Report sought to address 
the adolescent public that did not qualify for higher education. The rhetoric and 
reasoning of ‘youth as national asset’ guided the report in suggesting a radical 
revision of an outdated apprenticeship system: the nation’s increasingly 
technological industry needed a specially trained junior workforce which had not 
been replenished to meet the rate of economic growth. As a matter of national 
emergency, vocational training had to be modernised and to be made attractive 
again to the young people hitherto exploited in apprenticeships.614
The mass media were quick to adopt the rhetoric of ‘youth as national 
asset’ and to disseminate the term ‘teenager’ into everyday vocabulary. The 
teenage celebration bandwagon made good copy -  in particular, it seemed, to the 
Daily Mirror and the Picture Post, which ran regular spreads and serials on 
youth topics (such as the Daily Mirror's influential ‘The Beanstalk Generation’ 
on 15-19 September 1958); but this also allowed the media to influence the 
meaning of ‘teenager’, shaping a descriptive reference into an ideological term, 
encumbered with the added moral concern of ‘the nation’s future.’615 This 
opened the door to moral judgments and anxieties about what teenagers were, 
how they behaved and what they did -  all in direct reference to the public good. 
The sometimes glib journalistic interventions in the public image of young 
people contributed to an elision of meanings: as teenagers throughout the 1950s 
were mostly working-class and the prominent culture was male, it was easy to 
consider teenage culture as a whole as deviant, violent and delinquent.616 At 
times this resembled a throwback to the days of physiognomy, as young people’s 
appearance (mainly the sartorial styles) was linked with rising crime and thus 
with general cultural decline when contemplating, for example, the figure of the 
Teddy Boy.617
6,4 Davis, Youth, 98-101, 107-109.
615 On tabloid coverage see Marwick, Sixties, 61-63; Osgerby, “Young Ones,” 15.
616 Sandbrook, 441.
617 Osgerby, “Young Ones,” 18; Rock and Cohen, 315.
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Partly in order to continue singing the praises of the otherwise ‘unsung 
majority’ of youth as the nation’s future -  a reaction already familiar from 
Perruchot’s and Giroud’s surveys in France -  the popular media of 1950s Britain 
attempted to marginalise criminality and relegate it to deviant behaviour, to 
juvenile delinquency. In a changing, insecure social climate this was relatively 
easy, as recorded crime figures did rise: 1951 saw more than twice as many 
recorded cases of violence against the person as there had been in 1938, and 
three times as many rapes; and between 1955-61 there was a threefold increase in 
under-21s convicted of violent crime.618 Leslie Wilkins’s Home Office study 
Delinquent Generations (1960) suggested not only that postwar youths were 
more delinquent but that their delinquency spread as the postwar years wore on. 
The War alone was not enough to explain the supposed wave of youthful 
lawlessness; something else, perhaps anxiety regarding social and economic 
change, had to be considered.619 In a later study, the sociologist T.R. Fyvel 
concurred, suggesting that social conditioning was to blame: juvenile 
delinquency was a delayed result of war (wartime destruction, absent fathers, 
overworked mothers) and more immediately the consequence of social and 
economic change, which led to the breakdown of traditional modes of 
socialisation.620 Yet here again, Fyvel elided meanings and values. As Sandbrook 
points out, ‘youth’ was taken as ‘working-class youth’ and equated with a single
ff?  1type, the Teddy Boys, as well as with the general idea of juvenile delinquency.
Looking back at a slightly later period of the same process of 
demonisation of juvenile delinquency, the sociologist Stanley Cohen portrayed 
the Teddy Boys, and the Mods after them, as victims of a moral panic made into 
‘folk devils’. Society, Cohen claimed, reacted to enforce conformity on 
subcultures which it saw as rejecting its mainstream values; it did so through the 
established authority of the police and the judiciary, but also through the mass 
media. In reporting or commenting on juvenile delinquency, the media might 
have left behind a diffuse feeling of anxiety about the situation, or have thrown
618 Davis, Youth, 156; Sandbrook, 442.
6,9 Leslie Wilkins, Delinquent Generations (London: HMSO, 1960); discussed in Davis 87-90.
620 T.R. Fyvel, The Insecure Offenders: Rebellious Youth in the Welfare State (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1961); discussed in Osgerby, “Young Ones,” 17.
621 Davis, Youth, 154.
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certain moral directives into the discourse, and so played on the normative 
concerns of the public, amplifying the cycle of transgression and reaction 
through biased representation, isolating and alienating deviants from society, 
thus leading to more deviance and more social control. This kind of journalistic 
connection of Teds to delinquency was paralleled in France, where the 
delinquency of young followers of yeye was attributed to their ‘Godless 
music’.622 Cohen’s catalogue of modes of expression is revealing, and 
encompasses news reports and commentary (proclaiming disaster, prophesying 
doom, or insinuating what might have happened) as well as uses of imagery 
(attributed spuriously or referring to ‘affluent youths’ to arouse the resentment of 
older generations). Since the social sciences offered no clear causal explanation, 
the media suggested some of their own: juvenile delinquency could have been ‘a 
sign of the times’; a social ‘disease’; a menacing, conspiratorial cabalism; or the 
result of sheer boredom -  in which case further blame had to be delegated to 
society, for failing to constructively direct the young, or to a pathology of the 
young (because ‘in the old days’ one did not have time to get bored).623
Yet for the most part youth subcultures did not reject all mainstream 
values, and mainstream culture was not absolutely monolithic and repressive.624 
Perhaps the affluent society was to blame after all: just as the media manipulated 
public opinion so it manipulated popular tastes, and this commercial exploitation 
of the impressionable confused them about their tastes, values and standards: 
strange dress and linguistic habits, and a disturbingly casual attitude to violence. 
Therefore, the ‘affluent youth’ are troubled by affluence in general.625 This take 
on the puzzle of ‘delinquency in affluence’ was elaborated in a pivotal document 
on postwar British youth culture, the Ministry of Education report on The Youth 
Service in England and Wales, chaired by Diana, Countess of Albemarle, and 
published shortly after the Crowther Report, in February 1960. The Albemarle 
Report went well beyond examining informal education to consider many aspects 
of contemporary youth experience that informed it, reflecting Lady Albemarle’s 
view that understanding “the world of young people” illuminated the “less
622 Cohen, 17-18.
623 Cohen, 51-64.
624 Cf. Sandbrook, 452.
625 This was suggested in 1959 by the sociologist Bryan Wilson, quoted in Sandbrook, 452.
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tangible changes in society.” To do so the committee re-examined many cliches 
about the youth of the day -  the delinquent generation, their rejection of family 
life, their supposed pampering by the Welfare State, their materialism, their 
immorality, their disaffectedness -  and found all of them void. Considering 
various aspects of postwar life -  the biological difference of ‘the bulge’, juvenile 
delinquency, National Service, housing shortages, the lack of educational 
opportunities, and consumerism -  the committee (which included Richard 
Hoggart) concluded that British youths were not so bad after all. Young people 
needed to be empowered to realise their potential: their problems were “deeply 
rooted in the soil of a disturbed modem world,” and it was the state’s role to give 
them aims and challenges and to encourage them (through the Youth Service) to 
cooperate and participate.
The Albemarle Report was probably the most substantially affirmative 
(and exceptionally clear) official document about youth in postwar Britain. The 
general public, however, tended to think of youth culture in simplistic and 
stereotypically abusive terms. ‘Teddy Boy’ became synonymous with ‘juvenile 
delinquent’, and later more generally with any disagreeable rogue (as in the case 
of John Osbome); and, for a while, ‘Teenager’ came to be just a generalised 
version of a Ted -  and later of a Mod.627 Among the various teenage types, the 
Teddy Boys were certainly the first visible ones and the first ‘folk devils’ tied up 
with the impression of Britain’s social change. The Teds -  like their French 
counterparts, the blousons noirs -  were a working-class product of the leaner 
postwar years and were in decline by the late 1950s, when some turned into 
Rockers. Overlapping with the Teds’ ubiquity in the newspapers were the Mods, 
a smarter set with more worldly and romantic pretensions, who better suited the 
affluence of the Macmillan years. More importantly, whereas the Teds could do 
no right by the average tabloid reader, the Mods had it both ways and were 
portrayed as folk devils in the magistrate’s court (most famously for early-1960s 
beach brawls), but as trendsetters of elegant, dandy style in the colour
626 Ministry of Education, The Youth Service in England and Wales (London: Parliamentary 
Papers, Cmnd. 929, 1960); Sandbrook, 448-450; Davis, 110-117; see also Ray Gosling, “Lady 
Albemarle’s Boys” (London: Fabian Society, 1961).
627 Davis, Youth, 164-165, 189-190.
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supplements.628 At the same time as the Mods, the Trads (for traditional) 
emerged, associated with folk or blues music and Marxist or CND politics. As 
Mod style faltered in the later 1960s, the more middle-class Trad style gained 
ground thanks to a surge in student radicalism.
Lady Albemarle’s misguided boys, indeed the majority of British youths, 
were not politically active, but this is not the representative image of the late 
1950s. Politics was actually one of the areas of public life most influenced by the 
youth phenomenon. As their French counterparts protested in an organised and 
violent manner as part of the labour movement and against colonial wars, 
English youths rallied to the cause of nuclear disarmament.629 The initial spark 
for the British nuclear disarmament movement was the government’s 
international and security policies, and particularly the 1957 White Paper 
published by defence secretary Duncan Sandys. Sandys proposed to overhaul the 
overstretched British security commitments at home, across the empire and on 
the continent: to provide the best and most economical home defence, he 
suggested shrinking the military by abolishing National Service, relying instead 
on nuclear deterrence. While in some circles this seemed a reasonable follow- 
up to the imperial flop at Suez several months earlier, others felt this was an 
incredible and outdated folly. Among the latter was J.B. Priestley, who cried foul 
in the New Statesman, calling for public protest against nuclear armament: 
quitting the arms race, he reasoned, would not only break the nuclear deadlock 
but also establish an alternative, moral leadership role for post-Suez Britain. The 
CND was a ‘liberation movement’ for the youth voice. Its arrival as a discernible 
group on the political stage effectively ended years of consensus politics.631 
Young people, under the age of 25, comprised at least half of the marchers and
628 Cf. Dick Hebdige, “The Meaning of Mod,” Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in 
Post-War Britain, ed. by Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (London: Unwin Hyman, 1976), 87- 
96.
629 Unlike today, this did not concern environmentalism, curiously absent from the 1950s British 
public arena despite the growing conservationist trend suggested in chapter 3 above. 
Hennessy, 117.
630 By this Sandys implied that Britain could not defend its population in case of an attack. 
William Wallace, “World Status without Tears,” in Bogdanor and Skidelsky (eds.), 192-220.
631 Robert Taylor, “The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,” in Bogdanor and Skidelsky (eds.), 
251; see also the editors’ introduction in Bogdanor and Skidelsky (eds.), 13.
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demonstrators at any CND event. Yet while it did manage to focus popular leftist 
fears and frustrations between 1958 and 1962, CND enjoyed very limited 
success. Its methods tended to be anti-political, relying instead on emotional, 
gestural protests (like the Easter marches through the countryside), which, while 
charming young people disillusioned with party politics, did not mature into 
transformative politics. CND followed a tradition of radical dissenting 
movements, and was novel mainly in its function as pressure group and, most
632importantly, because of the predominance of young members.
One of the stranger myths or aspirations tied up with British youth 
subcultures in the 1950s and early 1960s was the idea that the postwar ‘gilded 
youth’ constituted both an international movement and a distinct social class, and 
therefore would bring about the erosion of traditional class boundaries. This was 
not such a far-fetched idea, as by 1963 social polarisation and inequality had 
become less extreme; nevertheless, the world occupied by youth was “precisely a 
world of new-found affluence and conspicuous consumption, of apolitical 
quiescence, and of a new, basically middle-class, classlessness.”633 Popular 
literature and film, too, were still class-conscious, producing the ‘disaffected 
middle-class youth’ type of Hurry on Down and Lucky Jim or the ‘working-class 
youth on the make’ type of Room at the Top and Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning, 6 3 4  Although fears of a ‘teenage revolution’ animated defenders of a 
traditional way of life, British youths did not transform British politics in a major 
way. A 1965 study asserted that postwar British youths were actually rather 
conservative, politically continuous with their elders, and had no generational 
political identity.635 This age group, uninterested in world events, economy or 
religion, was hard to recruit politically -  much unlike their French counterparts, 
who were concerned with politics but felt unable to influence it. British youths of
632 The CND also tapped into the emerging Trad youth subculture, although the typical and 
unpopular Trad anti-Americanism did little to help its public profile. Marwick, Sixties, 65-66; 
Hennessy, 531; Taylor, “The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,” 221, 227, 250.
633 Davis, Youth, 158-159 (my italics); see also: Peter Laurie, The Teenage Revolution (London: 
Anthony Blond, 1965), 9-11.
634 Davis, Youth, 176-177; Sandbrook, 441.
635 Philip Abrams and Alan Little, “The Young Activist in British Politics,” British Journal of 
Sociology 16,4 (December 1965), 325-331.
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the 1950s and early 1960s were mainly concerned with leisure: Marxist 
observers thought this entangled them in their own oppression; viewed less 
dichotomously, the ‘oppression’ of affluence was simply a fundamental element 
merged into other social transformations -  that is, leisure consumerism was part 
of young people’s ‘dependent participation’.636 Ironically, the liberalisation of 
traditional British life, so linked to the threat presented by postwar youths, was 
eventually instigated from above by the Conservative Home Secretary, Rab 
Butler.637 This fact was nevertheless obscured by a “gigantic ‘vitality fantasy’” of 
the time, animated by affluence to an “almost un-British vibrance” and tying 
together the almost ritual attack on stuffy conventions; the classlessness fallacy; 
aspirations to social ascendancy that effectively affirmed the class system; and 
the rise of youth -  as subculture, leaders of the cult of vitality, speed and 
modernity.638
Consuming Passions of a Flaming Youth
Young people in postwar Britain wielded greatest influence by using their 
affluence to consume in distinctive ways, leading contemporary commentators to 
refer to ‘teenage culture’ or ‘youth culture’. The figure of ‘the Teenage
Consumer’ was itself one of the powerful and ubiquitous images of British 
popular press. It was only to be expected that the ‘affluent youth’ would want to 
spend, but in the label ‘teenage consumer’ the two parts qualified each other: the 
teenager was defined by his consumption -  just as in France -  and the 
predominant consumer was the teenager. Promoting the term was one of the most 
influential youth studies in postwar Britain, Mark Abrams’s The Teenage 
Consumer (1959), on which he expanded in Teenage Consumer Spending in 
1959 (1961). Abrams was a commercial market researcher, not a disinterested 
social scientist (he relied on the primary research of other parties), but his
636 Laurie, 109-111; Sinfield, 178; Booker, 80.
637 Among these measures are the relaxation of literary censorship, the legalisation of gambling, 
extending pub licensing hours, and preparing the abolishment of capital punishment and the 
decriminalisation of homosexuality. Hennessy, 512-513, 521.
638 Booker, 22-24, 79; Marwick, 98-99.
639 Marwick, Sixties, 43.
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argument regarding teenage consumption trends was deemed influential enough 
for the Albemarle Committee to consult him.640 Abrams concluded that there was 
“distinctive teenage spending for distinctive teenage needs in a distinctive 
teenage world.”641 Earning more than ever, hardly taxed and unencumbered by 
adult commitments, British teenagers -  whom Abrams defined as single youths 
between the ages of 15 (school leaving age) and 25 -  had between them about 
£900 million to spend in 1958. This was double the amount their counterparts 
had had at their discretionary disposal twenty years earlier, and they spent it 
“mainly on dressing up in order to impress other teenagers and on goods which 
form the nexus of teenage gregariousness outside the home.”642
In The Teenage Revolution (1965), Peter Laurie elaborated on teenage 
spending patterns. Teenagers, claimed Laurie, were defined by their conspicuous 
consumption: “the distinctive fact about teenagers’ behaviour is economic,” and 
this framed the discrete society they created for themselves. The economic 
definition of teenagers also illuminated their patterns of socialisation: 
expenditure on “things that give immediate pleasure and little lasting use” was 
not just a personal indulgence but also had a communicative function: one could 
only participate in a largely commercial teenage culture by spending money.643 
Laurie recognised the economic transaction across the counter as a major new 
mode of interaction between adults and youths, but also noted that this 
mercantile relation created a conflict of interest between the two parties, with 
adult merchants and businessmen trying to 'fleece the young’; and market 
research like that of Abrams only made that exploitation easier.644
The ‘youth industry’ that sprang up to meet teenage consumer demand 
performed two mutually constitutive functions -  to create the Teenager 
(Abrams), and to then exploit him. This fed back into the discourse about youth 
culture and the emergence of the Teenager as a social-economic type, in a way 
pacifying some of the more resentful attitudes toward 'affluent youths’.
640 Marwick, Sixties, 59.
641 Mark Abrams, The Teenage Consumer (London: The London Press Exchange LTD, 1959), 
1 0 .
642 Abrams, 9-10.
643 Laurie, 9-13, 74
644 Laurie, 13, 59.
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Considering teenagers as juvenile delinquents served to exclude them from 
society, whereas considering them as consumers put them on a par with adults, 
who were forced to acknowledge teenage participation. Laurie credited Abrams 
with calming enraged adult opinion of teenage ‘idleness’ and ‘superficiality’, and 
reconciling it with what teenagers were really like. This was aided by the 
emergence as adolescents, around 1960, of the first ‘bulge’ children, who were 
seen as a less violent and more self-absorbed lot than the Teds only a few years 
their seniors. The younger adolescents, suggested Laurie, were emancipated by 
their openness and sensitivity to outside influences, making their identity
645formation less dependent on gang culture.
The tendency in postwar Britain was to see all adolescents as problematic 
while ignoring or belittling their role as serious agents of economic growth and 
commercial innovation; yet this tendency was not particular to Britain.646 The 
negative representation of youth culture in the 1950s and early 1960s as 
characterised by gangs and conspicuous consumption was significantly informed 
by the association with American popular culture. The threat of corrosive 
Americanisation of British culture in affluence was not pure myth. Abrams 
pointed out that working-class tastes and values characterised the vast majority 
of British teenagers; but with no domestic model for their spending, they turned 
to “the one industrial country in the world that has such experience,” namely the 
United States.647 British manufacturers struggled with the shift from a hitherto 
inert, loyal and consistent adult market toward dynamic and ever-changing 
teenage consumers, who looked for cheap new and untraditional mass-produced 
goods.648
Music was central to the distinction of young tastes from mainstream 
tastes. Music technology itself was transformed in 1948 with the introduction of 
33rpm long-player albums (more durable than the heavier, more brittle 78rpm 
ones) and 45rpm seven-inch singles, which fast outgrew the sales of sheet music, 
shooting from 4 million singles sold in 1955 to 52 million by 1960. By 1960 the 
teenage market and its performers dominated the ‘hit parades’, themselves only
645 Davis, Youth, 157-158,166; Laurie, 17-26.
646 Rock and Cohen, 288,294, 300, 302, 314; Hennessy, 492.
647 Abrams, 19, 13-14.
648 Osgerby, “Young Ones,” 12, 17.
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introduced in 1952 with the New Musical Express Top Twelve. Teenagers were 
dominant not necessarily because they could buy more records, but because they 
formed the largest identifiable market (£830 million annually, making up 40% of 
the market), meaning big revenues from teenage tastes. Music was also important 
to youth socialisation patterns: teens congregated around their favourite 
performers, divided by star allegiances, and followed them in films as well as in 
old dance halls and variety theatres, which were reinvigorated by the new trends; 
music was also consumed in ‘milk bars’ and ‘expresso bars’, to the sounds of 
American or Americanised hits from jukeboxes.649
The American influence on the style and content of British music took 
many forms. From the resistance of folk revivalists like Ewan MacColl, through 
the fascination with traditional jazz, considered around 1960 to be more ‘sincere’ 
and ‘authentic’ than faddish rock’n’roll, and embraced along with MacColl as 
part of the leftist activism of CND (as above); on to the lighter, upbeat dance hall 
swing numbers of working-class areas; then the digested New Orleans fusion 
assimilated into Skiffle, best exemplified by Lonnie Donegan, which was popular 
because anyone could play it on household instruments; and then the more 
straightforward dilutions of black rhythm’n’blues in white rock’n’roll, with 
English singers like Tommy Steele (‘discovered’ in Soho cafe the 2-Is) and Cliff 
Richard, accompanied on guitar, imitating American singing accents. Here, too, 
older record producers and artist managers exploited young talent and rebranded 
it for mass consumption, stylistically fusing American rock’n’roll with the 
familiar British variety tradition.650
Other media attempted to latch on to the commercial success of music 
with the youth audience. Television, both commercial and public, adapted early 
to young tastes with programmes like ‘Hit Parade’ (1952) and ‘Music Shop’ 
(1956), and then ‘Six-Five Special’ (1957) and ‘Juke Box Jury’ (1959). Imported 
American ‘teenpics’ wooed young audiences back to cinemas with Blackboard 
Jungle (1955) and Rock Around the Clock (1956), and were soon followed by 
lighter British imitations like The Young Ones (1961) and Summer Holiday
649 Sandbrook, 456, 462; Osgerby, “Young Ones,” 12-14; Anthony Bicat, “Fifties Children: 
Sixties People,” in Bogdanor and Skidelsky (eds.), 324-326.
650 Sandbrook, 465-484, in particular 475; Osgerby, Youth, 119-120.
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(1963). Public radio, until then a popular medium, was encumbered by 
‘needletime’ regulations and only caught up with teen tastes in 1967 with the 
establishment of BBC Radio One. In the meantime it lost listeners to foreign 
stations, like Radio Luxembourg and the American Forces Network, and later to 
‘pirate’ radio, like Radio Caroline and Radio London. The adaptation of public 
broadcasting to youth tastes did not please everyone, and a coordinated popular 
movement emerged to influence it back onto ‘decent’ programming, most 
notably with Mary Whitehouse’s National Viewers and Listeners Association, 
established in 1963.651
American popular culture thoroughly influenced what has been called the 
British ‘youthful oppositional style’ -  not just in music -  thus demonstrating the 
largely derivative nature of British youth culture of the 1950s. The American 
cultural influence, like many of its followers, was bohemian but middle-class, 
drawing on the Beat myth and by postwar French Existentialist thought and 
fiction (as with some Angry writing). This tendency also imported the 
exoticist/primitivist idolisation of ‘negro culture’ and the American south, with 
its emphasis on modem jazz and dance; recreational dmg use, sometimes imbued 
with non-Westem mysticism; and its self-definition as iconoclastic and avant- 
garde. Yet even when ‘oppositional’, youth styles still conformed to style herds 
(Teds, Beats, mods, rockers) and class backgrounds.652
However, American cultural influences aggravated the British ‘racial 
problem’ and its class underpinnings. The predominant youth attitude toward 
black American culture was its appropriation, as with rock’n’roll among Teds 
and rockers, without acknowledging its black roots.653 Instead, this culture was 
displaced and projected onto an exoticised white mainstream American culture, 
what Sinfield called “a generalized version of gangsters, ‘automobiles’ and
fi51 Osgerby, “Young Ones,” 13; Sandbrook, 463; Osgerby, Youth, 99.
652 Compare, for example, “The Noonday Underground” (99-112) and “The Life and Hard Time 
of a Teenage London Society Girl” (225-244), in Tom Wolfe, The Mid-Atlantic Man, and 
Other New Breeds in England and America (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969 
[1968]). See also Marwick, Sixties, 55; Davis, Youth, 178.
6j3 Originating in 1954 with US radio disk-jockey Alan Freed, the term ‘rock’n’roll’ itself was 
essentially a ‘white’ euphemism for black rhythm’n ’blues. Sandbrook, 459.
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Hollywood.”654 Urban Britain of the 1950s did not offer white youths a 
proximity to black culture that in America had let it into mainstream white 
culture through the back door. Instead, racial prejudice in Britain was ubiquitous: 
West-Indian immigrants were just about tolerated, because they could not be 
ignored, and black Americans, with their culture displaced, hardly figured at all. 
At least to the government these racial tensions seemed contained, and 
Macmillan’s government did not legislate to restrict immigration until 1962 
because it thought that the public was generally uninterested in such a measure. 
Then again, the political elite, still being mostly upper class, was slow to 
understand the fullness of the racial tensions among the working classes who 
absorbed the (mostly West-Indian) immigrants. The 1958 riots had taken many, 
in government and across Britain, by surprise.655
‘Americanisation’ had a mixed reception in Britain, regarded on the one 
hand as straightforward cultural imperialism, ‘Coca-Colonisation’ or ‘affluence- 
borne decline’, and celebrated as introducing an un-British vibrancy that 
liberated now-affluent British youths of national traditions.656 To the old British 
elites this widespread popular advancement came at the cost of empire itself, 
including its power, prestige and old hierarchies -  fostering a declinist mentalite 
shared by old imperialists (Eden) and pragmatists (Macmillan) alike. In a 
revealing comment from his time as housing minister, Macmillan dryly observed 
in his diary how the “proletariat,” having come into its own, was “determined to 
maintain its standard of ‘panem and circenses’ at all costs.”657 Yet it was 
Macmillan’s governments that were accused precisely of a ‘bread and circuses’ 
policy: endorsing short-term or temporary economic measures that produced the
654 Sinfield, 152.
655 Osgerby, Youth, 123, citing Paul Gilroy and Errol Lawrence, “Two-Tone Britain: White and 
Black Youth and the Politics of Anti-Racism,” in Multi-Racist Britain, ed. by P. Cohen and 
H.S. Bains, (London: Pluto Press, 1988), 128-129; Marwick, Society, 132; Hennessy, 496- 
501; on racialism in British immigration policies see Hampshire, 60-70.
656 Sinfield, 156; Hennessy compares the first-hand impressions of Hoggart (the famous ‘spiritual 
dry-rot’) and the excited young Richard Eyre; Hennessy, 15-16. On the consequences of this 
liberation see Wolfe’s “The Mid-Atlantic Man,” in Wolfe, 43-60.
657 Hennessy, 19; quoting from The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years, 1950-1957, ed. by 
Peter Catterall (London: Macmillan, 2003), 186 (entry for 27 September 1952); also 
Hennessy, 28-29.
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tangible effect of affluence and profusion of goods, at the expense of more 
responsible long-term measures.658 Ultimately, Macmillan himself was 
ambivalent about affluence and the conditions it created for Britain’s youth, on 
the one hand defending his policies -  “the temptations of comfort and affluence 
are not an argument in favour of poverty” -  but on the other hand admitting 
behind closed doors in 1959 that “we all really know that in the last 40 years the 
morals of this country have declined.”659
Colin Maclnnes and Absolute Beginners
Colin Maclnnes (1914-1976) was an astute observer of teenage mores in the late 
1950s. This was surprising for two reasons: when City o f Spades, the first novel 
in his London trilogy, was published in 1957 he was already 42 years old; and he 
was remarkably attuned to the youth cultures of the time considering they were 
generally associated with working-class and lower-middle-class youths. For 
Maclnnes, despite his impoverished later life, was well-born: the second son of 
the novelist Angela Thirkell, the great grandson of the painter Sir Edward Burne- 
Jones, as well as first cousin of prime minister Stanley Baldwin and of the author 
Rudyard Kipling -  a relation of whom he was particularly proud.
This unlikely chronicler of late 1950s British youth culture produced 
probably the best fictional account of the new subculture in all its complexity, 
leading his Absolute Beginners to be compared with J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher 
in the Rye (1951). The two novels shared the template of ‘the world through the 
eyes of a contemporary adolescent’, as did Fran9oise Sagan’s Bonjour tristesse 
(1954) between them and Anthony Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange (1962) 
afterwards. These novels show the estrangement of postwar youths from an 
established order that seems either trivial or fake; the painful coming of age that 
teaches adolescents of their weaknesses and strengths; the sense of self-confident
658 Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, “Bread and Circuses? The Conservatives in Office, 1951-1964,” in 
Bogdanor and Skidelsky (eds.), 56-58.
659 Hennessy, 538, citing James Margach, The Abuse o f Power: the War between Downing Street 
and the Media from Lloyd George to Callaghan (London: W.H. Allen, 1978), 121; and 
Hennessy, 511, citing Mark Jarvis, Conservative Governments, Morality and Social Change 
in Affluent Britain, 1957-1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 161.
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knowing or cleverness; fresh, cynical outlooks related in new linguistic 
affectations; and some violence and cruelty (sometimes toward oneself, as in 
Catcher). These fictional protagonists project a “hopeful and vulnerable sense of 
life” tested by irony and drama as they take on the world alone, with 
“marvellously inadequate equipment”.660 Sagan’s novel, buoyed by immediate 
scandal, was translated and published in Britain in 1955, and forms a link 
between Salinger and Maclnnes. Salinger’s Holden and Sagan’s Cecile are 
affluent metropolitan adolescents rebelling in their little ways against their 
stifling privilege and the adult world. Yet, being older and more cynical, Cecile 
is closer to Maclnnes’s poorer and unnamed protagonist. Both are sexually 
active, have a complex understanding of adult types, and are less sentimental and 
idealistic than Holden.
Not that Maclnnes had intended to write a new Catcher. Working as a 
critic and essayist for cultural reviews like Encounter, Twentieth Century and 
Queen, Maclnnes started to address aspects of popular youth culture, thus 
introducing the topic to the intelligentsia. In essays like ‘Young England, Half 
English’ Maclnnes instantly grasped early British pop music as a key to the so- 
called ‘teenage revolution’, identifying its roots in black American music but 
noting how it was not wholly Americanised.661 This essay’s title was chosen by 
Maclnnes with Encounter co-editor Irving Kristol to allude to familiar earlier 
titles such as Orwell’s essay ‘England, Your England’ (in his The Lion and the 
Unicorn, 1941) and D.H. Lawrence’s short story ‘England My England’ (1922). 
The gesture was toward the radical ‘condition of England’ tradition which 
stressed individual integrity and groundedness as essential English qualities -  
taken to be the secret of British endurance in the First (Lawrence) and the Second 
(Orwell) World Wars. Both writers suggested that the move away from one’s 
local, traditional, popular roots toward some kind of cosmopolitanism -  be it to
660 This was said of Salinger, but holds true for Sagan and Maclnnes, too. R. W.B. Lewis, “Adam 
as Hero in the Age of Containment,” in The American Adam: Innocence Tragedy and 
Tradition in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), 199- 
200 .
661 Davis, Youth, 171-173; Colin Maclnnes, “Young England, Half English: the Pied Piper from 
Bermondsey,” England, Half English, rev. ed. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1986 [1961]), 11- 
16 (originally in Encounter, December 1957).
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the upper classes (Lawrence’s Egbert) or to Marxist internationalism (Orwell) -  
comes at the cost of English assurance and strength and threatens Englishness 
itself.662 Suggesting that in 1957 England was already only ‘half English’, 
Maclnnes implied that English tradition and constancy were being eroded by 
wholesale adoption rather than adaptation-by-appropriation of American popular 
culture.663
The writing of Absolute Beginners, from April to November 1958, 
became more urgent following the race riots featured in its last section, first in 
Nottingham’s St. Anne’s Well, and then at Notting Hill, west London. 
Maclnnes’s immediate response was that the riots “will seem, with Suez, the key 
event of the post-war period,” but also that they were at risk of being obscured by 
the “general tendency... in editorial comment to find alibis. There are vicious 
coloureds. Teds are frustrated psychopaths. This is a ‘race riot’, not a race 
riot.”664 Incorporating the riots into his novel-in-progress, Maclnnes based his 
detailed description of incidents on the Manchester Guardian’s reportage.665 Yet, 
facing the same critical dismissal as Sillitoe, he continued to claim that his 
intention was not documentary but rather lyrical, “poetic evocations of a human 
situation, with undertones of social criticism of it.”666 There are other similarities 
between Absolute Beginners and Saturday Night and Sunday Morning: Arthur 
Seaton dresses like a Teddy boy but is otherwise, like Maclnnes’s protagonist, an 
individualist and a non-conformist, not a gang creature; both feel their youth is
662 George Orwell, “England Your England,” in England Your England and Other Essays 
(London: Seeker & Warburg, 1953 [1941]), 192-224; D.H. Lawrence, “England, My 
England,” in England, My England (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1960 [1922]), 7-40.
663 Maclnnes, “Young England, Half English,” 15.
664 Maclnnes in unpublished memorandum dated 5 September 1958, quoted in Tony Gould, 
Inside Outsider: the Life and Times o f Colin Maclnnes (London: Allison & Busby, 1993 
[1983]), 134.
665 Gould, 134; Colin Maclnnes, Absolute Beginners (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986 
[1964]), 192-197, 201-205, 232. All subsequent main text page references to the novel are to 
this edition. Compare the vivid portrayal of black characters in Absolute Beginners with the 
barely present character of Sam in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning.
666 Maclnnes in an unattributed comment, quoted in Harriet Blodgett, “City of Other Worlds: The 
London Novels of Colin Maclnnes,” Critique: Studies in Modem Fiction XVIII, 1 (1976), 
105.
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ending and look for stability; and, discounting north-south differences, both 
protagonists share local and inward-looking frames of reference, pushing the 
wider world to the background. The interjection of this world into their lives 
occurs through the racial element, which seems as foreign to Saturday Night and 
Sunday Morning as it is central to Absolute Beginners, with the two novels 
reflecting two stages in the social transformation of late-1950s Britain.667
Absolute Beginners is narrated by a nameless teenage photographer 
nearing the end of his eighteenth year, living an independent life in a west 
London immigrant neighbourhood he dubs ‘Napoli’ for its colourful squalor. In 
the recent past he used to date Suzette, with whom he is still infatuated, but who 
prefers black men and is about to enter a marriage of convenience with her 
middle-aged homosexual boss, Henley. He has a tense and contemptuous 
relationship with his mother and a soft spot for her hen-pecked second husband, 
his father, whose wasted life he mainly pities. Two other figures from the 
narrator’s past are his half-brother Vernon, six years his senior, whom he 
despises for his earnest, straight-laced ways, the ways of someone who has never 
had a youth; and Ed the Ted, a lost working-class kid who joined a gang and is 
portrayed as an insecure bumbling idiot. Most of the narrative takes place in 
affluent (Kensington, Mayfair) and less affluent (Bayswater, Notting Hill) west 
London, where the narrator lives, and in Soho, where he goes for his diversions. 
A motley crew of token secondary characters surrounds the protagonist: lesbians 
(Big Jill), gay prostitutes (Hoplite), ‘spades’ (Mr. Cool), Jewish intellectuals 
(Mannie Katz); an oily Australian television presenter (Call-me-Cobber), his 
model girlfriend (the ex-Deb-of-last-year), the gossip columnist Dido Lament, 
the exploitative advertising executive (Vendice Partners), the “scruffy and 
disapproving” (145) Marxist Ron Todd, and the disquieting, calculating teenage 
pimp, the Wizard.
The plot is organised into four uneven parts according to the summer 
months over which it takes place. As this is a coming-of-age story, this duration 
is nostalgically recognised retrospectively as a last summer of innocence before
667 Absolute Beginners is still absent from most critical analyses of the British postwar novel. 
Nick Bentley, “Translating English: Youth, Race and Nation in Colin Maclnnes’s City o f 
Spades and Absolute BeginnersConnotations: A Journal for Critical Debate 13, 1-2 (2003- 
2004), 149.
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everything changes: this is another theme linking Absolute Beginners with 
Sagan’s summertime romance in Bonjour tristesse, mentioned above, as well as 
with another successful contemporary novel, L.P. Hartley’s The Go-Between 
(1953), set in the ‘golden summer’ of 1914. The sense of splendour and 
blossoming is thwarted by the retrospective knowledge of the impending 
corruption of order. The anticipation of the end of summer is palpable, and the 
time remaining is felt not only to run out but to accelerate as it elapses (again, a 
gesture of belatedness): ‘In June’ is the first and by far the longest part of 
Absolute Beginners, but is an exposition unfolding over one day, while 
subsequent, shorter parts show events occurring over longer time spans. ‘In July’ 
and ‘In August’ expand on the narrator’s family situation and on his rift with 
Suzette, also showing the first signs of violent racial tension. The penultimate ‘In 
September’ witnesses the riots, affecting the narrator more profoundly than the 
death of his father or the final consummation of his love for Suzette. Failing to 
move people into action by his witness accounts, the narrator, feeling helpless 
and disoriented, attempts to leave the country, but is finally reconciled with 
London as his home for all its contemporary ugliness.
To discuss Absolute Beginners in the context of cultural pessimism would 
seem to be reading it against the intended grain, as Maclnnes maintained that he 
wanted to view British youth optimistically, as a generation full of promise. 
Nevertheless, he adds,
it would be equally possible to see, in the teenage neutralism and 
indifference to politics, and self-sufficiency, and instinct for 
enjoyment - in short, in their kind of happy mindlessness -  the raw 
material for crypto-fascisms of the worst kind. I don’t sense this 
myself at all, though I may very well be wrong.668
It has been suggested that a desire to provide an ‘optimistic view’ is one reason 
Maclnnes did not elaborate on the theme of Teddy Boys in the novel: Absolute
668 Colin Maclnnes, “Pop Songs and Teenagers,” England, Half English, 59 (originally in The 
Twentieth Century, February 1958).
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Beginners embodies “all the left-liberal hopes of the day.”669 Yet what Maclnnes 
overlooked before 1958, Anthony Burgess foregrounded in A Clockwork Orange 
in 1962, a novel based on the juvenile delinquency that he saw around him in 
Sussex: Teddy boy thuggery and mod and rocker riots on beaches and in seaside 
towns. This casual violence, portrayed through the eyes of the teenage 
protagonist Alex, is shown, perhaps forgivingly, as a natural phase that 
disappears with time and maturity. Unlike Maclnnes, Burgess chose to represent 
teenage violence at one remove, as a fantastic, futuristic narrative complete with 
its own barely intelligible juvenile argot, the nadsat.610 Like the fictional present 
of Absolute Beginners, the fictional future of A Clockwork Orange is not 
politicised. This stance, together with its aesthetisation of violence, is the stuff of 
A Clockwork Orange's ‘crypto-fascism’, which suggested that freely choosing 
evil is better than being conditioned or coerced to disavow it.671 If Absolute 
Beginners represents bright but lost young things, then A Clockwork Orange 
represents similarly lost but much darker young things. Both Maclnnes and 
Burgess were outsiders to the realities they represented, and thus in writing about 
a certain underworld the authorial stance of Maclnnes was closer to that of 
Orwell than to that of Genet. Like Orwell, Maclnnes was well-born and 
‘slummed it’ in order to explore his subjects; in that sense he is more a journalist 
or a voyeur than he is a true participant.672 Orwell’s influence can be felt in the 
intricate ways in which the novel maintains an optimistic outlook about a 
pessimistic narrator who more often than not expresses the author’s own 
opinions.
Maclnnes’s 18-year-old narrator introduces the other younger characters 
as if they belong to a different generation. He describes the 14-year-old singer
669 Gould, 128; quotation from Sinfield, 128.
670 While the bulk of the novel was already written beforehand, its nadsat and futurist stylistics 
were added following Burgess’s experiences of the Russian Teds, the stilyagi, on a 1961 trip 
to Leningrad. Andrew Biswell, The Real Life o f Anthony Burgess (London: Picador, 2005), 
237.
671 Burgess later opined that the book was actually ‘too didactic to be artistic’; Biswell, 255.
672 Gould, 108; in this sense both Maclnnes and Orwell follow the example of writers like Henry 
Mayhew, whose London Labour and the London Poor (1851-2) was the first systematic 
journalistic study of the capital’s lower social strata.
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Laurie London as “a sign of decadence. This teenage thing is getting out of 
hand,” leading ‘teenager’ to “become a dirty word or, at any rate, a square one” 
(10). From “a real savage splendour” (11) that the teenage phenomenon had 
initially held, teenagers have become exploited, either by market and media who 
“buy us younger every year” (9) or by themselves, “the crafty little absolute 
beginners” (10). Even at his tender age, the narrator already thinks ‘things are not 
as they used to be’ and that ‘it’s all gone downhill’, related to a sense of an 
ending. He feels robbed of “the teenage dream” -  by younger teens and by his 
own maturation -  and is adamant to make the most of the time left: “1 was out for 
kicks and fantasy” (11). It is from this complex perspective on youth that the 
narrator recounts the plot: still part of it, but knowing his time is running out; 
upset at teen ‘decadence’ but wanting to join the party; speaking for teenagers in 
general, but always from his individual position.
Young people in Absolute Beginners possess many of the typical traits of 
postwar youths already discussed. They are mostly concerned with themselves 
and with their specific identity construction, their ‘uniqueness’ -  although this is 
often carried out by conforming to gangs and assuming their characteristics. 
Teenagers share a nomadic, restless existence, presented as ‘children of nobody’ 
who are one another’s frame of reference. To the narrator this process had 
started, embarrassingly, back in the Scouts: “for the first time, here was a family: 
at any rate, a lot, a mob, a click I could belong to” (68). There is, however, a part 
of the youth clannishness and cult of coolness that relies on a delicate balance 
between conformity and individual originality. Still, even when it is chosen from 
among given choices, individual self-definition overrides social forces: the 
narrator chose to live in ‘Napoli’ because it offered him a rare opportunity: “if 
you have loot, and can look after yourself, they treat you as a man, which is what 
you are”, and so, “however horrible the area is, you’re free” (53). Even 
prospective affluence, represented in Wiz turning to pimping, is not an end in 
itself: “I want to be rich all right, but I don’t want to be hooked’ (108). And so, 
even in the face of Ed the Ted who is about to mug him, he reasserts that “I’m 
not being summoned by anyone except the magistrate” (152).
The brighter youths recognised the novelty of their existence as a new 
and distinct social stratum: “when the kids discovered that, for the first time since 
centuries of kingdom-come, they’d money, which hitherto had always been
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denied to us at the best time in life to use it, namely, when you’re young and 
strong... a real savage splendour in the days when we found that no one couldn’t 
sit on our faces any more...” (11). Just several years earlier, when Vernon was a 
teenager, “there just weren’t any: can you believe it? Not any authentic teenagers 
at all. In those days, it seems, you were just an over-grown boy, or an under­
grown man, life didn’t seem to cater for anything whatever else between” (39). 
The narrator is fully appreciative of his circumstances: “what an age it is I’ve 
grown up in, with everything possible to mankind at last, and every horror too, 
you could imagine! And what a time it’s been in England, what a period of fun 
and hope and foolishness and sad stupidity!” (233-234). Metropolitan British 
youths were still exploring their new privilege: “it took me years myself to 
discover... that youth has power, a kind of divine power straight from mother 
nature” (13). This sense of empowerment was not shared by “the other two 
million teenagers they say exist throughout our country” (13). Still, teenagers 
started behaving like inheritors: “even here in this Soho, the headquarters of the 
adult mafia, you could everywhere see the signs of un-silent teenage revolution” 
(74).
The teenage narrator is a typical adolescent whose paradoxical juvenile 
egoism leads him to both see himself as deservedly at the centre of things and to 
resist a scrutiny which he finds menacing. He observes a “sparring stage that 
always seems necessary with the seniors” (22) in which the ‘absolute beginners’ 
need to stake their place. This establishes difference that allows teenagers to be 
considered differently from adults: the narrator explains his abstinence from 
liquor “because I get all the kicks I need from me” (23). He also resists the ex- 
Deb’s overly-intimate inquisitiveness, seeing it as another projection of adult sex 
obsessions on teenagers (79-80). All adult behaviour is seen as threatening, “the 
old blackmail of the parents and all oldies against the kiddos” (44), and “it’s only 
you adult numbers who want to destroy one another” (26). Destroy they do: at 
48, the narrator’s father is spiritually “squashed by a combination of my Mum 
and the 1930s” (31), being “what’s known as a failure,” with “no mind to speak 
o f’ (32). Moreover, “even at the best of times you can’t tell even your father and 
mother anything that really matters to you” (183). Viewed from the ‘absolute 
beginner’ side, the adult-adolescent difference needs to be established on
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egalitarian terms, as the protagonist tells his father: “I’ve not got your 
experience, but one thing I’m not, please, is a fool” (175).
No less important than the teenager/adult distinction are the distinctions 
between teenagers and children, and among different teenager types. The narrator 
is rattled by his treatment at the bank as “it was all so unnecessary and so old- 
fashioned treating a teenager like a kid” (30). Youth is important, however 
fleeting, as Vernon finds out when told “Somehow you missed the teenage rave, 
and you never seem to have had a youth” (35). Even Big Jill, the narrator’s 
neighbour and confidante, “is very wise, in spite c/being not far in her twenties” 
(56, my italics), so despite her merits her difference is observed. Children are 
different, with a misleading charm and a disregard for the maxim of coolness: “I 
mistrust them, and consider they’re a menace, because they’re so damned wilful 
and energetic” (49). Yet teenagers are not without their problems: “turning into 
mindless butterflies all of the same size and colour, that have to flutter round 
exactly the same flowers, on exactly the same gardens” (75). Each teenage type 
has a uniform that announces it: Ed the Ted (46-47), Hoplite the Dandy (57), “the 
Misery Kid and his trad drag” and Dean Swift the Mod (70-71). The narrator 
views these types with detachment, himself about “to move up a category or 
two” from being an ‘absolute beginner’ (188); his sentiments lie with the Mod 
crowd, for their self-control, attention to stylistic detail, and rejection of the Ted 
ethos (“Teds, semi-Teds... you know... local hooligans...”: 155).
The novel espouses a somewhat idealised image of a general and unified 
‘youth culture’, heralding an age of ‘new classlessness’. The narrator makes it 
clear, first to Mickey (25) and again to Vernon (35) that he is interested in neither 
class nor politics. Vernon’s accusation of the narrator as having no social 
conscience prompts a more express disvowal: “I do not reject the working- 
classes, and I do not belong to the upper-classes, for one and the same simple 
reason... I’m just not interested in the whole class crap that seems to needle you” 
(41). This is reminiscent of his slightly older contemporary, Sillitoe’s Arthur 
Seaton, an ‘opposing self interested not in overthrowing the class structure of 
oppression, but only with getting his own back.673 Nevertheless, Maclnnes’s
673 Cf. Sillitoe, Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, 202-203; Taylor, After the War, 113, 116, 
128.
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narrator notes class signiflers, as with the “old Victorian lower-middle tumble- 
downs” in Notting Hill who “live on like shells” when their owners’ descendants 
were relocated to the outer suburbs (51); or with his enumeration of social types 
and age groups remaining in ‘Napoli’ (53, 66). The class and race structure still 
exists in the novel, as its alternatives indicate: in jazz clubs “no one, not a soul, 
cares what your class is, or what your race is, or what your income... as long as 
you dig the scene and can behave yourself, and have left all that crap behind 
you” (69). Like Vian, Maclnnes sees in jazz a basic humanist resistance to 
politics, war, commercial exploitation, and racial and sexual injustice. Social 
redemption depends on well-meaning individuals.674
Consumption serves in Absolute Beginners to doubly define young 
people by their conspicuous consumption and by its contrast with the spending 
habits of their elders: the parent generation is resentful of the young’s affluence, 
opportunities and confidence. The narrator’s father “always comes back again 
to... what a much better time I have than he had in the 1930s” (36); “you’ve 
simply no idea what that pre-war period was like. Poverty, unemployment, 
fascism, and disaster and, worst of all, no chance, no opportunity...it was a 
terrible time for the young” (37); “I should have had my youth in the 1950s, like 
you have” (38). Mother chips in, too, with a look that says “what is this monster 
I’ve created?” (45), exclaiming “You’ve too much spending money, that’s your 
trouble... all you teenagers have... and you’re only minors! With no 
responsibilities to need all that spending money for” (43). Even Vernon, only 
slightly older, thinks teenagers are “dissolute” and “immoral” (41). The narrator, 
too, reflects on “how your elders are always so suspicious when they hear that 
you’ve made money! They just can’t credit that little junior has grown up a bit, 
and turned some honest coin” (174).
Consumption also opened the door to teenage exploitation and, in the 
novel, the celebrated “teenage revolution” is apparent precisely through 
businesses, goods and the commercial transaction (74-75). “It’s been a two-way 
twist, this teenage party,” says Wiz, “Exploitation of the kiddos by the 
conscripts, and exploitation of themselves” (10). The narrator adds that youth is 
the best time of life “before the newspapers and telly got hold of this teenage
674 Sinfield, 169.
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fable and prostituted it” (11). He is astonished at how some teenagers are 
oblivious to their exploitation, like the Kid-from-Outer-Space, who defends 
television, protesting “you got to believe something in this world” (89). The 
narrator acknowledges that television offered “a sort of non-university 
education” through “experts and professors”, but regarding real-life concerns -  
jazz, teenagers, juvenile delinquency -  “the whole dam thing seems utterly 
unreal. Cooked up in a hurry, and made to sound simpler than it is... they’re 
crap” (166). Ultimately, given a chance, teenagers -  like Zesty the English 
rock’n’roller (118) and Seth Samaritan the jazz-pop singer (146) -  exploit each 
other, too.
Maclnnes had maintained elsewhere that despite first appearances, British 
youth culture was not completely taken over by Americanisation: while imported 
American popular culture was increasingly prominent, English popular culture, 
even while copying it, retained some of its own traditional or home-grown 
traits.675 In Absolute Beginners, Zesty’s case sticks out: “though Zesty caught all 
the necessary US overtones to send the juveniles that he performed for, the words 
he thought up were actually about the London teenage kids -  I mean not just ‘Ah 
luv yew, Oh yess Ah du’ that could be about anyone, but numbers like Ugly 
Usherette, and Chickory with my Chick, and Jean, your Jeans!, and Nasty 
Newington Narcissus” (118). For that he wins the narrator’s approval, insisting 
“English kids... be English kids, not West Ken yanks and bogus imitation 
Americans,” although “that doesn’t mean I’m anti the whole US thing” (58). 
What he opposes is the Lonnie Donegan-style of ‘adapted authenticity’ that the 
Marxist ‘ballad-and-blues’ movement espoused, mostly “ancient English, or 
modem American” styles and too little “about us and now” (147). Otherwise, he 
is keen on American ‘spade music’, particularly Mississippi delta jazz, played by 
Czar Tusdie’s orchestra, “one of the great bands of all time, and American, and 
coloured” (188). In dancing, too, it is clear to all, as the ex-Deb enthuses, that 
“They’re the best dancers in the world!” (222).
The narrator acknowledges that “America launched the teenage 
movement, there’s no denying” (59), and sees it as the future. He does, however, 
find the overbearing influence of American culture on British popular culture
675 Gould, 127-128; Maclnnes, “Pop Songs and Teenagers”, 56-57.
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problematic: “we’ve got to produce our own variety, and not imitate the 
Americans... or anybody, for that matter” (59). The playing field does not seem 
level, though, with plentiful “yank mags” (23, 103), and film stars and singing 
sensations that make “the local product” look bad (59). This is due to the half- 
fantastic status, and thus the temptation, of anything American. To the narrator, 
Nebraska, Hoplite’s soldier paramour, looks stereotypical, “a perfectly ordinary 
young US product -  fresh, washed, and double-rinsed as they manufacture them 
in thousands over there” (112); Hoplite, however, even after losing romantic 
interest in Nebraska, would still “love to see the occupation army... tailored 
uniforms, and gorgeous work clothes, like their films of prisons. You’re not 
tempted?” (169).
The tempting, optimistic Americanisation in Absolute Beginners reflects 
the grim, declining State of England: like the trees along the Thames, “all rotting 
away gradually, and old: which, of course, England is” (177). Britain’s position, 
claims the narrator, “is that she hasn’t found her position” (27).676 In fact, he says 
later, “It’s because I’m a patriot, that I can’t bear our country” (59): “how 
horrible this country is, how dreary, how lifeless, how blind and busy over 
trifles!” (49). This is reminiscent of Orwell’s earlier claim that the benign 
patriotism uniting the English had been divorced from intellectual concerns in 
favour of a gentle privacy and individuality of petty life, leaving them a family 
still, but one with the wrong members in control.677 Mannie suggests that “the 
trouble about this country... is the total flight from reality in every sector... the 
price of riches is that you export reality to where it is you get your money from” 
(98). “England,” Mannie adds, “is dreadful, and the English -  they’re barbarians. 
But three things of theirs I cherish most sincerely -  the lovely tongue... and the 
nosey instinct... and their own radicals... and everything else I can forget” (99). 
‘Everything else’ being, one supposes, what Orwell had called “their old- 
fashioned outlook, their graded snobberies, their mixture of bawdiness and 
hypocrisy, their extreme gentleness, their deeply moral attitude to life” -  not
676 The former American Secretary of State Dean Acheson famously made a similar comment 
some time later, suggesting to an audience at West Point on 5 December 1962 that “Britain 
has lost an empire and has not yet found a role”; quoted in Hennessy, 274.
677 Orwell, 195-198,210, 220.
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forgetting the residual barbarism of the English and the traditional hypocrisy and 
thoughtlessness in their treatment of empire.678
The narrator is guided by this social concern, rather than by stereotypical 
teenage disengagement: “all the horrors I see around me, especially the English 
ones, I  feel responsible for... just as much as for the few nice things I dig” (147, 
my italics). Topping these concerns are the race riots and the ‘coloured problem’ 
they throw up, rattling the narrator by the impression of general complicity, “a 
sort of conspiracy in the air to pretend what was happening in Napoli, wasn’t 
happening: or, if it was, it somehow didn’t signify at all” (215). Urban violence 
was normal; the outrage was the cover-up: “so far as the government and top cats 
who control things were concerned, these riots might not have happened at all, or 
have been in some other country” (228). The riots are the point when the narrator 
realises “I don’t understand my own country any more” (198), “I’d fallen right 
out of love with England. And even with London... the whole dam group of 
islands could sink under the sea, and all I wanted was shake my feet off of 
them...” (228). England has been defamiliarised and the narrator disillusioned.
Attempting to emulate metropolitan teen argot, Maclnnes extensively 
employed non-standard English in both dialogue and narration.679 This comes in 
two main forms: the up-to-date Mod, Ted or camp colloquialisms; and the 
intended play with words and metaphors, which only partly succeeds in imbuing 
them with new meanings. With this Maclnnes shows another aspect of his 
Orwellian bent, mocking dying metaphors, pretentious turns of phrase, and
z ro r t
meaningless words criticised by Orwell a decade earlier. Non-standard 
colloquialisms form the fabric of the novel’s realism, reflecting characters’ 
personalities and backgrounds. Misery Kid, a withdrawn ‘trad child’, mainly 
gazes out incuriously, uttering truncated sentences lacking in verbs: “She not 
meant to?” (71), or “This client no deposit?” (72). Amberley the columnist 
speaks with haughty authority: “The leader columns are aimed at the more
678 Quotation from Orwell, 197; see also 195, 199, 201.
679 Another contemporary example of non-standard English in accounts of London life came with 
Nell Dunn’s Up the Junction (1963), where the narrator and her friends convey the fragile 
‘kitchen-sink’ beauty of a changing Battersea.
680 George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” Collected Essays (London: Seeker & 
Warburg, 1961 [1946]), 337-351.
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intelligent portions of the population -  few though they may be,” and to the 
narrator, “I tremble to think, young man, that our country’s future’s in hands like 
yours” (140). The camper characters of Dido and Hoplite have their darling, 
precious way with over-the-top exclamations: “Oh, hul-/o infant prodigy... Are 
you hungering for something?” (Il l);  “Cute! Oh, lordy me!” (112). By contrast, 
Ed the Ted’s English betrays an uneducated Cockney background: “Naher! Me? 
Espel me? Wot? Lissen! Me, R lef them, see? You fink I’m sof, or sumfink?” 
(48).
Both dialogues and narration ring with current slang, perhaps part of “the 
lovely tongue” to which Mannie referred. These are ‘cats’ and their ‘birds’ who 
all have ‘loot’, sitting in ‘dives’ or ‘teenage huts’ named ‘The Dubious’ and 
‘Chez Nobody’ or talking on the ‘blower’, ‘digging’ and ‘wigging’ each other, 
and calling each other ‘kid’, ‘doll’, ‘darl’ and ‘hon’. This clever talk is usually 
self-consciously ironic, fast-paced and irreverent. The narrator, about to be 
presented as a “teenage product,” plans to arrive in “age-group regalia” (110), 
and his “full teenage drag” contrasts with Vernon’s “floppy dung-coloured 
garments” (34). Being “un-sharp” (66) is to be avoided, as is the odd “corny old 
thought” (96) about romance. This prevalent mode of expression is often 
familiarising, bringing its objects down (or up) to eye level. Real young criminals 
like Flikker are “young lost-property toughies” (160), and spend their formative 
years in “delinquent cages” (161). Luckier ‘numbers’, like the narrator and his 
‘blood brother’ the Wiz, simply learned living in “the school of life,” in “Brixton 
class” (85). Vendice the executive is dubbed “the balance-sheet product” (116), 
“the profit-and-loss one” and “the industrial chieftain” (117). His milieu is the 
“boyish”-seeming public school old boys, educated to bully each other as they 
later do with “some colony” (139). They live in safer, richer Kensington, “an 
Olde Englishe product like Changing the Guard, or Saville row suits, or Stilton 
cheese in big brown china jars, or any of those things they advertise in Esquire to 
make the Americans want to visit picturesque Great Britain” (21).
In some instances this broken English simply appropriates language to 
youth culture, also showing a margin of inarticulation in its outspokenness. A 
young yob is thus a “yoblet” (210), young black children are “little Spadelets” 
(66), and several children are “a crocodile of infants” (66). The narrator tells of 
how he “abluted” (191) and “hoofed it down the street” (227), and of his relief at
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being “un-displeased” (210). Dido’s figure-hugging dress is “a white hold-me- 
tight creation” (111). Suzette’s old boyfriend was from “French Gaboon” (15); 
Omar the landlord “simply grins his teeth” (54); Mickey stands by his scooter “as 
if it was an Arab pony” (22); in the time before television one had “steam radio” 
(166); but now, the London skyline shows “clean new concrete cloud-kissers, 
rising up like felixes from the Olde Englishe squares” (10). Yet there is more 
than jollity in one besieged ‘spade” s assertion of his equality, being “one of the 
Queen’s objects the same as any other” (208).
The narrator taps into a wide range of cultural references, highlighting the 
importance of music. Tommy Steele is preferred to Elvis Presley (58), and Billie 
Holiday (27-28, 145) and her producer, Norman Granz (81), are appreciated, 
while Ella Fitzgerald and Duke Ellington are thinly disguised as “Maria 
Bethlehem” and “Czar Tusdie” (188-189). Two tokens/types of celebrity -  
Winston Churchill and Marilyn Monroe -  are mentioned in the same breath 
(165), indicating their parity in both familiarity and remoteness. The expresso 
barista “speaks authentic old-tyme My Fair Lady dialect!” (12), and the 
narrator’s mother reminds him of a Tennessee Williams character (42). These 
allusions are not restricted to popular culture: “The Last Days of Pompeii” 
becomes a new-style Belgravia coffee bar (17); King Canute is conjured up 
during a night swim in the Serpentine (108); Karl Marx is hastily mentioned 
(147); the evangelist Billy Graham is an ironic example of speaking up “so dam 
honest and convincing” (167); and Roger Bannister becomes the paradigm of 
sprinting (182). The irony is clear in the description of ‘respectable’ areas 
adjacent to ‘Napoli’ as Blake’s “England’s green and pleasant land” (219); and in 
the fresh memory of Suez as “that two-day battle with the Pharaohs we’re all 
trying to forget” (93); or indeed in the narrator’s surprise rescue amid the riots, 
concluded with Henry Stanley’s “Dr. Livingstone, I presume” (209).
Along with the use of word play and allusion, simpler metaphors also 
claim language and its images to the teen narrator, and here his disillusionment 
shows. The singer trailed through Soho by screaming fans is thus “the young 
Pied Piper” (75) -  Maclnnes’s journalistic label for Tommy Steele. Another, less 
savoury current trend is the Angry Young Men, who are mainly good for “the 
fish-and-chip wrapper dailies” (21) -  a familiar naturalistic figure suggesting a 
shared greasiness as well as the ephemeral nature of fads (once in the papers,
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they are already yesterday’s news). While returning into London was “like 
coming home” (183), it is also regarded as “that old whore London” (14), raising 
“her bashed head again, like she was ashamed of her modem daughter down by 
the river” (48). ‘Napoli’ after the riots turns in the narrator’s mind from his nest 
to a bulLring (227). The moment of his souring and estrangement is resonant, 
showing the environment turning on its inhabitant and reminiscent of Merleau- 
Ponty’s comment on spatial dismption: “When this happens to you... it’s just 
like... the stones rise up from the pavement there and hit you, and the houses 
tumble, and the sky falls in... everything that you relied on, and all the natural 
things, do what you don’t expect them to. Your sense of security, and of there 
being some plan, some idea behind it all somewhere, just disappears” (205).
The narrator’s sense of estrangement comes from the disruption of his 
environment: this is curious because he derives his notions of normality and ‘the 
natural’ from the artifice comprising a cosmopolitan young man’s life. 
Sometimes this outlook is shaped by popular readings, like when he notes “She 
mutely acquiesced, as the women’s weeklies say” (45), or considers “the kids up 
in the Harrow road those days, who thought a book’s an SF or a Western, if they 
thought it’s anything” (67). Television is similarly irresistible but pernicious: 
some situations one is “unable not to watch, just like the telly” (175). Television 
is paradoxically both misrepresentative of reality and a sign of ‘real’ 
achievement in life, in becoming a ‘television personality’ (78, 169) -  even Ed 
the Ted could do that, “appearing in a telly programme on the Ted question 
where he stared photogenically, and only grunted” (47). However deceptive, 
mass communication remains the frame of reference, and so Hoplite would rather 
look more than exemplary, like an advertisement (127). In the few instances he 
ventures outside of London, to “the country, that great green thing that hangs 
around outside the capital, with animals” (80), the narrator’s notions of reality 
and normality are challenged as he tries to understand things through the 
familiar, seeing the power station “like a super-cinema with funnels stuck on it” 
(45), Boulter’s lock bridge “like in Japanese murder pictures” (177), and 
Cookham village as “a real old village like you see on biscuit boxes” (179).
This birthday leisure voyage up the Thames taps into an existing complex 
relationship the narrator/protagonist has with the city. The narrator sees the city 
as a backdrop for the enactment of fantasy, as what it could be, and “what is
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begun in reality has so often to be completed in fantasy” -  for after all, “This is 
London, man, a capital, a great big city where every kind of race has lived ever 
since the Romans!” (157).681 Here Maclnnes nods toward Conrad’s Heart o f 
Darkness (1902) and the short discussion in its opening pages of Thames settlers 
past, particularly the Romans, and through them of the immoral imperial role of 
exploitation first and civilising second, redeemed only by the idea of 
imperialism.682 Like Conrad’s Africans, Maclnnes’s black population and 
‘darkness’ are viewed from the outside. Effectively the narrator relates to the 
London blacks (West Indians rather than Africans) like the real-life Teds related 
to black (American) music and dance -  by displacement. It is another, exoticist 
fantasy, enacted against the backdrop of London, ‘city of spades’.
Nevertheless, great and plentiful as it is, London has its limitations: “all 
this chat about the sea, and seafaring, and ships sailing out of London, made me 
begin to feel that hell, it really was ridiculous that here was I, nearly nineteen, 
and never yet left the city of my creation” (130). The alternative is charming: “If 
this is the country, why haven’t I shaken hands with it before -  it’s glorious!” 
(172). The traditional, idealised English rural landscape contrasts with the violent 
urban riots, profoundly wrong “because the whole thing was just so 
meaningless,” and erupting with a “whole lot of unexpected force behind it” 
(192), triggering the sensations of crisis: weakness, nausea and fear. “They don’t 
know it, but our city’s getting dangerous!” (212), because its violent potential is 
contained along a class frontier: “Napoli was like a prison, or a concentration 
camp: inside, blue murder, outside, buses and evening papers and hurrying home 
to sausages and mash and tea” (219). These were the ordinary people that “just 
stood by, out of harm’s way... and watched... Quite decent, respectable people 
they seemed” (203), but they gazed into ‘Napoli’ as if into a gladiatorial circus.
681 Richard Wollheim’s review of the novel, quoted in Gould, 142.
682 Joseph Conrad, Heart o f Darkness, ed. and intro, by Robert Hampson (London: Penguin 
Books, 1995), 16-20.
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Summary: Youth in an Old World
This section juxstaposed two fictional versions of postwar youth -  Vian’s 
L ’Ecume des jours (1947) and Maclnnes’s Absolute Beginners (1959). The two 
novels share many preoccupations and concerns: a sense that youth is a process 
of formation and one which has its own distinct culture; the exploration of new 
technologies, opportunities and habits; the reflection of the impact of American 
culture (especially jazz) on postwar Britain and France as alternative to national 
cultures; and the sense of youth’s fragility, which the young characters share, a 
sense that it is over almost as soon as it has begun.
British and French perceptions of postwar youth share two main 
culturally pessimistic narratives.
The first of these narratives concerns anxiety for youth as a national asset, 
and reflects the projected collective hopes of the elder generation in the 
formulation they are us, inspiring speculations about their political and economic 
participation. As every generation carries the high expectations of their elders, 
these tense anticipations were hardly without precedent; yet, because postwar 
youth enjoyed a more liberal upbringing and were less influenced by their elders, 
this anxiety for youth -  ultimately an anxiety for national continuity -  was 
unprecedented in scale. In France, this projection relied on a strong self- 
consciousness of belatedness, apparent in the representation of France as a 
beleaguered country that needed to restore itself to former strength (as Monnet 
put it, ‘modernisation or decadence’). Paradoxically, this relied on a leap into the 
future to find the ‘pre-war rhythm’. Great expectations of postwar youths led to 
some consternation about signs that they were not as promising after all, being 
instead disoriented and criminal, ‘abstentionist’ and consumerist. This might 
explain attempts by Perruchot and Giroud to try to balance their overviews by 
reiterating their confidence in young people, a confidence based on the relative 
conservatism and goodwill of youth. Morin, however, wrote in no uncertain 
terms of the juvenilised mass culture as one of ‘bread and circuses’, hopelessly 
obsessed with youth, beauty and love.
In Britain, the state openly sought to recruit youths as a national resource, 
acknowledging the need for their tempering and development through the
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military (National Sevice), education (the Crowther and Robbins committees) 
and professional training (Newsom). Lady Albemarle’s emollient views 
contrasted with an otherwise hostile public opinion of young people. Youths 
were seen as doubly corrupt: not just menacingly delinquent, as the newspapers 
suggested, but worse, delinquent in relative affluence -  that is, ungrateful and 
refusing to contribute. This was also true of their general conservatism, and their 
narrow political involvement (in the CND) reflected more a disdain for 
conventional politics. It seems that for most of the 1950s, young people could do 
no right, hemmed in as they were by the hopes and pessimism of their elders: 
they disappointed the false hope for a ‘new classlessness ’ and were seen as 
largely culpable for the transformation of traditional English life.
A second major pessimistic narrative casts youth as the face of an alien 
and unpromising modernity, tying the image of youth to images of the new 
postwar age -  this time, they are not us. This narrative encompasses two 
interrelated elements constructing youths as a menacing unknown: the generation 
gap distancing youth from their elders; and the Americanisation of youth as 
reflecting that of wider popular culture. The widening generation gap darkened 
perceptions of postwar youths: they were shaped independently of mainstream 
adult culture, and were largely inscrutable and misunderstood on both sides of 
the Channel, designated as desperate or delinquent, and distanced further by their 
vilification. The seeming impenetrability of youth culture is readily apparent in 
Vian’s and Maclnnes’s novels: both stress the sheltered, largely self-referential, 
strictly young cultural space that excludes adults and sustains its own language, 
customs and a fresh approach to the world. Mclnnes’s frustration is with certain 
positions associated with the older generation and its resistance to changes in the 
hierarchies of class, race and age. Vian has no such direct target, but simply 
expresses frustration at the ephemeral nature of youth, which inevitably yields to 
the adult imperatives of work and seriousness.
Interestingly, both novels stray from the current youth parlance and fresh 
outlooks and employ Decadent gestures that betray their consciousness of 
belatedness; in an old world, the fictional young characters are simultaneously 
precocious and wizened. Absolute Beginners opens with the narrator’s lament 
over fallen ‘teenagers nowadays’ and their cultural consumption, highlighting not 
simply the urge to distinguish age groups in very precise terms, but also a sense
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of accelerated time. A similar awareness pervades L ’Ecume des jours, whose 
Decadent streak encompasses the menacing quality of passing time together with 
sustenance by artifice and its undoing by nature -  an extension of the trope of 
aging as degeneration. In real life, too, French and British youth were wise 
beyond their years and not necessarily optimistic: Giroud and Perruchot noted 
this impression in their surveys, as did the Albemarle Report, which considered 
youth experience with all its challenges and complexities. On both sides of the 
generation gap, pessimistic attitudes were apparent.
The issue of ‘Americanisation’ and its modernised, consumerist character 
inspired excitement at the foreign mixed with trepidation in both Britain and 
France: traditionalists viewed it as cultural imperialism, whereas to many young 
observers it presented an alternative and thus the opportunity of cultural 
liberation. The young protagonists of both Vian and Maclnnes are fascinated 
with American jazz culture, which they exoticise and fetishise, appreciating the 
room it makes for youth culture. If youth cultures had already been regarded as 
problematic for being delinquent and politically abstentionist, the consumerist 
link to American culture also figured them as destructive of national cultures -  
partly, as Maclnnes’s narrator/protagonist noted, because American influence 
was overbearing. The understanding of youths in both Britain and France 
primarily in economic terms, through ‘participation’ (earning and spending) or 
through being ‘teenage consumers’, did little to improve their image. If anything, 
this reductive, quantifying basis offered little room for showing improvement: 
working and earning more would have provoked envy and contempt, and 
spending more would have justified young people’s consumerist image.
The link between youths and ‘Americanisation’ was also problematic for 
highlighting already existent social and political problems. In Britain, not only 
did American influence ‘corrupt’ youths, but it aggravated the ‘racial problem’ 
through young people’s complex adoption of (displaced, sanitised) black 
American popular culture. Even to once hopeful observers like Booker, the 
British ‘vitality fantasy’ of youth was illuminated by extra-British elements. In 
France, as Cesaire claimed, imperialism and American-style modernisation were 
two faces of the same destructive capitalism: this was a sensitive bundle of 
anxieties about displacement (mobility, local and professional identity) and about 
difference (colonial domination, national identity) that inspired, as seen in
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previous chapters, much pessimism. It is relevant to the image of youth because, 
as Barthes understood and Vian demonstrated, fetishised consumerist plenty, 
cleanliness and effortlessness informed Morin’s ‘juvenilised’ culture, animated 
by American tropes. The new face of mass culture was the dark face of youth.
While the narrative of youth as national asset was familiar (if not usually 
so tensely expectant), the narrative of youth as agent of an alien modernity was 
largely unprecedented, and reflected uncertainties and insecurities in the face of 
the sweeping social and economic changes of postwar reconstruction. This 
discourse embodied various values: to view youth as threatening existing ways of 
life was a conservative outlook, which tapped into class- and nation-related 
identity anxieties; the trope of belatedness highlights a certain inferiority 
complex of older generations in old, tired countries (although admittedly this was 
more prevalent in France); finally, the trope of ‘bread and circuses’ used with 
regard to youth implied that while their morals might have been lax, they still 
enjoyed greater wellbeing and opportunities -  the stakes were higher after the 
war, and so were anxieties about them.
The concerns informing cultural pessimism about youth in a modernising 
age link back to themes discussed earlier in this thesis. These include fears for 
the continuity of social structure, evident in the ‘transnational classlessness’ 
myth of youth; fears for national continuity in light of youth’s Americanisation 
and break with traditions; fears for ‘high’ culture itself in the face of a 
‘juvenilised’ popular culture democratised by affluence and consumerism; fears 
for the redefinition (and thus the transformation) of collective identity by 
decolonisation and an Americanised inward colonisation; and fears for the 
redemptive roles of technology and modernisation in general, considering that 
the ambivalent social import of the latter enabled greater affluence and 
reconstruction but also entailed consumerism and cultural shallowness, presented 
certain social strata with new opportunities but also eroded traditional order and 
identities.
The issue of youth, more than social structure and national identity, was 
one in which the French and British experiences were similar. This was because 
the European youth phenomenon as a whole was largely unprecedented: an 
emergent intermediary group between children and adults had a clear economic 
presence but no fixed social status and every intention to distinguish themselves
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from previous generations.683 Yet some divergences between British and French 
experiences must still be acknowledged here. Americanisation was more 
noticeable in France, as American culture was more distant from French culture 
than from British culture (although, as chapter 1 shows, the British-American 
familiarity bred its own contempts). Decolonisation, for reasons already 
discussed, was from the outset more sensitive and more painful in France, and 
this informed the vigour with which France’s cultural ‘inward colonisation’ was 
carried out. The relative prominence of (mainly commercial) British youth 
culture within British popular culture preceded its French parallel, influencing it 
in mainstream, depoliticised, Americanised directions. However, it was in Britain 
that young people caused the gravest outbursts of youth violence, significantly 
not against authority but against other marginalised groups, be they other young 
people (Ted, Mod and Rocker beach fights) or immigrants (the 1958 riots). In the 
face of this fresh-faced phenomenon, the sense of belatedness seemed stronger in 
France, related as it was to the sense that wartime occupation and collaboration 
burdened the postwar period and needed to be left behind; in Britain, where no 
such overhaul seemed necessary, the sense of belatedness was less prominent and 
was tied up with the erosion of old class hierarchies by affluence.
683 Judt, 347.
270
Conclusion: Postwar Cultural Pessimism and Its 
Relevance
The present thesis has its origins in an earlier project which explored the 
meanings of Western identity in contemporary Western European cultures. Two 
dominant impressions emerged from that project: first, that the term ‘the West’ is 
very imprecisely defined and thus can be used extremely flexibly; and secondly, 
that as soon as a notion of the West emerged (as early as the partition of the 
Roman Empire by Diocletian) it was seen as declining. A wide range of 
historical and cultural commentators from Gibbon to Schopenhauer to Spengler 
to Adorno to, more recently, Kermode, Brantlinger, Whissen and Buckley, have 
made the concept of decline central to their discussions of the West and Western 
identities. Discussions of decline take many forms -  with politics, philosophy, 
morality or even the environment as their focus. 1 became particularly interested 
in this ‘declinism’ that focused on culture and which Bennett has usefully dubbed 
‘cultural pessimism’.
The test of any theory lies in its ability to account for particular instances. 
The present thesis left aside the general notion of ‘the West’ to explore and 
compare two specific Western European countries -  Britain and France -  at a 
specific juncture in history -  the era following the end of the Second World War, 
roughly 1944 to 1964. The decision to study France and Britain together and the 
decision to study them during the postwar period are mutually supportive, and 
the merit of cultural pessimism is in providing the context for such an 
undertaking. By juxtaposing and comparing two national cultures, I was able to 
gain perspective on many issues that, from the inside, have been interpreted as 
particular to one or other nation’s history. But if comparison sometimes reveals 
Britain and France to be more similar than is generally realised, it also highlights 
the distinctions between national responses to similar problems and challenges. 
From the perspective of cultural pessimism, affinities between the two national 
cultures were greatest during the period of transition when both experienced an 
international decline that forced them to redefine their collective identities. Other
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nations and other periods might be the subject of future studies along these lines, 
but this period seemed to me a particularly rich source of affinities (and relative 
differences) between the two national cultures. The postwar period is a 
particularly fertile ground for comparative studies of cultural pessimism, as 
attempted here.
In three themed sections, I juxtaposed and compared the French and 
British interventions in three major areas: social status, national identity and 
youth culture. In each one I explored a broad range of material before focusing 
on key representative texts. Some common tendencies emerge from this 
juxtaposition and comparison. The first section revealed a strong sense of 
marginality and entrapment in an obsolete social order that was seen to have 
outlived itself after 1945: this was aggravated by new and demystifying outlooks 
on everyday life, and found its outlet in intellectual as well as popular pessimism 
regarding the prospects of socioeconomic transformation and mobility. The 
second section presented the growing sense that traditional national culture was 
under threat and required a deliberate effort for its conservation as ‘heritage’. 
This challenge was further complicated by what might be called a semiotic crisis, 
seeing the representation of the past, the present, and the link between them, as 
encumbered by the postwar realities of the age of atom and catastrophe. The third 
section shows that despite the different terms used, the effects of British 
affluence and French rattrapage and consumerism on youth (and on popular 
culture) were generally similar. The third section develops some ideas discussed 
earlier, linking pessimism over social change with anxieties for the prospective 
transformation brought about by the rise of youth culture, and linking a fear for 
the continuity of national culture with the widening Americanisation of youth 
culture and of popular culture in general. While the first two sections focus on 
pessimistic sentiments directed at the past and the changing present, the third 
section shows, through the treatment of the youth phenomenon, the projection of 
pessimistic attitudes into the future.
This study relies on the assumption that all cultures are infinitely 
divergent, and that, while their differences can be assumed, a case needs to be 
made for their comparison. The structure of this thesis reflects this by presenting 
in each section British and French contexts in juxtaposition, letting their 
particularities show and then introducing a comparative element in the section
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summaries. Noting cultural differences as well as commonalities enabled me to 
avoid over-simplification. Several salient differences were introduced in the 
introduction and referred to in subsequent sections: the greater initial resonance 
of Americanisation and decolonisation in France, and the greater resistance to 
them; the slower pace of economic and industrial modernisation in Britain; 
greater direct cultural interventionism in France, certainly under de Gaulle; and 
the stronger tendency in Britain to depoliticise dissent and displace it into class 
concerns or isolated issues (like nuclear disarmament). Concerning cultural 
pessimism, national divergences became clear: a more disturbing pessimism 
regarding the nation and national culture was experienced in France and was 
strongly rooted in the need to break with its wartime shame; disillusionment with 
affluence, especially when it informed the vilification of youths, seemed more 
prominent in the British public discourse; and finally, the ‘two cultures’ debate, 
together with the CND initiative, reflects a greater and more public ambivalence 
toward technological progress and modernisation in Britain than in France.
The value of any study of cultural pessimism is in offering a consistent 
interpretation -  a narrative -  of narratives of decline. The narrative suggested in 
this thesis has several aims: to interpret certain representative works of the 
postwar period as manifestations of cultural pessimism (a literary element); to 
contextualise these works in their wider socio-cultural settings (a historical 
element); and to discuss these works and contexts in light of the conceptual 
‘toolkit’ of cultural pessimism assembled from the history, terms, tropes and 
relevance of cultural pessimism in the introduction (a theoretical element). It 
goes without saying that each of these elements could be opened up and 
developed further.684 Other narratives of cultural pessimism could be identified, 
and the corpus of tropes of cultural pessimism could be expanded: I have not, for 
example, developed the figure of Faust, also noted by Spengler, nor that of 
Prometheus.
The chosen approach enabled me to do several things. First, I was able to 
read important but very different French and British literary works not only in 
the context of the period in which they were written and first read, but also in the 
context of what was going on across the Channel. To compare Sillitoe’s view of
684 In this respect, too, I follow Bennett’s lead. Bennett, Cultural Pessimism, 17, 179.
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class and power with Genet’s, to examine what Englishness meant to Wilson 
alongside Duras’s view of Frenchness and to see postwar youth through the eyes 
of both Maclnnes and Vian, provides fresh perspectives on familiar works and 
foregrounds the cultural pessimism that binds them together. Discussions of 
Genet, Duras and Vian usually focus on their particularly French experimental 
nature. Sillitoe, Wilson and Maclnnes, meanwhile, are situated in the context of a 
distinctive British realism. By looking at these works together through the lens of 
cultural pessimism, their unrecognised similarities emerge. The works I consider 
partake in the discourse of cultural pessimism; and, in turn, provide insight into 
its workings as a narrative system. Other works are mentioned throughout this 
thesis as exemplifying postwar British and French literature: Rochefort’s Les 
Petits Enfants du siecle, Dunn’s Up the Junction, Sagan’s Bonjour tristesse and 
Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange, for example. The choices which I eventually 
made were motivated by the thematic richness of the works themselves and the 
opportunity they provided for a discussion of the widest possible range of tropes 
of cultural pessimism.
Secondly, by looking at French and British culture more broadly through 
a comparative lens, I was able to highlight both the differences (for example, in 
attitudes to the loss of empire) and the similarities (for example, in response to 
encroaching Americanisation) between the two countries. As Stefan Collini has 
recently observed, in both France and Britain “the writing of what was once 
confidently called ‘the national story’ has been affected by similar factors,” and 
“both now stand as awkward members of a larger Europe... without a distinctive 
world-historical mission.”685 The social and cultural histories I offer here shed 
some light on how this came about and offer a starting point for further research 
into the historical development of contemporary Europe.
Finally, this historically-based study allowed me to test the value of the 
concept of cultural pessimism as a tool for analysis, which I found rich and 
rewarding. Whether or not Britain and France declined in fact, many of their 
citizens undoubtedly believed that theirs was an age in which the best was over 
and the worst was to come. In this historical context, I unpacked European 
cultural pessimism into some of its constituent tropes but, as noted above, more
685 Collini, “French Contrasts,” 54.
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work is required here. A full compendium of the tropes and imagery of cultural 
pessimism would be a useful tool for future research into the history of decline 
and indeed ‘the West’.686 This thesis demonstrates how cultural pessimism can 
also contribute to relevant literary discussions, despite not being a strictly literary 
concept. Indeed, I would argue that a consideration of the discourse of cultural 
pessimism enriches many different disciplines.
This thesis illustrates on a small scale the centrality of perceptions of 
decline to French and British cultural identities: they share a precarious, 
endangered existence that in itself helps define them against the erosion of their 
traditional or historical foundations. This claim stands independently of Collini’s 
suggestion that declinism corresponds or reacts to actual decline: the truth of 
narratives of cultural decline may be contested, but their existence and validity as 
expressions of personal outlook or mentality are not debatable. It is not, for 
example, the actual precedence of Roman decline which is important to cultural 
pessimism, but the image of declining Rome as a moral, an object lesson. 
Pessimism is an attitude to the world, not a description of it: because of its a 
prioiri assumptions the image it presents is not a depiction of the social state of 
affairs but a projection. As such (recall Genet’s ‘image and reflection’ in 
Comment jouer Le Balcon), the pessimistic outlook is essentially self-referential 
and resistant to disproof, but these qualities also help preserve its intriguing 
rhetorical potency.688
686 Montandon’s collection shows the variety and detail such a compendium can have, but it lacks 
a systematic synthesis, being a conference proceedings volume. Mythes de la Decadence, dir. 
by Alain Montandon (Clermont-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal Maison de la 
Recherche, 2001).
687 Bailey notes the detrimental legacy of philosophy on the understanding of pessimism in its 
refusal of the affective side of pessimistic views: they are either wholly rational or wholly 
unreasonable. Joe Bailey, Pessimism (London: Routledge, 1988), 6, 19, 27. Maasen and 
Weingart suggest at least three theoretical directions for reasoning the ‘unreasonable’ 
tendency of pessimism, through a sociology of knowledge that would examine the suggestive 
function of imagery and metaphor. Sabine Maasen and Peter Weingart, Metaphors and the 
Dynamics o f Knowledge (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 34-37.
688 A small contemporary example is the celebrity of Jade Goody which, once established as 
negative, is seen to contribute to the corruption of moral/cultural standards. The pessimistic 
gaze constructs Jade Goody as both the product and the cause of the decline of British culture.
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One of my motivations in approaching this project, and one which 
animated many occasional conversations about it, was that the immediate 
postwar period set the stage for much of the current western European order. 
Studies of the postwar period play a crucial role in explaining and accounting for 
what followed: not just war’s aftermath, but its legacy and the legacy of postwar 
reconstruction have had long-lasting effects on Europe. More particularly, an 
examination of postwar cultural pessimism helps understand more recent variants 
of cultural pessimism, which, in recent years, have multiplied.689 This suggests 
another trajectory for prospective research, proceeding from the hypothesis that 
the latter half of the twentieth century shows the influence of earlier postwar 
varieties of cultural pessimism.
European manifestations of cultural pessimism also continue to inform 
understandings of European identities. This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome and, while European integration has 
progressed much since 1957, pessimistic narratives continue to plague it. Such 
narratives point out the detached nature of supranational regional politics, and to 
the way the latter reputedly comes at the expense of national particularities and 
local identities, particularly the smaller ones in the union. The problem of the 
Roman barbarians has found a new form in today’s ‘Eastern problems’: the 
problem of incorporating Russia, which alone can dwarf all other union members 
put together and eclipse the European character of the union with its 
predominantly Asian populations; and the problem of integrating Turkey, the 
first officially non-Christian state to be considered for accession, thus 
challenging the supposedly non-religious definitions of European identity relying 
instead on shared traditions and heritage.690 The European discourse on the
689 Cf. Raymond Tallis, Enemies o f Hope: A Critique o f Contemporary Pessimism: Irrationalism, 
Anti-Humanism and Counter-Enlightenment (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1997); 
Nicolas Baverez, La France qui tombe (Paris: Perrin, 2003). For comments on the ‘franco- 
pessimism’ trend and some British comparisons, see: Perry Anderson, “Degringolade,” LRB 
26, 17 (2 September 2004); and Perry Anderson, “Union Sucree,” LRB 26, 18 (23 September 
2004).
690 The Romans and barbarians presently absent from Europe moved across the water to the 
United States, where they feature prominently in discussions of America-as-Empire. Cf. 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
276
Russian and Turkish cases is a prime candidate for discourse analysis with regard 
to cultural pessimistic tropes. Such an analysis might offer insights into the 
discourse of EU expansionism and integration beyond acknowledged political 
and ideological stances.
2000); and most recently: Cullen Murphy, Are We Rome? The Fall o f  an Empire and the Fate 
of America (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007). An interesting historical perspective on the 
influence of the Turkish threat on the formation of secular European identity was offered 
recently in: Nancy Bisaha, Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman 
Turks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
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